

EUROPEAN SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION
TO CLOSER UNION OF THE RHODESIAS
AND NYASALAND, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO THE PERIOD FROM 1945-1953

BY

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PREFACE

This dissertation is a study of the interplay of Imperial, Colonial and Settler politics in support of, and in opposition to the establishment of a united white ruled central Africa. Accordingly, consideration of African involvement arises only as it affected the other groups. This is not in any way to belittle the significance of African activity in the period - activity which has been studied in depth by other authors - it is simply a consequence of the aspect of the problem I have chosen to address. I would like to express my gratitude to the many people who have helped me in the completion of this study. First and foremost I would like to thank my two supervisors, Professor G A Shepperson and Dr Ian Duffield for the advice they have given me and the consideration they have shown at all times.

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SECTION 1

THE DRIVE TOWARDS AMALGAMATION AND THE
BRITISH GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE : 1890 - 1946

CHAPTER 1

The Drive to the North

The inauguration of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1953 was the result of the failure of all the parties involved in the future of these territories to achieve their aims to a greater or lesser extent. It marked the failure of the campaign of the Rhodesian settlers for the amalgamation of the three territories into a unitary state, a campaign conducted for over forty years with fluctuating intensity. It marked the end of one powerful tradition of Imperial policy which had been to use South Africa as the guarantor of British interests in Africa south of the Congo. Federation also marked the defeat of the heretofore successful efforts of the Africans of the northern territories together with their allies, notably the Scottish missionaries in Nyasaland, to prevent any closer association of their territories with what they considered to be the white South. Finally, 1953 marked a defeat for South Africa's desire for expansion northwards. This drive to the north predated the creation of the Union of South Africa and had its roots in the Voortrekker determination to escape British control as well as in the British Imperial determination to see southern Africa as an exclusively British area of interest. The interweaving of the conflict between these two forces is fundamental to the history of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland: the struggle of the white settlers to achieve amalgamation and the opposition to this on the part of the Africans of the two northern territories, and their

white allies, must be seen in this South African context.

From the time of the Great Trek the British authorities in the Cape Colony as well as those in Westminster consistently worked to ensure that the Afrikaner communities created by these Voortrekkers did not threaten British hegemony in southern Africa. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century it appeared to many that some form of union or confederation of the British colonies of the Cape and Natal with the independent Afrikaner states in the north was the only satisfactory solution to this problem. The stumbling block was that the Afrikaners showed no interest in any such movement and were resistant equally to persuasion as to force.

In the early 1880s Cecil Rhodes began to work and scheme for a much bigger prize - a British African territory stretching from the Cape to Lake Tanganyika at least, if not further. The British Government gave his schemes its tacit approval by granting to his British South Africa Company a Charter in 1889. Westminster's aim was not the same as that of Rhodes, they saw his expansionist aims as a means of counteracting the threat posed to their interests by the stubborn independence of the Afrikaner Republics, the Orange Free State and the South African Republic.¹ This had become a threat of much greater significance than heretofore because of the discovery of massive gold deposits on the Witwatersrand which gave the Transvaal power that it had not previously possessed. The threat posed by the newly powerful Transvaal and its attempts to seek foreign support became extremely dangerous at this time because the recently united German Empire had become actively interested in Africa. The President of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger, hoped to form an extended South

African Republic which, with German help, would have access to the sea for its enormous wealth and thus break its dependence on the Cape seaports. This threat to British paramountcy in the area and consequently to British control of the most important sea-route to India and the Far East was one the British Government could not ignore, yet it came at a time when British public opinion was still very unhappy about large government expenditure on foreign adventures. Rhodes and his Chartered Company therefore provided the opportunity to economically protect British interests.

Rhodes' aim was to encircle the two Afrikaner Republics by expanding in two areas. First, he hoped to extend Cape authority over what is now Botswana, to cut the Afrikaner Republics off from the Germans in their new colony of South West Africa and, secondly, to expand the Chartered Company's rule over the lands to the north of the Zambesi as far as Katanga and Lake Tanganyika. In addition Rhodes aimed to gain as much as possible of the territory towards the east coast claimed by Portugal. This latter strand of policy never really got close to implementation, but claims to these territories remained a factor in South African politics well into the twentieth century.

In the north Rhodes had greater success. The Chartered Company, using the control it had gained of certain mining concessions granted by Lobengula of the Amandebele, occupied the lands of Lobengula's Mashona 'vassals' in 1891, then, after a brisk military campaign 'provoked' by the Amandebele, the Company occupied the rest of Zimbabwe in 1893. Company agents were, meanwhile, making

treaties with African chiefs, great and small, from the northern shores of the Zambesi to the shores of Lake Malawi and Lake Tanganyika as well as in Katanga. As a result all of what is now Zambia, Malawi and the Zairean province of Katanga was claimed for the Company.

At this time, Rhodes was the most powerful figure in southern Africa. He controlled great wealth, he headed the Chartered Company with its wide-reaching claims over Africa north of the Limpopo and from 1890 he was Prime Minister of the Cape Colony. He was in a unique position which enabled him to implement the strategy of squeezing the Afrikaner Republics into closer co-operation with Britain through a policy of encirclement. His initiative was essential because the Government in London was gravely handicapped by the antipathy of British public opinion to public expenditure on 'foreign adventures'.² The failure of the attempt to crush the Transvaal military in Colley's campaign of 1881 had forced Britain to find an alternative strategy to maintain her hegemony in the area. This was necessary because it was clear, almost immediately after Colley's failure, that the Transvaal was intent on expansion, both for new land and also to obtain access to the sea. In 1883, the satellite republic of Stellaland was established in Botswana and the Portuguese granted a concession to an American entrepreneur to build a railway from Delagoa Bay into the Transvaal. Germany began a whirlwind campaign of annexation of colonial territories in Africa by carving out a new colony of South-West Africa (Namibia) in 1884, a further threat to British hegemony. The British Government feared a link up

between the Transvaal and the German territories, which fears were greatly exacerbated in January 1885 by the signing of a treaty of friendship between the Transvaal and Germany. When in February of that year, Germany, in a move that was unmistakeably aimed at British interest in Africa, annexed Tanganyika, Gladstone's Liberal administration felt impelled to take action. In March 1885, the British Government created the Protectorate of Bechuanaland, which included the Afrikaner Republic of Stellaland, as a buffer between the Transvaal and German territory. This complemented the action they had taken in the previous November of annexing St Lucia Bay to the colony of Natal which effectively ended any hope the Afrikaner settlements in Zululand had of gaining access to the sea and so opening a way for the Transvaalers.

The action came just in time, for in 1886 it became clear that the massive gold deposits within the territory of the Transvaal had started a rapid and profound change in the economic status of the Republic and of the balance of economic power in southern Africa. A comparatively poor agricultural state was rapidly transformed into the richest territory in southern Africa. It was all the more necessary, therefore, to isolate and, if possible, to neutralise this threat to British hegemony in the area. So in 1887, Zululand was annexed to the Empire and Lobengula of the Amandebele was persuaded, in February 1888, to accept British protection, so making Zimbabwe part of the British sphere of influence. It was then that Cecil Rhodes' ambitions meshed very neatly with the aims of the British Government. The massive territorial claims of the British South Africa Company north of the Limpopo appeared to guarantee these

northern lands to Britain at no cost to the Exchequer and leave the Transvaal effectively hemmed into its existing borders.

Rhodes however began to run into difficulties in the north.

Although completely successful in gaining political control of Zimbabwe, the expected rapid economic development did not take place because the rumoured rich gold deposits were not to be found.

Rhodes' hopes of British Government support for his claims to large areas of what is now Mozambique were frustrated when Westminster, for its own wider diplomatic reasons, sought to conciliate Portugal and so did not support Rhodes. This pattern was repeated when Rhodes came into conflict with King Leopold's Congo Free State over Katanga. Britain chose to gain Leopold's friendship rather than lose it by supporting Rhodes. Even where there was no external power competing with Rhodes for the support of the British Government his plans were not entirely successful. In seeking to have Nyasaland included as part of the Company's territories Rhodes ran into fierce opposition. It was the Scottish missionary lobby and the evangelical Glasgow business men who backed the African Lakes Corporation, together with the Scots missionaries and African Lakes men in the field who constituted the single most active opposition to Rhodes' plans. Their opposition was based on the firm belief that Nyasaland should be held in trust for the benefit of its African inhabitants and that Imperial rule rather than Company rule was essential for the achievement of that aim.

As early as 1882, the Free Church of Scotland and the African Lakes Corporation had begun actively seeking a British Government presence

in Nyasaland to end the slave trade and prevent a Portuguese takeover of at least part of the land.³ The African Lakes Corporation (ALC) presented an alternative form of protection by seeking a Charter to rule Nyasaland from the British Government. When this attempt became known in 1885, it met with very strong opposition from the Church of Scotland and its missionaries at Blantyre. There was never any chance of Westminster granting such a charter but there was considerable tension among the different Scottish interests nonetheless. However these differences did not prevent the Church of Scotland, the Free Church and the African Lakes Corporation from co-operating with various anti-slavery lobbies in Britain in a campaign during 1886 which culminated in a conference in Glasgow calling for Imperial protection for Nyasaland from the threat posed by the Portuguese. This pressure was maintained as the threat to Nyasaland was intensified by the war with Zanzibari slave-traders at Karonga in the north of the country, a situation which became all the more threatening because of the Portuguese confiscation of the ALC steamer on the Zambesi and their closing the river, the lifeline of the Scots in Nyasaland, to international traffic. The Scottish churches and the ALC arranged a meeting in London of all the Scottish members of both Houses of Parliament in the Spring of 1888 to lobby for Imperial intervention in Nyasaland. This followed a number of interviews, granted by Lord Salisbury to the Scottish pressure groups, which had achieved nothing at all.⁴ Salisbury had given them little hope of help because he was still trying to maintain the Portuguese as an ally in his diplomatic struggle

with Germany. Rhodes' intervention, which changed the situation in the Scots' favour even though ironically they would become his bitter opponents before long, coincided with these discussions. The future of Nyasaland was always a minor issue for Salisbury, and for British Government policy in southern Africa. British Government priorities throughout this period remained focussed upon establishing the area, now made up of Zimbabwe and Zambia, as British to exclude any possible Afrikaner expansion northwards. Free navigation of the Zambesi and the exclusion of the Portuguese from Nyasaland were also policy aims, but of a much lower order. However, the discovery, by D J Rankin, of the Chinde mouth of the Zambesi in January 1889, helped the situation enormously because ships could now sail up the Zambesi directly from the sea, which had previously been impossible. This seriously weakened, in international law, Portugal's claims to control traffic on the river. However, by this time it was the actions of Rhodes which were the driving force in the affairs of southern Africa. From July 1890, when he became Prime Minister of the Cape Colony, Cecil Rhodes was able to devote himself completely to his dream of extending British power to the north. Salisbury attempted to use this drive by Rhodes and his Company as guarantors of British interests in central Africa. Both he and Rhodes wanted to limit the independence of the Boer Republic and, if possible, force them into some form of union loyal to Britain. Rhodes paid the bills for the British administration of Nyasaland as part of the price of co-operation from London, even though, out of deference to the Scots, it was technically administered by the British Foreign Office and was not legally part of the

Company area.⁵ Thus the Portuguese and Zanzibari threats were deflected and the agitation in Scotland stilled. This was important to Salisbury because many leading Scottish Conservatives had taken part in this movement including Lord Balfour of Burleigh, who would later become Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland.

The Scots missionaries in Nyasaland, particularly those of the Church of Scotland based at Blantyre under the leadership of Dr D C Scott, were not satisfied. They were not prepared to be saved from the frying pan of Portuguese rule by being thrown into the fire of Company rule. They viewed the dual role of H H Johnston, as both Foreign Office official and Company agent, with extreme disquiet. They strongly suspected that Rhodes still intended to include Nyasaland in the Company area and that this possibility had not been ruled out by London, so they continued to press for firm assurances of continued Imperial control for Nyasaland. They were well aware that Johnston had been willing, in 1890-91, for Nyasaland to become part of the Chartered territory and suspected that he continued to be so inclined. D C Scott and his assistant Alexander Hetherwick were particularly vociferous about the threat of Company rule which they opposed, arguing that a company exists to make profits and this should not be the motivation of a government. They also opposed the Company because they believed that it would bring with it South African ideas of the supremacy of settler interest over those of the indigenous people. What particularly annoyed Johnston was that these ideas of the missionaries were communicated to Africans through the medium of the Blantyre Mission magazine, Life

and Work in British Central Africa.

The Blantyre missionaries stubbornly maintained their vigilant stand against the possibility of a takeover by the British South Africa Company. Their caution was justified because it was not until 1894, with the breakdown in relations between Johnston and Rhodes and the decision by the Government in London to assume responsibility for the cost of the Protectorate when the period of subsidy agreed to by Rhodes came to an end, that direct Imperial rule seemed to be firmly established.

This little conflict was the first stage in a struggle that was to continue up to 1953. In this early period, African participation was minimal; it was primarily a Scottish campaign on their behalf. Although the central issue of the campaign, opposition to any closer association with southern territories and the continuation of Imperial control as a guarantee of the primacy of African interests, never altered, the role of the Nyasa people was to become more and more prominent. The strength of the Scottish missionary lobby led Salisbury to make his decision to exclude Nyasaland from Company rule, provisionally at first in 1891 but definitively in 1894 when the British Government assumed financial responsibility for the territory. This was a striking victory for the Scots since the desire to avoid expense on the part of the Imperial Government had been precisely what had created the opportunity for Rhodes' initiatives. However, Nyasaland was a peripheral issue for Westminster and Rhodes was left firmly in control of Southern and Northern Rhodesia and avoidance of expenditure continued to be a

prime consideration in Britain's policy for her African colonies.

In the last twenty years of the nineteenth century British policy in southern Africa was largely unaffected by changes of government in the United Kingdom. In the Gladstone Ministry of August 1892 - March 1894, however, there were indications of differences emerging in the means, if not the ends, of Imperial policy. Britain's acquiescence in the annexation of Swaziland by the Transvaal under the terms of the Pretoria Convention of November 1893, represented a tentative reconciliation with the Boer Republic. The Colonial Secretary, Lord Ripon, and the rest of the Liberal Administration were still committed to the containment of the Transvaal by denial of any access to the sea unless Kruger and his government agreed to enter a South African commercial union. Lord Ripon and his colleagues were willing to settle for such a link hoping that it would open the way for the Transvaal to be brought into a British dominated political union.

The next year, in September, Britain annexed Pondoland and thus closed the gap between the Cape Colony and Natal. This was still part of their attempt to tempt rather than force the Transvaalers into co-operation.⁶ The granting of self-government to Natal in May of 1893 was another part of this policy of trusting more and more authority to Colonies in the hope that this would ensure to supremacy of British interests in the area and show the Afrikaners that it might be possible to preserve their identity and some autonomy while co-operating with the Empire.

The Imperial Government's traditional attitude to the Boer Republic was firmly re-established with the appointment of Joseph Chamberlain as Secretary of State for the Colonies in Lord Salisbury's Conservative/Liberal Unionist ministry, in June 1895. In the same month Britain annexed Tongaland and Kosi Bay to block the Transvaal's access to the coast. This measure prevented the Transvaal attempting to expand to the eastern seaboard, but the following month, July 1895, it achieved a direct, albeit vulnerable, outlet to the coast with the opening of the Delagoa Bay railway. Although the intentions of Rhodes and the Imperial Government coincided closely over southern Africa and for all that the Chartered Company had close connections with leading conservatives, Rhodes and his company did not share the relative detachment with which the British Government regarded the lack of progress in their agreed strategy to end Boer independence. Whilst southern Africa was, and remained, low down on the list of the British Government's colonial priorities, it was all-important to Rhodes and his associates. Frustration at this lack of progress, coupled with disappointment at the failure of the Rhodesias to produce another Rand, drove Rhodes and the Chartered Company's Administrator of the Rhodesias, L Starr Jameson, to seek desperate remedies. The disaster of Jameson's raid⁷ marked the failure of Rhodes' attempts to destroy Afrikaner independence and forced his resignation from the Cape Colony premiership on the 6 January 1896. Amongst the other consequences of the raid were a crisis in Anglo-German relations⁸ and, more importantly, the Boer Republic's decision to prepare for war.⁹

The lead up to war centered around the control of Delagoa Bay which remained crucial to the continued survival of the Boer Republics. In August 1898, a secret Anglo-German agreement on the future of Portugal's African territories earmarked it for British control. At that time it looked as if a virtually bankrupt Portugal would have to forfeit at least part of her colonial empire to survive. Portugal continued to manage without off-loading her African territories and so deprived Britain of the opportunity of placing an economic stranglehold on the South African Republics. Encirclement and economic pressure having failed, the British Government resorted once more to the military option and on 12 October 1899 the Boer War commenced.

The initial attempt by the Conservatives after Vereeniging¹⁰ to completely subjugate the Boers of the Orange Free State and the Transvaal was checked by the Liberal election victory of January 1906. The main architect of this aborted policy was Alfred Milner,¹¹ but even before the resignation of Balfour, in December 1905, ended Milner's strategy of the Anglicisation of South Africa, through emigration and the suppression of all things Afrikaner, serious doubts had been raised about the feasibility of his policy.

Joseph Chamberlain, who as Colonial Secretary had, in 1899, strongly favoured the military solution to end continued Boer independence, returned from a visit to South Africa in February 1903, convinced of the impracticability of Milner's policy. Chamberlain advocated reconciliation with the Boer as the only sensible way forward and took his policy into opposition on resigning from Balfour's

ministry over Imperial Preference in September 1903. The Liberal Party's policy of appeasement of the Afrikaner, instigated by Lord Elgin and Winston Churchill, from 1906 onwards, met with fierce opposition from the arch-imperialists in the Conservative Party and in south Africa, in particular from L S Jameson as Prime Minister of the Cape Colony from 1904-1908.

The Liberal election victory produced a new policy of conciliation towards those Afrikaners willing to co-operate, and an attempt to create an atmosphere conducive to the creation of a united South Africa guaranteeing British interests, while satisfying the majority of Afrikaners. This Liberal policy was aimed at the Afrikaner people only. Any moves towards an extension of the Cape franchise would have destroyed this incipient British-Afrikaner co-operation. The give-and-take involved in creating this reconciliation resulted in South Africa's population being abandoned to local white rule and the end of sixty years of non-racial development in the Cape. The implementation of the Liberal Government's policy led to the formation of the Union of South Africa in July 1909. It had been the British imperialist elements in the Cape Parliament that had rejected a similar scheme for a South African federation in June 1880. Twenty-nine years later they were forced to accept a less favourable form of union.

Within the rivalry, conflict and compromise between the British Government and Afrikanerdom, the threads of two separate policies are clearly exposed. One policy, associated with Liberal governments, tended towards the safeguarding of Imperial interests by seeking to co-operate with moderate Afrikaner opinion. This

conciliatory policy was most clearly pursued during Campbell-Bannerman's ministry, but, as has already been shown, there were indications of what was to come in Balfour's 1902-1905 administration. Conservative governments, by contrast, constantly sought to minimise Boer influence, by whatever means possible. Both parties, when in office, sought to end Afrikaner independence, with its threat to British dominance in South Africa, but by different means. The Conservative Party attempted to achieve this result by force of arms, whereas the Liberals sought the same solution in the creation of the Union of South Africa. Although more blurred and less clearly divided on party lines, there remained two separate South African policies after the formation of the Union. They were, by and large the continuation of the pre-1909 policies. One favoured the encouragement of a British and moderate Afrikaner establishment which would ensure the loyalty of South Africa to the Empire. In this role South Africa would act as the British Government's proxy and would stand to gain benefits in territory and influence as its reliability was made evident. This policy sought to contain the more extreme independent Afrikaner elements in a position of harmless perpetual minority within the Union. Any gains by extreme Boer opinion were recognised as a threat to this policy, on which the Union of South Africa was established. The alternative policy argued that the Union was inevitably unreliable due to the extent of Afrikaner influence and that the only way to combat it was by establishing an external counterweight, a greater Rhodesia, the loyalty of whose white settler population would not be in doubt.

Most of those who favoured an internal balance to Afrikaner nationalism argued for the inclusion of Southern Rhodesia in the Union to supplement its British population. However, such a move would irrevocably deny the alternative option of creating an external counterweight and so others, who supported the internal balance policy, were reluctant to completely undermine the only alternative strategy by incorporating Southern Rhodesia into the Union.

The policy which was in favour at any one time at Westminster depended on the strength of the Imperial Government's belief that the Government of South Africa was able and willing to support the British Empire and her interests.

One of the features of British policy in southern Africa has been the lack of hesitation in dismissing African interests to the lowest level in the order of Imperial priorities. It would thus appear that factors other than a concern for the welfare of the indigenous people were instrumental in continuing the Imperial status of the High Commission Territories after 1909.

Although the formation of the Union was the culmination of the Liberal Government's policy, doubts remained about the level of co-operation which could be expected from the Afrikaner community. Elgin in 1907 and Crewe in 1908, played safe by retaining the High Commission Territories under direct Imperial control.¹² As targets of many years standing for Afrikaner expansion, the High Commission Territories were seen to be a good lever in encouraging the process of co-operation within the Union. Although the same reservations applied to Southern Rhodesia, it was not included in the Union in 1909 for quite a different reason.

The inclusion of Southern Rhodesia in the proposed Union of South Africa would have solved a number of problems relating to the territory. In the first place the settler population of Southern Rhodesia was strongly British Imperialist in character and would have been a very reassuring addition to the anti-Afrikaner nationalist population. Secondly, the Chartered Company had invested a substantial amount of capital in the territory, for no immediate return, and were keen to dispose of the area, if compensated for their losses and assets in it. Inclusion would also have solved the problem of the Rhodesian settlers themselves. Prior to Union the settlers and their leader, Charles Coghlan, were strongly in favour of joining the proposed Union, as they saw this as a means of acquiring representative government, ridding themselves of their unpopular Company rule, and at the same time removing the threat of being overwhelmed by the Africans. Imperial, Company and colonial interests would all have been served by Southern Rhodesia becoming the fifth province of South Africa. Lord Selbourne convincingly advocated Rhodesia's inclusion in a federation of South Africa.¹³ In his memorandum of 1907, Selbourne argued that a South Africa within and totally loyal to the British Empire would find its urge for northward expansion aided as far north as Lake Tanganyika. Although Afrikaner opinion divided on the issue, with Hofmeyr opposed and Steyn unsure, Botha and Smuts were keen. They saw the incorporation of Rhodesia with its fertile land and small settler population as an ideal solution to their poor white problem. All the interested parties, with the obvious exception of the

Africans, whose views on the matter were of no consequence in Imperial, colonial or Company opinion, were in favour of Rhodesia's inclusion in the proposed union. What prevented it was the cost.

The British Government was not prepared to compensate the Company and its shareholders, though fully agreeing that remuneration would be required in any transfer of authority in Southern Rhodesia.

However, neither the Rhodesian settlers nor the emerging Union of South Africa were in any position to meet the Company price. Not that the South African leadership was unwilling to try, but Botha's offer of 20 million pounds in 1909 was turned down by the Company.¹⁴

This decision stemmed from the fear on the part of influential men within the Company that Rhodesian inclusion in the Union would result in the Boer domination of all southern Africa. Other British South Africa Company directors, among them Drummond Chaplin, were willing to consider Rhodesia's inclusion, but they cautiously insisted on delay. They felt it was safer to wait and see how South African unification would work in practice and " . . . how far the policy of a United Boer South is consistent with Imperial interests . . ." before agreeing to any South African offer to the Chartered Company.¹⁵

The matter was further complicated by the dispute arising from the confusion surrounding what actually belonged to the Company and what did not. This lack of clarity had already frustrated British Government attempts to end Company rule in 1903 and 1907.¹⁶ The British Government was loth to enter into this murky area again.¹⁷ However, it must be noted that that although Rhodesia was not

included in the Union of South Africa in 1909, all concerned were convinced of the inevitability of its eventual incorporation.

British policy was to maintain the status quo until the Union was in a position to meet the Company's price for the end of Company rule.

The only debate concerned how much of Africa the Union could expect. That it would gain at least Southern Rhodesia and the High Commission Territories was not in doubt. The Secretary of State for the colonies in 1913, Viscount Lewis Harcourt, was of the opinion that both the Rhodesias were part of South Africa's heritage, but that South Africa could not expect to incorporate Northern Rhodesia until Southern Rhodesia had joined the Union. Britain's High Commissioner in South Africa, Viscount Herbert Gladstone, disagreed and argued strongly in favour of the river Zambesi marking the northern limit of South African rule.¹⁸ The Colonial Office showed its preference by its refusal to allow the Chartered Company to amalgamate its administrations for Southern and Northern Rhodesia in 1913, on the grounds that Northern Rhodesia, unlike Southern Rhodesia, was part of black Africa. Much as Botha, Smuts and the Union's Government wanted the Rhodesias and High Commission Territories, they wanted Southern Mozambique, and its ports at Beira and Lourenco Marques, even more. In 1910, the Liberal Government's Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Gray, was convinced that the Union of South Africa would be satisfied with nothing less than the incorporation of Delagoa Bay. Gray was sympathetic to the Union's Mozambique ambitions and felt that it would also be in Portugal's interests to

sell her colonies.¹⁹ Harcourt (on this occasion with the support of the Colonial Office) was in favour, in 1911, of partitioning Mozambique between Nyasaland and the Union.²⁰

It was recognised by both Asquith's Government and the South African leaders, Botha and Smuts, that World War I presented a golden opportunity for the Union to fulfil its longstanding eastern ambitions. More importantly, the Liberal Ministers in Asquith's coalition Government supported South Africa's demands for Southern Mozambique.²¹ In 1915, soon after the Union's conquest of German South West Africa, Botha, and more particularly Smuts, were strongly advocating that, on the capture of German Tanganyika, the northern portion be joined to British East Africa, but that the southern portion be exchanged with the Portuguese for Southern Mozambique.²² To further this proposal, Smuts was keen to get South African troops assigned to the east African campaign to hasten the conquest of German East Africa.

South Africa's agitation for gaining Mozambique harbours cannot be seen in isolation from the aims of Southern Rhodesia. After the inflexible imperialist aims of the Chartered Company and its conservative allies had been denied with the formation of the Union, they sought to promote Southern Rhodesia as a bastion opposing Boer expansionism. This goal was pursued by attempting to enlarge Southern Rhodesia and widen any split in Afrikaner unity. Accordingly, Southern Rhodesia competed with the Union in claiming parts of Bechuanaland and Mozambique for itself while British imperialists within South Africa recognised the many advantages to be gained

from co-operating with the moderate wing of Afrikanerdom.²³

In 1916, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, Viscount Sydney Buxton, proposed partitioning Mozambique, south of the Zambesi, between Rhodesia and South Africa. His proposal was an attempt to reach a compromise that would go some way to fulfilling both Southern Rhodesia's and South Africa's territorial ambitions in Mozambique, whilst not closing the option of Rhodesia's incorporation into the Union in the future. In addition to his Mozambique plans Buxton proposed that Bechuanaland should be partitioned between South Africa and Southern Rhodesia, with South Africa incorporating South West Africa, minus the Caprivi strip which would go to Southern Rhodesia and the Company. South Africa would also gain Swaziland and North Western Rhodesia would be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia. As Southern Rhodesian incorporation was still considered by most observers to be inevitable in the end, the Union might accept this compromise as it stood to gain a much greater Rhodesia, on incorporation, yet this very expansion strengthened Southern Rhodesia as a counterweight to South Africa and, as such, might be acceptable to the Company and its British imperialist allies.

Buxton sought to deflect opposition from the Aborigines Protection Society and to still the fears in Nyasaland about incorporation by offering to join North-Eastern Rhodesia with Nyasaland in a new Central African Protectorate.²⁴ This would be administered by the Colonial Office and would definitely not be included in any future proposals for union with South Africa, even though Buxton was not

convinced that Africans in the proposed Protectorate would fare better than in an enlarged Union.²⁵

In both Company and Union Government circles, confidence was high that Portugal would be willing to withdraw to a position north of the Zambesi and east of the Shire. In this matter, however, the scepticism of the Colonial Secretary, Walter Long,²⁶ proved to be more accurate. Although, Botha²⁹ and Smuts²⁸ continued to press for the incorporation of southern Mozambique into the Union, the end of the war saw the status quo maintained in southern Africa with the notable exception of South Africa's gaining German South-West Africa. The high hopes for South African territorial advance as part of the outcome of the war had largely been unfulfilled, but, on the other hand the Company and its supporters had not been able to strengthen Rhodesia as a counterweight to the Union. Yet, on the eve of the war, the hoped-for split in Afrikaner ranks had occurred when Louis Botha dropped James Hertzog, the Minister of Justice, from his cabinet because of the latter's forceful public support for the principle of South Africa first and the Empire second. The division between Afrikaner moderates and the diehard nationalists resulted in a rebellion by the latter group when the moderate leaders took South Africa into the war. General Christiaan de Wet²⁹ led the Boer rebellion in October 1914 and did not finally surrender until June 1915 at Bloemfontein. The vigour with which the South African Government quelled this anti-British rebellion was well received in London. Not only did the Imperial Government believe that Botha and Smuts had proved their loyalty by first taking South Africa into the

war and then so thoroughly defeating the rebellion of their fellow Afrikaners, but they also felt that it would be well nigh impossible, as a consequence of these actions, for Afrikaner unity to be restored. This had the effect of reinforcing the British Government's inclination to use the Union as their envoy in Africa. The gains made by Hertzog's Nationalist Party in the Union's October 1915 elections raised doubts in Conservative circles, but, by contrast, increased the determination of leading Liberals to advance South African interests. The Liberals hoped that this policy would enable Smuts and Botha to show the advantages of their policy of co-operation and strengthen their position and the support for their government, a government which had been forced to rely upon Labour Party support to remain in office since the Nationalist gains in October. The problem was that by the end of the war, the British Government experienced severe difficulties in granting any of South Africa's territorial ambitions.

The British South Africa Company's charter had come up for review in 1914. In seeking to have their charter extended until the next review, in 1924, the Company had sought to play upon the anti-Union bias of the Rhodesian settlers, a bias which had been increased by the very same events which had convinced the British Government of the South African Government's loyalty. Whitehall had been influenced by Botha and Smuts' response to Afrikaner unrest. It was not the response but rather the unrest which produced the strongest reactions amongst Rhodesian settlers and South African imperialists. Thus, although the Rhodesian settlers and their political leaders had been in favour of inclusion in the Union at its outset,³⁰ by 1914

the majority were opposed. The Company was aware that its rule was unpopular amongst Rhodesian settlers, but from 1912 it launched a campaign to persuade its territory's European population that continued Company rule was better than Afrikaner rule. The Company offered to write off Southern Rhodesia's £7 million deficit and to lend money to white settlers to buy land to which the Company claimed ownership. This campaign failed to make Company rule any more popular in the Rhodesias, but it did fuel a growing anti-Union, anti-Afrikaner political climate in Southern Rhodesia.³¹ In this the Company was aided by events in the Union itself. The Johannesburg strike of 1913, the general strike of 1914, the Afrikaner revolt of 1914-15 and the growth of the 'Indian problem', all added weight to the Company's arguments.³²

The core of the aversion of Rhodesian settlers to incorporation, however, was bilingualism and in an attempt to prevent its insidious spread north, the Rhodesian franchise ordinance of 1912 was introduced. This ordinance specifically excluded proficiency in Dutch as a means of passing the literacy test, only English was acceptable. The driving force behind this ordinance was the real fear of large scale 'poor Dutch' emigration into the Rhodesias. By means of the ordinance the mainly British Rhodesian settlers were attempting to lessen the danger of a 'Bywoner' influx, and to limit the political impact of those who did come. Although this measure sparked a fierce reaction in the Union, the British Government felt that to block or dilute it would only arouse even more anti-Afrikaner prejudice and agitation in Southern Rhodesia. The British Government concluded that accepting it would do less damage in South Africa than refusing it would do in Southern Rhodesia. In the general election of 1914 the Southern

Rhodesian electorate firmly rejected any moves towards incorporation with the south and as a result, the Imperial Government allowed the British South Africa Company to carry on virtually as before in Rhodesia.

South Africa's other hopes of territorial gain lay with the High Commission Territories. Botha had pressed hard for the transfer of the three territories, especially Swaziland, between April 1911 and the outbreak of war. Although in these efforts he received qualified assistance from the British High Commissioner in South Africa, Viscount Gladstone, no agreement had been reached before war was declared. Gladstone's successor, Viscount Buxton, managed to persuade Botha to shelve the issue until hostilities ceased. The campaign had only just been revived by Botha, in a letter to Milner of July 1919, before his untimely death produced further delay in the discussions.³³ Although Smuts continued the pressure he was also unsuccessful in achieving any immediate transfer. His biggest defeat and the most serious set-back to South African northward expansion, came in 1924 when the Southern Rhodesian settlers decided to opt for limited representative government, rather than incorporation.

As we have seen, prior to the formation of the Union, political opinion in the United Kingdom and southern Africa was generally in favour of Rhodesia's inclusion in South Africa. Botha and Smuts were most emphatic in their view that Southern Rhodesia was part of South Africa,³⁴ and if well compensated, the Company was prepared to see Rhodesia form South Africa's fifth province. When the Union was formed without Southern Rhodesia and under an Afrikaner-dominated

government, however, the Company worked forcibly for the creation of a greater Rhodesia as an essential counterweight to the Afrikaner South.³⁵ In this they were initially supported by the Conservative Party in the United Kingdom. The Liberals, on the other hand, favoured Rhodesian incorporation in the Union, to help to guarantee South Africa's loyalty, as soon as Botha and Smuts could meet the cost, both financial and political.³⁶ A combination of these factors led to the renewal of the British South Africa Company's charter for ten years in 1914. However, for a number of reasons, a much more bi-partisan position appeared to be emerging by the end of the Great War. The most important factor in this was that from May 1915 the Conservative Party was part of a coalition government, a government which worked closely with its Dominions to further its war effort. These twin constraints, plus the favourable impression made by Smuts in Lloyd George's war cabinet from March 1917 onwards, resulted in the Conservative Party temporarily abandoning its opposition to South African incorporation of Rhodesia.

In July 1918 the Privy Council awarded the British South Africa Company the right to claim compensation from the British Government for its Rhodesian deficit on the termination of its charter, but ruled that most of the land claimed by the Company actually belonged to the Crown. These two findings had the effect of greatly weakening the Chartered Company's desire to continue to administer the Rhodesias. Indeed, the sooner it could shed the responsibility and financial loss of governing Rhodesia and receive adequate compensation the better. The Company would then be able to carry on running its mining and commercial interests in the territory, without the drain of

administering it. The Company was also far less concerned about establishing a greater Rhodesia as a counterweight to the Union.³⁷

This resulted partly from the Privy Council's ruling, partly from the frustration of having their attempts at creating a greater Rhodesia continuously blocked by London, but mainly from the loss of its major support in Conservative Party circles during the Lloyd George/Bonar Law Coalition government.

On a number of occasions between the formation of the Union and the end of the Great War, the Chartered Company had been thwarted in its attempts to form a viable external British counterweight to South Africa by the British Government. In 1911, Harcourt blocked Company attempts to gain control of Mozambique's ports,³⁸ in 1913, the Colonial Office refused the Company permission to amalgamate the two Rhodesias³⁹ and throughout 1915, prevaricated in the face of constant and open pressure from the British South Africa Company for the amalgamation of the Rhodesias. It must be remembered that the Company and its supporters in political circles, both in Britain and South Africa, were primarily concerned with the threat of an Afrikaner-dominated Union and sought the amalgamation of the Rhodesias simply because this would strengthen their use of Rhodes' counterbalance policy to negate Afrikaner influence and halt its expansion.

In 1917, the Company made a concerted effort to achieve amalgamation and succeeded in having a pro-amalgamation motion passed in the Southern Rhodesian Legislature, overcoming the opposition of a majority of the Legislature's elected members. In addition, the Company was strongly urging the Colonial Office to use the newly-

acquired colony of Tanganyika to help build a greater Rhodesia to act as a counterweight to the Union.⁴⁰ Chaplin and the company were bitterly disappointed when the Secretary of State, Walter Long, turned down the proposal as they had been convinced that he could be relied upon to support their cause.⁴¹ The refusal of first Long and then Milner to pursue the creation of a greater Rhodesia to balance the Union, undermined the Company's determination to oppose South African incorporation. Moreover, once the British South Africa Company began to see its future purely as a commercial enterprise, no longer concerned with the administration of territories, Rhodesian incorporation by South Africa became far more appealing. Milner was closely linked with, and favourable to, the Chartered Company and had previously worked for large scale European settlement in Rhodesia to strengthen its position as a counterbalance to South Africa. By the time he became Secretary of State for the Colonies, in 1919, however, he was convinced that this policy was unrealistic and felt that Southern Rhodesia should "definitely" and North-Western Rhodesia "probably" join the Union. Southern Rhodesian settler aspirations for more representative government were dismissed by Milner as "impossible and absurd", but he realised that if these settlers rejected incorporation, some sort of holding option would be required until Southern Rhodesia's inevitable, eventual entry into South Africa was effected.⁴² The main advantage Milner foresaw in Rhodesian incorporation was that it would strengthen political support for the non-republican element in the Union. Milner had, in fact, been converted to the traditional Liberal Party position

of supporting the internal balance, as opposed to external counter-balance. In addition to this, Milner hoped that once Southern Rhodesia was part of South Africa it would be able to attract settlers in larger numbers and more rapidly than it had as a Chartered Company territory. By encouraging 'loyalist' immigrants to settle in Southern Rhodesia, Milner hoped to make South Africa safe, and remove, once and for all fears of an Afrikaner Nationalist dominated South Africa.

In the immediate post war years Colonial Office resources were over extended. Faced with the new mandated territories to administer, with depleted resources due to Britain's precarious financial position and an enormous war debt, the Colonial Office favoured delegating some of its African responsibilities to the South African Dominion, if this was politically feasible. It should be pointed out that Africa remained low on the Colonial Office's priorities and in the interests of its personnel, especially since the threat of a German-controlled belt of territories stretching across Africa had now been removed.

Pre-occupied with anti-Empire agitation in India, Ireland and Egypt, Milner, and after him Churchill, would gladly have handed over responsibility for Rhodesia, and possibly more of Africa south of the Sahara, to South Africa, if the Union had been in a position to accept the task and if the Rhodesian settlers could have been persuaded to agree to it. Milner was convinced that any attempt by the British Government to force, or even to seem to be pressing Rhodesia into the Union, would fatally undermine his chances of eventually accomplishing his new policy of the internal counterbalance. Milner's

view was strongly reinforced by Buxton.⁴³ Smuts had served with distinction in the war cabinet and had proved his worth on domestic, as well as Imperial matters.⁴⁴ More importantly, he was trusted in government circles, and was also very popular with the British public. Given these circumstances, delegating British Imperial responsibilities in southern Africa to Smuts would have given rise to very little political opposition or public outcry. Milner was, therefore, hopeful of Rhodesia's incorporation in 1919, if the Union Government would only press its case, and offer the British South Africa Company reasonable compensation. As the Company had, since November 1918, been pressing the British Government to place a figure on the compensation it was due, incorporation would have had the added advantage of relieving the Imperial Government of this financial burden. However, the Union was unable to co-operate with the British Government to the extent required to fulfil Milner's aspirations.

Before his death on 29th August 1919, Botha had been less inclined to make an early push for Rhodesian incorporation because of the priority he was giving to the introduction of settlers to South West Africa, to speed its assimilation into the Union. Smuts, on succeeding Botha to the premiership, placed Rhodesian incorporation amongst his top priorities. He saw Rhodesian incorporation as the first step towards building economic and political ties binding white Africa together as far north as Kenya. A vital consequence of this process would have been to enable Smuts to place Mozambique under severe pressure, with the aim of eventually gaining for South Africa the long sought after harbours and rail links of the Portuguese Colony.

Smuts' aspirations were taken seriously in Africa and by African observers,⁴⁵ but they came to nought. Lacking Botha's widespread popularity in the Union, Smuts found it impossible to compromise to an extent that would make his proposals acceptable to the Rhodesian settlers. Bilingualism proved a particularly difficult stumbling block, as Afrikaners in the Union would not countenance incorporation without it and most Rhodesians strongly opposed its introduction into their territory. In seeking to widen his room for manoeuvre, on this and other issues, Smuts sought to strengthen his position and the middle ground in South African politics. His South African Party extended overtures to the Unionists about a possible amalgamation. At the same time Smuts sought to counter the claims of the Afrikaner nationalists that his government was closer to being an Imperial lackey than the ruler of an independent territory.

Milner's policy was to delay and block Rhodesian settler aspirations for representative government, while trying not to offend them and hoping that Smuts' efforts to strengthen the moderate opinion in South Africa would meet with success and strengthen his position sufficiently to make feasible a South African offer for Rhodesia's incorporation. In the meantime, the influx of new settlers to Southern Rhodesia would, hopefully, help to dull the extent of anti-Union feeling in the territory. This policy was dealt a severe blow with the significant gains by Hertzog's Nationalist party in the March 1920 elections in South Africa. The overwhelmingly anti-Union and pro-representative government vote that was amassed in the Southern Rhodesian elections of April that year, partly in response

to the South African situation, further lessened Smuts' chances of gaining the Rhodesias. Milner had already made it quite clear to Smuts that " . . . as long as there is any fear . . . of the Nationalist party getting the upper hand in the Union - it would be out of the question to think of getting Rhodesia into it."⁴⁶

Thus because of internal problems in the Union and the opposition of Rhodesia's settlers, South Africa lost the opportunity to gain the Rhodesias and take on the *Imperial mantle* of the British Government in Africa, south of the Sahara.

Milner's policy (of trying to keep the Rhodesian settlers manageable, while promising nothing and prevaricating until Smuts was in a position to push strongly for incorporation, whereupon the British Government would support his initiative) was first undermined, and then abandoned by his successors. Prince Arthur of Connaught⁴⁷ undermined Milner's policy by advising Churchill⁴⁸ that Milner seemed to have conceded the principle of representative government to the Rhodesian settlers.⁴⁹

Milner's policy was then abandoned when Churchill, largely through lack of interest and by delegating responsibility for the area, allowed Lambert, Amery and Buxton to speed towards representative government for Southern Rhodesia. After a lull during the Milner years, the external counterweight theory was very much back in fashion.

Given that Milner had been gravely concerned by the gains by the Afrikaner nationalists in 1920, it comes as no surprise that those less committed to the internal counterweight were even more profoundly affected. Lambert had never shared Milner's rejection of representative government for Southern Rhodesia⁵⁰ and the South

African election results of 1920 strengthened his resolve in that direction. Lambert's purpose for southern Africa was aided by L S Amery remaining at the Colonial Office after Milner's retirement and by the new Secretary of State's lack of knowledge or interest in the area. The timing of Milner's departure was particularly cruel for Smuts' and South Africa's expansionist aspirations. In the very month that Churchill took over as Secretary of State for the Colonies, Smuts and his South Africa Party achieved the electoral success for which he and Milner had been waiting. Under Milner's strategy for South Africa, Smuts' general election victory of February 1921 would have committed the British Government to the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia into the Union. Milner had, after all, been operating a holding exercise until such a time as a consensus could be achieved in South Africa behind Smuts' moderate, loyalist position. The February result appeared to show that Smuts' consensus had been gained. The British South Africa Company, as well as Smuts, were now convinced that both Rhodesias should be incorporated promptly.⁵¹ The Afrikaner threat had receded and Rhodesia's incorporation would confirm that trend.⁵² Lambert and Amery had other ideas. On their advice, and in the same month that he took office, Churchill appointed Sydney Buxton to head a departmental committee to investigate when and with what reservations, representative government could be granted to Southern Rhodesia: incorporation by South Africa was not even considered. Buxton's committee which reported on 14 May 1921, less than two months after its formation, was composed of Lambert and four others.⁵³

During his time as High Commissioner in South Africa, Buxton had moved away from favouring incorporation to a position sympathetic to Rhodesian representative government. Amery thought that there should have been no enquiry and Southern Rhodesia should be granted representative government at the start of 1923 without recourse to any further electoral endorsement.⁵⁴ Moreover, Amery was, in 1921, strongly pushing Buxton's proposals of 1916, for the amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia with North Western Rhodesia. However, even he did not finally rule out the option of this combined territory entering the Union, if, at some future date, the Union's loyalty to Britain could be assured.⁵⁵ It was hardly surprising, therefore, that Buxton's committee advocated representative government for Southern Rhodesia after a referendum, on a constitution to be agreed with its settler leaders. Churchill endorsed the report and in doing so, irreparably reversed Milner's South African policy. Churchill implemented this reversal through inattention and the delegation of policy to Amery, coupled with a glaring ignorance about the size of the settler population in Southern Rhodesia and the cost to the British Government of representative government.⁵⁶ Too late did Smuts and the Chartered Company forcibly appraise him of the reality of the situation. It made little difference that by September of 1921 Churchill was convinced that he had introduced the wrong policy.⁵⁷ The referendum had been irrevocably agreed and, try as he might, Churchill could not persuade Coghlan and his colleagues to consider negotiating with Smuts.

In December, in London, Churchill exerted considerable pressure on Coghlan to look favourably on incorporation.⁵⁸ Coghlan, however, would not be cowed,⁵⁹ even when Churchill urged on by the Company and Smuts, threatened that the British Government would not pay the Company the compensation award, leaving the newly-formed Southern Rhodesian administration responsible for it and, as a result, virtually bankrupt. In these negotiations Churchill's position was undermined and Coghlan bolstered by two Colonial Office officials, namely Lambert and Sir James Masterton-Smith,⁶⁰ Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office, who shared Lambert's fears of a large influx of poor Afrikaners into Southern Rhodesia after incorporation.⁶¹ Lambert also gave Coghlan moral and practical support during these discussions.⁶² The sole consolation Churchill was able to offer Smuts, was that specific proposals for incorporation would be presented to the Southern Rhodesian electorate and offered as an alternative to the representative government constitution at the referendum.

Smuts published his revised terms for incorporation in July 1922 and toured the Southern Rhodesia for three weeks in August, campaigning in all but name, for his proposals. These were very reasonable, containing substantial financial inducements, guaranteeing a *specific amount of development*, promising Rhodesian control of, and full government support for, European settlement in the territory and offering very generous electoral representation of ten members in the Union Parliament. Smuts had been as generous as he could, without severely undermining his position inside South Africa. Hertzog's nationalists

were fiercely opposing Rhodesian incorporation and constantly accusing Smuts of surrendering the Union to the 'Kaffir' north. The proposals inevitably included the extension of bilingualism to South Africa's proposed fifth province, but even if this clause could have been omitted, it is unlikely that Southern Rhodesia would have voted for incorporation. Anti-Afrikaner prejudice and the 'little Englander' mentality were too widespread and Coghlan too popular. Nevertheless, the result might well have been a lot closer if Churchill had followed Milner's intentions and left the decision to a general election at the end of the following year. The collection of groupings and individuals opposing incorporation, under Coghlan's leadership, probably would have encountered far more internal tensions and difficulties on deciding on an election manifesto than on a single issue referendum. A delay of a year might also have allowed Smuts and the Company more time to instil some passion into the well-financed, but poorly organised and staid, pro-incorporation campaign in Southern Rhodesia.⁶³

South Africa's opportunity of incorporating Rhodesia in the foreseeable future, appeared to have gone with the heavily pro-representative government vote on 6 November 1922.⁶⁴ Although it was understood that Southern Rhodesia could still enter the Union at a later date,⁶⁵ it was widely recognised that this was highly unlikely, unless circumstances altered dramatically. Smuts, however, decided to press on and attempt to achieve incorporation by other means. The crucial issue of finance remained and Smuts sought to exploit it. If the British Government could be persuaded to refuse to pay the

Cave Commission⁶⁶ recommended compensation to the Company, but instead could place responsibility for that on the emergent Southern Rhodesian administration, the new territory would be virtually bankrupt from its inception. Having urged the Union Association in Rhodesia not to disband but to continue campaigning for incorporation, Smuts set about gaining the co-operation of the Company and British Government in his new strategy to induce Southern Rhodesia's incorporation.⁶⁷ Smuts was confident that Coghlan and his associates could be persuaded to face economic realities and bring Southern Rhodesia into the Union, despite the referendum result. He was, moreover, endeavouring to obtain Northern Rhodesia as well, with the Company retaining its land and mineral rights but receiving no compensation at all.⁶⁸

Smuts' plan amounted to little more than the financial and economic blackmailing of Southern Rhodesia to force it into the Union, while hoping that Coghlan would concede to his demands and thus avoid the need to carry out the unpleasant process. To succeed, however, Smuts required the co-operation of the Company and the British Government. The British South Africa Company had opposed representative government and worked for the incorporation of Rhodesia because their wider, financial interests would be better served by an expanded and loyal South Africa, given that they were to be compensated in the terms of the Cave Commission for the loss of Southern Rhodesia. Churchill's acceptance of the Buxton Committee's report produced an angry response from the Company, but its leaders were also highly critical of Smuts for failing to make a concrete offer for Southern

Rhodesia before Milner's departure.⁶⁹ Although in favour of incorporation, the Company was not prepared to co-operate with Smuts in making representative government unworkable, as any resulting economic collapse in Southern Rhodesia would seriously affect its financial interests there. On the contrary, the Company would actively oppose such a policy and strive to promote financial confidence in the new territory, to protect its investments and other financial concerns. In this it would receive the support of the British Government.

Not only did the close links between the Chartered Company and the Conservative Party establishment make any other outcome unlikely, there were also political considerations. Support for Smuts would have left the Bonar Law administration open to criticism from both left and right. From within their own party they would have been accused of failing British interests and a British community in Africa while the question of African interests would have been raised from amongst the Liberal and Labour ranks.

Although prevented in this instance from achieving northward expansion for South Africa, Smuts remained committed to the goal of a South African Dominion stretching to Kenya.⁷⁰ He pursued this aim in both government and opposition until his death in 1951. South Africa's efforts to extend its borders to the North varied in intensity and priority but it continued to be a constant theme of the Union Government whether Smuts or Hertzog was Prime Minister. For all their scaremongering about the 'black north' when in opposition, the Nationalist Party under Hertzog, when in government,

proved to be as determined as Smuts and his followers to gain at least the High Commission Territories and Southern Rhodesia.⁷¹

The expansionist aims of South African governments, whichever party was in power, remained a central concern for the British Government's policy north of the Zambesi. The fear of the spread of Afrikaner nationalism constituted a constant threat to the British aim for hegemony over all of southern Africa, indeed it affected British policy towards Africa as far north as Kenya. All the developments which led to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland must be considered against this background. British policy in what came to be known as central Africa was formed always in terms of the British Government's policy towards the Union of South Africa. Whitehall always perceived the pressures for and against amalgamation or federation of the territories north of the Limpopo as a problem concerning the northern half of its South African policy.

CHAPTER 2

To Amalgamate or Not?

Southern Rhodesia's rejection of incorporation by South Africa ensured that it was the question of whether or not the central African territories should amalgamate which dominated imperial and colonial consideration of the region over the next quarter of a century. Between 1922 and 1946 South Africa's opposition to the amalgamation of the Rhodesias remained constant, but the views of the other participants in central African politics varied according to changing circumstances. This Chapter considers the ebb and flow of support for amalgamation by Britain, Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia and the reasons for their changes of opinion.

In 1923 amalgamation was unpopular in both the Rhodesias. The settlers of Southern Rhodesia opposed any closer links with a territory comprised of such a small European, and large African, populations. The European community of Northern Rhodesia opposed union because they believed that their separate identity and interests would be completely submerged by the far larger Southern Rhodesian white population. The settler community of Northern Rhodesia was strengthened in this resolve by the belief that its territory was economically sound and poised for rapid development.¹ The discovery near Ndola in 1925 of sulphide deposits containing commercially viable amounts of copper further strengthened anti-amalgamation opinion in Northern Rhodesia.

Neither the discovery of mineable copper in Northern Rhodesia, nor Hertzog's election victory in South Africa, in June 1924, noticeably

dampened support in Southern Rhodesia for Coghlan's policy of opposing amalgamation with the 'black North'. Although the victory of Hertzog's Nationalists made the possibility of incorporation into the Union even more unpopular in Southern Rhodesia than it had been in 1922, the dread of being swamped by a massively increased African population remained a more potent fear; especially in the light of the Devonshire Declaration of 1923.²

Although specifically concerning Kenya, Devonshire's command paper applied, by implication, to other British colonies in Africa and advocated that ". . . the interests of the African natives must be paramount, and that if and when these interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail."³

The Secretary of State's ruling made very little difference to colonial policy in practice. The Colonial Governors, who in theory implemented colonial policy but in practice, to a very large extent, formed it as well for their particular colony, on the whole paid no more than lip service to it. The governors were well aware that the Imperial Government was in no position to force unpopular policies of African trusteeship onto settler communities and continued to administer their territories in much the same way after the Devonshire Declaration as they had before it. Moreover, L S Amery, on his return to the Colonial Office in October 1924, this time as Secretary of State, sought to negate the Devonshire Declaration.

Until the Conservative Government's departure, in May 1929, Amery, as Secretary of State at both the Colonial and Dominion Offices, pursued a strategy designed to make co-operation with, and delegation of power

and responsibility for trusteeship to, the European settler communities in Africa, the main plank of Imperial policy.⁴ Amery adopted this policy of colonial devolution on the basis that it provided a moderate middle path between the uncompromising policy of indefinite white rule propagated in South Africa, and the economic and political stagnation of Imperial rule through the Colonial Office. The native policy of South Africa, Amery argued, was incompatible with the British Government's policy of trusteeship, whereas colonial, as opposed to Imperial, rule was not only compatible with trusteeship but would also benefit the African with both economic development and an envisaged century of British civilisation.

It could be argued that, for the African, the difference between permanent white rule, as pursued by South Africa, and a century of settler domination, as advocated by Amery, was minimal. Concern for the future of the African, however, was not one of Amery's priorities. His motivation in seeking to undermine the Colonial Office's policy of paramountcy of African interests, especially in Northern Rhodesia and Kenya, was the fear of the spread of an Afrikaner controlled South Africa, a fear which was shared by many figures in government circles, the Colonial Office and the Colonial Service. Both Amery and Stanley were convinced that to neutralise the excesses of Hertzog's South Africa, sound British traditions and standards had to be firmly embedded through British settler rule from the Rhodesias to Kenya. They also feared that lack of concessions to settler demands for devolution of power would result in South Africa eventually

extending its borders to incorporate Kenya.⁶ To strengthen British settler rule north of South Africa, Amery sought to build a large federation in east and central Africa. In pursuing this policy he was concurring with advice from Smuts, which he had received on a regular basis since Smuts' loss of office.⁷

The strength of Southern Rhodesian opposition, led by the Prime Minister, Coghlan, to any moves towards closer links with the North, initially precluded a central African Federation. In an attempt to surmount this problem the Ormsby-Gore Parliamentary Commission was established, in 1924. It investigated whether or not the other British territories of central and east Africa could be amalgamated or federated.⁸ Although the Commission reported that any moves towards union should not be considered for many years,⁹ Amery remained committed to the idea of these territories playing their part in creating an external counterweight to South Africa. To further this end he appointed Sir Edward Grigg as Governor of Kenya in 1926, intending, with Grigg's help, to create an east African federation.¹⁰ Amery and Grigg failed in their efforts for the same reason that made so many Colonial Office initiatives ineffectual, namely, the relative ease with which colonial governors could delay, negate or ignore Imperial Government instructions which they found unworkable or unpalatable.¹¹

In this instance it was the Governor of Tanganyika, Sir Donald Cameron, who provided the successful opposition. He was less successful, however, in preventing Amery from introducing, as official Colonial Office policy in east Africa,¹² the devolution of power to settler

communities although he could, and did, prevent its implementation in Tanganyika whilst he remained governor. The twin roles of trusteeship and steady devolution of administrative responsibility to the settler communities, balanced very uneasily within Colonial Office policy. It is worth noting here that the possibility of African independence was not even being considered. It was Imperial, settler and South African, interests which concerned the policy makers. Nevertheless, it was the intransigent position of the Kenyan settlers in refusing to concede the possibility of African rule on even the Amery time scale, that was the decisive factor in forming Cameron's policy of opposition to any east African federation.¹³

Amery's initial attempts to create a large British settler controlled territory in east and/or central Africa, to act as a counterweight to South Africa, were unsuccessful. This external counterweight policy of Amery's was baulked in the first place by the findings of the Ormsby-Gore Commission. Secondly, and more importantly, it was hindered by settler opposition to amalgamation in both Rhodesias, by Cameron's opposition to east African federation in Tanganyika, and by Kenyan settler opposition to any closer association with Uganda which was considered to be a 'native colony'. Although there was some support for an east and central African federation in the twenties, its supporters favoured federation only as a means of gaining representative government. The failure, in 1925, 1926 and 1927, of Lord Delamere's sponsored, unofficial conferences on the issue to reach any clear conclusions was due to this very factor.¹⁴ None of the delegates were in favour of federation for its own sake

but only as a method of gaining power in their own territories and their own territory's interests and fears remained paramount.

Despite his efforts to build a northern counterbalance to South Africa, Amery still had not completely dismissed the alternative option of the Union proving its loyalty to the United Kingdom and, as a result, eventually gaining the remainder of British 'White Africa'.¹⁵ Indeed, on his return from South Africa in 1927 Amery was quite confident that economic development and increased trade with Britain would result in the Union co-operating more with British imperial interests and moderating its internal policy and thus it would become more acceptable to the British Government.

"The work of the Empire Marketing Board had already attracted widespread attention and exercised a very considerable political influence. It is no exaggeration to say that an extension of preference which would include fresh and preserved fruit, dairy produce, meat and maize would transform the whole political as well as the economic life of South Africa, and make it definitely one of the strongest instead of one of the weaker links in the Imperial chain."¹⁶

If these changes did not materialise, however, Amery was determined to use Southern Rhodesia as the foundation for " . . . an independent central South African Dominion to check and counterbalance the parochial South African Union."¹⁷

Britain's failure to formally commit herself to the external counterweight solution to the South African problem was the result of the difficulties she experienced, in the twenties, in trying to create this counterbalance and to the disappointment of her hopes that Hertzog's ministry would moderate its policies. Britain's refusal

to transfer any of the High Commission Territories to South Africa, despite Hertzog's strong pressure on this issue between 1924 and 1927,¹⁸ illustrates the Union's failure to move in the direction which Whitehall wanted.

Amery's intention for the High Commission territories was to strengthen the numbers and status of their British settlers, and then to have them gradually transferred into the Union, beginning with Swaziland. The rate of transfer would depend upon the extent of Hertzog's co-operation with the British. The transfer of each territory would also in some small measure increase the British loyalist elements in the South African electorate.¹⁹ Amery envisaged the process extending over a great number of years. If South Africa proved dependable enough to gain the final High Commission territory of Bechuanaland then the process would have succeeded; if it did not Bechuanaland would be retained to comprise part of the external counterweight. It was to investigate the possibility of forming such a counterweight, that the Hilton Young Commission was appointed in November 1927.²⁰ Its findings, published in October 1928, further dented Amery's prospects of succeeding with his African strategy. The Commission ruled out any possibility of Kenya achieving representative government²¹ and strongly advocated the retention of Imperial control throughout central and eastern Africa.²² This conclusion was the exact opposite of what Amery was trying to establish as accepted Colonial Office policy and it was small consolation for him that the Commission advocated "the creation of a central organ of government" for the three east African territories.²³

The Commissioners could not agree on recommendations for central Africa. In a minority report, the Chairman, Sir E Hilton Young, advocated the formation of a greater Rhodesia, by uniting the north-west of Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia, and creating a greater Nyasaland which would be extended to include North Eastern Rhodesia. The greater Northern Rhodesia would continue to have representative government and the greater Nyasaland would become a Crown Colony. Closer co-operation in the area would be established by the formation of a central executive authority "which may and probably will develop into a central legislature for a strictly limited number of 'transferred' subjects - such as defence, research, customs and communications".²⁴ Hilton Young, however, was opposed to Nyasaland and North Eastern Rhodesia being wholly united with a greater Rhodesia for the "foreseeable future", as their climate and conditions prevented them from being "white man's country".²⁵ Unfortunately for Amery, his appointee as chairman could not even achieve a majority in favour of this position within the commission, let alone the optimum position of unanimous support. The majority report on central Africa advocated maintaining the status quo for the present. It argued that "the institution of a central authority ... would be premature" because there were too many uncertainties, the most important being whether or not north of the Zambesi was to be considered "white man's territory".²⁶

The Commission found that settler opinion in Southern Rhodesia was now generally in favour of union with Northern Rhodesia, although deep reservations remained about amalgamation with a 'native' protectorate.²⁷

The reason for this change in opinion since 1923, was primarily the amount of copper discovered in Northern Rhodesia since 1925. Apart from gaining Northern Rhodesia's copper resources, Southern Rhodesia's leaders were also concerned about the possibility that Northern Rhodesia would be drawn into a loose grouping of other northern territories, leaving Southern Rhodesia in an isolated position in relation to South Africa. Another incentive was *the lure* of large amounts of land in Northern Rhodesia potentially suitable for European farming.

A more surprising, and debatable finding, was Hilton Young's view that European opinion in Northern Rhodesia had also altered in favour of amalgamation.²⁸ Certainly, two Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council representatives had approached the Southern Rhodesian Government for terms on amalgamation in February 1928 and obtained from H U Moffat²⁹ a generous offer, including over-representation in a combined parliament and guaranteed minimum representation in the combined government. This deal agreed between the Southern Rhodesian Government and Captain Murray and Mr Strike was, however, roundly attacked in Northern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesian settlers were keen to escape from Colonial Office control and its association with eventual African rule, but they wished to achieve this by gaining representative government, not by amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. Leopold Moore, the leader of Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials in the Legislative Council, was dismissive of the Murray/Strike proposals: "I think if there were a chance of anything being worse than Downing Street it would be by submitting our affairs and direction to a

united Rhodesia. Whatever money is available will be spent where the balance of voting power is, and that is not North of the Zambesi."³⁰ When the amalgamation proposals, agreed between Strike, Murray, and Moffat, were formally introduced into the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council,³¹ in November 1929, only their proposer and seconder supported them. Although London rule was unpopular in Northern Rhodesia, the prospect of being controlled from Salisbury remained more distasteful.

The formation of Ramsay MacDonald's second ministry in June 1929 ended Leopold Amery's stay at the Colonial and Dominions Offices, but it was not the end of pressure for the formation of a northern counterbalance to South Africa. Hertzog's victory in the 'Black menace' election in South Africa in the same month, strengthened calls for the implementation of this policy. The Imperial Secretary in South Africa, Sir Bede Clifford, had proposed that the Governor of Southern Rhodesia become the High Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Bechuanaland, while Amery had preferred that the northern part of Bechuanaland, at least, be incorporated into Southern Rhodesia.³² The strengthening of Hertzog's Government as a result of the 1929 election reinforced Clifford's efforts for the formation of a British counterweight to the Afrikaner-controlled Union.³³ However, it was the result of the British general election, rather than the South African one which had the most immediate impact on support for the amalgamation of the Rhodesias in central Africa. The publication of the Passfield Memorandum³⁴ by the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, in June 1930, came as a rude shock for the

Northern Rhodesian Unofficials who hoped eventually for representative government. Lord Passfield's Memorandum made it clear that even if an Unofficial majority was achieved in Northern Rhodesia's Legislative Council, the Imperial Government would continue to control the implementation of its policy of African trusteeship. In addition, the Secretary of State's document reinforced the doctrine of the paramountcy of African interests, originally outlined in the Devonshire Declaration. These two factors produced uproar amongst Northern Rhodesia's European population, but their demands for a conference were unambiguously rejected by the Secretary of State.³⁵ Although the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir James Maxwell, calmed some fears by insisting that the Memorandum did not involve any changes in the administration of the territory,³⁶ it was clearly recognised that colonial, as opposed to Imperial, rule could now only be achieved through amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. Coinciding, as it did with a collapse in the price of copper,³⁷ the Passfield Memorandum produced in Northern Rhodesia a large groundswell of support for this amalgamation. The Secretary of State's intervention actually produced very little difference in the Colonial Office's policy of indecisive dualism but this was irrelevant in the situation. Scant heed, too, was paid, in Northern Rhodesia, to a Parliamentary Joint Select Committee's report, in the following year, which confirmed this situation.³⁸ What was crucial was that the settler population of Northern Rhodesia was now convinced that Northern Rhodesia had been firmly placed outside white Africa and the only way to avoid eventually becoming a

native territory, was to amalgamate with the South. The importance of the Passfield Memorandum was, therefore, not in what it achieved which was almost nothing, but what it was seen as heralding for Northern Rhodesia, by the European population of that territory. It resulted in the Northern Rhodesian elected members giving their support to the Southern Rhodesia Government's request to the Colonial Secretary, J H Thomas, for a conference on amalgamation. Although this request was rejected, support for a united central Africa to counter the Union remained strong in influential quarters in Britain which were also indifferent to claims for the paramountcy of African interests north of the Zambesi.³⁹

The African mineworkers strike, of May 1935, confirmed the majority of Northern Rhodesia's European population in their desire for amalgamation: a desire already made evident, in November 1933, with the introduction into the Legislative Council by the Unofficials of a motion calling for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.⁴⁰ Although the strike lasted only just over one week, it greatly frightened the settler population. The speed with which the strike spread from Mufulira to Nkana and then Luanshya, indicated organisation and co-operation, and re-emphasised to the settlers the extent of their isolation.⁴¹ The extent of European support, in Northern Rhodesia, for amalgamation, can be gauged from the elections for its Legislative Council in 1935, in which every candidate supported not only greater Unofficial representation and responsibility but also amalgamation. Nevertheless, the mining corporations and railway interests remained opposed to amalgamation, because it would involve colonial rule



replacing Imperial rule. Under colonial rule the influence of the white labour force, and their trade unions, would massively increase, as any colonial government would be dependent on their support to attain power. Amongst Nyasaland's tiny settler community there was strong support for amalgamation with the Rhodesias and opposition to any links with Tanganyika.⁴² The Scots missionaries, however, continued to oppose any links with Southern Rhodesia, even though they had by this time ceased to promote African advance in practice, while they still held on to it as a theory.

While ^{the} European population of Northern Rhodesia was, by 1935, firmly in favour of amalgamation, significant opposition to this union remained in Southern Rhodesia. The Rhodesian Labour Party was hostile to amalgamation, as their 1935 party conference showed,⁴³ because of Northern Rhodesia's large African population and its lack of an official colour bar.⁴⁴ Their representatives at the first, and unofficial, Victoria Falls Conference, in January 1936,⁴⁵ made agreement on specific proposals for amalgamation impossible. The Rhodesian Labour Party would only consider amalgamation on condition that colonial control replaced Imperial administration of 'native policy'. Although the Northern Rhodesian members of the Legislative Council would have acceded to almost any terms, in order to secure firm amalgamation proposals, it was obvious to all that the Rhodesian Labour Party demands would be completely unacceptable to London. The conference approved a proposal advocating the early amalgamation of the territories, but no terms were forthcoming.

A similar call for the early amalgamation of the territories was passed by the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council, in May 1936.

In rejecting this demand, but not the policy of amalgamation, Malcolm MacDonald⁴⁶ argued that circumstances had not altered significantly since J H Thomas' decision of 1931. Thomas, MacDonald's predecessor, had argued that Southern Rhodesia was not well enough established to cope with the added responsibility of amalgamation, particularly as this would include the added burden of administering large areas of African territory.⁴⁷

There were, in point of fact, other reasons which carried more weight in determining the response of the Secretary of State in 1931 and 1936. The most important consideration for the Imperial Government concerning central Africa, was maintaining direct control of Northern Rhodesia's copper mines.⁴⁸ Such control would obviously be endangered, if not completely removed, by amalgamation. It was increasingly important to the British Government that it retain control of Northern Rhodesia's copper.

The increasing tensions in Europe lay behind this policy and the deteriorating political situation was the second factor in determining the Imperial Government's refusal to consider amalgamation in the thirties. The rise of Nazism had re-opened the question of Germany's old colonies. As part of a general pact guaranteeing peace in Europe, Britain was prepared to concede to joint administration, with Germany, of a massive belt of land stretching across the middle of Africa.⁴⁹ Included in this suggested zone of joint control were part of Mozambique, Tanganyika, South West Africa and the Belgian

Congo, as well as all of Angola, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Although this proposal came to nothing, mainly because of Hitler's refusal to give Britain acceptable guarantees over non-aggression in Europe, the fact that it was made at all is significant. It is relevant in two ways. First, it showed the extent of British anxiety over the situation in Europe: this proposal would inevitably result in Britain's control of Northern Rhodesia's copper being less than complete. Secondly, it reveals the extent to which the British Government viewed Africa as being comprised of building blocks which could be combined in any manner considered desirable, and control of which could be transferred between imperial powers with relative impunity. It was in this way that the British Government regarded the expansionist aims of South Africa and the Rhodesias, an attitude not seriously questioned until after Labour's victory in 1945.

A further influence adversely affecting Rhodesian hopes for amalgamation in 1936, though not 1931, was Smuts' re-entry into the South African Government. In December 1932, South Africa finally came off the gold standard to try to counter the loss of capital to the United Kingdom and prevent its recession from worsening. As a further effort to combat South Africa's economic plight and resolve the political crisis precipitated by abandoning the gold standard, Hertzog and Smuts agreed terms and formed a coalition government in March 1933.⁵⁰ This national coalition was given overwhelming support in the May election,⁵¹ and eventually lead to the fusion of the Nationalists with the South African Party.⁵²

The formation of the United Party,⁵³ and the resulting self-imposed isolation of Malan and the die-hard Afrikaner Nationalists, was viewed with considerable relief in Whitehall. Not only were the Republican extremists exiled from office, but concern over the possible threat to Britain's continued use of the Simonstown naval base was removed.⁵⁴ Although Hertzog remained Prime Minister, Smuts could be relied upon to defend British strategic interests. The union of parties had the added benefit for Smuts that it finally finished secessionist moves in his Party in Natal.⁵⁵

Smuts' return to a leading position in the South African Government, placed the British Government in a much more difficult position concerning the Union's continuing demands for the High Commission Territories. Smuts argued strongly that, as the Union sustained the High Commission Territories economically, it should also have political control.⁵⁶ Despite J H Thomas' agreement with Hertzog, in May 1935, that the Union and Britain should jointly invest in and develop the three territories, and also co-operate in persuading the High Commission Territories African populations to agree to transfer, the United Kingdom Government's policy remained one of delay. Frustration at Britain's lack of support for their agreed strategy, as much as pressure from Malan at the lack of progress over transfer, led Hertzog to accuse the British Government of breach of contract when he returned from talks with Malcolm MacDonald, in June 1937; a charge he had already confronted the British Government with during the Imperial conference in May.⁵⁷

During the same month, and into July, discussions on central African amalgamation were held in London between MacDonald, the Governors of the central African territories, together with Huggins, Moore, Gore-Brown and representatives from Nyasaland. MacDonald argued that while amalgamation was impractical at that time, nonetheless the United Kingdom was seeking to devise means of closer co-operation. The British Government was prepared to consider closer association, but not amalgamation, and gave Huggins the choice of either a locally-appointed inquiry or a British commission, to investigate the various possibilities.⁵⁸ The Bledisloe Commission⁵⁹ was the outcome of these negotiations. Its formation, after the rebuff of the previous year, was seen by central African settlers as a definite victory for Huggins. This view was confirmed later in the year when, at Huggins' instigation, the terms of reference of the commission were extended to include an examination of the option of amalgamation.⁶⁰

During 1937, therefore, Neville Chamberlain's government was attempting to keep all its options open. The first priority was to maintain the status quo until Germany's response to their offer of dividing up the middle of Africa, was known. After the withdrawal of this offer, Britain's main concern was the continuing loyalty of South Africa. As a result no major moves towards the formation of a greater Rhodesia were feasible and the Bledisloe Commission's main function was to buy time for the United Kingdom. Even though MacDonald hoped for South African support in any conflict with Germany, distrust of Hertzog and lack of faith in South Africa's long term dependability deterred him from the early transfer of any of

the High Commission Territories. On this issue as well, the British Government sought refuge by forming a joint committee, in March 1938, to investigate areas for co-operation.

The sense of elation amongst central Africa's European community at the establishment of the Bledisloe Commission was quickly replaced by anger and bitterness when its findings were published, early in 1939. The Commission favoured amalgamation, presenting in the second part of its report strong arguments in favour of it, and urged that the British Government adopt it as official policy. The report pointed out that communication by road, rail and air would be facilitated, that there were no geographical difficulties, that the marketing of produce would be made easier and that administration of the whole region would be far more efficient and economical under one government. However, the Commission felt that it was not possible to implement this policy immediately. The stumbling block to immediate amalgamation was the differences in native policy between Southern Rhodesia and the northern territories. The Commission's eventual recommendation, to defer amalgamation until an expected convergence on native policy occurred in central Africa, was essentially a compromise.

Amongst the commissioners, Bledisloe and Astley Cooper were in favour of immediate amalgamation, Fitzgerald, Mainwaring and Orr Ewing were opposed while Southern Rhodesia maintained her policy of parallel development. Evans' position was one shared by a great number of people in Britain over the next few years. Evans faced the dilemma that he supported the principle of amalgamation, but was

concerned as to what it might produce in practice, because of the Southern Rhodesian Government's policy toward the African. The Commission's expectations of the convergence of native policy in central Africa were more a technique on the part of the chairman to prevent a minority report, than an accurate assessment of future trends. Indeed, Gore-Browne refuted this claim in a speech at Broken Hill, Northern Rhodesia, on 18 May 1939: "It is as certain as anything can be in politics that neither Southern Rhodesia nor the Colonial Office will amend or abandon their policies to the extent that the divergence [in native policy] will disappear."⁶² It was a view with which Roy Welensky concurred: "If we have to wait until these policies meet, then amalgamation will never be seen".⁶³ As a first step towards the eventual amalgamation of all three territories, the Commission recommended that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia should be united forthwith. This proposal met with ferocious opposition in Northern Rhodesia, as it was widely recognised that any such union would simply reinforce Colonial Office native policy in Northern Rhodesia and make future amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia that much less likely.⁶⁴ There was one aspect of the Royal Commission's report that did meet with settler approval. That was its proposal to enlarge the Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, even if no union with Nyasaland occurred, and to grant the elected members, at the very least, parity with the official members. Nominated members, appointed to look after African interests, would hold the balance.⁶⁵ Northern Rhodesian settler agitation for greater representation and

responsibility had been closely connected with the demands for amalgamation and was regarded by many as being of even greater importance. In 1936 Gore-Browne had raised the threat of collective resignation unless some of their demands were met.⁶⁶ Over the next three years, the Unofficials in Northern Rhodesia made startling gains in representation. First, in 1937, they were granted representation on the newly-formed Finance Committee, then, in 1938, they gained greater representation on the Legislative Council and, finally, in 1939, three Unofficials were accepted on to the Executive Committee. These concessions were made, at least in part, to try to reduce demands in Northern Rhodesia for immediate amalgamation, and buy the Colonial and Imperial Governments breathing space on this question.

The outbreak of war in Europe pushed the amalgamation issue into the background, even in central Africa, but did not stop all agitation on the issue. Lord Bledisloe may have had to compromise in his report, but he was firmly in favour of amalgamation and continued to press the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs on the matter.⁶⁷

What is even more interesting than his continued agitation for the acceptance of the principle of amalgamation and the instigation of moves towards it, were the arguments he employed. Although not mentioned in his report, Bledisloe's main argument for amalgamation in central Africa, was the need for a counterbalance to the Union. In pressing this argument on the Dominion and Colonial Offices, Bledisloe was mirroring the arguments of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Herbert Stanley, who was also pressing for immediate amalgamation.⁶⁸

British opponents of the amalgamation of central Africa were also harassing the Dominions Office, concerned lest amalgamation was implemented under cover of the war.⁶⁹ In fact, agitation for and fears of moves towards amalgamation during the war were groundless. The British Government had no intentions of doing anything so drastic. Central Africa was of very low priority indeed during the war and two important factors worked to preclude amalgamation. These were the need to retain direct control of Northern Rhodesia's copper production and the desire to do nothing to undermine Smuts' pro-war administration in South Africa.

Smuts had also seen the possibilities of the war being used to distract hostile attention, in Britain, from changes in southern Africa. His concern, however, was not amalgamation, but the expansion of South Africa. In October 1939, he pressed the British Government to progress the transfer of Swaziland and Bechuanaland quickly and quietly through Parliament, when its members' attention was focused on the progress of the war.⁷⁰ Although the United Kingdom Government was unwilling to co-operate in this ploy, it recognised the strength of Smuts' argument, namely, that the transfer of at least Swaziland, and hopefully Bechuanaland as well, was one of the best means of combatting the secessionist tendencies of Malan's Nationalists.⁷¹ Clark even implied that if Malan and Hertzog reconciled their differences and united then the continued stability of Smuts' government might depend on it succeeding where Hertzog's Government had failed in extending South Africa's borders northwards.⁷²

Smuts retained greater ambitions than the transfer of the High

Commission Territories and had never lost sight of his goal of stretching South Africa's borders as far north as possible. In his opinion, Southern Rhodesia's long-term position was untenable and so, along with hopes for a change in attitude in Southern Rhodesia towards the Union, Smuts continued to believe that its incorporation would again become a viable option.⁷³ As a consequence, he was

fiercely opposed to any agreement with Nazi Germany which would compromise British control of any part of central or eastern Africa, and in this he had the support of L S Amery.⁷⁴

Smuts' hopes of even yet acquiring Southern Rhodesia were not fanciful, or at least were not regarded as such in London. Hailey, in particular, urged, in 1940, the early amalgamation of central Africa, irrespective of differences in native policy, as otherwise controversy over that issue would drive Southern Rhodesia towards the Union, and into it if the terms were right.⁷⁵

After taking up his post as High Commissioner in South Africa in September 1941, Lord Harlech⁷⁶ added his weight to Bledisloe's and Hailey's demands in urging the immediate amalgamation of central Africa.⁷⁷ As late as April 1943,

G F Seel in the Colonial Office was advocating a loose grouping in central Africa in order to prevent Southern Rhodesia from drifting into the Union.⁷⁸ This view gained the backing of Sir George Gater,⁷⁹

but Sir Edward Richards, the Governor of Nyasaland, would not countenance it.⁸⁰

Considering the importance of those who were pressing for amalgamation between 1939 and 1943 and the strength of their support for the policy, it is rather remarkable that none of the Secretaries of State for the period moved to implement

amalgamation. Had Cranbourne remained at the Colonial Office after 1942 it is probable that Sir Henry Moore's⁸² proposals for the amalgamation of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika would have been implemented, despite opposition within the department.⁸³ Clearly a major factor in the failure of this pressure to produce amalgamation was the British Government's feeling of indebtedness towards Smuts for having brought South Africa into the war.⁸⁴ With the rest of British Africa increasingly dependent upon the Union for supplies because of the war, the United Kingdom Government were loath to take any action that could possibly weaken Smuts' hold on office. As a result, in October 1941, Cranbourne and Moyne proposed that any decision on central African amalgamation be postponed until after the war.⁸⁵ With Churchill's agreement this became the official policy but with the clear understanding that the Union would under no circumstances be allowed to expand beyond the Zambesi in the interim.⁸⁶ Smuts', however, was beginning to put forward proposals for a much larger grouping in Africa.

By January 1942, Smuts was preparing his plans for a vast and initially loose confederation tying together all of white Africa. He felt that having the rest of Africa increasingly reliant on South Africa for supplies of food and materials was a positive step towards creating a favourable climate for his grandiose plans. "It seems as if we have now to carry all the smaller fry of Africa on our backs. In years gone by they looked to Europe for their supplies, but now that that prospect has failed they crowd in on us, and we have to do our best with the very limited supplies at our disposal ... we

are quite popular nowadays and hope that something greater may be built on these foundations in the future. The Portuguese and British colonies, Congo and French Congo are all in this plight. They may yet be in the net. I am working on some such plan as that of the pan-American union of our Yankee friends. After all, the day for these pygmy units are past, and Hitler has at least proved that."⁸⁷ With the results of South Africa's 1943 general election⁸⁸ apparently securing his position, Smuts felt confident enough to put his proposals formally in an address to a meeting of the Empire Parliamentary Association at the Houses of Parliament, in November 1943.⁸⁹

The Secretary of State for the Colonies, Oliver Stanley, was in general opposed to Smuts' idea of regional confederations of British colonies attached to one of the Dominions.⁹⁰ Nevertheless, he saw distinct advantages in the formation of one for southern and central Africa, so long as the Portuguese colonies of Mozambique and Angola were involved, along with the Belgian Congo, to prevent South Africa dominating the confederation. Cranbourne concurred with Stanley's proviso that east Africa must not be involved.⁹¹ It might be supposed that London would have reacted more favourably towards Smuts and his proposals. After all, he had brought South Africa into a second war in support of Britain, he appeared to have gained a consensus of South African opinion behind his policies and was now presenting the British Government with the means of reducing the problems of the transfer of the High Commission Territories and central African amalgamation. A large, loose grouping in southern

and central Africa, with South Africa as an interested, but outside, power, would have allowed Britain to step back from these two contentious issues, and also provided scope for interminable delays over making any definite decisions.

Unlike sections of the British Press which warmly welcomed Smuts' new ideas⁹² the British Government was wary of Smuts and his proposals, because it was still not convinced about South Africa's reliability as the guarantor of British policy in southern Africa. It was felt in government circles that South Africa's loyalty was almost completely dependent on Smuts, and he was seventy-three in the year of his electoral success.⁹³ Moreover, many remained sceptical about Smuts' disclaimers of all intentions of South African expansion.

Sir Evelyn Baring,⁹⁴ was amongst those who remained unconvinced and drew attention to the heavy investment in Northern Rhodesia by the South African mining concerns and their continuing search for other insurance against the exhaustion of South Africa's gold reserves.⁹⁵ In addition, Baring continued to believe that Smuts still hoped to extend the Union to include both Rhodesias.⁹⁶

Smuts was certainly keen for South Africa to take over the colonial responsibilities which Britain was unable or unwilling to continue. However, he and Pirow gave precedence to the maintenance of white rule in Africa over the early expansion of the Union.⁹⁷ The main thrust of South Africa's policy for Africa, under Smuts, was to try to prevent the devolution of power from the Imperial governments to the indigenous peoples. Wherever this was proposed, particularly where Britain was the Imperial power, South Africa offered to take on

the responsibility of overseeing the colony. As a result, South Africa's interests were not confined to the southern part of the continent. In January 1941, Smuts objected to the British War Cabinet's decision to restore Ethiopia, as soon as possible, to an independent state under the rule of Haile Selassie.⁹⁸ The implication behind this disagreement was that South Africa could oversee Abyssinia as a mandated or protected territory. Smuts was still pressing the point In July 1945, when he asked that formal provision be made for the Allies to consult with South Africa before any final decision was taken about the allocation of the Italian colonies.⁹⁹ The advent of a Labour Government, with its decision to work for security through a strong United Nations Organisation, rather than by independent strategic bases in Britain's colonies and dependancies, and in particular the decision to withdraw from Egypt and the Middle East, ended the few remaining hopes South Africa cherished of gaining Abyssinia or other North African territories. The new Labour Government was convinced that the advent of the atomic bomb nullified most of the strategic arguments for maintaining colonies in Africa.¹⁰⁰ Labour went through the motions of consulting with Smuts about the future of the Italian colonies during the post-war conference in Paris, in April 1946,¹⁰¹ but by then Smuts had lost any chance of persuading Bevin to his point of view. So South Africa's efforts, dating from the early thirties and continuing until Smuts' defeat in 1948, to become a colonial power defending white rule in Africa proved entirely unsuccessful.

The factors which doomed Smuts' efforts to failure - apart from those already examined above - were America's attitudes towards Empire,

Britain's growing dependence on the United States and the effects of the Allies' propaganda during the war.

First, America's attitude must be considered. The extent of the differences between the basic assumptions of the British and American Government concerning the British Empire, were clearly demonstrated at the meeting between Churchill and Roosevelt, at Placentia Bay in August 1947. Roosevelt assumed when he advocated self-determination in Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter, drawn up at these discussions, that this applied to British Colonial peoples as much as anyone else, whereas Churchill thought that no-one could possibly consider that it applied to people in the British Empire.¹⁰² Although Churchill made efforts to sort out the muddle,¹⁰³ it became increasingly difficult, as the war progressed, for Britain to maintain a case for Empire exemption from Article 3 without appearing hypocritical, if not tyrannical. Yet, as both Lord Cranbourne¹⁰⁴ and his predecessor at the Colonial Office, Lord Moyne,¹⁰⁵ were strongly opposed to the granting of wholesale independence to Britain's colonies at any time in the future, a convincing argument for just such an exemption had to be presented.¹⁰⁶

Moyne and Cranbourne's view, that the majority of the British Empire should remain permanently under Imperial control, did not find favour within the American Administration, but any transfer of territories to South African jurisdiction would have been even more unpopular. It was, moreover, realised in London, that this prospect of permanent Imperial rule was hardly an incentive for the peoples of British Empire to fight in the war. This presented a problem

as it was increasingly evident that Britain would require the martial efforts of its colonial peoples if it was to defeat Germany and Japan. Moreover, Britain was growing more dependent on American support in its war effort. The extent of antagonism in the United States towards the British Empire and what they understood to be British colonial policy, was a major concern for the War Cabinet for this very reason.¹⁰⁷

Churchill became convinced that a vindication of British colonial policy past and present, was required to curtail the criticisms in the United States and encourage support for the British Empire amongst the peoples it ruled.¹⁰⁸ On investigation however, it became clear that Britain did not possess a colonial policy of any form or substance, but merely a few, vague statements, frequently contradicting one another.¹⁰⁹

Britain's continued refusal to accept that Article 3 of the Atlantic Charter applied to her colonies was a source of constant irritation in relations with the United States.¹¹⁰ What Britain needed was for her past and present record on colonial matters to be presented in as positive a light as possible and for the whole emphasis of the debate to be shifted on to future intentions. By presenting plans for economic development and provision for social care, the Colonial Office and British Government hoped to dissipate American criticism and restore the confidence of the colonial peoples in the Empire. The tone was to be progressive, but no firm plans or commitments to the granting of colonial independence were to be offered. In this climate any transfer of colonial responsibilities to South

Africa was impossible, even if the British Government had been convinced that the Union's guarantee of co-operation extended beyond Smuts.

The architect and instigator of this new presentation of the British Empire to the world at large and the United States of America in particular, was Oliver Stanley.¹¹¹ Stanley was very successful in convincing erstwhile critics that the British Empire was bringing economic development and other tangible benefits to its colonies. He also succeeded, to a large extent, in creating the impression that this new direction of British policy for its colonies was, in fact, simply the continuation of traditional goals.¹¹² The language Stanley used to placate American opinion, however, had the side-effect of raising false expectations amongst Britain's colonial peoples. Stanley emphasised the need for economic stability as a pre-requisite for the granting of political independence to any colony. The repeated use of the phrase 'self-government' in this context by Stanley, was ambiguous, and intentionally so.¹¹³ The phrase was generally interpreted as meaning representative self-government, but in fact vague enough to allow Great Britain to stop well short of this, if she so desired, while still being able to claim to be adhering to the stated policy. Stanley was convinced, as his two immediate predecessors had been, that only the largest colonies would, eventually, be granted full independence. This was not how the American Administration interpreted his statements and Stanley, clearly, was intentionally misleading them.¹¹⁴ He was probably not fully aware that he was also, as a consequence, raising expectations of

rapid development and progress to independence for the colonies, not only in the Empire but in Britain itself.

Under Stanley, the Colonial Office had moved to a position whereby the advance of colonial peoples, both economically and politically, was to be fostered. In Africa, this took the form of promoting a partnership, within a territory, between the indigenous people and its European, and sometimes Indian, settlers. The concept was vague and intended to stop well short of fully independent African rule. What it recognised, however, was that in most of east Africa and parts of central Africa, Amery's policy of devolution of power to the European community alone, was no longer viable. Although this policy change on the part of the British Government towards its colonies was dramatic neither the supporters nor opponents of continuing white rule in Africa realised that any change in policy had actually occurred, let alone recognising the significance of the change. Stanley had instigated and overseen a significant change in policy at the Colonial Office, indeed it could be argued that he had introduced a colonial policy for the first time. This policy was not as radical as the United States understood it to be, but neither was it the purely public relations job which British Imperialists were led to believe.

What Stanley had succeeded in gaining was room for manoeuvre for Britain over her colonies, but in so doing he was storing up problems for Britain in the future. Indeed, his attempt to match British Colonial policy with the terms of the Atlantic Charter changed, in retrospect, the Devonshire Declaration and the Passfield Memorandum

into the very policy the white settlers had originally feared, but which the documents did not in fact represent at the time they were produced. Nevertheless, by denying that he was making policy, and insisting rather that he was merely re-affirming it, Stanley sought to, and largely succeeded in, justifying and exonerating Britain's colonial record which had been so widely criticised in the United States. In this way, Britain avoided making any substantive concessions to the USA on colonial issues, while maintaining American support for the war effort.

The outbreak of World War II may have pushed the amalgamation issue into the background in central Africa, but it did not stop all agitation for its implementation. Most settler politicians in central Africa recognised that any call for immediate amalgamation was unlikely to be looked on favourably by London during the war. Nevertheless, early in 1941, Roy Welensky formed the Northern Rhodesian Labour Party to fight in the general election, later in the year, with the stated purpose of campaigning for immediate amalgamation. In introducing party politics to Northern Rhodesia, Welensky came into conflict with Colonel Sir Stewart Gore-Browne, who argued that Northern Rhodesia was not yet ready for such a development. One of the main considerations which influenced Welensky's action, was his desire to re-establish a united pro-amalgamation position amongst the Unofficials in the Legislative and Executive Councils. The war had created a boom in Northern Rhodesia's copper-based economy and this, coupled with the gains made in representation by the Unofficials from 1937 onwards, had contrived to undermine the consensus

supporting amalgamation which had emerged in the early nineteen thirties. Economic growth and the political advances had re-kindled the hope in many Northern Rhodesian settlers, that representative government, without the necessity of amalgamating with Southern Rhodesia, was once again a realistic possibility. As has already been shown, support for amalgamation in Northern Rhodesia was always a means to an end, not a goal in itself. Amalgamation was only popularly endorsed in Northern Rhodesia when its European supporters were convinced that without it representative government would not be granted and European rule would gradually be replaced by African control.

Welensky's move was initially very successful, with all five Labour Party candidates being returned in Northern Rhodesia's 1941 elections.¹¹⁵ However, his next initiative in attempting to recapture a united front in favour of amalgamation was scotched. He tried to convene another Victoria Falls Conference with representatives from Southern Rhodesia, early in 1942, but was out-maneuvred by Gore-Browne. Addressing the Legislative Council Gore-Browne stated:

"We all know that the political issue of amalgamation had to be deferred, and I am sure that we all see the justice of this and that none of us wish to embarrass the sorely-tried government at home by pressing this point at the moment."¹¹⁶

Although Welensky continued to advocate the merits of amalgamation after this setback, he was still no nearer success by the end of 1943. His lack of progress is well illustrated by the failure of his motion in favour of amalgamation to gain the support of all the Unofficials in the Legislative Council in November of that year.

It was perhaps not surprising that Gore-Brown opposed Welensky's motion, given his views on agitation for amalgamation during the war and the fact that he represented African interests. What is more interesting, however, is that Welensky also failed to gain the support of Major McKee (Midland electoral area) and Geoffrey Pelletier (Ndola electoral area).¹¹⁷ This lack of unanimity was also mirrored in the European community as a whole, as is shown by the fact that Pelletier had recently won his seat, in a by-election, against a Labour Party candidate.¹¹⁸ Yet, by the middle of 1945 Welensky had largely succeeded in obtaining his objective. His success owed as much to force of personality as to the arguments he used. By August of that year amongst the Unofficials in the Legislative Council only Gore-Browne was not supporting his campaign for an early amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.¹¹⁹

Throughout this period when Welensky was seeking to gain an Unofficial consensus in favour of immediate amalgamation, the Governor, Sir John Waddington, and his administration sought to remain non-committed. The Northern Rhodesian Government refused to support Welensky's motions in the Legislative Council, leaning heavily on the Bledisloe Commission when pressed, and seeking to avoid being forced to reject the principle of amalgamation as an option open for consideration. While there can be no doubt that it was entirely due to Welensky's efforts that amalgamation remained a topical political issue in central Africa during the war, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Godfrey Huggins, was also firmly in favour of amalgamation.

Huggins had remained largely inactive on the amalgamation issue for most of the war, partly, at least, because of the substantial minority amongst Southern Rhodesian Europeans who firmly opposed any closer ties with the black north. Towards the end of the war, however, Huggins began once more to publicly advocate immediate amalgamation. The co-ordination of the war effort in central Africa had resulted in closer co-operation and some joint bodies for certain decision-making processes. Both Welensky and Huggins were confident that these areas of closer association could be capitalised upon and the British Government induced to move towards amalgamation. Policy in London on central Africa was, as it always had been, dominated by concerns over the possible expansion of South Africa. In March 1944, Creasy and Cohen in the Colonial Office were concerned lest a totally negative response to continuing demands for amalgamation in central Africa drive Southern Rhodesia into the Union. Their proposals, which found favour with the Governors of the three central African territories, opposed amalgamation for the foreseeable future, but sought to strengthen and make permanent the war-time machinery for closer co-operation on matters of common interest.¹²⁰ One of the main factors behind the British Government's decision to reject the amalgamation of central Africa in 1944, was the fear that the European populations in central Africa would not be large enough to enable it to emerge as a powerful self-supporting Dominion. Unless it achieved this status it would fail to act as a counter-weight to South Africa and would, in fact, become increasingly susceptible to Union overtures for incorporation, as its dependence

on South Africa grew. In presenting this joint view of the Colonial and Dominions Offices to the Cabinet, Cranbourne and Stanley were as aware as Creasy and Cohen that a flat rejection of amalgamation could well frustrate and anger Southern Rhodesia sufficiently for them to turn towards the Union out of pique.¹²¹ Any such northward advance by South Africa had to be prevented for reasons already recounted. Alongside these factors, however, was a new consideration for opposing South African expansion. Any spread of Union influence northward would strengthen settler opposition in east Africa towards Stanley's new policy of African advancement in partnership with European and Indian settlers. The settler communities of east Africa, especially Kenya, had to be isolated from all external aid if this strategy was to have any chance of being implemented. So, by April 1944, it had been decided at Cabinet level, that the Central African Council and its secretariat would be established on a permanent basis.¹²² This inter-territorial body would continue to be purely advisory and have no executive powers, but for all that, its continuation appears to have been accepted by Huggins, as a positive step towards amalgamation, when he was informed of it in London in July 1944.¹²³

London would not officially exclude amalgamation as a possible solution, because of the furore this would create in central Africa. Nevertheless, amalgamation had been dismissed by the British Government as a viable policy option by the end of the war.

In May 1946, Welensky, Gore-Browne and Waddington held talks in London with George Hall¹²⁴ on proposed constitutional amendments to the composition of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council.

Welensky however used the occasion to press his arguments for amalgamation on the Colonial Secretary, but received no support from either Waddington or Gore-Browne. Hall rejected the case for amalgamating the central African territories on the twin grounds of African opposition in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and the nature of Southern Rhodesia's 'native' policy. However, more important than Hall's rejection of amalgamation was Oliver Stanley's insistence that any Conservative Government which succeeded Labour would also reject amalgamation. It was during Welensky's separate private discussions with Stanley that the Conservative politician suggested federation as a possible alternative to amalgamation.¹²⁵

The British Government's decision to reject amalgamation was undoubtedly based on the reasons Hall offered Welensky, but the decision was also influenced by strong doubts as to whether or not central Africa could survive as an independent unitary state, and the knowledge that to do otherwise than reject amalgamation would have strained relations with the United States even further.

In late 1944 and throughout 1945, Britain was resisting American attempts to raise the whole issue of colonial mandates and territorial trusteeship, both in direct talks with British representatives and in general discussions at the United Nations' inaugural conference at San Francisco.¹²⁶ Britain was seeking to maintain its autonomy on colonial issues and the outcry that would have greeted the amalgamation of central Africa, particularly from the Fabian Society and the Church of Scotland, would have adversely affected this attempt. Given that the United Kingdom Government was aware that it would

probably encounter severe criticism for supporting Smuts in his attempt to incorporate South West Africa into the Union, it could not afford also to be portrayed as constantly stifling moves towards African independence by supporting permanent white settler rule. The new Labour Government's policy of achieving world-wide security through the strengthening of the United Nations increased the need to avoid acquiring this image. In any event, any attempt to amalgamate Nyasaland with Northern and Southern Rhodesia, would have been strongly resisted by the Governor of Nyasaland and his administration.¹²⁷

For the above reasons by 1946 the British Government no longer considered amalgamation a feasible alternative for central Africa. However, the need for closer association in central Africa appeared to be growing. Many people in Whitehall and Westminster had been convinced by the successful operation of a resident Minister in west Africa during the war¹²⁸ of the need for larger units in colonial administration. There was also a great deal of interest and support in government circles for a variant on Smuts' proposals, of an international regional body for southern Africa.¹²⁹ The weakening of Smuts' coalition Government, in October 1945, with the departure of the Labour and Dominion parties, made the advent of an Afrikaner South Africa, even before Smuts' death, a distinct possibility, and served to strengthen the need for some form of definite closer association in central Africa. Concern was heightened the following year when the Southern Rhodesian elections resulted in Huggins retaining only a precarious hold on government. Huggins' main

losses were to factions opposed to any union with the north and more favourably disposed to incorporation with the Union. The political situation in Southern Rhodesia, therefore, would have ruled out amalgamation in the immediate future, even if the British Government had not already so decided. As it was, it served to complete the dismissal of amalgamation from the Imperial Government's consideration. 1946 also saw the rejection of any serious attempt to produce an international conference for southern Africa, to discuss incorporating the Portuguese and Belgian colonies, and the first indication that Welensky and the Europeans of central Africa might settle for something less than full amalgamation.¹³⁰

London continued to maintain a studied neutrality towards the principle of amalgamating central Africa in its public statements and its communications with those territories, neither endorsing nor rejecting amalgamation.¹³¹ The United Kingdom continued to refer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies' statement to the House of Commons on 18 October 1944, and the Bledisloe report, to block all attempts to force a decision from them on the issue. Nevertheless, although the leaders of settler opinion in central Africa did not realise it as yet, and the British Government refused to admit it publicly, the option of amalgamation in central Africa had been definitely rejected by 1946.¹³² It took a further number of years before everyone concerned accepted this outcome, but 1946 saw the end of any realistic hopes of the United Kingdom agreeing to the amalgamation of central Africa.

S E C T I O N 2

FEDERATION ACHIEVED : 1946-1953

CHAPTER 3

The Post-War Years

The UK's Economic Situation

Before looking in detail at the uneven emergence of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland between 1946 and 1953, it is necessary to outline briefly the political backdrop to the unfolding drama.

First, it should be noted that the federal issue did not emerge in Britain as a politically contentious, or even important, issue until after Labour was out of office. This was partly because there existed broad, cross party support for the principle of closer association, short of amalgamation, for central Africa, which tended to reinforce the convention that colonial policy should remain outwith the arena of party political dispute, and so the dilemma of whether or not to impose an agreed federal scheme against the overwhelming opposition of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia's African peoples did not arise. Mainly, however, it was that, in comparison with the succession of financial and foreign crises and major domestic problems with which the Attlee administration had to deal, whilst establishing the welfare state, the issue of federation was a very minor concern indeed.

The ending of Lease Lend by President Truman in August 1945, served to exacerbate the 'financial Dunkirk' which already faced the United Kingdom at the end of the war. Britain had only managed to last the war because of the United States' lease lend and Canada's mutual aid. Keynes had already assured the Cabinet that only through substantial, long-term aid from America could Britain hope to recover to anything

approaching its pre-war position abroad and create a tolerable standard of living at home. Britain did manage to extract a large, long-term loan from the USA, although it was neither as large nor *at* as low a rate of interest as Attlee's administration had wanted. Moreover, the two central conditions attached by the American Government to the loan, when implemented, were to have unfortunate consequences for the British economy. Nonetheless, with the loan secured, Dalton's policy of 'cheap money' allowed the Government to pursue its nationalisation and welfare provision policies throughout 1946. During the same period Bevin was seeking to maintain Britain's standing as a world power, by attempting to honour the United Kingdom's defence commitments abroad and actually add to and strengthen the Empire in north Africa and the middle East.

The summer of 1947 saw a massive drain on Britain's dollar and gold reserves, the underlying cause of which was the world-wide shortage of food and raw materials, combined with Britain's inability to reduce its massive trade deficit with the United States. These major problems had been exacerbated in early 1947 by a sharp rise in American prices, coinciding with severe shortages of fuel, particularly coal, in the United Kingdom. The implementation in July of America's loan condition to make Sterling freely convertible into other currencies, accelerated the dollar and gold drain to a critical level. Only by the removal of the pound from free convertability and the introduction of austerity measures by Cripps, who had succeeded Dalton as Chancellor of the Exchequer on 13 November 1947, was Britain saved from total bankruptcy.

The United Kingdom's gradual recovery was reinforced by the massive injection of funds into Europe in general, and Britain in particular, through Marshall Aid and the European Recovery Programme. Even so, Britain's economy was under severe pressure once more from March 1949 and by September, Cripps was forced into a massive devaluation of the pound. The recovery, produced by the new competitive level of sterling and the adoption of Morrison's policy of consolidation, was checked once more by huge increases in the defence budget. This controversial measure was introduced by the Attlee administration, under American pressure, in response to the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950. This difficult situation was worsened still further by shortages of raw materials, produced by American stockpiling of strategic items in preparation for its war effort.

Britain's dependence upon American financial aid and the necessity to reduce expenditure were the twin factors which forced Britain's retreat from Empire and overseas commitments. Withdrawals from first Greece, Palestine and then Iran, were all based on considerations of economic necessity and relations with the United States. Frequently British withdrawal occurred when challenged by new, assertive nationalist forces within the territories concerned. These attempts to achieve self-determination proved so successful precisely because Britain was facing economic difficulties and so had to maintain strict financial stringency. In addition, popular anti-empire feeling within the USA remained high and the United Kingdom had to take note of American views, as, in many essentials, Britain was now dependent on America. It was under these new post-

war conditions that India, Ceylon, Malta and Newfoundland had all gained independence by 1950.

Britain's continued belief in herself as the third world power and increasing anxiety about possible Russian expansion outside of Europe, lay behind Bevin's advocacy of the formation of a greater Somalia in 1945 and 1946. Attlee's objections and continued American opposition to any expansion of Britain's Empire, ended the Foreign Secretary's imperialist aspirations. With the obvious exceptions of the conflicts in Malaya and Korea, from 1947 onwards, Britain's main foreign pre-occupation centred on Europe, opposing moves towards the formation of a Council of Europe and the implementation of the Schuman plan, countering Russia's blockade of West Berlin and fostering the establishment of NATO.

American opinion may have been antagonistic toward the British Empire, but the United Kingdom's pretensions to super power status depended upon a strong imperial base and continued close links of trade and defence with the Dominions. Such aspirations proved to be increasingly impracticable after the war, although still strongly held by the British Government, nonetheless. As for Empire, Britain sought to develop it economically and, more importantly, to convince the USA and the client states themselves, that the United Kingdom was seeking to aid their economic advance. These efforts were not confined to the Overseas Food Corporation and Colonial Development Corporation, but increasingly involved joint efforts with other colonial powers.

Joint action on technical problems between colonies in Africa had been discussed by Britain and France briefly in early 1940 and these were resumed in late 1945. By May 1949, a conference in Lisbon, on the problems of transport development in central, eastern and southern Africa attracted delegates from the Governments of Britain, France, Belgium, South Africa, and the colonies concerned, as well as the host nation. Moreover, from early 1948 Britain and France were considering the possibilities of economic co-operation in the colonial sphere, particularly in east Africa, but with relevance for Africa as a whole. Whilst Britain's ardour for these developments to involve South Africa may have cooled after 1948, the Union itself under Malan, remained as committed to regional groupings in Africa as it had been when Smuts was Prime Minister. Concurrent with these developments in Britain's colonial policy for Africa, was growing opposition, within the Colonial Service, to any notion that the areas of Africa where Europeans had settled in any significant numbers could be developed along similar lines to the rest of British Africa.

Finally, it should be noted that an important consideration in the post-war development of the British Empire, lay in its producing raw materials for the United Kingdom and providing dollars through exports to North America. The economic progress of Britain's colonies was thus shaped by the United Kingdom's trade and economic requirements than the individual needs of any one client territory. The operation of the dollar pool, covering most, though not all, of the Commonwealth, caused particular resentment in the Rhodesias as much as anywhere.

Support for a Greater Federation

Throughout the decades of pressure for closer association in central Africa there also existed influential support for larger or somewhat different unions of settler-controlled territories in east, central and southern Africa. Mention has been made of some of these attempts in the previous Chapter. The years immediately preceding the establishment of Federation, however, saw a final flurry of activity on this front and helped to form the political environment in which the decisions to create it were taken. The achievement of a Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was not seen as precluding or even necessarily hindering the achievement of a greater federation at a later date. For example, among the points in favour of federation, contained in the UCAA National Executive Council's memorandum of October 1952, - for members giving speeches during the Southern Rhodesian referendum campaign - were the advantages it would bring in any future negotiations on either closer association with other territories, or for a corridor of land connecting central Africa to the sea.¹

Before looking in detail at the political process leading to the creation of the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland it is useful to examine briefly some of the moves which were made at a late stage to try and extend the proposed federation into a larger union.

In this context it is of interest to note not only the degree of support in the early 1950s for uniting the proposed central African Federation with east Africa, Bechuanaland, even the northern part of

South West Africa and Natal, but also the clear differences brought out by these pressures in attitude and approach between Huggins and Welensky. Initially Huggins was open to suggestions of pressing for the establishment of a greater Federation while Welensky wanted to concentrate on achieving federation in central Africa before considering any wider expansion. However, by 1953, Welensky was far more willing to consider a central African Federation joining with other territories at an early date, whereas Huggins was primarily concerned with consolidating the soon to be created Federation.

Between 1950 and the establishment of Federation at the end of 1953, there were four important initiatives for the creation of a settler-ruled federation consisting of more than just Nyasaland, Southern and Northern Rhodesia. On only the first of these initiatives were Welensky and Huggins completely in accord with one another.

In February 1951, Kendall Ward, a leading Kenyan Unofficial, sounded out David Stirling about Southern Rhodesia's probable reaction to Imperial Rule being unilaterally rejected and "something like a Boston Tea Party" occurring in Kenya. Ward asked Stirling to attempt to gain Huggins' and Welensky's support for such developments in Kenya and sought his advice on whether or not the Kenyan settlers should approach Malan with a request for help in such an endeavour. Ward also asked if the white Kenyans could "expect material as well as moral support" from the Rhodesias and assured Stirling that he was speaking on behalf of a large number of Kenya's "most respected and established settlers".²

Huggins, Welensky and Stirling were concerned at the proposed constitutional changes in Kenya, but urged Ward and his associates to show restraint and not be provoked into pursuing an unconstitutional route towards independence.³ Huggins felt that the best assistance he could offer Kenya's settlers was to publicly advocate the adoption of Southern Rhodesia's twin pyramid policy in other British Africa colonies. However, what primarily concerned Huggins and Stirling was not so much the threat of Kenya's settlers declaring UDI, but the possibility that they would ask for help from Malan's South Africa. In Stirling's reply to Ward, probably towards the end of March 1951, the leader of the Capricorn Africa Society emphasised that both he and Huggins, with whom he had had a long discussion, were adamant that no approach for help of any kind be made to Malan. Stirling argued that Malan's Government could do nothing in response to such a request from over two thousand miles away, but the fact that Kenya's settlers had made the request would produce grave repercussions in Southern Rhodesia.

As you know a section of our population favours a political merger with the Union. Malan would immediately exploit an appeal for assistance from the white settlers in Kenya in a way which would be most embarrassing to us here. It would certainly mean his capturing more support in Southern Rhodesia than he has got at the moment, thus contributing towards the undermining of the only British European bulwark in Africa.⁴

Throughout 1951, Huggins, Welensky and Stirling continued to discourage Kenya's settlers from taking action that would provoke a constitutional crisis. Moreover, while the Rhodesias' white leaders remained worried about the proposed constitutional changes in Kenya

and Tanganyika which would weaken the position of those territories' white settlers, they did not encourage Kenyan and Tanganyikan settler overtures for an early link up with the Rhodesias.⁵ Nonetheless, it is probable that the second initiative in the attempt to form a greater federation was in response to, or inspired by, the first. During the latter part of 1951, Colonel David Stirling and the Capricorn Africa Society began to organise and publicise an east and central Africa settlers convention to press for the creation of a greater federation, to be held in Salisbury in March 1952. Stirling claimed widespread support for such a convention including "the informal support of Mr Lennox-Boyd and also Sir Edward Twinning, Governor of Tanganyika" and "the enthusiastic support of Mr Gordon-Walker", who, he claimed, was arranging for a number of interested Labour and Conservative MPs to attend.⁶ While Stirling was well known for his tendency to exaggerate the extent and degree of support for his campaigns, his idea of a settlers' convention was taken seriously enough in Whitehall for personal meetings to be arranged in November 1951 with Foster, Minister of State at the Commonwealth Relations Office and in January 1952, with the Commonwealth Secretary, Ismay. At these two meetings, Stirling stressed the urgent need for the early production of official proposals for a greater federation of east and central Africa.⁷ Initially Welensky was not opposed to the convention provided it did not interfere with the prospects of securing federation for central Africa. In making Huggins aware of where he stood Welensky added:

"I can see considerable advantage in all the European Settler communities situated in this area saying with one voice that they want some form of political unity and a settled policy".⁸

However Welensky became convinced that the convention would hinder the establishment of a central African Federation. By January 1952, he and Rennie were in agreement that the proposed convention was badly timed and that no proposals for a larger federation should be considered until the central African Federation was well established.⁹

Thus, while Welensky does not appear to have aided Rennie in the Governor's efforts to undermine support for the March convention, neither does he seem to have attempted to put a stop to them.¹⁰

In contrast, Huggins was initially strongly in favour of Stirling's proposed convention and agreed to speak at it. By January 1952 he had begun to reconsider his position, possibly influenced by Welensky's point of view, but Stockil's appointment to Stirling's Organising Committee made it politically difficult for him to withdraw his support,¹¹ particularly as other influential names had lent their weight to the cause of a greater federation, amongst them N H Wilson, J W Keller, G M Ellman-Brown, C J Bourden, Stanley Cooke, Geof Beckett, Humphrey Gibbs, H St L Grenfell and other figures of note from Kenya and Tanganyika.¹² In the end it took the personal intervention of Sir Evelyn Baring, the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, to persuade Huggins to neither address nor attend Stirling's settler convention.¹³

A couple of months after the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister had extracted himself from Stirling's scheme, a third attempt to produce

a greater federation began. Leading members of the Kenyan settler establishment sought Welensky's support for Kenya, and possibly Tanganyika as well, to join the proposed central Africa Federation. Welensky outlined his position on the proposed union most clearly in a letter to Havelock of 6 June 1952.

I told Blundell last year that my view was that it was necessary for the Europeans in Kenya to maintain the status quo until we had achieved Central African Federation. Once we have achieved that and have the status of a near Dominion it will be much easier for us to help the British Colonies adjoining. I mention this to you because I do think that any changes that may be possible in your part of the world should be made bearing in mind the fact that at some not too distant time in the future there is the possibility of a link-up with us. I think I must also try and impress on you that for the present it would not help our cause here in Central Africa to suggest we are likely to link up with East Africa. This is due to a fairly strong element in Southern Rhodesia who fear the possibility of Asiatic immigration from East Africa into the Rhodesias.¹⁴

The British Government was also strongly of the opinion that any serious canvassing of the idea of a link up between central and east Africa should be avoided as it would endanger the chances of successfully achieving central African Federation, by sowing confusion and creating the impression that Federation was the first step in a larger strategy to invest control of the whole of British east and central Africa in the hands of the white settlers.¹⁵ The British Government may not have intended this larger strategy but some at least of the white settlers most certainly did, as Welensky's letter to Havelock, above, indicated.

After the Southern Rhodesian referendum the establishment of a Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland seemed to be guaranteed

and, in the strategy, the Kenyan settler leaders had agreed with Welensky, the next step was to press for the formation of a greater federation of east and central Africa. Havelock and Welensky had decided that the best plan was for Kenya to maintain a loose east African Association, allowing Kenya and Tanganyika, but not Uganda, to be incorporated into the central African Federation at the earliest possible opportunity after its formation. Welensky was, moreover, going to investigate with the British Government the possibilities of the Federation, once it was constituted, assuming the Trusteeship of Tanganyika from the United Kingdom.¹⁶ However, in July 1953, Havelock heard from Blundell and Ward, who had met with Welensky in London a few weeks earlier, that he now favoured the formation of an east African Federation which would be able to unite with the central African Federation at a later date. Havelock remained committed to the earlier plan and claimed that Baring fully supported his proposal that the settler leaders of east and central Africa should launch a co-ordinated campaign for the establishment of a five nation federation.¹⁷ In contrast Huggins had informed Blundell that he believed that it would be a decade before the Federation would be in a position to expand northwards.¹⁸ Welensky's change of approach to the attainment of a greater federation seems to have been motivated by the wish to maintain northward expansion as a realistic option in the face of Huggins' lack of enthusiasm and the opposition of Southern Rhodesia's white population to such a move. Indeed, Welensky admitted to Havelock that he and Huggins disagreed on the issue of moving towards a greater

federation.¹⁹ Huggins felt that Kenya needed to gain greater political autonomy from London before union with the central African Federation could be considered, whereas Welensky recognised that the stumbling block was white Southern Rhodesian popular opinion. He saw the early federation of Kenya and Tanganyika as a means of preventing the British Government from increasing African representation in those two territories to such an extent that union with the central African Federation would become an anathema to white Southern Rhodesians.

Although Welensky was, by August 1953, convinced of the need to consolidate the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland before looking to add Kenya and Tanganyika, he remained committed to such expansion as a desirable objective. Welensky recognised that there was no possibility of closer association with east Africa at that point in time, given the fears generated by the Mau Mau disturbances and Southern Rhodesian concern over the size of Kenya's and Tanganyika's Indian populations. Nonetheless, while Welensky recognised that future moves towards closer association with Kenya and Tanganyika would need to be undertaken gradually and cautiously, he remained convinced of the desirability of such moves, which cannot be said of Huggins.²⁰

In the early 1950s as well as the various attempts to initiate moves towards closer association with the central African territories' northern neighbours, there occurred a determined effort to bring Bechuanaland into the proposed Federation. Before examining this development we must consider briefly some of the more extravagant

plans for a greater federation that were mooted in all seriousness during this period. It should be borne in mind that the main motivation for these proposals was to ensure that the sought-after central African Federation would be strong enough to maintain its independence from South Africa and, if possible, have the potential to rival the Union as a regional power.

In early 1952, the Southern Rhodesian Joint National Council (JNC) led by F Gordon Harper and A C Soffe sought Welensky's support in their attempt to persuade the Trusteeship Committee of the UNO to agree to the incorporation of the northern portions of South West Africa and Bechuanaland into the proposed central African Federation.²¹ Welensky supported Harper and Soffe's desire to secure a seaport for the proposed federation and extend its borders southwards, acquisitions that the JNC had been campaigning for since at least 1950.²² Moreover, although Welensky was prepared to encourage them in their attempt albeit unofficially, he was also very aware of the immense difficulties facing the JNC in their pursuit of this goal. Not least of these problems was the lack of Huggins' support.²³ The combined opposition of the British, South African and Southern Rhodesian Governments ensured that the JNCs campaign was abandoned almost before it got started, despite support from other influential figures in Northern Rhodesia.²⁴

In retrospect such grandiose schemes may appear slightly farcical but at the time they were contemplated in all seriousness and not just by white settlers. In June 1952, Frederick Crawford, who went on to become the Governor of Uganda, wrote to Welensky setting out his

thoughts on the whole issue of creating a federation in central Africa to act as a counterbalance to the Union.²⁵ Whilst Crawford's views may not have been representative of other senior figures in the Colonial Service, they do show that even as late as 1952, the idea of redistributing the territorial boundaries and authority for governing huge chunks of Africa was very much alive.

In his letter, Crawford informed Welensky of his conviction that if a central African Federation failed to emerge then South Africa would eventually absorb the Rhodesias. Crawford advocated the creation of a greater federation consisting of not only the Rhodesias, Nyasaland and Bechuanaland but also the other two High Commission territories, Natal and either the southern section of Mozambique or the northern section of South West Africa. His justification for such a large federation was opposition to what he saw as the Government's policy of appeasement towards South Africa and fear of Afrikaner expansion, as his advice to Welensky - that all Afrikaners in the Rhodesias be expelled - reveals. The notion that Natal might secede from the Union of South Africa and join a central African Federation was a realistic possibility. Throughout 1952, sections of the white, English speaking population of Natal were preparing the ground for a possible break with the Union and receiving strong support from the state's United Party.²⁶ Be that as it may, neither Crawford's nor the JNCs initiatives came to anything. However, the interesting point is that the two proposals were made at all, and were taken seriously by some of the individuals and governments central to establishment of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

Indeed, as we shall see, Welensky was prepared to pursue the idea of incorporating Bechuanaland and the northern part of South West Africa on his own initiative only one year later.

One aspect of the JNCs and Crawford's suggestions that was pursued with some vigour in the lead up to the creation of a central African Federation was the proposed incorporation of Bechuanaland. During 1951, Whitehead and Welensky had voiced their support for the incorporation of either the whole of Bechuanaland or its northern part into a central African Federation.²⁷ Then, in July 1952, L S Glover of the Bechuanaland European Advisory Council approached Welensky with proposals for Bechuanaland's entry into the soon to be created Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland.²⁸ Welensky's response was enthusiastic and, while making it clear to Glover that Huggins was not in a position to reply formally to his approach, Welensky did attempt to get the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister involved in an indirect and unofficial dialogue with Glover on the issue of Bechuanaland's incorporation.²⁹ In response Huggins adopted the attitude that while Bechuanaland's inclusion would be welcome his and Welensky's efforts should be concentrated on obtaining the three territory federation on offer; to attempt to include Bechuanaland at this late stage would only complicate matters.³⁰ Huggins felt, moreover, that Bechuanaland would inevitably eventually join a successful federation rather than be incorporated by South Africa but, initially at least, all the Federation's resources would be fully allocated in developing Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and so would be unable to cope with a third under-developed territory.

Given Huggins' response, Welensky could do no more than encourage Glover to attempt to build support within Bechuanaland for incorporation into the Federation and await the opportunity to re-open discussion of the issue with the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister. In the meantime Welensky maintained a regular correspondence with Glover in order to be kept abreast of developments. In October 1952, Glover informed Welensky that Bathoen II, OBE, Chief of the Banwaketse was keen that Bechuanaland be incorporated into the central African Federation provided the High Commission Territory's individual identity could be preserved within the Federal State. Moreover, Glover believed that Bathoen II could convince Tshekedi Khama of the advantages of entering the Federation and emphasised to Welensky the benefits that would accrue to the British supporters of Federation in presenting their case if Bechuanaland's African Chiefs came out in favour of entering the central African Federation.³¹ Welensky was not slow to inform Lord Salisbury, the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, about the contents of Glover's letter.³² The following month he received more good news when Glover informed him that Bechuanaland's European Advisory Council had voted 7 - 1 in favour of the motion:

That Council consider the Draft Federation Scheme relative to the proposed Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and that action be taken to explore the advisability and opportunity for the Bechuanaland Protectorate to become a Member State within the Federation.³³

Initially the intention had been to place the motion agreed at the European Advisory Council before Bechuanaland's Joint Advisory Council, but as there was not another meeting of this Council

scheduled until May 1953, Glover decided in March to send the motion directly to the High Commissioner. In the same month Glover informed Welensky that one of the repercussions of the Bamangwato affair was that Bathoen II was not now prepared to publicly support Bechuanaland joining the central African Federation without the support of Tshekedi Khama, support which was not as yet forthcoming.³⁴

Towards the end of July 1953, Glover made a revised proposal to Welensky in which Bechuanaland and South West Africa would be divided between South Africa and the Federation along the twenty-first parallel.³⁵ As Glover explained to Welensky, the proposal should be attractive to the Union as they would be gaining a large portion of Bechuanaland and giving up only a small section of South West Africa, while the Federation would be gaining the all-important seaport it required. The difficulty would be in obtaining the British Government's consent. Welensky was hopeful that agreement could be reached along the lines outlined by Glover.³⁶ The following month he wrote to Huggins in an attempt to convince the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister of the need to begin negotiations.³⁷

Huggins' initial response was non-committal,³⁸ but it soon became clear that he was opposed to taking any sort of initiative over Bechuanaland or in pursuit of a seaport for Federation.³⁹ The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was loath to offend Malan and now believed that Southern Rhodesia's white opposition would oppose the addition of another overwhelmingly 'native state' to the Federation.

Huggins was content to let the matter rest until such time as the United Kingdom Government proposed to allow part of Bechuanaland to be incorporated into South Africa, at which time the central African Federation would absorb the northern area of the High Commission Territory, an area to which Southern Rhodesia had staked a claim.

Huggins' position was unequivocal, but on being informed that not only was Bathoen II in favour of Bechuanaland entering the central African Federation but also most of the territory's other African Chiefs, Welensky determined to make one last attempt to gain Huggins' support for the Federal Government to take the initiative.⁴⁰

In January 1954, Welensky wrote to Huggins arguing in favour of vigorously pursuing Glover's proposals on Bechuanaland and South West Africa and requesting a meeting with the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister at which he could expand his arguments.⁴¹ At this meeting Welensky managed to persuade Huggins to meet with Glover to discuss his proposals further.⁴² However, before such a meeting could be arranged Bechuanaland's Resident Commissioner forcefully rejected any suggestion that all or part of the territory would be allowed to merge with the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland and thus enabled Huggins to reject Welensky's overtures and return to his position of wait and see.⁴³

One can only speculate as to why Welensky was repeatedly more open to the suggestions for the expansion of the proposed central African Federation to include additional territories to the north or south,

but one factor influencing his approach may well have been that the larger the Federation the more difficult it would be for Southern Rhodesia to dominate it.

CHAPTER 4

Amalgamation or Federation?

Huggins and Welensky diverge over the form of Closer Association

An important change in central Africa produced by the second world war was the establishment of the Central African Council. This Council's actions and relationships with the governments of the three Territories were of prime importance in generating and shaping the moves towards federation during the immediate post-war period.

The Central African Council and Nyasaland

By the middle of 1946 considerable differences existed between the Governor of Nyasaland, Sir Edmund Richards, and the Chief Secretary of the Central African Council (CAC), W A W Clark. Richards remained convinced that Nyasaland should be linked with east Africa and prevented from joining any attempts at closer association in central Africa.¹ He viewed with disquiet Clark's attempts from November 1945 onwards to establish a unified Central African European Education Department, arguing that such a move would be "an irrevocable step in the direction of amalgamation, which has been completely ruled out as impracticable by the British government" whilst the African populations remain opposed.² Although Clark countered with the argument that the east African example had shown that the unification of a few departments did not result in amalgamation, but merely closer co-operation, Richards strongly maintained his position, strengthened by the knowledge that Clark

was seeking a unified European Education Department at the behest of Roy Welensky and Gore-Browne.

Differences between the Nyasaland Government and the CAC were not confined to European education alone. A further cause of friction was the different interpretations placed upon the term 'joint services'. The Nyasaland Government understood 'joint services' to be where the department of one territory provided the service for all three with the costs split among them or where a public utility was administered by a joint body on behalf of all three territories. Clark and the Northern and Southern Rhodesian Governments regarded 'joint services' as being the formation of unitary departments to cover all three territories.³ Clark's frustration with the Nyasaland Government's obstructionist attitude towards the CAC⁴ was shared by the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir Campbell Tait.⁵ Sir John Waddington, Governor of Northern Rhodesia, backed Clark's position and gained the support of A B Cohen (later Sir Andrew) at the Colonial Office.⁶ Cohen argued vigorously and convincingly within the Colonial Office for Nyasaland to be instructed to co-operate with the CAC and for full backing to be given to this "essay in regionalism".⁷ Indeed, so eager was Cohen for closer co-operation to be achieved in central Africa, that when Richards accused Clark and others of using the CAC as a vehicle for amalgamation,⁸ he ignored the evidence of Clark's own memorandum in categorically dismissing the claim.⁹ Cohen rejected Richards' accusation, not because it was false, but because he feared that to admit its validity would undermine the position of

the CAC to the extent that the whole policy of regional co-operation in central Africa would come under threat.

Sir Eric Machtig and Sir George Cater, Permanent Under-Secretaries at the Commonwealth Relations and Colonial Offices respectively, accepted Cohen's proposed course of action in instructing Richards to co-operate, but tacitly accepted the truth of the Nyasaland Governor's claim when spelling out imperial policy for central Africa to Clark. Machtig went to some pains to emphasise to Clark that joint services were not a step towards amalgamation but an integral part of Britain's policy of working for closer co-ordination which had been adopted as "a workable alternative to amalgamation" since, in accordance with the 1944 declaration "amalgamation is not practicable under existing circumstances".¹⁰ Gater, in instructing Richards to co-operate over joint services, also made an attempt to convince the Nyasaland Governor that his present attitude only served to enhance the prospects of the very thing he opposed: "Unless we are prepared to make a real working success of the CAC the forces which are working towards amalgamation will only be strengthened. Hence the importance of showing on our side a wholehearted willingness to make the policy of co-ordination a successful one in practice". Aware that Machtig had brought Clark into line, Gater assured Richards that he had misjudged Clark and was wrong in attributing pro-amalgamation leanings to the CAC's Chief Secretary.¹¹ We must immediately ask why Clark was striving to foster moves towards amalgamation, in direct contradiction of Imperial Government policy, until brusquely reminded of that policy. More importantly,

why was Cohen so determined to support closer association in central Africa that he attempted to mislead his superiors as to Clark's attitude?

Clark was convinced that only by a policy whereby the United Kingdom consciously sought amalgamation - with due provision for safeguarding African rights and interests - would Imperial aims in central Africa conform "with the evolution of the Commonwealth and Empire to date, and with the policy which is being pursued by the UK government today in other parts of the colonial Empire."

In Clark's view, the Secretary of State's statement of 18 October 1944 supported moves towards closer association in central Africa and unless such moves were seen to be being vigorously pursued by Britain and its representatives in central Africa, then the government and people of Southern Rhodesia would become disillusioned. If that occurred then the reversal of the Southern Rhodesian negative attitude regarding federation with the Union of South Africa would become a real possibility.¹² Clark may also have been persuaded that his policy was in sympathy with the views of the Secretary of State at the Dominions Office, Viscount Addison.¹³

Moreover, the fear of Southern Rhodesia turning away from the liberal North and towards South Africa was central to Cohen's response to the controversy over joint services. Cohen emphasised the economic benefits closer association would accord the territories and argued that Northern Rhodesia's unofficial colour bar would never be successfully eradicated until such times as Southern Rhodesia removed this feature in its economy. By introducing joint services

for subjects such as European Education, Customs and Posts and Telegraphs, Cohen argued that there was every chance of Southern Rhodesia becoming convinced of the advantages of Nyasaland's liberal attitude towards employing Africans and no real danger of Southern Rhodesian social custom spreading to Nyasaland. In this manner Southern Rhodesia would, hopefully, begin to question its colour bar and the Colonial Office could endeavour to encourage this tendency, albeit by indirect means. Cohen's final point was that the growth of a liberalising attitude in Southern Rhodesia would benefit Sir Godfrey Huggins, as opposed to the Liberal party which had been heavily backed by the Afrikaner vote at the recent election.¹⁴ It is worth noting that almost identical arguments were used to promote a limited form of federation after the CAC had been irreparably undermined in 1949-50.

Any continuing ambiguity regarding Nyasaland's attitude towards the CAC was apparently dispelled when Sir Geoffrey Colby succeeded Richards in 1948. Certainly, Colby was far more positive towards the CAC than his predecessor had been, yet his support was not based on a belief in closer co-ordination in central Africa, but rather on the acceptance of Gater's argument to Richards that any other approach would only serve to strengthen the demands for amalgamation. Colby firmly believed that Nyasaland's best interests would be served by closer association with east Africa and Tanganyika in particular. In accepting the need to support the CAC to frustrate efforts aimed at political integration, Colby did not lose sight of this, his ultimate hope for Nyasaland.

Cohen was concerned enough by Colby's attitude to try to persuade Creech Jones to discourage strongly the Nyasaland Governor from this viewpoint during the Secretary of State's visit to Nyasaland in April 1949.¹⁵ If such a reprimand was delivered, it evidently failed to deter Colby from continuing to argue the merits of an east African linkage.¹⁶ In maintaining this stance against the united opposition of the Colonial Office in London, Colby was bolstered by the open support he received from his senior Colonial Service officers in Nyasaland,¹⁷ not so much for his east African aspirations as for his view of Southern Rhodesian designs, which in turn strengthened his will to seek to avoid Southern Rhodesian domination, by linking with the North. Colby and Cecil Barker, Nyasaland's Northern Provincial Commissioner, regarded Southern Rhodesia as only interested in Nyasaland as a cheap labour pool and believed that there was every likelihood of both the Rhodesias being submerged into the Union.¹⁸ This was yet another argument, in Colby's view, for Nyasaland to link with east Africa rather than the Rhodesias. It is interesting to note that one of the arguments used by Cohen in attacking Colby's hopes of an east African link up was "the extreme importance of Nyasaland labour to Central Africa".¹⁹

As has been shown, Richards and Nyasaland were unco-operative over CAC from its inception and strongly opposed to what they saw as the underlying purpose of the Council, namely the promotion of amalgamation. Richard's successor, Colby, whilst supporting the Council, did so only as a means of frustrating moves for amalgamation

and, like Richards, would have preferred Nyasaland to break from central Africa and be more closely linked with Tanganyika and east Africa. The British Government's enthusiasm for the CAC was founded more on expediency than principle. Clark, the Council's first Chief Secretary actively sought to use its mechanism as a means to fostering moves towards amalgamation. Indeed, the CACs only real support came from succeeding Governors of Northern Rhodesia, Sir John Waddington and Sir Gilbert Rennie.²⁰ They endorsed its stated aims of promoting co-operation on economic matters and technical and administrative services whilst not threatening the three territories' political separateness, although others may have tried to use it for this purpose. Huggins and the Southern Rhodesian Government had been disappointed that all that was forthcoming in 1944 was the CAC. Nevertheless, it was accepted as being better than nothing and as a small step towards amalgamation. Moreover, Huggins had seen immediately that the Council could be used to push for amalgamation, but, if progress were not forthcoming, this very lack of movement could be used as an argument for something more concrete to replace it.²¹ The CAC was therefore viewed in different ways as a vehicle for promoting amalgamation, a means of preventing amalgamation, and a mechanism for delaying any decision over closer association in central Africa. Only within the Northern Rhodesian administration was it regarded as being an end in itself.

Having persuaded Welensky not to reject the CAC out of hand, but instead to use it as a means of pushing for amalgamation,²² Huggins was undermined in this strategy by the results of the 1946 Southern

Rhodesian General Elections.²³ Even during the election campaign the United Party tended to play down their commitment to amalgamation because of its lack of appeal in the country,²⁴ although Huggins continued to campaign forcefully in favour.²⁵ The large gains won by the Liberal Party on a ticket strongly opposed to any links with the 'black north', served to strengthen the tendency in the minority United Party Government to avoid the amalgamation issue altogether, if possible. Huggins' government, dependent on the Rhodesia Labour Party for a majority in the Legislature, retained amalgamation as a stated policy, but in practice did nothing and sought to postpone or deflect debates, demanded by the Liberal Party, proposing immediate Dominion status for Southern Rhodesia as an alternative to amalgamation. As a consequence Welensky experienced a very frustrating two years in which not only would no initiatives on amalgamation be forthcoming from Southern Rhodesia, but his own attempts in that direction regularly failed to even gain a response from Huggins' government.

Welensky's Efforts to keep alive the Campaign for Amalgamation

Welensky has expected the Southern Rhodesian election result to lead to a weakening of Southern Rhodesia's commitment to the CAC,²⁷ but their refusal to face the amalgamation issue, placed the responsibility of maintaining pressure on the Imperial and Colonial Governments for closer association squarely at his door. The extent to which the Southern Rhodesian Government had abandoned the pursuit of amalgamation was clearly revealed in December 1946. In that month Welensky proposed a conference of Southern and Northern Rhodesian parliamentarians to be convened by Creech Jones and called on the Southern

Rhodesian Government to state its position on amalgamation in order to help convince the British Government.²⁷ The lack of response from Southern Rhodesian official circles was total.

As we have already seen, Welensky had been seeking to pressurise the Northern Rhodesian Government over the amalgamation issue since early in 1941.²⁸ From 1944 he had been presenting proposals for amalgamation in the Legislative Council as frequently as standing orders allowed: about every six months. His primary intention in so doing was to force the territory's government to drop its blocking device of referring each proposal to the Bledisloe Commission Report and the statement of 18 October 1944, and force it into either definitely accepting or clearly rejecting the principle of amalgamation. In this attempt, the wording of his proposal presented in October 1946 was particularly perceptive.

Welensky's motion read:

"That it is in the best interests of both Europeans and Africans that the territories of Northern and Southern Rhodesia should be amalgamated as soon as it is reasonably practicable."²⁹

This skilfully worded motion presented the Northern Rhodesian Government with the dilemma that the use of the usual method to neutralise the proposal could be widely perceived as a rejection of the desirability of amalgamation, a view that Welensky would be sure to emphasise and seek to capitalise. Not only would such a position be very unpopular amongst the Europeans in Northern Rhodesia, it would also be a departure from previous statements which had tended to support amalgamation in principle, whilst accepting its

impracticality under existing circumstances.³⁰ Yet, to accept Welensky's statement would be in direct conflict with the Colonial Office policy for central Africa of supporting closer association short of amalgamation or federation. Although the Colonial Office had taken care to avoid publicly stating its policy, it had, nevertheless, definitely determined to reject amalgamation, as Welensky knew well.³¹

Welensky's other purposes behind his motion were twofold. He sought to force the territorial government to open up the crucial and highly charged question of 'native' policy and to examine any differences between the two Rhodesias' policies towards the Africans. Such an examination would be highly embarrassing to both the Northern Rhodesian and British Governments, containing, as it must, implicit criticisms at least, of Southern Rhodesia's 'native' policy and highlighting differences between the theory and practice of Northern Rhodesia's 'native' policy. However, as both Bledisloe and the official statement of October 1944 advocated, the indefinite delay of amalgamation due to differences in 'native' policy between the Rhodesias, only by forcing the British and Northern Rhodesian Governments to face and re-examine the issue could Welensky hope to resurrect the feasibility of amalgamation.

The other intention of the motion was to enable the Unofficials representing African interests in the Legislative Council to support it in good faith. By avoiding actually proposing amalgamation, but only seeking agreement that it was in the best interests of both African and European, Welensky hoped to succeed where he had failed

in the past and gain the support of Gore-Browne, Mrs Hay and Dr Fisher, the Bishop of Northern Rhodesia.³² Indeed, so keen was Welensky to gain their support, Gore-Browne's in particular, that he temporarily altered the wording of the motion to accommodate their views.³³

When Welensky's motion was actually debated in Northern Rhodesia's Legislative Council, on 11 December 1946, its rejection signalled defeat for his three hopes. The Unofficial representatives for African interests failed to support it and the territorial government stonewalled effectively to avoid both raising the 'native' policy question and giving the impression that they were rejecting the principle of amalgamation.³⁴ The territorial government achieved this result by continuously referring Welensky to the Bledisloe Commission Report, paragraphs 478-479, and adopting the position that no judgment could be made on the divergent 'native' policies of Northern and Southern Rhodesia, because it was too soon to be certain how they would develop and which one would, ultimately, prove to be in the African's best interests. The government maintained that, until the trends in the differing 'native' policies became clear and all doubts as to their consequences were removed, amalgamation could not be contemplated.³⁵

This setback, closely following Southern Rhodesia's lack of response over the amalgamation issue, does not appear to have dented Welensky's resolve to continue to campaign for the union of central Africa. Indeed, he took measures to intensify his efforts. After being elected as Gore-Browne's successor as leader of Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials, on 18 November,³⁴ Welensky resigned from the Executive

Council on 21 December in order to disassociate himself from the administration and its decisions and to free himself to lead the Unofficials in the Legislative Council more vigourously as an effective opposition to the government.³⁷ The effect of Welensky's resignation was tempered by the other two Unofficials, Gore-Browne and Page, retaining their places on the Executive Council. Nevertheless, Welensky continued to press for amalgamation in and out of the Legislative Council.

In April 1947, Welensky made another attempt to involve the Southern Rhodesian administration over amalgamation by demanding that it state its official position on the issue.³⁸ No response was forthcoming and it was the Liberal Party that finally forced Huggins to break his silence, in May. Stumbles claimed that the CAC was outwith Southern Rhodesia's control, too expensive and moving towards amalgamation. Denying all three charges Huggins replied that it was ridiculous to claim that the CAC was promoting amalgamation as its only member, apart from himself, to support that policy, was Welensky.³⁹ Huggins' analysis of the views of the members of the CAC may have been accurate,⁴⁰ but Clark, the Chief Secretary, had continued to foster amalgamation through the Council as best he could, despite the clear instructions from London to desist. In January 1947, Clark had claimed that the CAC was making small, but nevertheless, significant advances towards the implementation of amalgamation and eventual Dominion status and he established a special committee of the Council, in March, to study the unification of central Africa.⁴¹

Although the Southern Rhodesian Government remained passive⁴²

Clark's leadership of the CAC was not the only support Welensky was receiving on the question of amalgamation. The abdication of the government from involvement in any move towards amalgamation, from late 1945 onwards, was not accompanied by a similar withdrawal by Southern Rhodesian business and press. Within business circles support remained high for the United Party's election programme of the progressive attainment of central African union, Dominion status and closer co-operation with central Africa's neighbours, leading eventually to a greater federation or United States of Africa.⁴³

The Rhodesia Herald and The Bulawayo Chronicle frequently filled the void, caused by the administration's silence, warmly endorsing Welensky's calls for amalgamation and agitating for Southern Rhodesia to re-enter the closer association lists.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, without the clear support of the Southern Rhodesian Government for amalgamation Welensky's arguments were weakened and he was inhibited from pressing the issue to a confrontation resulting in opposition to, and non-co-operation with, the Northern Rhodesian Government.

Frustration with the Southern Rhodesian attitude caused Welensky to consider more indirect ways of promoting amalgamation and possible methods of circumventing Southern Rhodesia's official indifference, by appealing directly to its electorate. In June 1947 Welensky seriously considered touring Southern Rhodesia with Beckett in order to make amalgamation a live issue again in the territory.⁴⁵ Having rejected this option on the grounds that resentment in outside interference in Southern Rhodesia's internal affairs would be likely to

outweigh any support for amalgamation produced by the campaign, Welensky turned his attention elsewhere. He proposed the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia with Nyasaland, apparently as a first step towards the complete unification of central Africa, although he avoided presenting it as such.⁴⁶ Colby certainly had no doubts as to what Welensky's motives were.⁴⁷ There can be no doubt that this was a serious attempt by Welensky to unite the Northern territories, as his insistence that the proposal be forwarded to the Secretary of State indicates. The Northern Rhodesian administration had successfully stalled over the issue, but nevertheless Welensky was demanding a response by May 1949.⁴⁸

In addition to his moves towards union with Nyasaland, Welensky was, from late 1947, pressing for constitutional advances towards responsible government in Northern Rhodesia. In January 1948, he stepped up his campaign, demanding that if there were no moves towards amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia then progress towards responsible government would have to be forthcoming. His efforts were boosted by the support of Gore-Browne who argued that African rights were adequately safe-guarded under the Unofficials' proposals. The Unofficials were enraged by Thornton's claim in response, that these proposals for responsible government could be seen as the forerunner of amalgamation.⁴⁹ Although Gore-Browne categorically denied Thornton's claim - which was repeatedly attacked for having destroyed any chance of African support for the constitutional proposals through his linking them with amalgamation⁵⁰ - Colby used the fact that representative government was being sought and the

uncertainty over its outcome and effect on Southern Rhodesia's attitude towards amalgamation, to reject any consideration of Nyasaland amalgamating with Northern Rhodesia.⁵¹ There is some justification for Thornton and Colby's view, as Welensky, Beckett and other Unofficials tended to present their demands for the amalgamation of central Africa and their proposals for responsible government as, at best, complementary and, at worst, dependent on one another.⁵²

Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials' pressure for responsible government coincided with two separate attempts to form committees in Southern Rhodesia to press for amalgamation. Stanley Cooke under the auspices of the Southern Rhodesian Goodwill Mission held an exploratory meeting in Bulawayo early in February and Captain F E Harris met with Welensky and Beckett in Lusaka later in the month to discuss a similar idea.⁵³ Colonel David Stirling's Salisbury-based Federal Union Capricorn Africa was already in existence and had been since July 1947, but the emphasis of its campaigning was for a United States of Africa, rather than concentrating on the Union of central Africa as a first step.

There is evidence to suggest that Huggins was at least supportive of Harris' initiative and even sponsored the idea of his Lusaka visit.⁵⁴ That Welensky and Gore-Browne released their responsible government proposals immediately after Harris' visit indicates that their purpose was not confined to settler advance in Northern Rhodesia, but also to encourage Southern Rhodesia to look more favourably on union with the north. Harris had only recently retired from politics after

surviving for twelve years as Minister for Agriculture in Huggins' government and was regarded as something of an elder statesman within Southern Rhodesia. With the support of Huggins and Welensky, the United Central Africa Association was formed at two meetings in Bulawayo on 12 and 31 March 1948. Harris was elected President and the committee consisted of Stanely Cooke, R F Halsted (Food Controller for Southern Rhodesia), Colonel C M Newman, A C Thornton, and A M Bentley (Chairman of Rhodesia Stock Exchange).⁵⁵ The organisation was to be non-party political and so, although both David Young⁵⁶ and G A Davenport⁵⁷ had supported the association's establishment and spoken up publicly in favour of amalgamation, neither was on its central committee.

Federation Supplants Amalgamation as the favoured means of closer Association

The next event of any significance affecting the amalgamation issue occurred not in central Africa, but in South Africa. As has already been demonstrated, South Africa and British Imperial policy towards the Union, were a constant and over-riding factor influencing support for closer association in central Africa. Smuts' defeat in the South African general elections of 26 May 1948 and the formation of a Nationalist-Afrikaner government by David F Malan on the 3 June produced dramatic changes in central Africa and London. Welensky's immediate response to the news was that it served to underline the need for the creation of a counterbalance to South Africa, a united central Africa, but that if such unity was not forthcoming then this new Afrikaner threat would bring Northern Rhodesia's union with east Africa into consideration.⁵⁸ Although

Welensky had long favoured the principle of closer association with east Africa he felt that the geographical and communications difficulties made it impracticable.⁵⁹ It is possible that the emergence of an Afrikaner South Africa persuaded him to re-examine the feasibility of links with east Africa, but even if this was the case, Welensky's main consideration in raising this alternative possibility would have been to apply pressure and gain leverage on the Southern Rhodesian and British Governments over amalgamation for central Africa. This is not to say that Welensky did not take the danger of the Rhodesias being absorbed into an Afrikaner-ruled Union seriously. He did, but he was very aware that others would have taken it just as seriously and view the possibility with even more antipathy. Moreover, given an Afrikaner Union to the south, Britain might concede in central Africa what Welensky's consistent pressure, since the early forties, had failed to achieve: closer political association.

Apprehension over Afrikaner immigration as much as the acceptance of George Hall and Stanley Oliver's unequivocal opinions of 1946,⁶⁰ persuaded Welensky to drop demands for amalgamation in favour of federation. Another determining factor may well have been H Nigel Parry's conviction that, whereas the United Kingdom would never agree to amalgamation it might well consider federation. After discussions between Welensky and representatives from the UCAA early in June, it was announced that federation, rather than amalgamation, was the association's goal. It was explained that this change in policy was intended to allay African fears and convince any observer

that African interests would be adequately safeguarded.⁶² The other, unstated, reason was that it would enable Welensky to point to support for federation in Southern Rhodesia when he pressed the case for it, rather than amalgamation, to Creech Jones in London in late July. Although aware that official talks on closer association were not possible, as only Northern Rhodesian representatives would be in London, Welensky had requested, through Rennie, that a frank exchange of views take place⁶³ and the Colonial Office had agreed to this.⁶⁴

As a result of this activity Sir Thomas Lloyd⁶⁵ was confidently expecting Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials to change their demands from amalgamation to federation before long.⁶⁶ The Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices were also being informed by Parry that the CAC had achieved about as much as it could. This refrain, that the CAC had outlasted its usefulness, was one that was to be increasingly heard within Southern Rhodesia from late 1948 onwards.⁶⁷ For that reason it is worth noting that the main factor that convinced Parry that the Council had gone as far as it would, was Huggins' deliberate determination to curtail the Council and prevent it from achieving any clear success. When it is noted that by the time of the CACs formation, Huggins had already mapped out a scenario, which the Council's failure would strengthen the weight of argument for amalgamation, Parry's conviction appears to have been accurate. Parry, therefore, believed Huggins would prevent the CAC from succeeding and was sure that Britain would never agree to amalgamation and, as a result, he began to push the idea of a federation.

In a memorandum circulated to members of the CAC on 12 July 1948, Parry strongly advocated the case for the early federation of central Africa with the longer term possibility of linking with east Africa.⁶⁸ As a result Parry received a reprimand from Lambert for presenting proposals when this was not part of his remit.

Within a few weeks, however, Lambert was forced to admit that the United Kingdom was seriously considering the idea of federation. The main reason for this change in official policy was that the new support within central Africa for the idea of federation had been seized by Cohen as a possible means of resolving the United Kingdom's long-standing hopes for central Africa and fears of South African advance.

Cohen had felt for some time that federation should be Britain's ultimate goal for central Africa, but had taken the line that this could only occur once the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia had developed enough politically to play an effective role in the federation structure. This position was almost certainly strengthened by the hope that African opposition to any form of closer association with Southern Rhodesia would decline with time. The change of attitude by Welensky and the UCAA, along with Parry's analysis of the limitations of the CAC, accompanied by supporting arguments for the alternative of federation, encouraged Cohen to advocate that the United Kingdom Government take the initiative in moving towards federation.⁶⁹ The recently-established East African High Commission was the obvious model for central African federation.⁷⁰ At this stage, Cohen was less concerned about possible schemes than with

establishing federation as the British Government's policy. Clark supported the early establishment of federation in central Africa but expressed the concern that this policy might fail to gain public support in central Africa. Cohen envisaged the main stumbling block would be in producing a scheme which retained the United Kingdom Government's ultimate responsibility for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, whilst not infringing on Southern Rhodesia's position as a self-governing colony.⁷¹

The issue of federation for central Africa was thoroughly examined at a meeting between representatives of the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office on 21 July 1948.⁷² Lloyd accepted that the CAC would need to evolve and Cohen pressed hard for an early move to constitute a federal association "for a limited range of subjects." Machtig and the CRO however, were far from convinced by the arguments for federation and pointed out that Southern Rhodesia's priority was Dominion status, and its political leaders would be unlikely to consider anything other than an all European federal association. It was agreed to defer any recommendations until the matter had been discussed with Huggins when he was in London in October. It is probable, but not certain, that Gordon Walker discussed the possibilities of federation with Huggins when he visited Southern Rhodesia in September 1948.⁷³

Both Colby and Rennie were opposed to raising the issue of federation and felt that adequate progress was being made under the CAC set-up. Apart from African opposition, the reasons they cited in opposing moves toward federation were, that their territories did not

have sufficient able people to support both a Legislative Council and a Federal Assembly, and that their territories were committed to development programmes on which they wanted to concentrate without the disruption of new and closer links with the rest of central Africa.⁷⁴ So when Welensky presented his arguments for federation to Creech Jones and the Colonial Office on 30 July 1948, he received a sympathetic hearing, but only Cohen, of the others present, was convinced of the need for federation.⁷⁵ At this meeting Welensky conceded that amalgamation could no longer be considered for central Africa. Although arguing strongly in favour of federation, he accepted that if Southern Rhodesia were not prepared to consider it as an alternative there was no point in proceeding with further discussions on it. The meeting agreed to Rennie's suggestion that the practical possibilities should be explored in central Africa prior to any further discussion with London.

Welensky appears to have returned to Broken Hill under the mistaken belief that Creech Jones accepted the case that the CAC had outlasted its usefulness.⁷⁶ Creech Jones did accept that if the CAC had reached the limit of its potential then some central authority, responsible for certain services along East African High Commission lines, would be required. The Secretary of State, however, made it perfectly plain that he was far from convinced that the Council had, in fact, achieved everything of which it was capable.⁷⁷ Whether this was the result of a genuine misunderstanding or an attempt by Welensky to intentionally mislead and raise the expectations of the European community in Northern Rhodesia and so put pressure on

the British Government, is unclear. However, the exchange of telegrams between Lloyd and Rennie⁷⁸ after Welensky's claims that the creation of a British Central African Dominion was imminent, on 19th August 1948,⁷⁹ would seem to support the latter. The fact that the Northern Rhodesian electors were going to the polls just over one week later and that a successful trip to London would reflect well on Welensky and his supporters, should also be borne in mind.⁸⁰

The Southern Rhodesian elections of 16 September 1948 saw Huggins and his United Party establish complete dominance, winning in 24 of the Assembly's 30 seats, on a tide of fear and prejudice against the emergence of an Afrikaner Nationalist government in South Africa. Although neither the immediate cause of the election - engineered by Huggins over a minor defeat on a CAC matter - nor the underlying reasons for it - primarily problems of sugar production - had anything to do with the sentiments that won the election for the United Party, it was an impressive achievement.⁸¹ Within the Colonial Office and CRO as a whole, the election results of 1948 in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia served to strengthen the conviction that Huggins' role as a moderate settler leader needed to be fostered to prevent him losing out, as Smuts had, in the Union, to a reactionary - white - coalition of urban labour and poor farmers. Increasingly it was felt that some accommodation of his aims for central Africa had become necessary.⁸²

Huggins was to be in London in October for the Dominions Prime Ministers' and Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference and it had been agreed in July by the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices, to take the opportunity to hold discussions on federation with him.

Prior to Huggins' departure different accounts were reaching London as to his views regarding federation. Cohen and Lambert had held talks with Welensky - who was in London for the British African Colonies Conference - who informed them that Huggins now favoured federation rather than amalgamation and had asked him to arrange talks with Creech Jones.⁸³ Cohen was eager to respond positively and arrange a meeting between Huggins, Welensky and representatives from the Colonial Office and CRO.⁸⁴ Yet in accepting Welensky's assurances as to Huggins' change of heart, Cohen appeared to overlook the position the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister had actually been advocating in Africa. Although Huggins did not rule out the option of federation in his public statement of 19 September and in his radio broadcast of 2 October, it was all too evident that his understanding of federation bore little resemblance to Cohen's and was fairly indistinguishable from amalgamation. Moreover, given that one of the main arguments used by Cohen in pressing for the early federation of central Africa was to establish a counterbalance to the Afrikaner ruled Union, Huggins' post-election victory speech on 17 September must have been disquieting. An elated Huggins had stated that he would press, in London, in October, for the union of the Rhodesias as the first step toward forming a central African Dominion with Nyasaland and a partnership with South Africa, leading eventually to a United States of Africa. Although Huggins emphasised, a couple of days later, that any United States of Africa was in the distant future, his plans for a united central Africa would appear to have completely undermined the main reason, in Colonial Office

eyes, for such a federation.⁸⁵ It is inconceivable that Cohen was unaware of Huggins' utterances. They were disregarded because Cohen felt they were not Huggins' real views, or that these had changed since Huggins' arrival in the United Kingdom, or else simply because they would prove inconvenient in his advocacy of a central African federation.

Apart from strengthening "Southern Rhodesia's hand in dealing with the Union", Cohen felt that the other great advantage of a federation for central Africa would be that it would enable the Colonial Office to build on the efforts already made by the CAC in persuading Southern Rhodesia to move toward its position on 'native' policy. Whilst conceding that Welensky had expressed doubts about Huggins' and Southern Rhodesia's acceptance, Cohen firmly proposed that the east African inter-territorial scheme be the model for central Africa. Lambert and Cohen recommended that the British Government clearly emphasise to Welensky and Huggins that this position would be the greatest degree of unity that they would be prepared to consider and that the specific problems of implementing the scheme, particularly that of persuading African opinion to accept it, would have to be resolved by the elected representatives in central Africa.⁸⁶ Lloyd added his support to the Cohen/Lambert position, but the proposed discussions between Creech Jones and Huggins did not occur, because Creech Jones avoided them.

Creech Jones had a great deal of respect for the views and abilities of Lloyd and Cohen, as his advancement of their careers showed,⁸⁷ yet on this occasion he neglected to follow their recommendations.⁸⁸ It

is difficult to be sure why Creech Jones prevented the proposed talks from proceeding, but the indications are that he felt the whole question was being rushed and so resisted Cohen's attempts to initiate moves towards the early creation of a federation in central Africa. Certainly the reason he offered to his officials and Welensky, that as Huggins had failed to raise the matter with him during their talks at the Commonwealth Conference, he assumed that they were not pursuing their request for talks, cannot be accepted.⁸⁹ One reason why Creech Jones wanted the whole question re-examined was that he felt that any counterweight to South Africa should include the High Commission Territories.⁹⁰ Indeed, in a 'Top Secret' memorandum to his senior officials early in October, Creech Jones concedes that there is a need for closer association in central Africa, but that such a grouping should be connected with the South African High Commission territories.⁹¹ He ends the memorandum by requesting suggestions for resolving the inherent problems involved. After adopting this stance, Creech Jones could not allow early attempts at federation limited to central Africa to go ahead in case agreement was reached, rendering the slender chances of High Commission Territory involvement void. In seeking such a radical re-organisation of British policy for southern and central Africa, Creech Jones would have required much more than the support of the Foreign Secretary, upon which he could normally depend. Moreover, even if the CRO could be won round - an unlikely prospect - and Attlee's personal antipathy to the Secretary of State overcome, Creech Jones was in no position to devote the time and energy such an enterprise would have required.⁹² It can be argued,

therefore, that Creech Jones rejected Cohen's initiative over early moves toward a central African Federation, on East African High Commission lines, because he saw them as an impossible dream. It will be seen, however, that impossible dreams could be realised in central African politics however unlikely they appeared at this time.

Cohen was disappointed that his proposals for early moves toward federation had not been accepted. Given that Welensky and the UCAA had endorsed federation and Huggins had apparently come around to supporting it as well, Cohen felt that a great opportunity for achieving a federation, with minimal central political control, had been lost.⁹³

The accuracy of his view is open to debate, but what cannot be disputed is that Huggins had definitely not rejected amalgamation in favour of federation.⁹⁴ Political realism motivated Welensky and the UCAAs adopting of what they openly described as the second best option, but Huggins was not prepared to drop amalgamation without a much longer struggle. Welensky may have thought that the categorical assurances given by Creech Jones and the Conservative Shadow Colonial Secretary, Oliver Stanley, in London early in October, to the effect that no British Government, whether Labour or Conservative, would accept amalgamation, had convinced Huggins to drop his amalgamation demands.⁹⁵ If so, he was very rapidly made aware that this was not the case.⁹⁶

With their hoped-for discussions on federation failing to materialise, Huggins and Welensky decided to take the initiative and announced, on 27 October, their plans for a conference to be held at the

Victoria Falls early in the new year. Southern Rhodesian opposition and Government spokesmen would be invited, as would Unofficial members of the northern territory's Legislative Council. The aim of the conference would be to agree on specific proposals for closer association as the basis of a negotiating position to present to the British Government. Welensky took some encouragement from Creech Jones' reiteration of his July position, that the United Kingdom Government would consider any scheme for closer association presented to it.

The Secretary of State took the opportunity of his final meeting with Welensky, late in October, to impress upon him strongly that no scheme would gain the support of the United Kingdom Government unless it was evident that it was acceptable to African opinion in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. As the Secretary of State had made the same point in July there could be no ambiguity over the matter. As far as Creech Jones was concerned the lack of African opposition, if not actual support, was a prerequisite for federation.⁹⁷ Given the intensity of African suspicion, in the Northern territories, toward Southern Rhodesia and the attitudes prevalent amongst the European community there, Welensky would have been under no illusions as to the difficulties of the task he had been set. His problems were not eased by Creech Jones instructing the Governments of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia not to take any initiatives over federation, but to leave the whole question with Welensky and the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials and with the Southern Rhodesian Government.⁹⁸ As a result Hudson, Northern

Rhodesia's Secretary for Native Affairs, could do no more than support Welensky and Gore-Browne's calls for Africans to examine the terms of federation carefully and to emphasise that federation was not amalgamation.⁹⁹

Having had his efforts to produce a central African Federation rebuffed in 1948, Cohen re-commenced his endeavours prior to Creech Jones' visit to central Africa in April 1949.¹⁰⁰ Within the Colonial Office the rough proposals for closer association agreed to at the February 1949 Victoria Falls conference were considered to be entirely unacceptable. Not only would the Nyasaland Government rebel at the prospect of such a degree of subjugation to Southern Rhodesia, it was also recognised that African opinion in the northern territories, particularly in Northern Rhodesia, would be exceedingly hostile. Cohen regretted that his proposals of 12 October 1948 had not been acted on, since, as the Unofficials conference had not only taken place but had agreed to a scheme with such a high level of central authority, it would not prove very much more difficult to obtain agreement on a scheme with minimal federal control, along the lines of the east African inter-territorial scheme. Cohen was highly sceptical that the Southern Rhodesians, in particular, would be satisfied with so limited a degree of federal control. He argued that closer association in central Africa would only be forthcoming if Britain altered its present position and took the initiative in producing an acceptable scheme.

Cohen and Lambert proposed that negotiations be started with the CRO to deduce the extent to which the east African scheme would have to be adapted for central Africa.¹⁰¹ Lloyd agreed that this would at least provide a suitable starting point for future discussions with representatives from central Africa. At these inter-office talks, Creech Jones definitely conceded that the CAC, as it was at present constituted, was inadequate. It was accepted that the agreement on a federal scheme arrived at by the political leaders of the European communities at the Victoria Falls was unacceptable, as it virtually surrendered the northern territories' independence to Southern Rhodesia. Any remaining hopes on Creech Jones' part for the High Commission Territories involvement in the federal planning ended when it was decided to avoid, if possible, the question of Bechuanaland, and Southern Rhodesian claims to all, or the northern part of it.¹⁰²

As the Colonial Office and CRO were not yet in a position to offer a definite initiative over federation by the time of Creech Jones' departure for central Africa, his visit was inevitably going to be of a primarily fact-finding nature. The line adopted by the Colonial Secretary was to listen sympathetically but not to commit the United Kingdom Government to any changes or definite positions. Nevertheless, in a meeting with Huggins and Welensky, the Secretary of State informed them that he now accepted that the CAC was inadequate. Whilst stipulating that the British Government would consider any proposals presented to it, it was evident, to Creech Jones at least, that there was a vast gulf between London and central

Africa over what federation would entail.¹⁰³ The extent of this difference was almost certainly not equally obvious to the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister and Welensky, as Creech Jones confined himself to expressing concern at aspects of the Victoria Falls proposals and did not state the narrow limits Britain envisaged for closer association. Moreover, although the Colonial Secretary did not give Welensky the assurance he sought that London would not reject federation proposals simply because of African opposition, Creech Jones did indicate that "sound proposals" would not be rejected on the basis of "ignorant or ill-informed opposition". Although the Secretary of State's actual words committed the British Government to precisely nothing, the impression they conveyed to Welensky and Huggins was that if a workable scheme could be agreed upon in central Africa and enough pressure applied on the United Kingdom Government, federation would be forthcoming and African opposition could be safely ignored. The argument that was going to carry most weight in applying pressure to London was that of the Afrikaner threat from the Union through immigration into the Rhodesias, and Welensky made ample use of it during this meeting with the Colonial Secretary.¹⁰⁴

The one firm commitment Creech Jones gave during his visit to central Africa was the old and oft-repeated one that the British Government would consider any federation proposals presented. Welensky's and Huggins' difficulty lay in gaining each other's agreement on such a scheme. At the heart of Welensky's and Huggins' failure, throughout 1949, to reach agreement on a specific scheme

for the joining of central Africa was that, whilst Welensky had accepted that only federation was attainable, Huggins, and his Cabinet colleagues even more so, were still only really interested in amalgamation. Announcing the date of the February 1949 Victoria Falls Conference, after discussions with Huggins on 18 December 1948, Welensky stated:

"I still believe that the easiest solution would be amalgamation, but it is no longer possible. The reasons are the opposition of the United Kingdom Government and of the Africans, certainly in Northern Rhodesia and possibly in Nyasaland".¹⁰⁵

The Pressure on the United Kingdom Government to produce an initiative on Closer Association

Huggins' fleeting flirtation with federation in London in October had passed before the Victoria Falls Conference.¹⁰⁶ Indeed he had returned from London convinced, by Creech Jones' avoidance of discussions concerning federation, that the British Government had determined not to negotiate the closer association issue with him. According to Parry, Huggins was convinced that the alternatives were early moves towards either a strong unitary federation or entry into the Union as the fifth province. Not surprisingly, it was the former option he pursued.¹⁰⁷ The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister's conviction that London was deeply prejudiced against closer association for central Africa, would eventually convince him that orthodox negotiations were useless and encourage him to pursue more aggressive tactics.¹⁰⁸ However, frustration with the discussions inside his own Cabinet and the lack of agreement with Welensky were other contributing factors. The resurrection of the

amalgamationist cause by the Southern Rhodesian delegation on the 16 and 17 February caused a deal of friction with the northern representatives, particularly those from Nyasaland, who were feeling slighted in any case at the lateness of their invitations to the conference, and because Welensky and Huggins had failed to keep them informed during 1948 about talks in London on closer association.¹⁰⁹ Although the February conference presented a unanimous position in its report, this was only achieved by omitting areas where differences remained and by referring other problems to sub-conferences to be resolved during the year. These disagreements were not on minor points but rather concerned matters of crucial importance for any scheme of closer association. Moreover, the degree of dispute between the various delegations on these topics tended to be wide rather than narrow. These insuperable problems of trying to gain agreement for a specific scheme were highlighted by the conference and its subsequent sub-committee's failure to produce actual proposals to present to the United Kingdom Government.¹¹⁰ The Colonial Office was, nevertheless, fully cognisant of all the proceedings at the Victoria Falls conference as the provincial Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia's Southern Province, G E Fane-Smith, who attended the conference as an observer, provided it with a copy of the verbatim report.¹¹¹

The tone of the conference was established from the start when Huggins strongly attacked the northern territories' rejection of amalgamation because of the opposition of their African inhabitants. In response Welensky accused Southern Rhodesia of being heavily

responsible for the lack of success over closer association, with its virtual abdication from the amalgamation campaign since Bledisloe, and reiterated his reasons for abandoning amalgamation in favour of federation. The leader of the Nyasaland delegation, Malcolm P Barrow (later Sir Malcolm) endorsed Welensky's sentiments and argued for a very decentralised federal structure, in part at least, because only through emphasising its differences from amalgamation could the policy of federation have any chance of being accepted by Nyasaland's African population.¹¹² This basic dispute as to the extent of the proposed federal authority's powers, was to dog all discussions between the three territories right up to the creation of the federation and beyond. Throughout 1949 the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet was to adhere to a position that favoured a unitary system of government, with no residuary powers to be held by the territorial governments who could not appeal to the Secretary of State over the central government, and whose reserve powers would, in any case, have been transferred to the federal administration.¹¹³ The northern territories meanwhile advocated the federal option with the territorial governments retaining extensive authority and independence. The arguments they presented were in response to the reaction of the United Kingdom Government and their respective African populations, but the Unofficials in both territories were also well aware that while the European populations in the north favoured closer association, the price of domination by Southern Rhodesia would be considered by many to be too high.

The failure to make any headway on closer association during 1949

proved frustrating for many of the leading Unofficials in central Africa. It was becoming increasingly apparent that an initiative from the British Government would be required to engineer an agreement. The Europeans of central Africa would not compromise enough to be able to present proposals to the United Kingdom Government, so increasingly attempts were made to pressure London into taking the initiative. Welensky increasingly threatened to launch a campaign of disruption and non-co-operation with the Northern Rhodesian Government unless early progress towards the establishment of federation was evident. Parry warned the Colonial Office that if federation did not materialise in the near future the Southern Rhodesian Government would begin to apply economic pressure on Northern Rhodesia and as a result the CAC would disintegrate. Parry also confirmed Welensky's stated intent to "paralyse the government" of Northern Rhodesia over lack of progress on closer association.¹¹⁴

These claims were not **dismissed** nor treated lightly in London. It was recognised that Welensky could engineer the breakdown of government in Northern Rhodesia because of the important role played by Unofficials in administering the territory. Such a campaign of disruption would have been particularly embarrassing for the Colonial Secretary, as he had been responsible for encouraging Northern Rhodesia's European leaders to play a major part in government.¹¹⁵ Creech Jones was, moreover, not at all keen for the extent of Unofficial involvement in running Northern Rhodesia to be publicised.¹¹⁶ In an attempt to placate the Northern

Rhodesian Unofficials and stem their campaign of agitation in the Legislative Council, Lord Listowel, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, emphasised the need for different policies in Africa. He argued, in late November, that moves toward responsible government in east and central Africa, unlike west Africa, would of necessity require to accommodate the settlers as well as African communities in mutually beneficial partnership.¹¹⁷

It was not just the Unofficials and members of the CAC secretariat, however, who were pressing for British Government intervention in central Africa to produce a federal scheme during 1949. As early as February R C S Stanley was advocating the creation of a central African Federation. The Northern Rhodesian Chief Secretary argued that it ultimately came down to a choice between promoting a White man's federation, which could be a strong supporter of the Commonwealth and a bulwark against communist infiltration into Africa, or promoting independent Black man's territories which would show no loyalty to the United Kingdom and would be liable to become communist strongholds.¹¹⁸ The Colonial Office was increasingly aware that to refuse to make any move over closer association would antagonise Southern Rhodesia and alienate European opinion in Northern Rhodesia. Clark's successor as the CACs Chief Secretary, A E T Benson (later Sir Arthur), the former Chief Secretary of Nigeria, was warning London, by July, that the minority in Southern Rhodesia which favoured joining South Africa was growing and would clearly benefit if Southern Rhodesia's central African ambitions were baulked.¹¹⁹ So, it was widely accepted within the Colonial Office that there were both strong

practical arguments, from the point of view of defence, economic development and communications, and strong political arguments, notably to create a counterweight to the Union, for the creation of a federated block in central Africa.¹²⁰ The problem was that the Colonial Secretary remained reluctant for the United Kingdom Government to be seen to be taking a lead in establishing such a federation and concerned as to the consequences, from such a move, for African interests in the northern territories. As a result the next attempt to break the deadlock over closer association, and involve Britain, emanated from Southern Rhodesia.

This initiative arose directly from the breakdown in discussions between Welensky and Huggins over the preparation of a draft constitution for a central African federation, in late September 1949. It appears that, although Welensky and Huggins initially reached almost complete agreement in early September over a draft constitution, pressure from Beadle and Whitehead forced Huggins to re-assess his position. These Southern Rhodesian Cabinet Ministers were strongly opposed to the minimal form of federation, which had almost been agreed between their Prime Minister and Welensky, and advocated something far closer to the February Victoria Falls Conference proposals, although it was known that these were totally unacceptable to the Europeans of Northern Rhodesia, **and even more** unacceptable to the Africans.¹²¹

With no prospect of reaching agreement with even the Unofficials of the northern territories over federation, Huggins sought to involve the British Government once more in an attempt to break the impasse.

Welensky was also very anxious that the United Kingdom Government be brought in at this stage as he was aware that without an initiative from London the prospects of federation were remote.¹²²

Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Justice and Internal Affairs, T H W Beadle and Attorney-General V L Robinson were dispatched to London in November, to seek the United Kingdom Government's help in producing a scheme that might be tolerated by the various non-African groupings in central Africa.¹²³

They were also to bring to London's attention Southern Rhodesian dissatisfaction with the CAC. During the discussions, Beadle made it clear that the government of Southern Rhodesia was only prepared to support the CAC's continued existence if assurances were given by the British Government that the Council was regarded as a stepping stone to closer union.¹²⁴

R F Halsted, Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Trade, accompanied them to London but does not appear to have been involved in the closer association negotiations.

The position adopted by the British Secretary of State, was that the CAC should be fostered and developed into something resembling the east African inter-territorial scheme. Although Creech Jones had conceded to Welensky and Huggins in April that the CAC arrangement was inadequate, he and Noel-Baker emphasised the progress that had been achieved under its auspices and advocated its evolution and not its destruction. The Secretaries of State were, in addition, firmly convinced that no federal scheme would find favour with all three territorial governments and Westminster, even though Cohen argued the case for a limited federation. Creech Jones and Noel-Baker agreed to

convene a conference of territorial representatives in London to discuss the difficulties being experienced in central Africa over reaching any agreement for closer association. The conference, which would also consider possible forms of inter-territorial association, would only be called after Southern Rhodesia had responded to the British Government's requests for specific information on the dissatisfaction with the CAC and their reasons why it could not be developed further.¹²⁵ This pre-requisite was required by the Secretaries of State because they had been unimpressed with Southern Rhodesian criticisms of, and arguments for, the discontinuation of the CAC presented up till then.¹²⁶

The Secretaries of State adopted this stance in the discussions with Beadle partly because the strong support for the CAC by Rennie, Benson and Colby, convinced them that the Council had been successful and could be even more so if Southern Rhodesia stopped sabotaging it. Rennie, in particular, was displeased that Huggins and his Cabinet colleagues had continued to make unwarranted criticisms of the Council throughout 1949:

"In my view the Council has done good work and it could do more and better work if the Government of Southern Rhodesia were prepared to make better and wiser use of it".¹²⁷

The British position was definitely disappointing as far as Beadle and Southern Rhodesia were concerned. Nevertheless, the Secretaries of State's offer of a London conference was a significant advance on Creech Jones' avoidance of direct discussions on closer association in October 1948. Moreover, Beadle's extraction of a promise from Creech Jones and Noel Baker that Britain would, in future, follow

a more positive line over central African closer association could have been exploited at the proposed conference.¹²⁸ Given these concessions from Britain the Southern Rhodesian response could be seen as an over-reaction, if it were not for the other contributing factors.

It is true that Huggins was angered by Beadle's reports from London that the Secretaries of State had ruled out totally the possibility of African Affairs being within the remit of any federal authority and were also insisting that progress over closer association had to be through the development of the CAC. However, his attack on the Labour government in early December, was as strongly influenced by the well-founded belief that such a move might reverse the steadily declining popularity of the United Party government in Southern Rhodesia. Using the occasion of the Gatooma and District Caledonian Society St Andrew's Dinner, Huggins castigated the British Labour administration for their intransigence over closer association. He argued that the British Government's attitude ruled out amalgamation and federation, but he made it absolutely clear that their favoured policy of the development of the CAC along East African High Commission lines was completely unacceptable to Southern Rhodesia. He claimed that at its inception it had been hoped that the CAC would prove to be a step towards amalgamation, but the British Government's opposition had prevented this development from occurring. Huggins emphasised the need for a United States of Africa, but with entry into the Union also unacceptable to Southern Rhodesia, the territory would have to preserve its current status.¹²⁹

The abrasive tone adopted by Huggins for his Gatooma speech was followed by the decision to withdraw from the CAC. The matter was discussed on Beadle's return and the decision taken by 10th December, although the United Kingdom Government was not officially alerted to the discussion, by Rennie, until the 23rd.¹³⁰ The Southern Rhodesian Cabinet had failed to convince the British Government by their arguments that the CAC had failed and required to be replaced by a powerful unitary federal government structure. In part, this was because the two governments measured the Council's success or failure by very different criteria. For Southern Rhodesia the CAC could only succeed by bringing amalgamation closer. This it had evidently failed to do and so it needed to be replaced. As far as London was concerned, however, the Council had been specifically designed to encourage co-operation in central Africa, whilst rigidly maintaining the constitutional status quo. The CAC, therefore, inevitably had to dissatisfy one government or the other. As we have seen,¹³¹ Huggins did not hold out high expectation of the Council succeeding, according to his terms, at its inception. He had been confident, however, that if it failed to bring amalgamation closer it could be discarded in a manner that would strengthen the case for closer association. Having failed to convince the United Kingdom administration of the need to replace the Council with something more concrete, Huggins sought to force the British Government to do so, by formally announcing at the Council's January meeting Southern Rhodesia's intention of leaving the CAC in one year's time. Prior to Huggins' January announcement strenuous efforts were made by

Benson, Colby and Rennie, as well as the CRO in London, to persuade the Southern Rhodesian Government to withdraw its ultimatum and accept the compromise of a revised CAC. Huggins showed a willingness to compromise but was prevented from doing so by Beadle, Halsted and Whitehead in the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet. Although the Cabinet remained sharply divided over the CAC and closer association, the general view within it was that while the Council or a similar body for inter-territorial co-operation existed, the United Kingdom Government would continue to block and deflect all Southern Rhodesian demands for closer union. There was, in fact, precious little else concerning closer association on which the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet could agree.

In Cabinet meetings of the 4th, 16th and 18th January the full gamut of fears, proposals and demands were presented. Davenport on one occasion was advocating that a policy of isolationism be followed for at least two years to allow Southern Rhodesia to consolidate its development. Simultaneously, fears, held broadly throughout the Cabinet, that Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would seek closer union with east Africa if ties with Southern Rhodesia were not maintained and strengthened, were forcefully expressed.¹³²

Although not specifically referred to at these Cabinet meetings, the constitutional developments in the Gold Coast at the end of 1949 would have given rise to feelings of disquiet within the Rhodesias, particularly concerning the future development of Northern Rhodesia.¹³³ It should also be noted that Huggins faced with a Cabinet composed of strong willed and independent men, coupled with a large majority in

the Legislature, experienced increasing difficulties during 1949 in maintaining control over his Cabinet. Indeed, a proposal to give six months notice of withdrawal from the CAC to take effect immediately, was passed as early as 4th October by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet, whilst Huggins was absent.¹³⁴ To a certain extent Huggins fulfilled a moderating role within the Cabinet, but the extent of his control over it is hard to quantify. Whilst it is clear that his grip was at times tenuous, it is likely that the pose of a moderate held captive by his more extreme colleagues proved a useful device when dealing with London and members of the Colonial Service in central Africa. Nevertheless, on the issue of withdrawal from the CAC Huggins undoubtedly had scant scope to compromise even if he had so wished, with only Davenport and Winterton showing the least inclination to moderate their positions.

After the October 4th decision by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet to withdraw from the Council - a decision which Huggins sidelined until December and Beadle's return - Benson and Colby met in Zomba to consider a plan for a possible alternative form for the CAC to take. On 30th December they met with Parry in Salisbury to consider further Benson and his deputy's scheme. The proposal was closely modelled on the east African inter-territorial scheme and Huggins agreed to put it to his Cabinet colleagues on 4th January. It was presented as a Cabinet Office Paper, since to acknowledge it as a CAC secretariat proposal would have resulted in it being dismissed out of hand, so strong was the anti-council prejudice within the Cabinet at that time. Although the paper received a measure of

qualified support from Davenport and Winterton, in the main it was severely criticised and rejected.¹³⁵

On 13th January Gordon Walker sent a personal appeal to the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia to drop the proposed withdrawal from the CAC in view of the advances made and concessions reached at the November 1949 discussions with Beadle.¹³⁶ This message was more conciliatory and less strongly worded than the Colonial Office wished,¹³⁷ but even so was rejected by Huggins after the Cabinet meeting of 16th January.¹³⁸ This negative response was particularly disappointing to Rennie because he thought that he had succeeded, in conjunction with Gordon Walker's appeal, in dissuading Huggins from issuing Southern Rhodesia's intention to withdraw. Beadle's role appears to have been crucial in ensuring that the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet's resolve to withdraw remained firm. Rennie's intervention did at least ensure that the Southern Rhodesian Government's intentions were not stated as bluntly as they were in the original draft.¹³⁹ What is made abundantly clear in Huggins' reply to Gordon Walker, however, is that the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet were in effect issuing an ultimatum to the British Government to produce an alternative to the Council that would clearly enhance closer association, or face the consequences of a Southern Rhodesia no longer tied to central Africa.

The Southern Rhodesian Cabinet could agree that it disliked the Benson, Parry, Colby proposals, but it experienced great difficulties in deciding what it did want. At the special Cabinet meeting on 16th January, it was finally agreed that a position paper dealing only with

the CACs defects and political objections to it, and offering nothing constructive in its place, would form the basis of Southern Rhodesia's case for giving notice to quit the Council at its next meeting on the 25th. Benson remained very concerned that the attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government and the tone of its proposals for the forthcoming CAC meeting were likely to endanger any future co-operation with the northern territories on a level already achieved under the Council. By lobbying Davenport, prior to the Cabinet meeting on 18th January, Benson managed to tone down the Southern Rhodesian stance, that it would pursue its own course regardless of the views of the northern territories.¹⁴⁰

As we shall see, the insular and arrogant attitude adopted by the Southern Rhodesians over the CAC dispute and the question of closer association as a whole, caused a great deal of resentment amongst the leaders of the northern territories' European communities.

Southern Rhodesia's declaration of its intention to withdraw from the CAC one year from January 1950, climaxed two long-running issues; one concerned fears about South African expansionism; the other, northern Officials' anger at, and Unofficials' dissatisfaction with, the Southern Rhodesian attitude towards the CAC and closer association.

As has already been shown the long history of pressure for a central African state had been dogged by fears within Northern Rhodesia of being dominated by Southern Rhodesia. Equally, there were clear reservations within Southern Rhodesia about the wisdom of joining with territories containing such massive disproportions between their

European and African populations. These concerns were largely concealed between 1938 and 1948 because the European populations in both Rhodesias favoured full amalgamation, albeit for different motives and to differing degrees. The problems began to re-appear and rapidly escalate from the point when Welensky and the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials abandoned amalgamation in favour of some sort of federation. As of June 1948 Welensky and Huggins were advocating different forms and degrees of closer association and as a result tensions and disputes began to mount.

One specific area which generated a great deal of friction was the CAC. The Officials and Unofficials of the northern territories were largely in agreement that the Council was beneficial and should be utilised to the utmost. This is not to say that the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials, in particular, did not have criticisms of the Council nor that they did not want it to be replaced with something stronger, but the general consensus was that until a better scheme was agreed upon to replace it, the CAC should be maintained and fostered. As has already been shown, the Southern Rhodesian Government, after its poor showing in the 1946 elections, sought to minimise the importance of the CAC and tended to become increasingly critical of the body. This attitude, although annoying the northern territories, was tolerated because of the awareness of Huggins' difficult position in Southern Rhodesia. After the Prime Minister's triumphal victory on 16 September 1948, however, a change of attitude by Southern Rhodesia was confidently expected by the north. The failure of such an alteration and, indeed, the Southern Rhodesian Government's

critical posture towards the Council actually hardening and intensifying, led to growing frustration in both government and Unofficial circles in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The decision by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet to give one year's notice of their intention to leave the Council brought this underlying irritation out into the open.

Benson, Colby and Rennie all complained to London during January and February 1950, about the Southern Rhodesian Government's uncooperative attitude towards the CAC, which had been particularly noticeable over the preceding eighteen months. Benson proposed that the northern governments should make plain at the Council meeting in January:

"that the Central Africa Council's lack of strength as a foundation and the creaking of its machinery have been due entirely to the lack of support which it has received from the Southern Rhodesian Government."¹⁴¹

Colby adopted an even stronger position, arguing that the Council's unpopularity in Southern Rhodesia had been, to a large extent, engineered by Southern Rhodesian Cabinet Ministers. Nyasaland's Governor believed that the Council's very success as a consultative and advisory body had produced the Southern Rhodesian Government's attacks on it. Southern Rhodesia wanted the CAC scrapped, not because it was not a success, but because it was not a suitable instrument of progress towards amalgamation.¹⁴² The Southern Rhodesian Government's attitude towards the Council had also, Colby agreed, effectively blocked any serious consideration of political integration short of amalgamation.

"Up to the present the achievement of any progress towards closer union or federation has been made largely impossible by the attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government".¹⁴³

Rennie too held the Southern Rhodesian Government largely responsible for the CACs unpopularity in that territory. He felt that after the September 1948 elections Huggins and his Cabinet became increasingly lukewarm towards the Council, and was convinced that "the limitations and defects of the CAC lie largely in the way in which the Government of Southern Rhodesia has used the Council up to date."¹⁴⁴

Having had their attempts to persuade Huggins not to proceed with his ultimatum rejected, and sharing the conviction that the Southern Rhodesian Government had, since September 1948, systematically sought to undermine the CAC through non-co-operation and public attacks, the northern territories' Governors and the Council's Chief Secretary, all urged the United Kingdom administration to adopt an uncompromising response to Southern Rhodesia's notice of withdrawal. Benson understood the Southern Rhodesian Government to be seeking to pressurise the British Government into making concessions over closer association by the announcement of its intention to leave the CAC. Southern Rhodesians, whilst only wanting union on their own terms, were not prepared to have closer association ruled out altogether, which explained the extended period of notice they had given, before they would be required to act. As the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet had failed to agree on any scheme or body to replace the Council and were clearly severely divided on the whole issue, Benson advocated that Imperial and Colonial governments take

the initiative and place the Southern Rhodesian administration under pressure. Under the Council's Chief Secretary's proposals, Huggins would be informed that the CAC would be wound up within three months and that Southern Rhodesia had until the end of April to produce detailed plans for an acceptable alternative. Faced with the choice of no mechanism for closer co-ordination in central Africa or the continuation of the CAC, Benson was convinced that the Southern Rhodesian Government would moderate its demands and accept the modified Council proposals in his and Colby's compromise scheme, which had been rejected by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet on 4th January.¹⁴⁵

Colby supported Benson's advice to London, but added that whilst he considered it necessary to retain in central Africa some form of machinery for co-ordination in the economic and administrative areas, any such body required the goodwill of all three territories to succeed. The Governor of Nyasaland favoured development along the lines of the east African inter-territorial scheme and was persuaded that present Southern Rhodesian opposition to such a move would diminish as awareness spread of the extent of Afrikaner immigration and the danger this represented combined with an expansionist, Afrikaner Nationalist Union.¹⁴⁶ Rennie was also convinced that the CAC or any alternative would only work if the Southern Rhodesian Government was prepared to co-operate. In arguing that an East African High Commission type scheme was the only feasible solution, he maintained that the further any proposals moved from the position of minimal federal authority, the harder

it would be to gain the support of Northern Rhodesia's African and European populations. Rennie favoured the continuation of the CAC, or some similar body to co-ordinate economic co-operation, and the exploration of the possibilities of political integration along minimalist federal lines.¹⁴⁷

In preparing their response to the Southern Rhodesian ultimatum over the CAC, therefore, the British Government was in no doubt as to the views of the Colonial Service officials in central Africa. Whitehall would have also been aware of the tensions within the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet and the differences between it and the Unofficials in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.

When Welensky arrived in Salisbury on 24th January, for the CAC meeting the following day, he discovered that the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet had, in fact, agreed on an alternative scheme to the Council at their meeting on the 18th. The proposal, for the amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia with the line of rail area in Northern Rhodesia was, however, completely unacceptable. Welensky informed Huggins and his Cabinet that even if he were to accept their scheme for the division of Northern Rhodesia, which he did not, a clear majority of his Unofficial colleagues would remain vehemently opposed.¹⁴⁸ At the CAC meeting on 25th January, a lot of animosity was generated between Southern Rhodesia's representatives and the Unofficials from the northern territories. Welensky was highly critical of Beadle's remarks in a press interview of 20 December in which the Southern Rhodesian Minister of Justice had accused the CAC of being a nominated body that weakened the elected Government of Southern Rhodesia.¹⁴⁹

Huggins claimed that it was pointless for the Southern Rhodesian Government to attempt to defend the CAC as it was so unpopular in the territory. Welensky, however, countered that the Council should have been publicly defended, and attacked the Southern Rhodesian Government for failing to present the good case which existed for the CAC.

Barrow went further in arguing that the Southern Rhodesian Government was, at best, making no effort to support the functioning of the Council. He went on to accuse Southern Rhodesia's representatives on the Council of "throwing spanners in the works", and claimed that the majority of the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet were not only antagonistic to the Council, but were actively attempting to undermine it, because they sought the complete union of the Rhodesias, if not Nyasaland. This fierce denunciation of Southern Rhodesia's attitude and motives was strongly supported by Beckett. He argued that the CAC was threatened, not because it was not working, nor because it was not necessary, but because it had become, through no fault of its own, a political embarrassment to the Southern Rhodesian Government.¹⁵⁰

It is evident that a fair measure of agreement existed in early 1950 between the northern territories' Officials and Unofficials with regard to the CAC and Southern Rhodesia's attempts to undermine it. There was an equal measure of concord concerning their opposition to Southern Rhodesia's continuing demands for amalgamation. The exact form closer association should take varied widely amongst the Officials and Unofficials of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, but

Southern Rhodesia's desire to dominate central Africa was recognised and opposed. It was for this reason that Rennie had strongly opposed the proposals in the February 1949 Victoria Falls Conference, claiming that they would "amount not to federation but, for all practical purposes, to the absorption of the Northern Territories in a government dominated politically and economically by Southern Rhodesia".¹⁵¹ The failure of Southern Rhodesia to gain agreement on a federal scheme during 1949 can also be directly attributed to Southern Rhodesia's desire to dominate central Africa and the determination of Unofficials from the northern territories to avoid such a development, a determination shared by the Governments and African populations of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Although Welensky and Huggins sought throughout 1949 to bridge the differences that existed between their positions on closer association, and hide their dispute from public view, their differences remained large. Welensky admitted this during the debate, on 9 December in the Legislative Council, on his motion urging Britain to take the lead in creating a central African Federation. He conceded that it had not been possible to prepare a draft constitution for a federal state, as had been intended at the Victoria Falls Conference, because of "basic" and "grave" differences between Southern and Northern Rhodesia.¹⁵² Although Welensky would not admit to it, it was evident from the speeches by Beckett and Morris that Northern Rhodesian Unofficials were far from happy with the attitude and actions of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Welensky had succeeded in avoiding a full scale clash with Huggins during their negotiations

in 1949, but he was aware that unless a new initiative was forthcoming from the British Government this clash could not long be delayed.¹⁵³ Sooner or later he and Huggins would have to face squarely the full implications of their mutually exclusive aspirations for central Africa's constitutional development. Other prominent figures, apart from Welensky and the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, were seeking to persuade the British Government to take the lead over closer association. Any examination of these appeals, however, has to be placed in the context of growing fears concerning the possible absorption of the Rhodesias by South Africa, the second issue brought to a head by Huggins' ultimatum on the CAC.

The historical context of the United Kingdom Government's apprehensions concerning the Union's northward ambitions has already been dealt with at some length. In the eyes of many influential figures, South Africa's brooding presence loomed as large over central Africa in 1950 as at any time in the past. Benson was, in December 1949, urging that London take the initiative in producing a workable format for closer association. The politicians of central Africa had shown themselves to be incapable of producing such a scheme and the result of failure to establish a central African block would, in Benson's opinion, be Southern Rhodesia's slow slide into the Union. That such an occurrence would as an inevitable consequence drag the High Commission Territories into South Africa, was a further argument, Benson believed, for the United Kingdom Government to act and act soon.¹⁵⁴ At the same time Kennedy was expressing concern to London at Afrikaner immigration into Southern

Rhodesia. Although the Afrikaner element still only comprised 14% of Southern Rhodesia's European population, the level of Boer immigration from the Union was running at over one quarter of all immigrants entering the territory. Moreover, the Afrikaners were more de-stabilising than their numbers suggested as they tended to farm great blocks of land together, forming Afrikaans speaking communities whose "sympathies and loyalties are all with the Union".¹⁵⁵

As has already been shown, Colby was also deeply worried by the level of Afrikaner immigration into the Rhodesias, though he had felt that this internal menace would, once it was realised, force the Southern Rhodesian Government to moderate its demands for amalgamation.

As we shall see, the threat of Afrikaner immigration into the Rhodesias, enhancing the danger of these territories being persuaded, or forced, into a receptive Union, was considered to be a very real possibility by influential figures within the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices. Official perceptions of South Africa continued to determine Britain's policy for central Africa, just as they had done since before the Union was formed.

In early 1950 there was considerable agreement in the advice issuing from central Africa to London. Rennie and Welensky were agreed that the status quo of the CAC or some similar body should be maintained while efforts, led by the British Government, were made to produce a measure of political integration short of amalgamation.¹⁵⁶ Benson was of like mind, but more insistent that Westminster take the initiative. Colby, too, favoured closer political association, short of amalgamation, but felt that no moves were possible until Southern

Rhodesia moderated its demands and was "prepared to consider more reasonable proposals for political integration designed to form a British block in Central Africa and thus be in a better position to resist absorption by the Union".¹⁵⁷

Only Southern Rhodesia remained out of step with these views, but there were some indications that having forced a showdown over the CAC, Huggins and his Cabinet were prepared to co-operate while awaiting London's response. On 15 February the formation of a CAC sub-committee, to examine proposed developments of the Council and alterations to it, was announced.¹⁵⁸ At least initially, the Southern Rhodesian Government appeared prepared to concede to the general consensus in central Africa and hope for the return of a more sympathetic government in Britain's general election.

Nevertheless, the composition of the Southern Rhodesian representation to the CAC sub-committee clearly indicated that Southern Rhodesia had no intention of dropping its demands for the Council's abolition and its replacement with an amalgamated central Africa.

CHAPTER 5

Labour's Second Administration

The United Kingdom elections of 26 February 1950, did not produce the return of the Conservative Party to Office, as many in central Africa had hoped. Nonetheless the result had significant repercussions for central Africa. It resulted in two new Secretaries of State at the Colonial and Commonwealth Relation Offices and, with an overall Labour Party majority of only five, an early change of government was thought probable. With such a small majority the British Government decided not to push ahead with any radical legislation or contentious policies. Nonetheless, the Labour Party, in Parliament and the country at large, remained in high spirits and confident mood throughout its brief second term.¹ These factors indirectly influenced Imperial policy on whether or not to initiate moves towards closer political association in central Africa. The Government of Southern Rhodesia's ultimatum over the continual existence of the CAC, however, made the prospect of any decision other than a positive one, very unappealing.

Initially, Creech Jones' non-election at Shipley, partly as a consequence of the Home Secretary, Chuter Ede's politically inept redistribution of constituencies during 1948 and 1949,² and Attlee's dropping of Noel Baker from the Cabinet, by moving him, as Gaitskell's successor, to Fuel and Power, made no impact on the situation in central Africa. However, over the longer term the inexperience of

Griffiths and innate conservatism of Gordon Walker, the new Secretaries of State, played an important role in promoting the federation of central Africa. Whilst the promotion of Gordon Walker was a logical move, the transfer of Griffiths from National Insurance to the Colonial Office was one of Attlee's more bizarre decisions.³ Certainly Griffiths' reputation as a capable Minister had been greatly enhanced during his tenure at the Ministry of National Insurance and his promotion into the Cabinet was overdue,⁴ but the Welshman's lack of knowledge of Colonial issues was in marked contrast to the expertise of his predecessor. It is highly unlikely that Cohen would have been able to advance federation at the speed and in the way he did during 1950 and 1951 if Creech Jones had held Shipley,⁵ but this is not to detract in any way from the determination Griffiths showed, in and out of office, in seeking to ensure that Britain honoured its responsibilities towards the indigenous peoples of central Africa.

In November 1949, Creech Jones and Noel Baker had clearly indicated that no federal scheme was likely to gain the support of all four governments concerned, so although they had been prepared to discuss Southern Rhodesia's complaints concerning the CAC and listen to their proposals for amalgamation, the Secretaries of State had indicated that, for the time being, all aspirations for the political integration of central Africa would remain unfulfilled. In the aftermath of Southern Rhodesia's announcement on CAC, the British general election and the advice flowing from central Africa, this stance was no longer so assured.

Benson's advocacy of an aggressive response to the Southern Rhodesian ultimatum over the CAC was not pursued by the British Government, possibly because the Southern Rhodesian Government's decision to co-operate with the CACs sub-committee looking at alternatives, indicated that they were prepared to be reasonable. Moreover, Benson's response would have produced an unwelcome early crisis for the two new Secretaries of State. Instead, advantage was taken of Huggins' short visit to Lisbon in late March, to hold discussions with him in London. Welensky had also made it clear that federation and the future of the CAC would be raised whilst he was in London, from late April, for Northern Rhodesian constitutional talks.⁶ Huggins held discussions with Whitehall officials en route to Lisbon on 20 and 21 March. These talks were, however, concerned with his Portuguese visit and it was not until his return from Lisbon that closer association was raised.

In deciding on an agreed position during their talks with Huggins, a significant difference of opinion emerged between the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices. At an initial meeting on 15 March, attended by Lloyd, Cohen, Baxter, Gibson and Gandee, an agreed line had been adopted without much difficulty. It was decided to inform the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia exactly what the maximum amount of political integration in central Africa the British Government was prepared to accept. The Officials agreed that this limit, a fairly minimal form of federation, would be facilitated by the acceptance and promotion of Benson's proposals. The only problem envisaged was that this scheme had already been roundly criticised

and rejected by the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet on 4 January. As all except Huggins believed the proposals to be an integral Cabinet document, Britain would need to be careful how the proposals were promoted.⁷ At the end of March, London was informed that Benson and Parry appeared to have reached agreement with the three territorial governments on a bi-annual Governors' Conference to replace the CACs current format. The Council's secretariat would remain intact to service the Governors' Conferences and their decisions.⁸ It was at this point that a difference in view between the two government departments became apparent.

The Commonwealth Relations Office believed that a successful conclusion to the CAC controversy would result in a general diminution of agitation for closer association in central Africa as a whole, especially in Southern Rhodesia. As the CAC problem appeared now to have been resolved, Gordon Walker wished to spell out to Huggins at their meeting on 3 April, that amalgamation or federation was "out of the question". The Colonial Office disagreed with the CRO's belief that pressure for union in central Africa would cease now that an acceptable replacement to the CAC had been agreed. Colonial Office officials were also very opposed to any blunt rejection of aspirations for political integration being delivered, as they believed the repercussions in both Rhodesias would be very grave.⁹

It is clear that the Commonwealth Relations Office totally misunderstood the purpose of Huggins' ultimatum over the CAC and the conditional nature of his agreement to participate in its replacement, the bi-annual Governors' Conference. The Southern Rhodesian Government had encouraged criticisms of the CAC, undermined its worth, and

then, against this background, announced their intention to withdraw from it, in an attempt to force the British Government to concede closer political association in central Africa. The Government of Southern Rhodesia's ultimate goal was and remained an amalgamated, and fully independent, central African state. Their co-operation over any other machinery for closer co-ordination would only be forthcoming when the United Kingdom Government was openly and clearly committed to moving towards this end.

It is also worth noting that at this stage, March 1950, Gordon Walker was opposed to both amalgamation and federation for central Africa and was prepared to stand firm on the issue. In adopting this position Gordon Walker was probably influenced by the impressions which Sir Percivale Liesching gained in talks with Huggins and Kennedy during his visit to Southern Rhodesia in late March 1949.

The CRO's permanent Under-Secretary of State felt that Huggins had only become involved in the closer association agitation to prevent Welensky from dominating the issue and, as a result, gaining popularity and a possible power base in Southern Rhodesia. The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was not really in favour of, or even interested in, federation, but rather favoured the amalgamation of and, Liesching speculated, the domination of central Africa by Southern Rhodesia.¹⁰ Gordon Walker presumably believed that if Huggins was indifferent to federation then Southern Rhodesia would accept closer co-ordination for central Africa if it was well administered and await the emergence of a British Government more favourably disposed to amalgamation. Huggins' lack of support for

Welensky's campaign for closer association since the war possibly encouraged Gordon Walker to believe that once the unpopular CAC was replaced, the Southern Rhodesian Government would return to its former low key attitude concerning closer association. This anti-federation attitude of the Secretary of State was to undergo a complete transformation over the next eighteen months.

The CRD and its Secretary of State remained adamant in their view that, providing the Governors' Conference could be made to work, Huggins and his Cabinet would drop their support for a federal scheme. Gordon Walker was adamant in his support for this position in a meeting between the two offices on 31 March.¹¹ He was very rapidly disabused of his view at the meeting with Huggins on 3 April.¹²

Huggins proposed the amalgamation of Nyasaland with the Rhodesias, excluding Barotseland. However, if the United Kingdom Government were averse to its inclusion, he was prepared to exclude Nyasaland¹³ and sought to refute any accusations that Nyasaland's involvement was sought just so that Southern Rhodesia could control its labour supply. Huggins claimed that the majority of Europeans and their elected members in both Rhodesias favoured amalgamation, but was forced to concede that Welensky opposed the amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia with the 'European part' of Northern Rhodesia and was at present drafting a federal constitution to form the basis of union discussions with Southern Rhodesia. One element in Huggins' strategy at the 3 April talks was to discover whether the amalgamation option was definitely barred by the British Government or whether

they would agree to it remaining a possibility. As Welensky insisted that he had switched from pursuing amalgamation to federation because the United Kingdom Government would never accept the latter, a denial of this attitude by the Secretary of State, would be of great value to the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister in seeking to gain Welensky and his Unofficials' support for amalgamation as opposed to federation.

A second part of Huggins' policy in the talks was to impress upon the British Government that moves towards modelling Northern Rhodesia into an African state would, as a direct consequence, result in Southern Rhodesia being driven towards closer association with South Africa. This move was a blatant attempt to influence the Northern Rhodesian constitutional talks, scheduled for later in the month, but it involved the central thesis pursued by Huggins during these discussions, namely, the danger of Southern Rhodesia being forced into the Union.

Whilst frequently assuring his hosts that he was not issuing threats, Huggins' whole purpose was to convince the United Kingdom Government that Southern Rhodesia's entry into South Africa would remain a continuous, if fluctuating, possibility until closer association, acceptable to Southern Rhodesia, was achieved. The establishment of a satisfactorily constituted central African Union would strengthen the economic and strategic position of the three territories in resisting incorporation pressure from the south. Huggins detailed the various factors which could hasten Southern Rhodesia's entry into the Union. These included, Afrikaner immigration, failure to achieve

amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and a deepening economic crisis for which no other solution appeared feasible.¹⁴ The last possibility was particularly relevant, given the precarious state of the Southern Rhodesian economy and its large burden of debt. This also helps to explain Huggins' insistence on a common Treasury for central Africa and the Northern Rhodesian Government and Unofficials' reluctance to concur, given the booming state of Northern Rhodesia's economy.

The extent of the gulf between Huggins and Welensky's positions on closer association in central Africa was underlined by the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials leader's constitutional proposals of April 1950.¹⁵ Welensky envisaged a two-chambered federal parliament, under a Governor-General, to administer common service departments. This was a top heavy means of introducing legislative and executive authority for a relatively minor amount of closer association and was criticised as such.¹⁶ However, Welensky's proposals produced a further altercation between the London departments, as the CRO insisted that the Colonial Office refrain from strengthening their arguments by informing the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials leader of Huggins' belief that central Africa possessed neither the manpower nor the finances for such a scheme. Whilst acceding to the Commonwealth Relations Office request, the Colonial Office was displeased by the incident and made their views plain.¹⁷

In his discussions concerning federation with the Secretaries of State, on 3 and 4 May 1950, Welensky, like Huggins, dwelt on the dangers of Afrikaner immigration and claimed that unless federation

occurred "there was a danger of the whites in Northern Rhodesia becoming overwhelmingly Afrikaner",¹⁸ and at the next general election securing a majority of the elected representatives. According to Welensky, the Afrikaners were concentrating in mining, railways, farm schemes and the civil service.¹⁹ The last named area of Afrikaner influence is of particular interest as, at the time of the Bledisloe Commission, there had been accusations that the Northern Rhodesian Government was "dominated" by its "pro-South African Civil Service".²⁰ Whilst this was clearly an exaggerated claim, it was undoubtedly true in the forties and early fifties that Northern Rhodesia's reliance upon white labour from the Union to fill the minor posts in its civil service, resulted in a definite tendency towards an apartheid mentality amongst the junior clerks and its other lower echelons.²¹ For all that, it can be stated with confidence, that both Welensky and Huggins were exaggerating the threat posed by the Afrikaner influx in order to enhance the prospects of closer association for central Africa. The dispute between the Rhodesias' leaders, as to the form of closer association remained. Welensky admitted that Huggins had already rejected his draft scheme for federation as half hearted. Rennie's comment on this situation is worth consideration as it highlighted the general attitude of Northern Rhodesia's senior officials towards Southern Rhodesia, a collective view that was not dispelled as federation approached nor by its inauguration. The Southern Rhodesians were amalgamationist at heart. They were not in favour of any form of federation that would restrict their sovereignty and they wanted the three states

reduced to the status of Provinces.²² Although Welensky gained as little satisfaction from these discussions on federation as from the main batch of talks on Northern Rhodesia's constitution, on one point he was completely in accord with a growing number of Colonial Office and CRO officials; that point was his request that the British Government take the initiative in producing agreement for a federal central Africa.

With the arrival of a new Secretary of State, Cohen recommenced his efforts to achieve a British Government initiative over closer association for central Africa. In a secret memorandum entitled "Relations of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland",²³ produced in late February or early March, Cohen listed the strategic, economic and communications arguments in favour of the joining of central Africa. The argument upon which Cohen placed most emphasis, however, was that "the creation of a solid British block of territories in central Africa, would make it easier to resist economic and political pressure from the Union of South Africa and to prevent the undue spreading of South African ideas northwards". Cohen concurred with the requests of Benson, Rennie and Welensky, and advised that the British Government take the initiative in promoting the federation of central Africa, but in so doing make every effort to avoid alarming African opinion. The British Government's intervention should take the form of a conference. Preceding such a conference, however, Cohen proposed that a meeting of officials from the four Governments concerned should take place with "the purpose of narrowing the issues for discussion at the main conference and presenting an analysis of the problems and

recommendations as to a solution".²⁴ In addition to promoting this view in London, Cohen sought the support of the leading Colonial Service figures in central Africa.²⁵

The initial response, in late April, to Cohen's scheme was encouraging, with not only Benson, but also Gisborne, the Secretary to the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet, giving the idea of an Official Conference their keen support.²⁶ Lambert and Lloyd favoured Cohen's idea, which received a further boost in early May, when Baxter at the CRO also came out strongly in favour of the United Kingdom Government taking the initiative over federation by means of an Officials Conference. Baxter argued that the British Government needed to act promptly in order to pre-empt the emergence of greater unity in central Africa on this issue as this would almost certainly lead to demands for far greater powers for a proposed federal government than the United Kingdom Government would be prepared to concede.²⁷ The one discouraging note for Cohen was that Baxter's views were not in accord with those of his Secretary of State. Gordon Walker had moderated his position, in the light of the recent talks with Huggins, and no longer advocated a flat rejection of federation or amalgamation. Nonetheless, the Commonwealth Relations Secretary was strongly arguing for a delay over any British Government moves on federation, until it became clearer how the new bi-annual Governors' Conference was working. Gordon Walker's hope was that Southern Rhodesia would prove to be co-operating with the new closer co-ordination machinery and so remove the need for any early moves towards federation.

In maintaining this view the Commonwealth Relations Secretary was at odds, by early May, not only with the Colonial Office, but also with his own officials, who were by this stage firmly convinced of the need for a British Government initiative over central Africa.²⁸ The collective view of the officials at both these government departments was that unless the Government in the United Kingdom was clearly seen to be seriously considering other forms of closer association, short of amalgamation, then Southern Rhodesia would withdraw into isolationism and the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials would boycott the Executive Council and oppose and obstruct the Government in the Legislative Council and elsewhere. The result of these actions would be to increase support within the Rhodesias for union with South Africa and decrease the chances of African development. Equally, it was important that the British Government's intervention achieved a successful conclusion, as failure would result in virtually the same consequences in central Africa as if the United Kingdom had taken no initiative at all. On this understanding, the officials of the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices jointly proposed a full conference on closer association, preceded by a preparatory conference of officials from the four governments involved.

"It would probably be best not to describe this meeting of officials as a conference, but merely to arrange for officials to meet here to sketch out proposals which might subsequently be considered by a full dress conference."²⁹

Gordon Walker's remaining hopes that Southern Rhodesia would co-operate with the new Governors' Conference on central Africa, even though no moves on closer association were in the offing, were dashed

during late June and early July. In that short space of time the Southern Rhodesian Government clearly demonstrated that it would prove as obstructive over the Rhodesias-Nyasaland conference as it had been for the last eighteen months of the CAC, unless moves towards the political integration of central Africa were forthcoming from Britain. In late June the Southern Rhodesian Government opposed the proposed establishment of a central African tourist board and then, in early July, it rejected the Rhodesias-Nyasaland conference's secretariat's scheme for a united agricultural and veterinary research department. The latter decision was of particular significance as Benson and Parry attached a great deal of importance to the scheme because, "apart from the valuable contribution it would have made to the development of the area, it was thought that its acceptance or rejection by the Southern Rhodesian Government would provide a valuable indication of the extent to which that Government was prepared to co-operate on a central African basis under the new set-up".³⁰ As a result of these decisions Parry was convinced that it was pointless proceeding with the Rhodesias-Nyasaland conference, unless Southern Rhodesia could be persuaded to alter its attitude and co-operate.³¹ This opinion was reinforced by Benson in meetings in London in late July.

Benson left Griffiths and officials from the Colonial Office and CRO in no doubt that the Southern Rhodesian Government would not co-operate until a clear, definite and positive position with regard to closer association was adopted by London. Benson was convinced that if Southern Rhodesia did not obtain satisfaction on this point then it

would be "driven into the arms of the Union" with the strong likelihood of Northern Rhodesia following it. Only the political union of central Africa could, in Benson's opinion, prevent South Africa enveloping the Rhodesias. By arguing strongly for Cohen's proposed officials conference, Benson persuaded Griffiths to support both it and the closest possible co-operation in central Africa, providing that the British Government's responsibilities to the African peoples of the northern territories were safeguarded.³² With both Welensky and Huggins also indicating their support for the United Kingdom Government calling an officials conference,³³ both the principle of a British initiative and the form it was to take had been basically decided by the end of July 1950.

It is of over-riding importance that the central reason for producing the British Government's initiative over closer association for central Africa, was the fear that in its absence both the Rhodesias were likely to merge with the Union of South Africa.³⁴ It comprised the main argument in Gordon Walker's minute to Attlee of 5 October 1950, officially requesting the convening of the officials conference - a request supported by Griffiths. In the minute, Gordon Walker argued that although Southern Rhodesia's desire for amalgamation could not be satisfied, by associating the Crown colony as closely as was practicable with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia the "very real" danger of Southern Rhodesia turning to the Union could be countered.³⁵

The official request of 5 October also indicated a marked change in the attitude of the Commonwealth Relations Secretary with regard to federation. From holding a position of fierce opposition in early

March, Gordon Walker had changed, by October 1950, into an articulate advocate of federation. This transformation was based squarely on his growing conviction of the Afrikaner danger.

Between the attainment of a rough consensus for an officials conference in July and the formal application in October only two difficulties occurred. One was the recurrence of friction between the Colonial and the Commonwealth Relations Offices and the other was a challenge, from Colby the Governor of Nyasaland, to the unofficial consensus favouring a British Government initiative.

The dispute between the Colonial and the Commonwealth Relations Offices concerned responsibility for the officials conference.

In co-operating with the CRO in the planning of this event the Colonial Office officials concerned became frustrated and annoyed with what they regarded as the haughty attitude of their opposite numbers at the Commonwealth Relations Office. Williams and Lambert in particular were convinced that the CRO would have liked, if they could, to edge the Colonial Office out of the officials conference and the process of initiating closer association in central Africa altogether.³⁶ This seemingly trivial rift is important because it indicates that the resentment felt by the Colonial Service Officers in the northern territories towards the Southern Rhodesian officials was echoed, albeit in a minor key, in Whitehall.

Colby's challenge of the generally accepted view on closer association in central Africa, was based on long-standing arguments that were to sustain his opposition to federation until the end of 1952. In September 1950, Colby opposed the calling of an officials conference

and rejected the arguments for closer association because Nyasaland's African population was totally opposed and the opinion of its small European community was hardening against the idea. He argued that the territory should be concentrating on economic development rather than political integration. Nonetheless, Nyasaland would not boycott an officials conference if the three other governments sent representatives.³⁷ Colby neatly turned the arguments being used in support of the creation of a federation to his own ends. He argued that the heavy Afrikaner immigration into the Rhodesias, coupled with the strong likelihood of a reactionary successor to Huggins, greatly increased the danger of the Rhodesias being absorbed by the Union. Nyasaland had no wish to be absorbed as well and so it opposed closer association with the Rhodesias, and instead favoured links with east Africa. Colby continued:

"Personally, I fail to see what advantage this territory is likely to gain from closer political union with Southern Rhodesia. Whatever they may say to the contrary, we are convinced that their only interest in this territory is that they want our labour and I find it quite inconceivable that money raised by taxation in Southern Rhodesia would be used for the development of this country".³⁸

Faced with Colby's rejection of his policy, Cohen's primary concern was to ensure that the Nyasaland Governor's opposition was not used as grounds for postponing or not holding the officials conference.³⁹ The support of Lloyd, and complete backing from Northern Rhodesia, ensured that this did not occur.⁴⁰ As the officials conference approached, Colby's attitude hardened. He continued strongly to maintain that Southern Rhodesia would not finance Nyasaland's

development after closer union. Such a course of action would not be politically viable, given the attitude of Southern Rhodesia's European population. As to the Afrikaner threat, Colby refuted the argument put forward by Benson, amongst others, that closer association would prevent Southern Rhodesia being absorbed into South Africa. He claimed that Southern Rhodesia would inevitably be incorporated into the Union when it next experienced an extended recession and that the copper belt of Northern Rhodesia would, in all probability, be drawn into the Union as well. Colby gave Cohen some forewarning of problems that would arise during the officials conference when he informed him that Nyasaland's representatives would be briefed not to commit themselves to any proposals.⁴¹

The officials conference was held in the Commonwealth Relations Office between 5 and 31 March 1950, under the chairmanship of Baxter.⁴² It was in no small measure due to the skills of Baxter and Cohen that the officials conference reached any conclusions at all. In January, prior to the opening of the conference, a definite difference in approach to the issues involved surfaced between the two Rhodesias' delegations during talks in Salisbury. The Northern Rhodesian officials argued that all discussions of specific issues, such as subjects for joint services and the division of functions, must, by necessity, await the decision as to the form which closer association would take. The Southern Rhodesian officials held the opposite view, that only after all the specific items had been agreed upon could an informed decision be made as to the mechanism that would administer the united features of the territories. Although Benson

and Parry managed to prevent a confrontation over this issue,⁴³ it re-surfaced almost immediately at the conference.⁴⁴

The issue of which should come first, specific areas of co-operation or the form the overall association was to take proved such a contentious problem because of underlying factors. What was in fact at issue was whether closer association should take the form of amalgamation or a federal structure. The delegations from the northern territories shared their respective government's animosity towards amalgamation, regarding it as a means by which Southern Rhodesia sought to dominate the area and gain control of Northern Rhodesia's finances and Nyasaland's labour force. It is immaterial whether or not this did underpin Southern Rhodesia's promotion of amalgamation. The important point is that the officials and unofficials of the northern territories were in no doubt that it was Southern Rhodesia's goal.

Those participating in the conference were well aware that failure on their part to recommend a solution for closer association would effectively stop any progress toward political union for the foreseeable future. All those participating in the conference believed, to varying degrees, that without political union for central Africa the region stood in real danger of being absorbed into South Africa. It was also realised that to avoid this fate and secure agreement for closer association, compromise would be necessary. Despite this the Southern Rhodesian delegation strenuously pursued their arguments for amalgamation, which was implacably opposed by the officials from the northern territories.

In previous attempts to produce union in central Africa, most notably the Bledisloe Commission, the issue upon which the arguments in favour of union inevitably foundered was the fundamental difference between Southern Rhodesia's approach to African development and that of the northern territories. This apparently insuperable problem was supposedly circumvented by Benson, with the aid of officials from the territorial governments. In their report on central Africa's various African populations, Benson and his associates seemed to have reconciled the irreconcilable. This illusion was achieved by denying that the differences between Southern Rhodesia's African policy and that of the northern territories were as large, in practice and intent, as had been claimed or at first appeared. The report claimed that the differences which remained had been receding for some time and would, given time, disappear altogether.⁴⁸ That this report went largely unchallenged and was indeed subsequently used as an argument for dismissing legitimate African fears, indicates that there was a widespread desire amongst the European communities and governments involved for the creation of some form of central African bloc, although they had reservations about any particular scheme. The driving force behind this support for closer association in central Africa was the fear of South Africa absorbing all, or part, of the region. This fear aided Cohen and Baxter in their attempts to create the impression of united support for federation in central Africa. Their policy succeeded in that the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was established in 1953, but in the long run it also failed. It failed because the Federation was built on one

illusion of unity and a denial of differences with the result that no section of central African society would give it more than cursory support.

Cohen and Baxter were able to produce their unanimous support for federation in central Africa because the delegates attending the conference were all convinced about the imminence of the South African threat. While omitting it from the published report, to avoid embarrassing their respective governments, the officials left no doubt that Afrikaner immigration and fear of absorption were their central reasons for proposing closer association for central Africa. This over-riding argument for federation was forwarded to the officials' respective governments in a secret minute agreed jointly at the end of the conference.

Cohen and Baxter presented their copy of the minute to their respective Secretaries of State at the start of April. As it was on the basis of their arguments that the British Government, for the first time, sought to actively foster political union in central Africa, we must examine these arguments carefully. It should be noted at the outset, however, that all the arguments for federation presented in the minutes had been raised on numerous occasions since the events in 1948 which re-activated a widely perceived demand for closer association. What was new was the force and detail given to these views and also that all the separate arguments for closer association had been drawn together into one single entity, strongly urging the early federation of central Africa by means of a specified scheme. In advocating specific proposals for a federation, the minutes also

presented the arguments for the various other possible forms closer association might take and explained why they had been rejected. The single over-riding concern of the conference minutes was to convince the respective governments of the need to act speedily to produce a federal structure for central Africa. In the Conference minutes it was argued that justification for closer association based on economic factors, best utilisation of resources and improved communications, had long been recognised as carrying a great measure of validity.

"The force of these considerations has been felt for many years, but Central Africa is now exposed to a special danger which, in the view of the Conference, makes it of compelling urgency that the three territories should combine in defence of their way of life. The danger lies in the extension of Union influence over the Rhodesias. The expansionist aims of certain Union politicians are well known. Allied with the alarming increase of Afrikaner immigration in recent years into Southern and Northern Rhodesia they are felt to constitute a serious and imminent threat to the independent existence of the two territories".⁴⁹

The officials' minutes acknowledged that not all the immigrants posed a danger, but emphasised the large numbers that refused to assimilate and instead formed concentrations of Afrikaner families, producing areas in both the Rhodesias where the Boer was in the majority. To gauge accurately the true levels of Afrikaner immigration a way had to be found to discount non-Boer immigration from South Africa and those Afrikaners who intended to return soon to the Union. Using membership of the Dutch Reformed Church as a fairly reliable guide, the Afrikaner population in Northern Rhodesia was estimated at over 18%, and in Southern Rhodesia at around 16%.

These levels were seen as being dangerously high, particularly as it was claimed that organisations in the Union were encouraging committed Afrikaner Nationalists to emigrate to the Rhodesias. In concentrating on this issue the draftees of the minutes were bringing to a head the concern that had been growing in government circles, particularly in Northern Rhodesia and the Colonial Office for over a year.⁵⁰ A central African Federation was seen as being essential if Afrikaner immigration was to be effectively controlled.

"If a quota system is to be adapted for dealing with this matter in Central Africa, it will be much more effective if operated on a federal basis for the whole area than if each territorial government has to operate it separately. First, a single quota structure is easier to operate than three separate systems. Secondly, it is useless for the Southern or Northern Rhodesian Government to limit Afrikaner immigration if the other Government is not taking the same action, since movement between the territories is not easy to control. Thirdly, since Union-born immigrants cannot be excluded altogether, the operation of a single Central African quota would make it easier to reduce the influx of Afrikaners into these parts of the territories where further settlement is not desired by counting against the full quota those Afrikaners at present essential to the economy of certain limited areas. For example, a certain number of Union-born miners are essential at present to the working of the copperbelt; this necessary immigration counting against a limited quota should of itself do much to cut down the number of Union-born immigrants to be admitted to other parts of Central Africa. Fourthly, it would be easier politically for a Central African Federation Government to impose and operate a quota system than for Colonial Governments in respect of which His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom still exercise full responsibility. Finally, Northern Rhodesia alone should have great difficulty in operating a quota system against Afrikaners in view of their increasing influence in that territory".⁵¹

The minutes showed a conviction that unless the growth of the Afrikaner element in the Rhodesias was at least slowed down, then all the

economic, cultural and political advancement of the Africans that had occurred in the territories would soon be undermined and lost.

It can be convincingly argued that the progress in the position of the Africans claimed by the three central African territories was grossly exaggerated. It was not necessary, however, to accept all the supposed benefits for the Africans under the status quo to be convinced that their position would be infinitely worse under an apartheid framework of government for the region. The Southern Rhodesian 'native policy', in particular, was not the undervalued liberal achievement which the Comparative Survey of Native Policy claimed but neither was it as far beyond the pale as some of federation's opponents in the United Kingdom claimed.

The conference minutes also raised the spectre of South African economic pressure being applied and emphasised the vulnerability of the separate territories to this pressure. The minutes also dwelt on the danger of Southern Rhodesia opting into the Union if it experienced a sustained economic depression. This potential problem - and the preventive of a larger unit which could diffuse any economic pressure from the Union and, because it had a wider based economy, resist the onset of recession in any particular area - had, as we have seen, already been forcefully impressed upon the British Government by Huggins.⁵² A further argument supporting the urgent need for the rapid establishment of a British bloc in central Africa was the supposed imminent retirement of Huggins as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia. Any successor, it was argued, would

be far less liberal than Huggins, lessening the chances of agreement for political union in central Africa and increasing the possibility of Southern Rhodesia eventually turning to the Union. Again this prognosis was not new, having been stated repeatedly by the Governor of Southern Rhodesia.⁵³ Any delay, the officials warned, would most probably result in the opportunity for the creation of a federation in central Africa being lost for good.

The case for the formation of a federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was further advanced in separate notes by Baxter and Cohen during April. Baxter warned that Southern Rhodesia had made major concessions over the proposed federal constitution, whereas the ground given up by the British Government over responsibility for the northern territories' African populations consisted of "changes of form rather than of substance". As a result, Baxter concluded that there was very little room for manoeuvre or alteration to the proposals.⁵⁴ In response to doubts emanating from Colby as to the extent that a federated central Africa would be able to resist pressure from South Africa, Cohen sought to overwhelm the remaining reservations of Griffiths and Dugdale, the Minister for Colonial Affairs. In mid-April, following talks with the Secretary and the Minister of State on two consecutive days,⁵⁶ Cohen produced a further extensive memorandum in support of federation for central Africa. In it he stressed the reasons why it was required, other than the specific danger of Afrikaner immigration dealt with at such length in the memorandum of 31 March.

Cohen argued that resistance to the spreading influence of South African ideas, propaganda and philosophy within Southern Rhodesia was dependent on the continued development of the more liberal elements and ideas within the territory. This would prove to be particularly important after Huggins' retirement and, in Cohen's view was dependent upon Southern Rhodesia being federated with the northern territories.

"It is, I believe, generally realised in Southern Rhodesia that they must either look north or south; they are too small to carry on alone. If they cannot look north, those who want to look south will inevitably gain influence . . ."57

As for Northern Rhodesia, Cohen explicitly accepted that the Northern Rhodesian Government could not advance the development of the African population in the manner, or at the pace, they would have wished because it, of necessity, had to work in tandem and by agreement with the European community. Of far more importance was Cohen's implicit acknowledgment that the government in Northern Rhodesia had to avoid a major constitutional crisis with the European settlers because of the likelihood that their appeals for support to the Union would not go unheeded. Cohen was, in effect, arguing that federation would make no difference, in practice, to the regular compromises the Northern Rhodesian Government had to make to retain its authority over the territory. Whatever the theoretical position, federation would not adversely affect government in Northern Rhodesia as it was administered in actuality and it would gain the clear advantage of decisively lessening the danger of Southern Rhodesia turning to the south. However, if the federal scheme was

not implemented, and soon, the consequences would be severe for the whole of central Africa.

"The economic and other links between the two Rhodesias are already so close that if Southern Rhodesia succumbed Northern Rhodesia would, I am sure, succumb sooner or later. In that event Nyasaland would, I believe, follow suit. All her links are with the south and, although theoretically she could link up with East Africa, the distance from Zomba to the nerve centres of East Africa is so great that I am extremely sceptical of such a development".⁵⁸

Cohen was seeking to show that if the territories of central Africa remained separate they would eventually be swallowed up piecemeal by the Union. Colby's notion, that the Rhodesias would be incorporated whatever the framework of government in central Africa and that Nyasaland could only be saved by it remaining outwith the proposed federation and linked to east Africa instead, was dismissed.

"Given a willingness on the part of His Majesty's Government to agree to closer association and to entrust increased powers, although over a limited range of subjects, to a federal Central African Government and Legislature, I believe that we could certainly count on such a Government being firmly attached to the British connection and on its providing an effective counter to the influence of the Union".⁵⁹

The only concession Cohen made to the existence and aspirations of the vast majority of central Africa's inhabitants was by arguing that only by the close linking of the Rhodesias could Southern Rhodesia's African policy be continued along a liberal line. Only if Southern Rhodesia supported the progressive advance of its African inhabitants could a similar policy be fully implemented in Northern Rhodesia.

Thus, Cohen argued that the African inhabitants of the region would benefit both economically and in terms of political development, from federation, particularly if the threat of absorption by the Union were removed.

For all Cohen's persuasiveness Griffiths remained determined to take no precipitous action over the Officials' recommendations. In his reluctance to move over the federal issue, the Secretary of State was strongly supported by Dugdale, who disliked both the Officials' scheme and the concept of federation in central Africa as such.⁶⁰

He was not, however, supported by Gordon Walker and indeed one of the main features of the debate on federation in the period from the Officials' conference to the Labour Party's loss of office, was the growing division between Gordon Walker - supported not only by his Officials at the Commonwealth Relations Office but also by the majority at the Colonial Office - and Griffiths.⁶¹

As we have seen Gordon Walker had moved progressively from the position he held when he took charge of the CRO as Secretary of State, namely, opposing either amalgamation or federation for central Africa, to a stance, in April 1951, that totally endorsed the Cohen/Baxter arguments for federation. Without question the argument which produced this dramatic alteration in the Secretary of State's opinion was that of the Afrikaner threat from the Union.⁶² As a result Gordon Walker was determined to vigorously pursue the Officials' proposals and sought recommendation of them by the British Government. The Commonwealth Relations Secretary was convinced that the British Government's endorsement of the Officials' scheme was an essential

pre-requisite if the proposed conference for later in the year was to succeed in establishing a federated central Africa.

When it became clear, during April, that Griffiths was not prepared to endorse the proposals,⁶³ and that members of the Cabinet held reservations about the feasibility of the scheme, believing the European population to be insufficient,⁶⁴ Gordon Walker sought to gain Attlee's support before the issue was discussed at Cabinet again on 31 May 1951. At their two meetings on 23 and 25 May, Gordon Walker emphasised to Attlee that Huggins was keen for the British Government to endorse the Officials' scheme in order to enable him to take a positive line on the proposals in Southern Rhodesia.⁶⁵ Lambert and Lloyd were at the same time pressing Griffiths along similar lines.⁶⁶

"Sir Godfrey Huggins' letter of 17 May shows plainly that he sets great store on HMG's commendation of the report being forthcoming. Unless HMG do at least give a lead which will ensure that the report receives full and fair consideration everywhere there can be little hope of its being accepted. If it is not accepted, then Southern Rhodesia is virtually certain to turn towards South Africa and a great opportunity will have been lost".⁶⁷

Griffiths, however, resisted these arguments and pursued a policy in which the United Kingdom, whilst recommending that all interested persons and parties studied the Officials' proposals very carefully, retained a position of studied neutrality.⁶⁸ The Colonial Secretary accepted in Cabinet, on 31 May, all the arguments presented in the Officials' report for the creation of a federal state and stated his belief that the constitutional safeguards for the African inhabitants were adequate. Nonetheless, Griffiths emphasised that no plan for federation could succeed unless the Africans could be convinced that

it would offer them effective protection. As African opinion remained to be convinced on this point he felt that the proposed central African conference should be concerned only with the further consideration of the Officials' scheme because it could not reach final conclusions. Gordon Walker in the end reluctantly conceded to this position and was persuaded that the British Government's public announcement should not include a recommendation of the Officials' scheme.⁶⁹

Although disappointed, Gordon Walker at least had the satisfaction of knowing that the Minister of Defence and Joint Chiefs of Staff were also now in favour of closer association in central Africa,⁷⁰ albeit at Cohen's prompting.⁷¹ Although Gordon Walker failed to get the Officials' proposals endorsed he did manage to ensure that the British Government's announcement went as far as it was possible to go short of endorsement.⁷²

What emerges most clearly is that if it had not been for Griffiths, supported by Dugdale, the Attlee Government would, in all probability, have sought to establish federation in central Africa in 1951.

The Colonial Secretary's opposition to any precipitant moves over federation was based on the principled position that the African populations of the northern territories must be at least consulted before any decisive action was commenced. Indeed, had it not been for Griffiths' adamant insistence, no promise to consult with the African populations would have been forthcoming from the Labour Government. Gordon Walker and Morrison, who had only recently succeeded Bevin as Foreign Secretary, were strongly opposed to any such commitment.⁷³

Griffiths' refusal to overlook the views of central Africa's indigenous

people resulted in a further clash with Gordon Walker on 4 June.

The Secretary for Commonwealth Relations pressed Griffiths to accept, in the government's announcement of the central African Ministers' conference, the expression of the hope that the conference would result in an agreed scheme being placed before Parliament. The Colonial Secretary maintained the position he had adopted in Cabinet, that the conference was a mechanism to enable the interested parties to air their views on the Officials' report and that the conference would not take any quantitative decisions. He argued that impressions to the contrary must not be conveyed as this would lead the local communities in central Africa, particularly the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, to conclude that the Secretaries of State's visit was to gain an endorsement for the Officials' scheme, rather than to seek views and information.⁷⁴ As with the question of whether to commend the Officials' scheme or not, it was Griffiths' view which was adopted by the Cabinet.⁷⁵

One factor that greatly aided the Colonial Secretary's success in carrying his policy in Cabinet and resisting the pressure from his Officials, was the high regard in which he was held by his Cabinet colleagues and the Prime Minister. Griffiths' tenure at the Ministry of National Insurance was widely acknowledged to have been a definite success and Attlee had even considered him as an alternative to Morrison as Bevin's successor at the Foreign Office in early March 1951.⁷⁶ Undoubtedly another consideration that weighed in Griffiths' favour was that the Government was keen to avoid any further serious divisions in the wake of Bevan and Wilson's resignation from the

Cabinet on 23 April. Griffiths' initial support of Bevan against Gaitskell and Shinwell over increased defence expenditure, however indecisive, would not have been forgotten,⁷⁷ and the possibility of Griffiths renewing this support from the back benches, if he resigned over the issue of federation, could not be ignored. These arguments should not be over-emphasised for the federal issue was, after all, minor compared to Labour's pressing problems elsewhere. Nonetheless, these factors contributed to Griffiths' success in maintaining his position on the federation issue as the Government's policy. It has been argued that the Labour Government's decision not to recommend the Officials' scheme nor to present it as a beneficial policy to the African inhabitants of the territories concerned, precluded any chance of federation being accepted by the African populations, especially by those in the northern territories.⁷⁸ Given the long history of African opposition, in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, to closer association with Southern Rhodesia, it is debatable whether even a policy of strong commitment to the Officials' scheme from its announcement in June 1951 by the Imperial and territorial governments would have succeeded in producing African endorsement. The opposition of Northern Rhodesia's African population to any possibility of association with Southern Rhodesia, had been made abundantly clear by their response to the attempts by Gore-Browne to win their support for the general scheme that initially emerged from the February 1949 Victoria Falls Conference.⁷⁹ One immediate consequence of Griffiths' prevention of the British Government from commending the Officials' proposals, however, was to ensure that

Huggins also did not endorse the scheme. He may not have intended to commend the proposed scheme in any case, but Griffiths' stance decided the matter. It also encouraged Huggins and his government to distance themselves from the whole controversy and debate that surrounded the proposed scheme in Southern Rhodesia. In his statement accompanying the publication of the Officials' Report in Southern Rhodesia in early June, Huggins emphasised that the proposals were not the Southern Rhodesian Government's and that the administration had not committed itself to anything.⁸⁰

Between the publication of the report in June and the Secretaries of State's visits to central Africa and the conference in September, certain factors became increasingly clear. Perhaps the most important was that Huggins and the United Party remained committed to seeking the amalgamation of central Africa. The United Party Executive met at Gwelo on 9 August and re-asserted its policy of pressing for amalgamation, yet it also held out hope for Gordon Walker, Baxter and Cohen, in that it conceded that if amalgamation proved impossible to attain then the federal scheme would be accepted, providing certain modifications were made to it.⁸¹ The modifications that the Southern Rhodesian Government visualised, however, were of a fairly fundamental nature and were connected with a series of severe criticisms of the Officials' proposals by members of the United Party Cabinet.

In August both Tredgold and Beadle presented radical revisions of the proposed scheme for discussion in the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet. Both the Ministers' proposed changes would result in the federal

scheme being transformed into virtual amalgamation. It is also worth noting that Tredgold's memorandum exposed many of the superficial claims and inaccuracies within the Comparative Survey of Native Policy and flatly contradicted its central thesis, that the African policies of the three territories were drawing closer together.⁸²

There existed the strong belief amongst many of Southern Rhodesia's leading political figures, amongst them Tredgold, Beadle, Greenfield, Winterton and Fletcher, that the Officials' proposals were unworkable. Several features of the scheme that were particularly harshly criticised were the presence of nominated members in the proposed Federal Assembly, the position and role of the Minister for African Interests, the postponement of full Dominion status and especially the division of functions between the Federal and Territorial Authorities which entailed all major matters affecting African interests being retained as Territorial responsibilities.⁸³

The opponents and their criticisms of the Officials' Report were formidable, but London remained confident that if Huggins gave a strong lead on the issue an agreement could still be reached on the basis of the March proposals. The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was not prepared to commit himself, however, until Britain had not only publicly supported the federal scheme, but had also agreed to abide by any recommendations that were forthcoming from the September conference in central Africa. As the conference approached, it also became increasingly apparent that Huggins shared many of the criticisms of the scheme held by his Ministers and that he too wanted the Report's recommendations radically revised.⁸⁴ Another

factor which encouraged Huggins to remain inactive and withdrawn from the federation controversy was his growing concern about a possible split in his Cabinet and United Party over the issue. Halsted, J R Dendy Young, and a handful of discontented United Party MPs were seriously considering during these months breaking away and, together with certain of the Liberal members, forming themselves into a stronger opposition.⁸⁵

With amalgamation clearly an unrealistic goal whilst the Labour Party remained in Office and in the light of the unofficials in the northern territories opposition to a unitary form of government for central Africa, Huggins adopted a similar attitude to the prospect of a federal state emerging along the lines of the Officials' proposals as he had done to the CAC. If federation proved an unsuitable vehicle for progressing towards an amalgamated, fully independent unit, then its failure could be used to provide convincing proof of the need for such a state.⁸⁶ This viewpoint did not prevent him from seeking significant concessions from the British Government over the terms for federation. The general consensus within the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices during 1951 was that some sort of accommodation was possible with the Southern Rhodesians over federation. Griffiths again appears as a solitary voice insisting that African aspirations had to be considered and be accorded a position of equal importance with those of Southern Rhodesia.⁸⁷

The views of both Griffiths and Gordon Walker, on federation, were strongly reinforced by their visits to their respective parts of

central Africa.⁸⁸ Griffiths was greatly impressed at the extent and depth of African opposition, in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, to closer association of any sort or form with Southern Rhodesia. Whilst accepting that this opposition was organised and orchestrated by the Congress in each territory, the Colonial Secretary found African opinion united in opposing federation. Griffiths realised that this opposition permeated African society and was not just the view of the educated minority. As a result he returned to London convinced that the United Kingdom could not and should not impose federation in the face of such total opposition, but would need to allay African fears and win them away from the complete rejection of any form of political association with Southern Rhodesia.⁸⁹

Gordon Walker was surprised by the strength of support for amalgamation that he encountered in 'responsible quarters' in Southern Rhodesia.⁹⁰ He should have been fore-warned since Liesching had returned from a visit to Southern Rhodesia, in July, convinced that many of the prominent figures opposed to the federal scheme were determined to extend Southern Rhodesia's 'native policy' to the northern territories, preferably by amalgamation, but failing that, by means of the federal government gaining responsibility for African affairs.⁹¹ The main impact on Gordon Walker of his visit, however, was to confirm to him the extent of the Afrikaner danger.

"I am more alarmed than ever that Southern Rhodesia will go to the Union if we cut her off from the north".⁹²

As the date for the opening of the central Africa conference neared, Griffiths experienced great difficulties in persuading African representatives to attend. His speech to the Nyasaland Protectorate

Council on 1 September failed to gain their agreement to send a delegation. This problem of overwhelming African opposition to federation, an extreme reluctance to discuss the issue and a refusal to attend the Secretaries of State's conference, combined with reports of Huggins' attitude as to the alterations he wanted in the proposed scheme, led Griffiths, at the start of September, to seek to have the conference postponed.⁹³ His proposed four-month postponement was flatly rejected by Gordon Walker who suggested that Griffiths should emphasise to the African leaders that the conference was only to discuss proposals and not to reach any final decisions.⁹⁴ It was only after the Colonial Secretary promised that federation would only be discussed not endorsed, and that absolutely no decisions would be taken at the Victoria Falls Conference, that the Nyasaland Protectorate Council (NPC) agreed to send two delegates.⁹⁵ With Nyasaland's Africans having been persuaded to attend the conference and in the light of Huggins' new suggestion - that the conference be cancelled and replaced by talks between himself, the Secretaries of State and the northern territories' Governors in order to agree on the details of the scheme, including amendments - Griffiths dropped his call for the conference's postponement.⁹⁶ In Northern Rhodesia the African Representative Council agreed to send representatives to the conference, but its members completely rejected Griffiths' attempts to persuade them to consider the federal proposals.

The Victoria Falls Conference of 18 and 21 September 1951, on closer association in central Africa achieved very little as the British

Government had intended. Before the convening of the conference was even announced, the British Cabinet had agreed that its function would be to act as a forum for the expression of views and hopefully to identify some common ground. Any greater achievements would have been totally undermined by Griffiths' concessions to the NPC and in any case both the Northern Rhodesian unofficials and Southern Rhodesian delegations were fully aware of the limited scope of the conference's remit prior to its commencement. The Southern Rhodesian Ministers accepted, or so Gordon Walker believed, that the September conference could not be the concluding one, "but merely a stage in the process of discussion".⁹⁷ Griffiths had, moreover, informed the Northern Rhodesian unofficials during their discussions on 12 September, that as he favoured federation he wanted to avoid the United Kingdom Government having to face the dilemma of whether or not to impose federation in the face of total African opposition in the northern territories. Accordingly, the Colonial Secretary agreed that the task for the Victoria Falls Conference would be to avoid a breakdown, secure an adjournment and have the talks re-convened in London in mid-1952.⁹⁸

The Southern Rhodesian Government may well have accepted that further conferences would be necessary, but it intended that specific amendments to the scheme would still be discussed. Huggins organised a meeting between representatives from his own and the two opposition parties on 3 September, to see if a common position could be established. Agreement was duly reached by Greenfield, A R W Stumbles and H H Davies, on a joint position for the Secretaries of State's

conference later in the month, which included two Houses of Assembly, the abolition of the African Affairs Board, the termination of the Congo Basin Treaties, a federal government veto on all constitutional changes, whether federal or territorial, all four governments to be responsible to the Commonwealth Secretary and not the Colonial Secretary, and Southern Rhodesia to retain the right to secede for the first ten years.⁹⁹ Clearly Greenfield had been forced to compromise Huggins' position on certain points, most notably the second chamber, in order to obtain agreement. However, the option of Southern Rhodesian secession from a federated central Africa at any stage of its first ten years, would have fitted Huggins' strategy - as he had adopted a similar attitude to federation as he had to the CAC. Whatever the amount of compromise in the agreement, what it did show was that Southern Rhodesian expectations for the September conference were far higher than what actually occurred. When Attlee announced the date for a general election the day after the conference opened, Gordon Walker and Griffiths' limited goals for the conference were reduced even further. Keen to return to the UK as quickly as possible, the Secretaries of State's main new aim for the truncated conference was to achieve the agreement of all participants to attend when it was re-convened the following year. Nevertheless some progress was made. All those attending the conference appeared to have accepted a new policy of partnership for central Africa. Moreover, the assurance from J S Moffat, Northern Rhodesia's nominated member for African interests, that Northern Rhodesia's Africans would consider federation if a policy

of partnership was defined and implemented, held out some hope of gaining African support for the scheme. Also, Huggins, Welensky and Gordon Walker were all agreed on the grave danger of 'Krugerism' and of the probability of Southern Rhodesia entering the Union if federation was not implemented.

Federation might have been essential to these men but C R Kumbikano, on behalf of the NPC claimed that federation would act as the thin end of the amalgamationist wedge. The refusal of Kumbikano, D L Yamba and the other African representatives¹⁰⁰ to even discuss federation irked the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister who had also been greatly annoyed by the timing of Attlee's election announcement. Huggins gave vent to his frustration by calling for the expulsion of the African delegates so that federation could be discussed. Welensky supported him in this demand and a major confrontation ensued between Griffiths and Huggins. When the Colonial Secretary's ultimatum, that if the African delegates were requested to leave, then the British Government's representatives would withdraw as well, was supported by Gordon Walker, albeit in more placatory language, and by Barrow's declaration that the Nyasaland unofficials would follow suit, Huggins allowed the matter to drop. The heated nature of the exchange between Huggins/Welensky and Griffiths were doubtless fueled, in part, by Welensky's awareness of Griffiths' general lack of support for Gordon Walker's attempts at the early establishment of a federation in central Africa.¹⁰¹ The break up of the conference was avoided, but the deep resentment the confrontation engendered was to have serious consequences for the formation of federation, as we will see.

Nonetheless, having weathered the crisis, the conference did manage to agree on a number of measures which brought the prospect of federation nearer. It was agreed that the protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be preserved under any federal scheme, that amalgamation would only be introduced if a majority of the inhabitants in all three Territories desired it, that land and land settlement questions and the political advancement of all the peoples of the northern territories would remain the responsibility of their Territorial Governments, and not subject to any federal authority. These assurances represented substantial concessions by Huggins and his fellow Southern Rhodesian representatives and apparently confirmed his conversion to federation from amalgamation. With the imminent prospect of the return of the Conservative Party to office in the UK however, it is debatable how far Huggins was committed to these assurances. Certainly his vigorous re-assertion of the advantages of amalgamation over federation in January 1952, would seem to indicate that he had no intention of treating these agreements as binding.¹⁰²

Griffiths and Gordon Walker returned to London with the Labour Government committed to the policy of federation for central Africa, as in the Conference's final communique, which had however also noted African opposition. The problem of whether or not federation should be imposed against the wishes of the African peoples had been avoided, in part, because it was hoped that the discussions on the introduction of a policy of partnership would resolve the dilemma by producing some measure of African acquiescence. This hope of the Secretary of State

was not unrealistic as both Moffat and Welensky remained confident that some African support would emerge,¹⁰³ and Colby and Rennie had given assurances that, providing the British Government strongly endorsed the federal scheme, there was the distinct chance that by the middle of 1952 the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would be adopting a less negative approach.¹⁰⁴ It may reasonably be assumed, however, that a factor of at least equal importance in determining Griffiths' and Gordon Walker's avoidance of the question of imposing federation, was the knowledge that after the election it might well no longer be their problem. At Attlee's request the Secretaries of State compiled a joint Cabinet memorandum for immediate circulation, but not to be considered by the Cabinet until after the election.¹⁰⁵ This memorandum in which Cohen's hand is easily discernable,¹⁰⁶ never was considered by a Labour Cabinet, but it remains, nonetheless, of great importance because it was central to the attitude adopted by the succeeding Conservative Administration.¹⁰⁷ Griffiths' and Gordon Walker's Cabinet memorandum made a number of recommendations, including one that the British Government publicly endorse the conclusions of the September Victoria Falls Conference and support the principle of federation in central Africa along the general lines of the proposals of the London conference of Officials. The question of imposition was, in part, still avoided by the confident hope that the acknowledged African opposition would reconsider its stance in the light of the assurances agreed at the Victoria Falls in September. The main thrust of the document, however, concerned the danger posed by South Africa.

"Important as the economic arguments in favour of federation are, we are convinced on the basis of our recent experience in Central Africa that the political arguments are still stronger."¹⁰⁸

Griffiths and Gordon Walker expressed particular concern at the level of immigration from the Union into the Rhodesias, especially as they claimed to have "definite evidence that Afrikaner immigration is being officially inspired". They had found the situation in Southern Rhodesia worrying and felt that the formation of an Afrikaner Nationalist Party in the territory on 9 September particularly disquieting.¹⁰⁹ It was Northern Rhodesia, however, that gave real cause for concern, with its considerably smaller European population and the dependence of the mining industry on white South African labour. Afrikaners were expected to gain five of the ten European seats on the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council at the next general election in 1953 and the fear common to both Rhodesias was that Afrikaners would gain control of Northern Rhodesia resulting in Southern Rhodesia being squeezed from the north and south. After their visit to the territories the Secretaries of State had moved to a position of full agreement with the fears Huggins and Welensky had strongly impressed upon them in April and May 1950.¹¹⁰ The Cabinet memorandum warned that if the Rhodesias were absorbed into or dominated by, the Union, then Nyasaland would inevitably succumb.

"We are faced in Central Africa with pressure by a country far stronger economically and industrially than any of the Central African territories, led by a militant Nationalist Party with expansionist aims, anxious to strengthen its influence in the north. This pressure can be countered only by an equally firm policy of resistance to it both in the political and economic spheres - a policy

which must have the support of both the European and African populations of the Central African territories, and which in our view has little chance of succeeding unless we can establish a British bloc of territories in Central Africa knit together by constitutional ties."¹¹¹

Griffiths and Gordon Walker felt that the South African threat to central Africa could not be over emphasised, but, in finally facing up to the issue of whether or not federation should be imposed over the emphatic opposition of the African inhabitants, the Secretaries of State stated:

"The Afrikaner pressure, moreover, makes early action urgent: but we should be strongly opposed to any attempt to force the federation proposals through in the face of the present solid African opposition."¹¹²

Gordon Walker had finally gained the endorsement of the Officials' federal scheme which he had been seeking since April, but at a price! Admittedly, Griffiths and Gordon Walker held out high hopes of being able to persuade African representatives to adopt a more conciliatory line on the basis of the safeguards given at the Victoria Falls Conference in September and providing Britain publicly promoted federation. Moreover, the wording of the Secretaries of State's opposition to the imposition of federation left the way open for this view to be reversed in the event of even limited support for the scheme being forthcoming from any sections of the African population. Nonetheless, Griffiths and Gordon Walker had committed themselves to opposing federation whilst African opposition was total, even though they were convinced that if federation failed to materialise South Africa would gain control of the region. Although other factors undoubtedly intervened - most notably Huggins' fierce personal attack

on Griffiths - and although Gordon Walker's commitment to opposing imposition was lukewarm, it was this commitment, circulated to, but not discussed by, the Cabinet that determined the Labour Party's opposition to the new Conservative Administration's policy for central Africa.

CHAPTER 6

Huggins' continued support for Amalgamation

The new Government lost no time in pursuing the federal issue. By 30 October Griffiths and Gordon Walker had, on request, given permission for the new Secretaries of State to see their memorandum of 12 October¹ and by the following day Lyttelton had accepted in general its recommendations. Thus Churchill's administration, like Attlee's before it,² accepted both the economic argument and, more importantly, the threat of incorporation by the Union, as the basis for establishing a federation in central Africa.³ At the Cabinet meeting on 15 November a memorandum compiled by Ismay, Lyttelton, Salisbury and Woolton⁴ was discussed. In the memorandum it was argued that the case for federation in British Central Africa was based, partly on the three territories' economic inter-dependence, but mainly on the need to create a stronger unit of government, better able to resist the infiltration of Afrikaners, and their ideas, from the Union of South Africa.⁵

Within a fortnight of the Conservative Party taking office, Huggins proposed that he visit London for informal talks on federation.⁶ His initiative was welcomed by officials at the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices, partly because they were concerned by reports reaching them which indicated that Huggins was experiencing some difficulties in uniting his party in support of federation, rather than amalgamation, and were alarmed at the possibility of an

open split in the United Party occurring over the issue.⁷ It was felt that the Financial Ministers' meeting in mid-January "would provide good 'cover' for Sir Godfrey Huggins' visit."⁸

However, in late October, Parry remained convinced that Huggins and his Government had still not given up their hopes of forcing the British Government into accepting some form of amalgamation. In order to forestall such an attempt, Welensky and Beckett, at Parry's urging, met with Huggins at Salisbury on 2 November, and stated categorically that Northern Rhodesia's European population would not accept amalgamation or any quasi-amalgamation scheme, but only federation. As a result of this meeting Huggins agreed to concessions to facilitate an agreement with the British Government over a federal scheme and persuaded his Cabinet to agree not to pursue the alternative of amalgamation "for the time being".⁹ Thus, in early November Huggins finally adopted Welensky's position on closer association, namely, that amalgamation was not politically feasible.

Although the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister continued to insist that amalgamation remained the best form of closer association, he sought to convince his Cabinet and party that federation must now be accepted as the only realistic policy. This position, which he maintained throughout November, was undermined by the fluent arguments of Tredgold and Beadle. These concentrated on the racial prejudice and fears of Rhodesia's white minority and emphasised constitutional developments in the Gold Coast.¹⁰ The difficulties Huggins encountered in advancing this change in policy were a

significant factor in his decision to raise the amalgamation issue with London once more.

In December, Sir Godfrey informed Ismay that he would be re-opening the amalgamation conundrum during their January 1952 discussions. Huggins explained to the Commonwealth Secretary that his decision to press the case for amalgamation yet again was to satisfy local opinion that every effort had been made to attain amalgamation. He accepted that if and when the British Government rejected his arguments for amalgamation the talks could then turn to a detailed examination of the amendments he would be seeking for the federal scheme.¹¹ This was, no doubt, a sincere appraisal of his motives at the time, when the talks commenced on 22 January. However, contemporary evidence, which we will now review, suggests that Huggins was pressing the case for amalgamation in earnest and not merely doing so for the benefit of the Southern Rhodesian electorate.

Sir Godfrey had made no secret of the fact that he believed amalgamation to be the best method of uniting the three Territories.¹² He had finally and reluctantly dropped his support for amalgamation in favour of federation after the Salisbury meeting had underlined the opposition he had encountered, during the Victoria Falls Conference, from the northern territories unofficials and their Governors. Another factor in the change was Rennie's and Colby's belief that some measure of African acquiescence would be forthcoming, if the federal scheme was strongly backed by the British Government and their representatives in central Africa. Their assessment, if accurate and accepted by Britain - which would be very reluctant to

introduce closer association of any description if African opposition was going to be total - would result in the federal scheme becoming accepted as the only possible method of closer association in central Africa.

However, Huggins was, no doubt, concerned by the extent of the opposition he encountered to the proposals for federation during the Southern Rhodesian Assembly debate on the constitution between 14 and 22 November. Some members rejected the Prime Minister's argument that the only option for closer association was some form of federation. More alarming, was the clear indication that many Southern Rhodesians would prefer "nothing" to federation "even if this ultimately meant a form of association with the Union",¹³ and that members of his own party as well as the opposition were receptive to the notion of union with South Africa.¹⁴ The extent of opposition to the federal proposals within the Assembly caused Huggins to reconsider his decision to publicly drop amalgamation as being unrealistic. He sought to appease popular feeling in Southern Rhodesia, and avoid antagonising his allies in Northern Rhodesia by publicly reviewing the case for amalgamation and, simultaneously, stressing to Ismay and Welensky the domestic necessity for his actions and accepting, in advance, that his arguments would be rejected. As we shall see, Huggins failed in his efforts to soothe the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials' disquiet at his resurrection of the case for amalgamation. Moreover, his own full commitment to amalgamation was re-activated by disclosures at the CAC meeting of 28 December.

Well before the December Council meeting concern was being expressed, both in central Africa and London, at the continuing solidarity of the Northern territories' Africans' opposition to federation. At the end of October, Cohen was advising Lloyd that "it is clearly necessary to make a further vigorous attempt to bring African opinion round to a true realisation of their own interests with regard to the scheme".¹⁵ Then, at the CAC meeting in Salisbury, Colby and Rennie declared categorically that African opposition was solid and that there was absolutely no possibility of it altering or being significantly influenced within the next twelve months, at least. This was a reversal of their earlier belief which had swayed Huggins in his decision to drop amalgamation in favour of federation. The two Governors were convinced that if federation were to be introduced it would have to be imposed from London, over the opposition of the African inhabitants of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Rennie and Colby's view was strongly endorsed by their respective Secretaries for Native Affairs, R P Bush and V Fox-Strangeways: the latter had only recently completed a tour of Nyasaland testing the extent and strength of African opposition to federation. Huggins was obviously unhappy at the repudiation of the main reason for agreeing to postpone the September conference on closer association until mid-1952. Nonetheless, as the general view now was that any scheme for closer association in central Africa would have to be imposed by the British Government over African opposition, he felt that one of the strongest reasons for the United Kingdom preferring federation to amalgamation had been removed. It was this

belief, coupled with his concern at the depth of opposition to the federal scheme within Southern Rhodesia that caused Huggins to abandon his tactical support for federation and advocate in London what he truly wanted, the amalgamation of British Central Africa.¹⁶

Huggins may have felt that the case for amalgamation had been significantly strengthened by Rennie and Colby's announcement at the December Council meeting, but his resurrection of the amalgamation issue produced its own problems. These started to manifest themselves when, on 2 December, Welensky first raised the possibility of his joining Huggins and Whitehead in London for the January talks. This request appears to have arisen as a direct result of the unease felt by Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials with the line of argument Huggins indicated he was going to pursue in London. At a meeting in Ndola on 2 December, Huggins and Northern Rhodesia's elected members of the Legislative Council discussed the federal proposals and debated what amendments should be sought from the British Government.¹⁷

Huggins stressed that opinion in Southern Rhodesia was hardening against the federal proposals and increasingly frequent objections were being made to the inclusion of Nyasaland in the scheme. Although Huggins was pursuing federation rather than amalgamation, it was evident that clear differences remained between his ideas on the composition of the proposed federal state and those envisaged by the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials. Huggins was particularly opposed to the continuation of the northern territories as British Protectorates after any federal constitution was implemented. Welensky and his colleagues felt that the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was

exaggerating the importance of Protectorate status. They were confident that they could effectively counter any excessive pressure from the Colonial Office, but in any case the Protectorate status of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would just have to be accepted as a fact of life, albeit an unpleasant one, as the Imperial Government had made it plain this responsibility would only be repealed with African consent.

One issue upon which all those present were in full agreement, was the need to present a united front to London for the forthcoming discussions. To strengthen this process it was agreed that Welensky would seek to be present at the January talks, in addition to Huggins and Whitehead, and that the Southern Rhodesian Government would forward to their Northern Rhodesian allies, as soon as possible, a note of its proposed modifications to the federal scheme. After Southern Rhodesia's proposed amendments had been studied by the Northern Rhodesian elected members further talks would be held to form a basis for the adoption of a common position for their future dealings with the British Government.¹⁸

Welensky raised the topic of his attending the January talks with Rennie on 2 December and again on the 4th, indicating his desire to be in London, even if unofficially, so that he was, at the very least, available for informal discussions.¹⁹ He dropped his proposal, however, when the Governor explained that Welensky's presence in London along with Huggins' would cause the British Government embarrassment. Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials would have been content to let the matter rest there, had Huggins not raised the question of amalgamation once more.

The Northern Rhodesian elected members were so concerned by the change of stance contained in Sir Godfrey's telegram to Ismay of 13 December, indicating his intention to present the case for amalgamation in January, that on the 14th they again demanded Welensky's attendance at the London talks.²⁰ Welensky wrote to Huggins on the same day, announcing his intention to attend the January talks, unofficially if necessary.²¹ The Northern Rhodesian Unofficials' disquiet over Huggins' revival of pressure for amalgamation was exacerbated by Southern Rhodesia's failure to produce, by that time, any written criticisms of the federal proposals.²² Northern Rhodesia's Chief Secretary, R C S S Stanley, moved quickly in an attempt to reassure Welensky over Huggins' resurrection of the amalgamation issue. Stanley, who was a committed supporter of federation for central Africa²³ argued that a compromise should be possible with Sir Godfrey over his new proposals, and assured Welensky that the British Government would definitely not accept amalgamation, but remained well disposed towards federation. Northern Rhodesia's Chief Secretary also stressed to Welensky that his presence in London in January at the same time as Huggins' would only serve to strengthen the hands of opponents of federation in the United Kingdom, in and out of Parliament, and make the Government's task of implementing a federal scheme "more difficult - perhaps even impossible".²⁴ Nonetheless, Welensky and his colleagues continued to insist that he should attend the London talks.²⁵ It was not until the CAC meeting on 28 December that Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials accepted that Welensky's presence in London

in January was not viable in the face of the British Government's resolute opposition. Nevertheless, the elected members of Northern Rhodesia were determined that their territory would have a voice at the forthcoming talks. Amalgamation was unacceptable to them and Huggins could not be relied on to represent the differing interests of both Northern and Southern Rhodesia. An implicit condition, therefore, for the dropping of demands for Welensky's presence in London, was that the Governor represented Northern Rhodesia at the discussions. Rennie's Officials supported Welensky's proposal at the Council meeting that the Governor attend the talks, as they were equally convinced that no Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia could be trusted to safeguard Northern Rhodesia's interests in any agreement over closer association.²⁶

At a meeting on 31 December, Northern Rhodesia's elected members strongly pressed Rennie once more to attend the January discussions.²⁷ Not only were Welensky, Beckett, and their followers uneasy about Huggins' intentions for central Africa, they were also very concerned that, unless agreement on a specific federal constitution was reached soon, the growing trend towards the rejection of federation, in both Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, would become unstoppable.²⁸

At the CAC meeting on the 29th Huggins had finally produced a memorandum of Southern Rhodesia's objections and proposed amendments to the Officials' scheme. Sir Godfrey suggested that both the Minister for African Affairs and the nominated members to the federal assembly be dropped. In addition he proposed the introduction of concurrent legislation, clearly aimed at preventing any of the territorial

governments from introducing universal suffrage or any other electoral constitutional changes disliked by the federal government. On the first two points there existed a fair measure of agreement within the Council, but the issue of concurrent legislation was a much more contentious and divisive matter.²⁹

As we have already seen, Sir Godfrey was greatly irked by the northern Governors' announcement at the Council meeting that no campaign would alter the opposition of their African populations. Nonetheless, with Welensky accepting that "there is no prospect of changing present African opinion either in this territory or Nyasaland in favour of Federation",³⁰ a position endorsed by Gore-Browne,³¹ the agenda for the London talks was clearly going to centre on the twin issues of whether or not the British Government would impose a federal scheme and, if it did, what concessions would be offered to Southern Rhodesia. Huggins may have had no real hope of gaining the Imperial Government's support for amalgamation, but he was determined that the federal authority would be the dominating element in any federation. The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister's expectations of reaching agreement with the British Government were not high, yet he remained convinced that a strongly centralised British Central Africa was essential for Southern Rhodesia's future. He was opposed to Southern Rhodesia linking up with the Union, was convinced that Southern Rhodesia could not survive as a dominion on its own, and disliked the independence the three territorial governments would retain under a federal system. Huggins, therefore, began to seriously consider the possibilities of the amalgamation of the

Rhodesias without the approval of the British Government.

Sir Godfrey had raised the matter with Welensky for serious consideration at their meeting on 2 December. He pressed Welensky to express what his attitude would be to any plan for the unilateral amalgamation of the Rhodesias. Welensky refused to be drawn over what steps Northern Rhodesia's elected members would be prepared to consider in the event of a federation failing to materialise.³²

Although non-committal, he certainly did not rule out unconstitutional, unilateral action to secure union if conventional means failed.

In a letter to Welensky of 5 January 1952, Huggins again, very explicitly, raised the issue of unilateral action. Sir Godfrey wanted to know if Welensky and his colleagues would be prepared to accept amalgamation if no agreement would be reached on a federal solution, if the British Government would not impose federation over African opposition or if the Southern Rhodesian electorate rejected the federal scheme at the referendum. Huggins asked Welensky whether, under any of these circumstances, "would your members accept amalgamation forced on the Colonial Office (after all the Colonial Office could not stop it)?" The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister made it clear that he did not intend to use this information as a lever during the January talks in London, but in order to make contingency plans in case federation failed to emerge.³³ It is clear that Huggins was examining the practical prospects for the achievement of amalgamation of the Rhodesias by unconstitutional means if federation was not established. As the matter was to remain confidential between Huggins and Welensky, it does not appear

to have been a move to prepare the ground for an attempt to blackmail the Government of the United Kingdom to gain concessions in the terms of the proposed federal scheme. Nor was it an academic exercise since Huggins, unlike Welensky, was far from convinced that a federal solution could be agreed upon by all the parties concerned.³⁴

It was with serious intention to implement the scheme that the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was examining the possibilities for unilateral action and pressing the Northern Rhodesian Unofficials' leader to commit himself.

Welensky, however, was extremely careful to avoid doing that very thing. In replying to Huggins on 12 January, the leader of Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials reiterated his belief that the British and Southern Rhodesian Governments would reach agreement on such modifications as the federal proposals required and emphasised that he would require further talks with Sir Godfrey before committing himself to any contingency plans. Nonetheless, Welensky clearly indicated what he saw as the probable outcome of such talks by arguing that, if federation was rejected, for whatever reason, then a large section of Northern Rhodesia's European population would "look to South Africa for succour. There is also a large section of the community, and I would say they are in the majority, who feel as I do and they would turn even more forcibly towards Southern Rhodesia. The question as you put it almost conveys to me the suggestion of a 'Boston tea-party'. If the Federal proposals fail I think there is quite a possibility of the matter being taken out of my hands and that a 'Boston tea-party' could happen."³⁵

This issue was, doubtless, one of the items covered during extensive discussions between Huggins and Welensky at Livingstone on 15 January, immediately prior to the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister's departure for London for talks on closer association. The bulk of the Livingstone dialogue, however, would have been concerned with the clear differences which remained between the two Rhodesias' positions on union in central Africa. Welensky was particularly concerned that every effort be made to retain Nyasaland in the proposed Federal state and was concerned lest political pressure in Southern Rhodesia was eroding the support Huggins had given to this position at the September Victoria Falls Conference.³⁶

During the January discussions in London and for the rest of 1952, the crucial question was still whether or not the United Kingdom Government would impose federation in British central Africa over the opposition of the African populations of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Fears that London would balk at such a step ensured that consideration of illegal methods to establish union in central Africa continued throughout the year.

Welensky asserted, in early April, that if that month's conference in London failed to produce a definite scheme which would assuredly be implemented, then unconstitutional methods would have to be considered.³⁷ During the April conference itself, Welensky raised the notion of unconstitutional action and its value as a threat if nothing else, in a letter to his fellow members of the Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia.³⁸ As late as 2 October, Beckett believed that Northern Rhodesia's European population "may now

have to adopt unconstitutional methods" in order to achieve federation.³⁹ As it turned out the Conservative Administration did impose federation over African opposition and so ensured that any thoughts of unconstitutional action by the Rhodesias' European political leaders remained only speculation. The UDI in Southern Rhodesia in 1965 shows that it would be unwise to underestimate the seriousness with which alternative means of achieving union in British central Africa were considered during 1951 and 1952.

CHAPTER 7

Difficulties over Nyasaland
and between the Rhodesias

In bowing to the united pressure of Northern Rhodesia's Unofficials and Officials to have Rennie included in the January talks in London, the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices ensnared themselves in a dilemma. With both Rhodesias now being represented in London normal practice demanded that the Governor of Nyasaland also be invited. The Commonwealth Relations Office had no objections, but officials at the Colonial Office were very reluctant for Colby to be present at the discussions,¹ because he had been opposed to the proposal of federation throughout 1951.

In May, Colby had bluntly informed Cohen that he understood the federal proposals to be "the first step towards ultimate fusion and the creation of a Central African Dominion". He argued that this would inevitably involve the establishment of a unitary tax system, resulting in higher taxation in Nyasaland and causing its development to be arrested. Colby insisted, therefore, that Nyasaland could not consider entering any federation under the proposed financial arrangements.² In November Colby added a political dimension to his argument that Nyasaland could not, and should not enter any federation with the Rhodesias:

"It is my considered opinion that there is no (repeat no) possibility, in the next 12 months, of getting Africans to change their attitude towards federation and consequently that there is nothing to be gained, and much to be lost, by endeavouring to make them change their minds"³

The Governor reported a recent and marked deterioration in the political situation in Nyasaland and laid the blame squarely on the unease generated by the Victoria Falls Conference on federation and subsequent official attempts to produce a measure of concord for the scheme amongst the African population. Colby continued:

"If my assessment of African opinion is right, I feel very strongly that we should take the initiative and pull out. To leave the initiative to Congress, and to allow them to claim, in due course, they were responsible for Nyasaland rejecting federation, would be politically disastrous."⁴

Cohen and the Colonial Office took Colby's announcement very seriously and responded immediately by reminding Nyasaland's Governor of the "broader political reasons" for federation, i.e., to resist South African pressure and expansionist aims. Cohen reiterated the gist of the agreement reached at September's Victoria Falls Conference that concerted action would be undertaken to persuade the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to accept federation. As a preliminary step in this programme the United Kingdom Government had publicly announced its support for the necessity of early establishment of federation,⁵ and, as Cohen emphasised, to halt the campaign now was politically impossible. The Colonial Office remained convinced that "it would have disastrous consequences if Nyasaland were to pull out at this stage".⁶ Cohen and senior officials at the Colonial Office were determined to retain Nyasaland in any scheme for closer association in central Africa, because they had no intentions of giving up their voice in the shaping of policy within Northern Rhodesia. It was believed that the best

means of guaranteeing the continuation of the Colonial Office central role in Northern Rhodesia after federation was the inclusion of Nyasaland in any association.⁷ The highest echelons of the Colonial Office were convinced of the need for federation for the reasons already covered, but they were determined to prevent Southern Rhodesia from gaining control of its northern neighbour, a goal which Southern Rhodesia would find significantly easier if the linking involved only these states.

The Colonial Office's view, that Colby's presence would not facilitate agreement with Huggins and Rennie on the federal proposals, was reinforced early in January when Nyasaland's Governor reiterated his conviction that Southern Rhodesia sought control over the northern territories rather than the partnership of federation.⁸ Colby, moreover, chose to ignore Lloyd's tactful attempt to persuade him to remain in Nyasaland and to accept Rennie's attendance in London.⁹ Colby's position, that if Northern Rhodesia was represented then Nyasaland must be as well, was mirrored by the arguments adopted by Leisching at the Commonwealth Relations Office.¹⁰ With Colby and the Commonwealth Relations Office concurring on the necessity of Nyasaland being represented along with Northern Rhodesia, the Colonial Office quickly conceded and invited the Governors of both territories to the talks.¹¹ That the attempt was made to prevent Colby's attendance at the January discussions, gives some indication, however, of the strength of the support, amongst senior Colonial Office officials, for federation in British central Africa.

Rennie and Colby's conviction that the opposition of the Africans of the northern territories to federation could not be altered within the foreseeable future, endowed the January 1952 discussions with a new and urgent significance. It should be noted that the Governors' stand on African opposition was not the manifestation of imagined Colonial Office prejudice against central Africa's European settlers. As we have seen, both Welensky and Gore-Brown concurred with the Governors' appraisal of the situation and recognised its importance. No longer could the difficult problem of African opposition be conveniently side-stepped with the expression of confident predictions of its early reversal. The question of whether or not to impose a federal scheme on British central Africa and the probable consequences of either decision now had to be faced, or so the relevant officials in London believed. Leisching, amongst others, was convinced that if there was no firm agreement for a federation reached during the January talks, then the Baxter/Cohen scheme for a central African Federation would have "foundered for good and there will be no mid-summer conference."¹² This outlook was shared by Beckett, who was convinced that, unless a definite federal scheme was agreed on within the first three months of 1952, "the whole hope of federation may go by default."¹³

At a wide-ranging meeting on 7 January, representatives from the two offices endeavoured to reach a joint position for the forthcoming talks and agree on what advice to offer their respective Secretaries of State over the dilemma of whether or not to impose a federal solution. As with the CAC meeting of 28 December, no real

difficulties were expected in reaching a compromise with Huggins on his demands for the dropping of nominated members and the Minister for African Affairs. On Sir Godfrey's proposals for concurrent legislation a clear division existed between the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices. Within the Commonwealth Relations Office a fair measure of support existed for Huggins' position. The Colonial Office position, however, as outlined by Lloyd, was categorical that "no proposal which involved any element of supervision of the territorial governments by the federal authority could be entertained," a position determined by the Colonial Office's firm intention of maintaining decisive influence in Northern Rhodesia after federation.¹⁴

On the question of whether or not to recommend the imposition of a federal government for British central Africa, both Baxter and Lloyd emphasised the dangers of both Southern and Northern Rhodesia entering the Union of South Africa if federation was not established. Gorrell-Barnes and Lambert, in contrast, placed a great deal of weight on fears that the imposition of federation would result in general industrial, commercial and social disruption by the African populations of the northern territories, including strikes and riots. A decision on what advice to offer was postponed until Colby and Rennie could be consulted about the likelihood and extent of disruption which the imposition of federation would cause in their respective territories.

On one point there was uniform agreement, "that everything possible should be done to avoid making the federal proposals the subject of a party conflict in this country". To further this end it was agreed

to consult with Griffiths and Gordon Walker after the discussions with Huggins, to try to avoid a front bench dispute in Parliament if federation was imposed.¹⁵ Baxter, for one, was determined that central African federation would be achieved despite the views of the African populations, and Colby, or any other difficulty.¹⁶ When the London talks began on the morning of Friday 18 January 1952, with a meeting between the relevant British and Southern Rhodesian civil servants, T S Gisborne advocated amalgamation as the correct solution. This argument was reiterated by Huggins in the afternoon when he and the Governors of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia joined the officials in their deliberations.¹⁷ The official discussions commenced on 22 January,¹⁸ and at the opening session, Sir Godfrey repeatedly advocated the case for amalgamating British central Africa, but this was persistently rejected by the British Secretaries of State, supported by their civil servants and the Governors of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. With no support for the case of amalgamation forthcoming, Sir Godfrey made it absolutely clear that in continuing with the discussions he was not committing himself and his Government to anything. It was recognised by all that any decisions agreed would not be binding. In responding not only to Huggins' arguments for amalgamation, but also to his proposed amendments to the federal scheme, the representatives of the United Kingdom Government were supported by Welensky's advice, that the closer they adhered to the Officials' proposals, the better the chances were of achieving federation.¹⁹ Welensky may have been prevented from attending the talks, but he

had, nevertheless, made efforts to ensure that any agreement that emerged would be acceptable to the unofficials of Northern Rhodesia and in particular to himself, their leader.

Definite progress towards a specific agreement was made during the eight days of discussions, but not all the problems were resolved. At the sixth meeting, on 29 January, Huggins raised the possibility of Nyasaland being excluded from the proposed federation. As we have seen, such a proposal was totally unacceptable to the Colonial Office, but in any case, Rennie scotched the suggestion by stating correctly, that such a move would be opposed by Northern Rhodesia's unofficials, a fact of which Huggins was well aware.²⁰ It was decided however despite the vigorous objections of Colby, to dispense with the proposed post of Minister of African Affairs. After prolonged discussion, the composition of the African Affairs Board was agreed, although Rennie vehemently protested at the dilution of its powers and reduction in its size. The question of whether or not to invite African representatives to the conference on closer association when it re-convened in mid-1952, if they continued to refuse to accept the principle of federation, was debated but no decision was reached.

At Rennie's instigation,²¹ it was agreed to bring forward the re-convened conference on closer association to April in order to prevent African opposition to federation from hardening, and to attempt to hinder the growth of campaigns by Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia's Congress advocating independence rather than federation. This move also reduced the time available for European opponents of

federation in Southern Rhodesia to unite and organise an effective campaign against the proposals.²² In the meantime, it was accepted that discussions would take place between the three governments in central Africa to reach consensus on the outstanding differences, and a working party in London would prepare a draft scheme for the April conference.²³

Since full agreement had not been reached, the crucial question of whether or not to impose federation was left largely untouched.

As we shall see, the British Government were eager to delay any decision on this issue for as long as possible in the hope that some indications of African support would emerge and, if possible, to avoid a clash with the Opposition. In British central Africa, however, the continued uncertainty over the implementation of any federal arrangement did not aid the territorial governments in their search for agreement on the division of powers between themselves and the proposed federal authority.

During the discussions in London sharp differences between the Governments of Northern and Southern Rhodesia had clearly emerged, fuelled by the personal tensions which existed between Rennie on the one side and Huggins and Whitehead on the other. Rennie was particularly incensed by Whitehead's implied threat that Southern Rhodesia would bring economic pressure to bear on Northern Rhodesia by restricting her supply of coal.²⁴

The long-standing resentments of Northern Rhodesia's European population, towards what was seen as Southern Rhodesia's superior and domineering attitude, were further exacerbated in February during an informal CAC meeting in Salisbury.²⁵ MacLeman reported to

London that:

"the Southern Rhodesians gave some offense to the representatives of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland by making it clear that they were out to get any concessions which would strengthen the Federal Government as against the territories, and made no secret of their hope that Southern Rhodesia would dominate a Federal Government."²⁶

Parry independently confirmed this view:

"My impression is that both official and unofficial opinion in the north is getting more than a little restive at the indications there have recently been that Southern Rhodesia is only likely to be interested in federation on its own terms and that this means the projection into federation of the present Southern Rhodesian political and administrative set up. Unfortunately little attempt was made by the Southern Rhodesian team to disguise this belief during the recent talks, and while the tactics adopted may have been logical from the Southern Rhodesian point of view, I doubt if they were wise. At any rate by not concealing their ambitions better they now stand little chance of persuading Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to throw more into the federal kitty."²⁷

This attitude of Huggins and his fellow Southern Rhodesians, resulted in persistent and vigorous clashes between Sir Godfrey and Rennie at the Council meeting, with Welensky trying desperately to moderate in the disputes and pacify the protagonists.²⁸ The gathering was not a formal meeting of the CAC because the Southern Rhodesian Government had refused to attend, if it was held under the auspices of the Council. Parry was convinced that this represented part of a strategy by the Southern Rhodesian Administration to supplant the Council's secretariat with their own Cabinet Office for the purpose of supervising inter-territorial proceedings in the period between the formal decision to establish federation and it

coming into being. The motive behind this strategy, Parry was convinced, was to ensure that "the federal government should be as little different as possible from the present Southern Rhodesian Government".²⁹

This incident served to reinforce the officials of the northern territories in the view held by many Northern Rhodesian Europeans, that the continuing negotiations concerning federation were completely dominated by the need to placate the prejudices of the Southern Rhodesian electorate,³⁰ and counter their reluctance to abandon the policy of amalgamation. It is certainly true that Huggins was pressing the United Kingdom Government for further concessions, as much to demonstrate to his own supporters that he was making every effort to gain amalgamation or a close approximation of it, as in the belief that the Conservative Administration might concede them.

Huggins remained determined to produce as powerful a federal government as possible for the proposed central African Federation. To this end the Southern Rhodesian Government proposed, in early March, that a simple two-thirds majority in the federal assembly, without further recourse to the British Government, should suffice for any and all constitutional changes in the envisaged federation. Officials at the Colonial Office, however, recognised the intent behind the proposition and opposed it.

"The effect of conceding this point would be that the federation could, by act of the federal legislature, be converted into a virtual amalgamation . . . this we cannot allow."³¹

The Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was also pressing for the creation of a combined federal civil service to supersede the separate territorial administrations after federation, and the transfers of European Agriculture and Marketing, Police and Public Health from territorial to federal government agency.³² At the informal Council meeting at the end of February, Southern Rhodesia's delegation presented the case for forming united federal units for the European elements in these functions. The representatives of the northern governments, however, not only resisted Southern Rhodesia's proposals, insisting that these areas continued under territorial control, but argued for attempts at racial integration to be made within these services.

The meeting failed to resolve the differences between the two sides and Colby showed his determination not to compromise over the issues by immediately informing Lyttelton that the Nyasaland Government rejected each and every one of the Southern Rhodesian Government's proposals.³³ Nyasaland's Governor was prepared to accept the removal of the Minister for African Interests from the provisional plan, but only if the African Affairs Board, and particularly the position of its chairman, was strengthened to compensate for the loss. In addition, Colby was adamant that each territorial government should be responsible for the method of electing its representatives to the federal assembly.

This last demand by the Nyasaland Governor caused severe problems for the British Government. During the discussions in London in January, Huggins had insisted upon a prior meeting between himself and Whitehead

with Ismay and Lyttelton, at which no civil servants were present.³⁴ During the wide-ranging discussions that took place, the two Rhodesians argued vigorously that unless Nyasaland made significant concessions over its policy of nominating rather than electing members it would have to be excluded from the proposed CAF.³⁵ The British Secretaries of State flatly rejected this ultimatum because they had been confidently hoping that a compromise solution would be forthcoming. However, the hard line Colby adopted concerning nominated members greatly reduced the scope for compromise. A virtual impasse, therefore, existed between the Southern Rhodesian Government and its northern counterparts. The extent of this became apparent in March during inter-governmental meetings called in an attempt to resolve their differences. Repeatedly the representatives of the northern governments would agree to the arguments of economy and efficiency put forward by the Southern Rhodesian delegate for the unification of various departments, but then go on to reject the proposition on the basis of national interests, such as the probable consequences upon the African population or workforce. This pattern was clearly illustrated at a meeting, on 12 March, debating Southern Rhodesia's proposal that Police and Prisons should become a federal function. The whole meeting accepted the cost and efficiency argument for a unified force but the officials from Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia still rejected the move on the grounds that they

"could not contemplate handing over the enforcement of territorial law and order to any organisation which was not under direct territorial control".³⁶

Such an attitude, if it were maintained, would severely undermine any federation which did emerge, since its over-riding concern was to retain territorial control over territorial matters, leaving extremely little to be federated. This unco-operative stand was prevalent amongst the northern territories' officials because they were convinced that Southern Rhodesia sought domination, by means of the control of the federal authority, rather than partnership. The attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government's representatives in their dealings with Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia did nothing to alleviate this impression, but rather served to reinforce it. Moreover, although the elected members of Northern Rhodesia's European population were more committed to federation and prepared to concede more to achieve it, nevertheless, they shared their officials' opinion of Southern Rhodesia's intentions and also opposed it.

Many of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia's officials had supported the idea of a strengthened CAC rather than federation in 1949-50. Such senior Colonial Service figures as Ronald P Bush, Northern Rhodesia's Secretary for Native Affairs, and Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt, Provincial Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia's Eastern Province, were convinced that if Southern Rhodesia had agreed to their preference for closer association - a strong CAC - the recent drastic deterioration in government-African relations would have been avoided.³⁷ While this did not prevent the northern territories' officials from conscientiously fulfilling the government's policy of seeking African confidence in, and support for, federation,

the federal scheme itself did not have their personal support.³⁸

The central argument for federation, that otherwise Southern, and then Northern Rhodesia, and possibly Nyasaland, would be sucked into the Union, was well known to them but they still had doubts about whether or not the federal scheme was in the best interests of central Africa's indigenous population.³⁹ The attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government and its representatives served to heighten these doubts.

The case for Police and Prisons remaining a territorial responsibility with no attempt at unification was finally clinched by statements made by both Nyasaland's and Northern Rhodesia's Commissioners of Police. They asserted that the loyalty of the African ranks could not be guaranteed if, in the near future, they were told that they were to become members of a federal force. Although some progress was achieved over Public Health and European Agriculture and Marketing between the Rhodesias, the Nyasaland Government refused to be committed to any of the tentative agreements.⁴⁰ This lack of progress served to increase Huggins' annoyance by further convincing him that the northern territories' governments were adopting an unco-operative and obstructionist policy towards federation.

Huggins had tended, from the end of 1951, to adopt a very pessimistic attitude towards the chances of federation being established, with Welensky seeking to encourage him and emphasising the positive aspects. Increasingly, however, Welensky attempted to impose a moderating influence over Huggins' demands for the envisaged federal constitution.⁴¹ After the open clashes between Huggins and Rennie

at the informal CAC meeting of 26 February, Welensky endeavoured to maintain a delicate balance by encouraging Sir Godfrey to accept that federation remained feasible, while, at the same time, seeking to reduce in number and magnitude the concessions that the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was demanding over the proposed constitution.⁴²

By the end of March, Huggins was incensed because Rennie and the Northern Rhodesian Government were not only resisting any extension of the proposed federal government's authority, but were actually seeking to expand the jurisdiction of the territorial administrations.⁴³ This was true, but nonetheless Rennie at least remained in favour of the principle of federation, as did some of his officials and most of Northern Rhodesia's unofficials. In Nyasaland not only did Colby and his civil servants oppose Nyasaland's inclusion in federation with the Rhodesias, but also the small European community was far from keen on the venture, unless it gained the support of the African population.⁴⁴ Prospects for definite progress being achieved at the April conference were bleak.

In an effort to break the deadlock Rennie, in early April, sounded out Welensky about whether or not he would be prepared to accept Nyasaland being dropped from the federal scheme, if closer association could not otherwise be achieved. Welensky indicated that he was prepared to accept such a development as a last resort, but he stressed that it would inevitably raise the whole issue of representation in the federal parliament once more and that Southern

Rhodesia's inherent numerical superiority would be unpopular with Northern Rhodesia's European populace.⁴⁵ Moreover, although such a move would be supported by the Governments of Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Colonial Office, as has been shown, were totally opposed.

At the April conference on closer association at Lancaster House, the divisions between the positions and aims of Southern Rhodesia and the northern territories were highlighted once more.⁴⁶ Disputes raised at the January talks which had been left unresolved by the intervening inter-governmental discussions, were re-examined and new ones raised, as the Southern Rhodesian Government sought to gain further concessions. Efforts by the Southern Rhodesian delegation, by Eastwood in particular, to have the African Affairs Board abolished, were successfully resisted by Colby, Rennie, Haddow and Welensky.⁴⁷ Rennie's arguments for stronger safeguards for territorial independence under the federal constitution, illustrated the conviction of the northern territories' officials and unofficials, that Southern Rhodesia still sought amalgamation and would seek to dominate Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia through the federation's administrative machinery. Alan Lennox-Boyd, on behalf of the United Kingdom Government, rejected Rennie's thesis and insisted that the proposed safeguards were adequate.⁴⁸ However Northern Rhodesian officials, and Unsworth in particular, remained unconvinced and at the next session expressed his concern that federation might result in providing Southern Rhodesia with "a backdoor to amalgamation".⁴⁹

Some progress was made. While Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia remained totally opposed to the formation of a federal police force, they did agree to a centralised initial training period of six months for European officers. As Moffat pointed out, this was a major concession as it departed from the northern territories' existing policy of African and European officers training together.⁵⁰

In agreeing on a compromise over responsibility for agriculture in which European agriculture was to be a federal function and African agriculture a territorial concern, Beckett and Barrow were concerned lest federation produce "a Federal Government for whites and a State Government for Africans". To this Huggins could only retort: "We should have amalgamation if that is the trouble!"⁵¹

Although all these disputes and more were raised at the April conference, enough compromises were patched together to enable a draft federal scheme to be prepared and published on 18 June 1952.⁵² Three commissions were established to report later in the year on the areas upon which no agreement could be reached.⁵³ Throughout the conference the clash of views between Southern Rhodesia and its northern neighbours on African development, underlay most of the altercations over specific issues.⁵⁴ The northern territories' policy of progressive integration, whatever its rate of implementation and level of success, was in direct conflict with Southern Rhodesia's twin pyramid philosophy, with its commitment to theoretically equal but separate development of the two races. The disputes concerning Agriculture, Police, Health and Education, amongst other topics, all rested on this basic difference in approaching the problem

of a multi-racial society. It was the existence of these two mutually exclusive philosophies that rendered many of the differences intractable, whatever the CACs African report may have claimed.⁵⁵

The fundamental conflict in outlook between Southern Rhodesia and the northern territories concerning not only the long term role of the African majority in society, but also the nature and goal of closer association were abundantly clear, yet in spite of this federation was implemented.

The central African federation was constituted for wider political considerations rather than internal requirements. It was for this reason that the Official Report in 1951 glossed over and dismissed the gulf which existed in African policy between Southern Rhodesia and the northern territories, rather than starkly confronting the issue. That the federation was deeply flawed and divided from its inception was largely due to the inability or unwillingness of successive British Governments to pay the political price of imposing one of British central Africa's opposing racial policies throughout the region, to the exclusion of the other. As a result, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland was an artificial contrivance which, when constituted, contained numerous unresolved disputes between the Federal Government and Southern Rhodesia, on the one hand, and Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia on the other. These differences tended to be further entrenched because the establishment of federation soured other areas of possible co-operation and coloured all dealings between the composite parts. The attempt to deny, or paper over, the fundamental nature of the differences in

outlook which formed the basis of these disputes, helped to harden further the intransigent attitude of all the parties concerned.

The north's tendency to non-co-operation was fuelled by suspicions of Southern Rhodesia's aspirations and ambivalence toward federation: the south's unco-operativeness was based on dissatisfaction with federation when they preferred amalgamation, and a desire for domination rather than partnership.

CHAPTER 8

The Imposition of Federation under the Conservatives

From the moment of its election the Conservative Administration under Churchill was committed to the federation of British Central Africa, although the Prime Minister himself took no real interest in the matter.¹ From the outset, however, the government had two interlocking priorities to maintain, while pressing for the federal option. Supported by senior civil servants, the Conservative Secretaries of State sought to maintain the parliamentary consensus in favour of federation in central Africa and, as a prerequisite to this, to obtain some measure of African support for the federal scheme. Apart from the general concern, that if an important piece of colonial policy failed to receive cross party support its effectiveness would be severely undermined because a change in government might result in efforts to reverse or undo it, there was also the worry that the House of Lords would significantly amend, or even reject, a politically contentious colonial policy bill. With a significant number of Liberal Peers in the Lords and given that parliamentary discipline is less easy to enforce in the Upper Chamber, this latter concern was a very real one.

In his first statement to the House of Commons on colonial policy, therefore, Lyttelton adopted a moderate conciliatory line.

"Certain broad lines of policy are accepted by all sections of the House as being above Party politics. These have been clearly stated by my predecessors from both the main Parties.

"Two of them are fundamental. First, we all aim at helping the colonial territories to attain self-government within the British Commonwealth. To that end we are seeking as rapidly as possible to build up in each territory the institutions which its circumstances require. Second, we are all determined to pursue the economic and social development of the colonial territories so that it keeps pace with their political development.

I should like to make it plain at the outset that His Majesty's Government intend no change in these aims. We desire to see successful constitutional development both in those territories which are less advanced towards self-government and in those with more advanced constitutions. His Majesty's Government will do their utmost to help Colonial Governments and Legislators to foster the health, wealth and happiness of the colonial people.

I hope, therefore, that however much there may from time to time be disagreement between us on details, all parties will be with me in agreeing on these ends."²

The sentiments expressed may have been admired and widely accepted by the Opposition. The Secretary of State himself, however, was far less acceptable. Lyttelton's reputation amongst the Parliamentary Labour Party of being insensitive and inflexible, more a business man than a politician, exacerbated the fierce parliamentary disputes over colonial policy during his term in Office. These arguments commenced almost immediately in December 1951, with the Labour Opposition objecting to aspects of Lyttelton's tougher military approach to the Malayan problem. The extent to which the Colonial Secretary's personality contributed to the controversies during his tenure is hard to gauge. Whether Lyttelton did indeed, as he believed,³ preside over the abandonment of Britain's bi-partisan colonial policy is a moot point. Certainly there were disputes and friction between the Government and the Opposition within the

colonial sphere, particularly over the nature of the measures taken to resolve the Kenyan Mau Mau and British Guiana crises. On one of these issues, however, did the Conservative Administration face a Parliamentary Labour Party united in their opposition, or agreed upon an alternative. Indeed, a strong case can and has been made that the dispute over the central African federation was an aberration in the continuance of a bi-partisan colonial policy albeit one that was placed under considerable strain on occasion.⁴ Certainly there was no difference on colonial policy between the Attlee and Churchill administrations in relation to the UNO. Both the Labour and Conservative governments were determined to prevent the United Nations from extending its responsibilities to cover the administration of non-self-governing territories. Whilst observing the UN charter and co-operating with its specialised agencies the committees, the United Kingdom allowed no intervention or interference in its colonies.⁵ Lyttelton's relative success or failure as secretary of state for the Colonies is a debatable issue. It is certainly true that he faced a series of difficult and challenging problems which would have taxed any Colonial Secretary. It is worth noting, however, that by 1953 the conviction within the Labour Party and Fabian Colonial Bureau that Lyttelton should be replaced was shared by such traditional allies of Conservative Government as the Times and the Economist, although they presented their preferred solution in a more diluted and guarded form.⁶ That, however, lay ahead. In 1951 no one, least of all Lyttelton, when he reluctantly accepted his Cabinet responsibilities,⁷ could have anticipated the traumas which lay in wait.

The Conservative Administration's hopes of maintaining Labour support for Imperial policy in central Africa were based on the assumption that some African support would be forthcoming. As the Labour party supported federation - with this one condition - and had agreed measures at the September Victoria Falls Conference to produce, at the very least, African acquiescence, the chances of the new Conservative Government achieving this objective seemed promising. Ismay and Lyttelton were confident of persuading African opinion to accept, if not support, federation, by giving a firm lead from the United Kingdom and territorial governments. The Colonial and Commonwealth Secretaries were, in early March, quite prepared to adopt the previous Labour administration's federal scheme unaltered, including the retention of the Minister for African Affairs, in order to ensure all party support for the measure.⁸ Rennie and Colby's announcement, at the CAC on 28 December, that African opinion was hard set against federation changed everything.

The memorandum from previous Labour Secretaries of State, in September,⁹ had emphasised that federation was only to be pursued after some measure of African support had been secured. Griffiths had been confident, at the conclusion of the September 1951 Victoria Falls Conference, that African opposition could be won over if their fears on the three crucial points could be met. These points were European ambitions, African political advancement, and land rights.¹⁰ In his statements before and after the memorandum of 12 September, Griffiths had stressed Labour's opposition to the imposition of a federal scheme against united African opposition.

The Conservative Government was acutely aware that if no public endorsement of federation was forthcoming from some element within the African populations of the northern territories, Parliament would divide along party lines. In addition, the effects imposition would have on British-South African relations, particularly in relation to the Union's long-standing claims to the High Commission Territories, had to be considered.

While in office, both Griffiths and Gordon Walker had repeatedly stressed to everyone interested in African rights and political advance, the great danger of British central Africa being absorbed by South Africa unless federation was achieved. In 1951, the main organisation concerned with this area was the Fabian Colonial Bureau. By April it was already gravely concerned by the level of Afrikaner immigration into British central Africa and Northern Rhodesia in particular.¹¹ In a letter to the Bureau's Secretary, Marjorie Nicholson, in early June, Griffiths assured her that both he and Rennie were well aware of the Afrikaner problem and of the need to take "urgent steps to deal with it".¹² In a number of private meetings in June and July both Griffiths and Gordon Walker sought to gain Fabian Colonial Bureau support for the officials' federal proposals, by insisting that the Rhodesias, and possibly also Nyasaland, would be incorporated by the Union unless the scheme was implemented.¹³ Griffiths rejected the FCBs preference for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia linking up with east Africa, on the grounds that east Africa's political future could be endangered by introducing the strong Afrikaner elements in Northern Rhodesia into its

framework.¹⁴ Nonetheless, this option remained the FCBs favourite policy and, while not opposed to the principle of closer association, in central Africa, it rejected the officials' proposed scheme partly because the Bureau believed that no federal constitution would be acceptable to both the northern territories' African population and Southern Rhodesia's European settlers.¹⁵

However, the argument of the Secretaries of State and their officials that federation was required to prevent Afrikaner expansion, steadily became more widely known and accepted. Griffiths and Gordon Walker's Conservative successors were therefore aware that this argument would be unlikely to increase Labour support for the imposition of federation. The Labour party's opposition to the imposition of the federal scheme over and against united African opposition had been reached after full consideration of the probable consequences of not securing federation in British central Africa. Most leading Conservative politicians, however, were convinced that the Labour Party's opposition to the federal proposals was based on opportunism and the failure of Attlee and Griffiths to withstand emotive back-bench pressure,¹⁶ a view largely shared by the Economist and the Times. Nonetheless, whatever the reasons for the Parliamentary Labour Party adopting this position, some sort of African endorsement of federation was essential if the issue was not going to divide Parliament along party lines. Some degree of African support would also be very helpful in the international arena, to counter accusations of racialism and broken promises and, more specifically, to ensure that South Africa could not cite the

imposition of federation as a precedent for the arbitrary absorption of the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and Swaziland into the Union.

Quite apart from the consequences of imposing federation in British central Africa, Attlee's second administration had been worried, in June 1951, that Malan's Afrikaner Government might try to force the transfer of the High Commission Territories prior to the emergence of federation. The matter was considered sufficiently serious for an extensive examination to be made of the economic sanctions the South African Government might employ to try to force the transfer, and what response Britain should make in such an eventuality.¹⁷

Concern over the mounting pressure within the Union for the transfer of the High Commission Territories was an important element in the British Cabinet's decision not to allow ~~Se~~retse Khama to return to Bechuanaland in June 1951, and in the British Government's refusal to recognise him as the territory's legal leader in January 1950.¹⁸

The United Kingdom's relations with South Africa were already under a certain amount of strain since Malan and leading members of the Union's Parliament and press had made it very clear that they opposed the federation of British central Africa because it would be detrimental to European interests in the region. Even more friction, however, was caused by the growing awareness within South Africa that it was used as a bogey to increase support for federation in central Africa.¹⁹ This realisation was forcibly strengthened by Griffiths in early January and by the speeches of numerous

MPs during the debate on federation of 4 March 1952. Speaker after speaker presented the Afrikaner threat as the major reason for proceeding with federation in central Africa.²⁰ Moreover, Griffiths had revealed in public, in an address at Chatham House, that the main reason for the officials' recommendation of federation in March 1951 was not an economic one but was the fear of South African expansion.²¹ The Conservatives failed to convince the Opposition that the only alternative to federation was incorporation by the Union, and in the process heightened the tensions between the United Kingdom and South African Governments concerning the future of central Africa.

The Parliamentary Labour Party's Policy on Federation

Although some Labour MPs, such as Gordon Walker and Tom Reid,²² were prepared to accept that the Rhodesias must either join together or be incorporated by the Union, others, notably A Fenner Brockway,²³ were convinced that the South African threat could be contained by other means. At the same time James Johnson and many more believed that the Afrikaner expansionist argument was a form of "political black-mail".²⁴ By and large, the Labour party maintained its position of refusing to support the imposition of federation over and against complete African opposition, no matter what the merits of the case for federation or the probable consequences of its non-implementation.

This is not to suggest that the Parliamentary Labour Party remained united over the issue of Federation. We have already noted the divisions within it on the issue and the tensions between Griffiths

and Gordon Walker on this topic while they were in Office, have also been examined. On their return to Opposition, these differences were accentuated further. Deep and bitter divisions within the Labour Opposition were not uncommon, but the split over the question of the central African federation was remarkable in that it was not the usual dissension by a left-wing Bevanite minority, as had emerged before over issues such as German re-armament or the British Guiana crisis. On this occasion the vast majority of Labour MPs were united behind Griffiths' policy of rejecting the imposition of any federal scheme over the solid opposition of the African inhabitants of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. The dissenters, known as the 'Keep Right Group' rallied behind Gordon Walker.

Undoubtedly the Labour Leadership was pleased that its position allowed for a full spectrum of views on the merits or otherwise of the principle of federation and the specific scheme proposed, but it did not adopt the policy principally to maintain party unity.²⁵

The Government may have felt that Griffiths was an example of political opportunism, sacrificing bi-partisan politics on Colonial policy in an attempt to maintain party unity,²⁶ but this would have been to ignore the clear pattern of continuity in Griffiths' position dating from his time as Secretary of State. Lyttelton, at least, must have been fully aware of Griffiths' determination to oppose imposition. It was clearly stated in the latter's joint memorandum with Gordon Walker of 12 October 1951, and Lyttelton was well acquainted with this.²⁷

Nonetheless, the Manchester Guardian considered that the main appeal for the Labour Party in opposing the imposition of federation, was that it presented an opportunity for them to confront the Government almost completely united behind a cause which most of them strongly believed was right.²⁸

The Daily Telegraph went further and argued that the Labour Party was attacking its own scheme in an attempt to unite its "innumerable squabbling factions" in one single, overriding campaign of hostility, but no substance.²⁹

As we shall see, many people, both inside and outside Parliament and the Labour Party, were highly critical of Griffiths' concentration on the issue of imposition, rather than the inherent problems and dangers of federation itself. Nonetheless, the only element within the Parliamentary Labour Party to take a stand against the official policy of refusing to impose any federal scheme over united African opposition, was the 'Keep Right Group'. This body consisted of a small number of pro-Federation Labour MPs who met in private and who lined up behind Gordon Walker.³⁰ Although its membership did not exceed twenty, it contained some influential figures and was viewed with approval, if not with open support, by at least a further thirty Labour MPs.³¹

Apart from Gordon Walker, there were four other ex-Ministers in the Group - George Brown, Richard Stokes, Sir Hartley Shawcross and Maurice Webb - a former member of the Colonial Service, Thomas Reid, and the two Labour members of the British Branch of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association's delegation to central Africa in August 1951, Stanley Evans and William Coldrick.³² The 'Keep Right' group's existence produced two important consequences

during 1952, one for the Government and one for the Opposition. The consequence which affected the Government will be considered first.

Griffiths had forced a division on the Government's approach to the Federation issue at the conclusion of the debate on 4 March.³³

Although only two Labour MPs - Evans and Coldrick - broke ranks on that occasion,³⁴ the Labour leadership feared a much greater rebellion should a division occur at the next major debate on the topic on 29 April.³⁵ As a result Griffiths did not push the House, either then or after a subsequent debate on 24 July,³⁷ into taking a vote. The stated reasons, as one would expect, did not refer to the threat of a disunited Opposition and were plausible. On 29 April Griffiths proffered the presence of two Southern Rhodesian Africans at the Federation Conference and the fact that the Conference's conclusions were, as yet, unknown, as the Labour Party's reasons for not dividing the House. On 24 July Lyttelton's assurance that Parliament would be consulted before any definite steps were taken on Federation, and the announcement of the postponement of the next conference on Federation from October to January, were Griffiths' justifications for not forcing a vote. However, Lyttelton had offered an even bigger concession during the debate on 4 March, with the specific intention of avoiding a division.³⁸ On that occasion, it would appear that Griffiths felt that the announcement of a further conference on Federation, to be held in October, was insufficient reason not to push his motion to a vote. The real unstated reason why the House failed to divide on the latter two debates, therefore,

was Labour's disinclination to put to the test the extent of support for the 'Keep Right' group's argument that Federation was necessary and might have to be imposed.³⁹

The extent to which the Parliamentary Labour Party would oppose the imposition of Federation remained unclear during most of 1952. This was most clearly demonstrated by Gordon Walker's speeches when he was opening or concluding Labour's case during the Parliamentary debates on the issue. It was particularly obvious on 24 July when he presented an impassioned advocacy of federation, with the idea that African consent was required, tagged on almost as an afterthought.⁴⁰ Attlee appears to have striven to avoid taking one side against the other. His personal convictions would have tended to place him on Gordon Walker's side, but he could not ignore Griffiths' popularity within the Party, both within Parliament and outside. Griffiths' position could only have been strengthened when he was the only non-Bevanite to be elected by the constituency parties on to the National Executive Council in 1952 and in 1953.⁴¹ Nonetheless, Gordon Walker and his associates did prevent Griffiths from leading the Parliamentary Labour Party into full-blooded opposition to Conservative policy in British central Africa during 1952.

The significance for the British Government of the emergence of the 'Keep Right' group was, partly that it held out the hope of eventual Labour acquiescence in the imposition of Federation and the continuance of a bi-partisan policy for the Colonies concerned. More importantly, the Conservative administration was convinced that Gordon Walker's group represented the views of a much larger number

of Labour MPs than its membership suggested.⁴² This belief served to strengthen the Government's resolve to pursue its central African policy, including the imposition of Federation if necessary. Given that significant Labour support existed for this line of action, its policy, although no longer strictly bi-partisan, was no longer a matter for a straight inter-party dispute. Moreover, as Amery explained to Welensky, the existence of significant Labour support for Federation, even if this was mostly convert, did afford "some assurance that there would be no attempt to undo the Federation, even if the Labour Party did come back to power at the next election."⁴³ While the Conservatives welcomed the emergence of the 'Keep Right' group, Welensky positively encouraged it through his close and regular contact with two of its leading members - Evans and Reid.⁴⁴ Welensky aimed at splitting the Parliamentary Labour Party over the Federation and the question of its imposition, and the second line of his strategy was to re-inforce Attlee's personal preference for a federated British central Africa. To this end Welensky and Beckett addressed a joint meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Fabian Colonial Bureau on 8 May on the topic of Federation.⁴⁵ Then, on 13 May, Welensky dined with Attlee and George Hall, and went on to hold a prolonged tete-a-tete with the leader of the Labour Party after the ex-Colonial Secretary had left. Welensky later informed Huggins that they had established a great deal of common ground during the course of the evening and that he had invited Attlee, along with Clement Davies⁴⁶ and Beverley Baxter,⁴⁷ to visit Northern Rhodesia later in the year, at his own expense.⁴⁸

Welensky assured Huggins that the trip, costing two thousand pounds, would be a sound investment and urged the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister to extend the invitation to include both Rhodesias. The three guests duly visited Northern Rhodesia during August and September of 1952.

In a letter to Martin Visagie of 4 June, Welensky makes it clear that his intention in inviting Attlee to visit Northern Rhodesia was to persuade him to support the setting up of the Federation and thus greatly strengthen the influence of Evans and the small group of Labour MPs "who now firmly believe that Federation is necessary." By this tactic Welensky hoped to foster a split in the Parliamentary Labour Party over federation and so aid the Conservative Administration in its attempt to prevent the House of Commons dividing on strictly party lines over the proposed scheme.⁴⁹

Attlee's attitude to the federation of the British central African territories was that although he was in favour of the concept, he was not committed to the Conservative Administration's specific scheme.⁵⁰ Reid believed that Attlee wanted to bring the Labour Party around to supporting Federation but was not in a strong position for achieving this end.⁵¹ Attlee was well aware of the dilemma posed by the issue of whether or not to impose Federation against the wishes of the African populations of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. He believed that it was the responsibility of the Southern Rhodesian Government to produce evidence of their good intentions and to convince all concerned that they were determined to implement fully the policy of social and industrial 'partnership'.

Nonetheless, during his tour of central Africa he made it clear to his audiences, both African and European, that the Labour Party supported the idea of federation, primarily for economic reasons.⁵² Welensky was pleased with Attlee's tour⁵³ and his hopes that the European settler leaders and their arguments would make a favourable impression on the leader of the Labour Party⁵⁴ appeared to have been fulfilled. Attlee had not been impressed by the African representatives whom he had met, or by their fundamental reasons for opposing federation. At least one observer was convinced that as a result of his visit, Attlee would return to the United Kingdom firmly committed to the support of the proposed Federation.⁵⁵ This may have been true at a personal level, but as leader of the Party, he had to take influences other than personal feeling into consideration. Even before he left for Africa, Attlee had been forcefully lobbied by Griffiths on the whole issue, particularly the impossibility of giving support for imposition.⁵⁶

Attlee revealed his thoughts in a long private talk with Welensky on 25 September. He asserted his warm support for Federation, but confessed to being gravely concerned about the repercussions on "coloured opinion" throughout the Commonwealth and in the world at large. He was also worried about the implications for South Africa's claims on the High Commission Territories if the federal scheme was pushed through against the clear wishes of the African populations of the three territories. Although Attlee accepted the seriousness of the problems which would face the territories if the federal scheme was not implemented, Welensky remained convinced that Attlee would

give way to Griffiths and firmly endorse a policy which totally rejected any imposition of federation. All that Welensky could offer Salisbury and Hopkinson as a possible means of avoiding this development, was the suggestion that Evans and his associates impress on Attlee the vital necessity of a federal arrangement for the future of all three territories.⁵⁷ However, as we shall see, the Conservative regime chose to alter its position on the nature and extent of African opposition to Federation within the territories.

South Africa's Intentions

The Conservative Government employed the argument of South African expansionist aims in central Africa, not only because it was a good lever to prize out some more Labour support for Federation, but also because they believed in the seriousness of these aims. It was accepted in Whitehall and Salisbury, and by the Official as well as Unofficial Legislative Council members in the Northern territories that Malan's South Africa had designs on the British territories to its north.

In late December, Sir J H Le Rougetel, the United Kingdom High Commissioner in South Africa, had presented a brief, on current South African attitudes and intentions towards British central Africa, to Ismay.

"Traditionally it was General Smuts who looked forward to the day when eventually the Rhodesias, and particularly Southern Rhodesia, would fall within the boundaries of the Union, and it was the Nationalists under General Hertzog who stressed the danger that this would give the Union too many African subjects to digest. Today the roles are becoming reversed. Many members of the United Party share the dream of their late leader, but most of them realise the obstacles to its realisation and some welcome the prospect of the establishment in Central Africa of a new Dominion completely independent of the Union and firmly based on British trade, in which they could take refuge if the Nationalists make life in the Union too uncomfortable for them. On the other hand the Nationalists generally assume, with varying degrees of certainty, that the Rhodesias will, in due course, join the Union and their fears that this may mean too many African subjects are, to an increasing extent, becoming submerged by the greater fear that the alternative may mean African self government in such parts of Central Africa as they do not themselves absorb. But they regard South Africa's northwards expansion as a long term possibility: they would not favour it now while it would mean an excess of votes for the United Party and its timing would, in their minds, be governed by the extent to which the proportion of Afrikaners in the white population of the Rhodesias increases and by the speed with which the grant by us of political rights to Africans frightens white settlers in the Rhodesias into seeking shelter in the Union from black domination. Some Nationalists may positively favour Closer Association in British Central Africa because the proportion of Afrikaners among the European voters in a federation would be greater than the present proportion of Afrikaner voters in Southern Rhodesia alone, and it might thus be easier for them to take British central Africa in one bite rather than several. But on the whole the Nationalists would prefer to see no Federation established in Central Africa, since it would delay the moment when, in the view of most of them, Southern Rhodesia will fall into their lap and their newspapers have accordingly taken pains to point out the prejudice to the status of Southern Rhodesia which Federation would involve and the extent to which Africans, either through direct representation in the legislature or indirectly through Whitehall would have a voice in Affairs." 58

Le Rougetel also emphasised that South African opposition to the creation of a Federation of British central Africa would be significantly diminished if the new constitution entrenched the white settlers in power and prevented the political advance of Africans, at least on Federal matters. He advised that any concessions to the Opposition's proposals to meet African objections, would greatly increase the Union's dislike for the scheme. This knowledge served to strengthen the Conservative Government's realisation that the official scheme could only be altered in the direction of placating the demands of the Southern Rhodesian Government. The belief that South Africa remained committed to the long term intention of acquiring the Rhodesias, and the conviction that only Huggins was capable of delivering Southern Rhodesian consent to any form of closer association in central Africa short of simple amalgamation, ensured that alterations to the proposed federal constitution would be made. Conviction about South Africa's intentions were reinforced on 4 March 1952 when, in the South African Parliament, Tighy called for talks to be initiated with the Southern Rhodesians on the proposition that they enter the Union of South Africa.⁵⁹

Alterations to the federal constitution, drafted by Baxter in March 1951, were accepted as being inevitable, despite the fact that these changes would enable the Labour Opposition to argue not only against imposition, but also against the proposed form of federation, because the alterations were made to accommodate Southern Rhodesian criticisms.

Within Whitehall a split now emerged between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office over the issue of whether or not

the imposition of Federation by the United Kingdom Government would set a precedent by which the South African Government could press for the transfer of the High Commission Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland to the Union, irrespective of the wishes of their African inhabitants. This was a crucial point because the British Government had accepted that the High Commission Territories should go to South Africa as soon as their populations approved of the transfer and London was, in theory at least, committed to promoting this outcome in these three Territories. Even if it could be convincingly claimed that a precedent had not been set, the emergence of a central African Federation would certainly highlight the anachronistic situation of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. Given that the United Party and the Nationalists were united in their determination to gain these territories, disagreeing only about the timing of the transfer,⁶⁰ then, if it was believed that a precedent had been set, the Union Parliament would be united in backing any demand from the Nationalist Government for an immediate transfer of sovereignty.

This would place the Conservative Administration in a quandary because they were opposed to transferring the High Commission Territories, but loath to risk the serious deterioration in relations with the South African Government which rejection of its demands would probably produce. The British Government put a great deal of weight on maintaining good relations with Malan's administration which was not always compatible with its historical opposition to any northward expansion of the Union. The Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations summed it up in September of that year -

"We must do all we can to preserve and strengthen our relations with South Africa. This is important, not only on the general ground of desirability of maintaining our Commonwealth links, but also for weighty strategic and economic reasons. The Nationalist Government's willingness to co-operate, both in Middle East defence in war-time and in anti-Communist measures, represents a change in traditional policy which must be encouraged. Moreover, our continued use of the Naval Base at Simonstown is of the utmost importance to us both in peace and war. Further, South Africa is the source of supply for a number of raw materials of great importance to the United Kingdom in peace-time and vital to us in time of war. Economically the stability of the Sterling area is dependent on the United Kingdom obtaining a substantial part of South Africa's gold output and equally the Union furnishes an important market for our exports."⁶¹

Moreover, in deciding its response to any demands from the Union Government for the High Commission Territories, the British Government was aware that if an agreement, satisfactory to South Africa, was not forthcoming, Malan's Government could economically strangle Basutoland and Swaziland and possibly also Bechuanaland by denying them essential facilities.⁶² As far as London was concerned, therefore, it would be best if the question of transfer was not raised and the Union Government not provoked over the matter. Therefore the problem of whether or not the imposition of Federation established precedent was an important one.

In January 1952 Baxter put forward the Commonwealth Relations Office argument that imposition would set no precedent because the Northern Territories would remain British Protectorates even after Federation was established, and since this would not apply to Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland if they were transferred to the Union, a fundamental difference existed between the two cases.⁶³ The Colonial

Office and particularly Gorrell-Barnes⁶⁴ were far from convinced by Baxter's arguments and perhaps more importantly Malan claimed to see no difference between the two situations.⁶⁵ During February 1952, Gorrell-Barnes dismissed as irrelevant Baxter's claim that the African inhabitants of central Africa would be advantaged by federation whereas their counterparts in the High Commission Territories would be disadvantaged by their transfer to South African sovereignty. He pointed out that the previous assurances given to central Africa's indigenous population, which would be set aside by imposing a federal arrangement, were "at least as firm as those given in relation to the transfer of the High Commission Territories to South Africa". Baxter's "fundamental difference" was no more than "a bad case of special pleading" in Gorrell-Barnes' view.⁶⁶

The debate between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office over whether imposition was a precedent or not, provided one other important outcome. There was now open discussion within Whitehall about how to counter the South African threat to British central Africa and the extent of that threat.

W A W Clark, the ex-Chief Secretary of the Central Africa Council, not only questioned the wisdom of attempting to "fashion a 'cordon-sanitaire' around or to build a bulwark against the Union", he also argued that the probable price for imposing Federation would prove to be too high.⁶⁷ He claimed, in his minute of 14 January 1952, that the two central arguments for Federation, namely, the economic and the Afrikaner threat, had been greatly exaggerated. - The previous August, Garner, at the Commonwealth Relations Office, had

questioned the degree of danger to British central Africa generally attributed to South Africa, but had made no impression on the official consensus of opinion on this issue. ^{67a} Any suggestion, Clark claimed, that the union would resort to territorial aggression could be "completely discounted". While the United Kingdom supported the Rhodesias any economic pressure placed on them by South Africa could be successfully resisted and the problem of Afrikaner infiltration could be dealt with by immigration controls "which could be almost as adequate and effective on a territorial as on a federal basis." Clark also raised an argument, in relation to South Africa, which had already been marshalled in support of Federation: the isolation of South Africa would be a dis-service to its African population as it would tend to reinforce the racial policies of the Union Government, and exacerbate the problems of race relations in that country. One of the arguments used to support closer association in central Africa had been that by virtue of its strengthened links, the moderate north would be able to influence Southern Rhodesia and slowly wean it away from its negative attitudes to African development. Federation for British central Africa was desirable, but, Clark believed, not essential and the probable price for imposing a federal solution over the opposition of the African inhabitants would prove to be too high. Imposition, he argued, would reduce the chances of African dependencies remaining well-disposed towards the United Kingdom and, at the same time, encourage the South African Government to demand the transfer of the High Commission Territories. To refuse these demands, after imposing

Federation, would seriously damage relations with the Union. To agree to them would place the Africans of the High Commission Territories in exactly the situation from which central Africa's African population was supposedly saved by Federation.⁶⁸

Baxter's response to Clark's arguments were not particularly convincing.⁶⁹ Baxter suggested that Clark's antagonism to Federation was prejudicing his judgment about the consequences of imposing it against African opposition. He also argued that as Malan would never agree to equivalent safeguards for the High Commission Territories as those contained in the federation proposals, any claims that imposition was going to set a precedent were spurious.

The British Government's dilemma was eventually resolved by the South African Government itself. Malan rejected Tighy's call for the Rhodesias to be invited to begin talks about entering the Union and argued that a white-ruled central African federation would provide a valuable buffer between the Union and black Africa.⁷⁰ Malan's Government's highly dubious alterations to the South African constitution, revealed in March that year, which aimed at disenfranchising the Cape Coloureds and further advancing the creation of an apartheid society, clearly rendered ineffectual any safeguards which could be offered to the High Commission Territories in any planned transfer of sovereignty.⁷¹ These actions of the Union Government completely undermined any claims it could have made that the imposition of federation created a precedent for the transfer of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland. This removed one difficulty facing the British Government in its consideration of the possibility of imposing Federation against African opposition in central Africa.

However, Malan's actions were also detrimental to the British Administration's cause. The Union Government's actions had demonstrated the ease with which constitutional safeguards could be circumvented and so weakened the security of the safeguards offered to the African population of the central African territories. Apprehension in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia was greatly heightened with the fear that their continued autonomy would be rapidly eroded once the Federation came into being.⁷² In addition, the Nationalist Government's actions tarnished its reputation among the whites in the Rhodesias. This reversed a growing trend within that community towards support for union with South Africa. In the view of one observer, this attitude had been fostered by the British Government's policy of attempting to appease the Labour Opposition in the United Kingdom Parliament and by a wide-ranging campaign against the federal scheme amongst the whites of the two Rhodesias.⁷³

At the time, however, when Colby and Rennie declared that the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were fixed in their total opposition to federation, the consequences of imposing the scheme appeared so serious that the British Government delayed any decision on the question until further efforts were made to gain some measure of African support for it.

British attempts to gain African endorsement of Federation

The officers of the Colonial Administration in each of the two northern territories continued to canvass the case for Federation to the African people at every opportunity. In addition to this the British Government now accepted, unofficially, the help of the

Capricorn Africa Society⁷⁴ in attempting to break down the unanimity of African opinion in the two Colonial Territories against the scheme.

On 8 February 1952, Baxter, Ismay and Lennox-Boyd met with Colonel Stirling of the Capricorn Africa Society. He proposed that the Society would organise "a small cadre of reliable Africans who, after a short course of instruction in Salisbury, would be sent out to various districts of east and central Africa to organise meetings and demonstrations in favour of central African federation, . . . and provide concrete evidence of African support for the measures which would be of great value in the House of Commons, when the Proposals were debated." The Government's representatives at the meeting, while accepting Stirling's offer of help, insisted that the British Government could not financially assist the plan and that expressions of African opinion should preferably be made on behalf of properly-constituted bodies and not simply by individuals.⁷⁵

The British Government also sought the aid of Roy Welensky in its efforts to gain some measure of African endorsement of Federation. At the request of Dodds-Parker,⁷⁶ Welensky initiated, late in February, talks with the Mining Companies and with the Mineworkers' Union to see if Northern Rhodesia's unofficial, but mandatory, industrial colour-bar could be circumvented.⁷⁷ Welensky was not hopeful of achieving a satisfactory outcome to these talks, but made the attempt because if it proved successful the Conservative Party's task of justifying the imposition of Federation would be made much

easier. The United Kingdom Government would be able to point to the ending of the industrial colour-bar in Northern Rhodesia as clear evidence that the policy of partnership was producing positive results and that African advancement could be ensured under the federal scheme. This would undercut the impact of liberal and African opposition to the scheme. There is no doubt such a development would have been welcomed by the pro-federation group within the Parliamentary Labour Party. In April, Stanley Evans echoed Dodds-Parker's request to Welensky in a letter to the Mayor of Broken Hill in which he advocated that a black Trades Union be fostered and other efforts made to help the creation of a black middle class.⁷⁸

Welensky's initiative with the mining industry failed, but he continued to try to provide some evidence of African support for Federation to strengthen the Conservative Administration's case. Although in the last weeks of 1951 Welensky had apparently accepted the assertion made by Colby and Rennie, that African opinion in the two territories was solidly against the federal scheme, by the end of March 1952, he was confidently predicting that some significant pro-federation Africans could be produced.⁷⁹ This show of optimism preceded an entirely individual campaign by Welensky to produce some show of African support for the scheme. This was the result of a direct appeal made to him by the British Government who insisted that he produce some evidence that African opinion was not united against federation.⁸⁰

Late in April, at a meeting with his fellow Members of the Legislative Council, Welensky stressed the importance of his campaign and how necessary it was to strengthen the hand of the British Government, as a preliminary to the imposition of Federation, by producing some show of African support for the scheme.⁸¹ Such was Welensky's eagerness to show that African opinion was divided that he endeavoured to stir up tribal and other sectarian differences and to attach these to the federal issue. Welensky, at some expense, employed teams of Africans to stir up anti-Bemba feeling and to equate this with opposition to the opponents of the federal scheme. This effort was concentrated on the African urban labour force and it enjoyed some brief success at the Mufulira mine compounds.⁸² Nevertheless, this effort to exploit latent African sectarian tensions did not produce the required result of a pro-federation African voice.

Meanwhile the Northern Rhodesian Administration had been continuing its campaign to win over some African support for Federation. Since the middle of 1951, District Commissioners had been instructed to campaign vigorously on this issue. This campaign had been particularly vigorously pursued while R P Bush was on leave and N Stubbs was acting Secretary for Native Affairs. Also R S Hudson's transfer to London had allowed Rennie to pursue his own personal preference for the Federation more forcefully and he had put a great deal of pressure on chiefs in particular, to publicly endorse the proposed scheme.⁸³ Rennie's strong personal commitment to the federal scheme,⁸⁴ was not shared by a substantial number of his leading

officials. Many of them believed that Federation would end African political and educational advancement, and they were also gravely concerned at the tactics that had been employed since the departure of Hudson to foster support for Federation among Africans.⁸⁵ Stubbs' activities - outlined below - had especially given rise to unease and had produced a public commitment from John Moffat who represented African interests in the Legislative Council and was widely respected in Northern Rhodesia, that he would personally check any tribal endorsement of Federation resulting from this intensive Government drive.⁸⁶

One of the key tactics employed by the Northern Rhodesian administration was to play on the distrust already existing between the tribal chiefs and Congress. The emergence of the African National Congress had been seen as a threat by many of the Northern Rhodesia's chiefs partly because many of them occupied posts which were not traditional but were the products of past British colonial policy. Moreover, even those chiefs whose positions were firmly traditional, resented the lack of respect that members of Congress tended to show towards them and their status, and the challenge that Congress made to their position as the leaders of and spokesmen for the African people. Stubbs tactic was to emphasise this division between Congress and the traditional leaders and then to go on to interpret antagonism towards Congress as support for the proposed federation.

Initially, these tactics had produced some positive results. This was particularly so in the Eastern Province where the economic situation was so bad that many Africans felt that nothing could make things worse, and that the proposed Federation might possibly improve

matters. Even more important was the fact that the chiefs were well aware that the Governor appointed them and paid their salaries and could just as easily appoint and pay someone else. All the chiefs had to give a public statement purporting to express their peoples' support for the proposed Federation. Their situation, vis-a-vis the Government, was such that there was enormous pressure on them simply to say what would please the colonial Administration.⁸⁷ However, the initial success, of getting the Ngoni, Chewa and Kunda tribal authorities of the Eastern Province to issue statements in favour of Federation, was short lived. Within a month these endorsements were withdrawn and African opposition again appeared as a united front.⁸⁸ During 1952, the Northern Rhodesian Government established the Federal Advisory Committee. This body was to promote support for federation but it also enabled the Government to establish a haven for those African politicians who had been discredited, and voted out of office in various African organisations, because of their moderate line over federation or their support for the scheme. In March 1952, the Northern Rhodesian Administration was reduced to producing these individuals as evidence that African opposition in the Territory was not united. One of these figures was Godwin Lewanika, who had also acted on the Government's behalf in gaining the Barotse support for federation through his influence on some key sub-groups within the tribe, and his influence over certain of the advisers to the Paramount Chief.⁸⁹

Despite all these efforts by the Capricorn Africa Society, by Welensky and by the Colonial Administration, no significant African

support for the proposed Federation was produced. This contributed to a change in the Conservative Government's approach to the problem of African non-endorsement of federation. Of equal, if not more, importance in the Government's new approach, was the failure of the Opposition 'Keep Right' group to attract significant open support within the Parliamentary Labour Party for the proposed Federation, and the fact that Attlee, even after his return from Rhodesia, continued to back Griffiths' policy of opposing imposition of Federation over African opposition.

Intimidation and Imposition

The Conservative Government had postponed any definite decision on imposition for as long as possible in the hope of attracting some element of African support for the Federal proposals. At a meeting on 13 June 1952, the Cabinet was still indecisive over whether or not to impose Federation "if a reasonable measure of African acquiescence is not forthcoming".⁹⁰ It was eventually agreed to postpone any definite decision in the hope that delay might yet provide time for some African and Labour support to be won.

In the House of Commons on 18th June,⁹¹ Lyttelton announced the publication of the White Paper on the proposed Federation, and also that judicial, financial and public service commissions were to be set up which would report later in the year. He went on to remind MPs that a further conference would be held on the issue in October. Under pressure from Griffiths, the Colonial Secretary agreed that either he, or his Minister of State, would tour the territories before any moves were started for the establishing of the new

federal structure. On 22 June⁹² an unconfirmed report appeared in the Press announcing that Henry Hopkinson⁹³ would tour Nyasaland and the Rhodesias in the near future. By then, however, the Government was beginning to be gravely concerned at the lack of progress of the campaigns to persuade both the European and African populations of the three territories concerned, that the proposed federation was in their best interests.⁹⁴ Two days before the Hopkinson newspaper report, Lyttelton had broadcast over the BBC to both Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. He emphasised the range of economic benefits Federation would bring to the African inhabitants of the area and he also stressed the extent and the strength of the safeguards for their position in the scheme.⁹⁵

By the time the issue of Federation was again debated in the House, on 24 July, the British Government had adopted a new strategy on how to proceed. While still hoping for some measure of support from the Parliamentary Labour Party and from the African inhabitants of the territories concerned, the new approach encompassed a vigorous advocacy of the particular form of Federation proposed, a far less conciliatory approach to the opponents of the scheme and a deliberate campaign to counter the claims made about total African opposition to the scheme. Having failed to discover any credible African support for Federation, the Conservative Government began vigorously to challenge the consensus view that African opposition was total. The method employed was to claim that whilst the tiny, but vocal, African intelligentsia were opposed to Federation, primarily for reasons of personal ambition, the overwhelming majority of Africans were both

ignorant of, and indifferent to the actual proposals. Moreover, they claimed, significant elements within the African population of British central Africa were in favour of federation and still more were eager to discover the real facts and to discuss them and their implications with the local Colonial officials. Evidence of this accurate reflection of African opinion, the Government insisted, had proved impossible to collect because of the widespread use of verbal and physical intimidation by the opponents of Federation, particularly the Congress movements.

It was apt that the change in governmental policy was signalled in the Times⁹⁶ as that newspaper had been arguing for some time that Federation should be imposed, because the vast bulk of the African population of the three territories concerned were ignorant of the concept as well as of the particular proposals.⁹⁷ The new strategy was launched in the House of Commons on 24 July 1952 by Lyttelton and Hopkinson. The Secretary of State's claims about widespread intimidation seemed to take the Opposition by surprise.⁹⁸

Lyttelton pressed home this advantage by announcing that Hopkinson would leave to tour British central Africa on 29 July and that one of his primary tasks would be to investigate the extent and significance of intimidation by the anti-Federation forces.

Hopkinson took full advantage of his month-long tour in Africa⁹⁹ to drum home the message to his African, settler and official, audiences, that the British Government was fully committed to the Federation proposals as they stood, and was determined to implement them.¹⁰⁰ He sought to ensure that the African population in particular harboured

no doubts about the Government's commitment and attempted to squash any hopes they had that politically-motivated strikes or policies of non-co-operation would cause the United Kingdom Government to waver.¹⁰¹

The Conservative Government may have been making every effort to convince their opponents that the Federation was going to be established, but they were also still seeking to save the issue from becoming a straightforward party political matter in the United Kingdom. In a letter to Welensky of 22 October, Hopkinson emphasised the Government's eagerness to carry moderate support in Britain for the plan.¹⁰² This could only be achieved by convincing enough people that the views ascribed to the African populations of the British central African territories were not a true reflection, but a gross distortion caused by ignorance and intimidation. This was the message that Lyttelton and his aides stressed in the latter part of 1952. Typical of this line is a speech by John Foster, Parliamentary Under Secretary at the Commonwealth Relations Office, on 3 November.¹⁰³ Foster accepted that some Africans had genuine fears of Federation and that it was the Government's responsibility to persuade them that these fears were groundless. Nevertheless, he argued the claim that the African inhabitants of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias were solidly opposed to Federation, was the false creation of agitators seeking to undermine the territorial governments. He went on to assert that ignorance and widespread intimidation had prevented many chiefs and other Africans, who were fully in support of the federal proposals, from publicly endorsing it. Such was the Government's

concern over intimidation and their desire to gain Labour Party acquiescence in the policy of imposition, that Hopkinson provided Attlee with a dossier full of reports about intimidation when the Labour leader arrived in Blantyre on 19 August.¹⁰⁴

It is undoubtedly true that instances did occur when Congress or its supporters used intimidation to maintain a united front against Federation. However there appears to have been no Government concern when its representatives or other supporters of Federation, utilised means of persuasion which fell into the same category. Moreover it was the view of Jim Rodger¹⁰⁵ and Neil Bernard,¹⁰⁶ men with far longer and much closer experience of the African people of Nyasaland than Hopkinson's official informants, that there was next to no intimidation in Nyasaland.¹⁰⁷ They felt that the reports of coercion were being exaggerated to distract attention from the continuing solid opposition of Nyasaland Africans to federation. Rodger warned Marjorie Nicholson¹⁰⁸ in a letter of 18 November 1952, "I am still afraid that the red herring - intimidation - will be used to side track the main issue - the African opposition to Federation. Please be on your guard."¹⁰⁹

Doubts have also been raised about the accuracy of the reports of intimidation in Northern Rhodesia. Strong social pressure upon people to remain united in opposition to Federation was countered by government influence, particularly in the case of chiefs. Many chiefs opposed Federation, but since they were dependent upon the Government for their continuation in office, they were reluctant to say so publicly. Nonetheless pressure from Government officials

to have them openly endorse the Federal proposals was, on the whole, successfully resisted. Increasingly the chiefs eluded their dilemma by excusing their lack of public support, saying that they feared reprisals from anti-federal elements within their own communities.¹¹⁰ This excuse was usually accepted at its face value by the District Commissioners and led to a largely unquestioned acceptance of the fact of widespread intimidation. Once the British Government had switched its policy from attempting to persuade people to change their minds to emphasising ignorance and intimidation there was no incentive to probe the accuracy of these excuses. The main thrust of the Government's revised position, as expounded by Lyttelton, Hopkinson and Foster, was to prepare the British electorate for the acceptance of the imposition of Federation as necessary and inevitable, if not particularly pleasant. If such a climate of public opinion could be created, then it was hoped that the Labour Party would at least not press its opposition to imposition too strongly, even if it would not openly concede to the Government's policy. A second aim was to convince the African population of British central Africa that federation was going to be implemented and that any effort at opposition on their part would be futile and therefore not worth attempting. In spite of the policy and campaigns the Conservative Government remained concerned about some of the possible consequences of imposing federation on central Africa. The Conservative Administration felt that it had Britain's reputation as "a champion of Liberal Western civilisation"¹¹¹ to maintain and was concerned that this

image was not tarnished by imposition, not only in the United Nations and before domestic public opinion but, more importantly, within its colonies.

Hopkinson's report on the level of intimidation in the northern territories, particularly Nyasaland, alarmed the Cabinet and produced a great deal of pressure for an immediate decision committing the Government to imposing the federal scheme.¹¹² There remained, however, a certain reluctance to proceed, because of the anticipated level of opposition to such a course in both the United Kingdom and in central Africa. Furthermore, although Malan's Government had destroyed its case for the transfer of the High Commission Territories by its manipulation of the South African Constitution, the danger could not be entirely dismissed that South Africa would try to force the incorporation of these territories, through economic pressure, if Britain were to impose Federation over African opposition. The Conservative Administration, moreover, were inhibited, to a certain extent, by their wish to avoid a situation arising in British central Africa that would lead to calls for UN intervention. The United Kingdom Government sought, therefore, to avoid any discussion of federation at the UN until after it had been established.¹¹³ The decision to implement the Federal scheme, despite strong opposition from the Labour Party, the Churches, specialised organisations and various ad hoc lobbies, and the vocal rejection of it by the African population of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias, was taken by the British Cabinet on 22 December at the recommendation of Salisbury, Swinton and Lyttelton.¹¹⁴ Their arguments in favour of imposition

had been given a timely boost by the latest despatches from the Governors of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Rennie warned that the imposition of the federal scheme held the danger of producing strikes and campaigns of non-co-operation and of the non-payment of taxes among the African population. He stressed however, that this opposition could not be maintained for long. He emphasised that no chiefs were expected to act unlawfully and that a resolute stance by the territorial Government would increase respect for it among the African population "particularly if the situation is firmly handled from the outset." The strongest argument that Rennie produced in favour of imposition was that if the Federal proposals were abandoned Congress' prestige would be vastly increased as it would gain the credit for this "victory" over the Government: the European population would be greatly disheartened and a rapid deterioration in race relations would result.¹¹⁵

It was not surprising that Northern Rhodesia's Governor supported imposition. Although he continued to hold reservations and objections about certain detailed aspects of the proposals, he had always personally been openly committed to the idea in principle. What was surprising was that the Governor of Nyasaland also came out strongly in favour of imposition.

Given Colby's record of opposition to the inclusion of Nyasaland in the proposed Federation, his sudden conversion to support for the imposition of the proposals, at first glance, appears quite remarkable.¹¹⁶ In fact there was a certain consistency in his position. Late in 1951 Colby had argued in favour of Nyasaland's early with-

drawal from any proposed scheme of federation because of the African opposition to it. This would enable the Territorial Government to claim, that it had instigated opposition to moves towards closer association and so pre-empt any claims by Nyasaland African National Congress that its pressure had produced this result. By December 1952, however, Colby was convinced that the worst possible decision by the British Government would be to delay or cancel the introduction of the Federation of the three territories. He considered that any such action, at that particular time, would undoubtedly greatly bolster the position of the Nyasaland African National Congress. This would be particularly dangerous because of Congress' recent instigation of a campaign seeking to undermine confidence in the Protectorate administration, its officials and the whole European population, and because of its new vigorous advocacy of full independence for the Protectorate. Colby claimed that Congress had switched its tactics and greatly increased the use of threats and intimidation because the Government had been enjoying some measure of success in countering the anti-Federation propaganda of Congress, particularly after Hopkinson's visit. The Governor of Nyasaland, like his counterpart in Northern Rhodesia, felt that Congress would oppose the introduction of Federation through strikes, demonstrations, withholding of taxes and a general policy of non-co-operation, yet he still strongly recommended the imposition of Federation.

Undoubtedly the outbreak of the Mau Mau 'oathings' and violence in Kenya in October had influenced the views of both Colby and the

United Kingdom Government. They wished to maintain law and order and they feared the possibility of similar activities occurring in central Africa. It is worth noting that there had also been violence in both South Africa and Bechuanaland that year. The Mau Mau affair must also have dampened Colby's long-held support for Nyasaland joining an east African federation. The Kenyan Emergency not only lent weight to the Government view that the indigenous inhabitants of east and central Africa remained too irresponsible and backward to decide for themselves on important issues like federation, it also drew attention away from central Africa and the issue of imposition. All those factors played a part but the fundamental reason why the Conservative Government agreed, in December 1952, to impose federation, was that the problems and difficulties that would result from failing to do so, far outweighed those which might be incurred by proceeding. Salisbury, Swinton, Lyttelton, Hopkinson, Rennie and Colby were unanimous on this point and on the vital importance of making this decision. It was felt that failure to implement the Federal proposals would result in moderate African opinion being submerged in extreme African nationalism, widespread loss of confidence in the United Kingdom Government in east, central and southern Africa, an acceleration of already deteriorating race relations in British central Africa and an increase in social and political unrest. Also "Southern Rhodesia, soured and isolated, will be drawn increasingly into the orbit of the Union" of South Africa.¹¹⁷ This was the argument stressed by Swinton in the vital Cabinet meeting of 22 December -

"If we were now to retreat on this issue, the days of British administration in Africa would be numbered and there was every likelihood that Southern Rhodesia would join the Union of South Africa".¹¹⁸

The British Government accepted that it would encounter wide-spread criticism and determined opposition in the United Kingdom to its decision to impose a Federal constitution on central Africa, but drew strength from the belief "that the more responsible elements in the Labour Party accepted the case for Federation, provided that adequate safeguards for African interests were retained."¹¹⁹ It was this consideration coupled with the continuing reservations and concerns of the Northern territories' officials and unofficials that acted as a brake, and limited the concessions that Southern Rhodesia was able to acquire at the final Constitutional Conference of January 1953.

The Carlton House Terrace Conference

The Carlton House Terrace Conference, in January 1953, was intended to fashion the final compromises, between the various Governmental and settler factions, that would enable the Federation of central Africa to be achieved. The Conference was plagued by the same rivalries, tensions and distrust which had for long hampered progress, particularly since Huggins' resurrection of the case for amalgamation in November 1951.¹²⁰ From the outset the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister's main concern appears to have been to placate the prejudices of his own country's delegation rather than to persuade or influence other conference members. Indeed the uncompromising content and tone of Huggins' opening speech, immediately following

upon the rigid contributions of his fellow Southern Rhodesians - Stockil, Keller, Eastwood and Munro - jeopardised the Conference's chances of success on the opening day. Welensky, in fact, believed that Huggins had risked aborting the Conference before even the opening statements of all the members had been completed.¹²¹

In his speech, Stockil warned the Conference that the Federal scheme would be rejected by the Southern Rhodesian electorate, who would then turn to South Africa, unless the constitution was radically altered. Although this threat was a real one, it is probable that Stockil was motivated as much by the desire to extract further concession for the Southern Rhodesian position as by fears of a move towards South Africa. His tactic had minimal effect on the delegations from the Governments of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia who more or less maintained their positions on constitutional issues such as the control of the Police force. On this issue Unsworth led the two Northern Government delegations in firmly rejecting Greenfield's proposal, which had the support of Huggins, that policing should be a federal matter.

The problems facing the United Kingdom Government delegation and its officials, in trying to hammer out the compromises necessary to create an agreed constitution, were well illustrated by the difficulties over European Agriculture. The Southern Rhodesian delegation proposed that European Agriculture, with all its service industries, such as marketing, price control and research, be centralised under federal auspices. This suggestion was flatly rejected by Colby and Rennie on behalf of their respective governments. Although the dispute centred on European Agriculture, much of the problem lay with

the service functions. In the Northern territories, marketing, price control and research were operated from within departments other than Agriculture. As a result these different departments resisted the transfer of part of their function to the Federal Government. The general tendency was for the territorial departments to guard jealously all their interests in order to maintain their positions relative to the other territorial departments. Embryonic Federal departments were viewed as either potential supplanters or as rivals, not as allies.

This pattern of bureaucratic power games was further complicated by the desire to uphold national prestige and widespread distrust, in the two northern administrations, of the Southern Rhodesian intentions. This lack of trust, coupled with the tone employed by the Southern Rhodesian delegation, forced Rennie, on at least one occasion, to remind Huggins that the Federal Government was not simply going to be an extension or projection of the Southern Rhodesian model. Rennie emphasised that the views of the northern administrations would have to be taken into consideration and accommodated. Throughout the Conference Unsworth played a leading role in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia's rejection of many of the proposals emanating from the Southern Rhodesian team. This was particularly clear in the matter of the police, as we have noted, and also in opposing Welensky's and Huggins' plan to bring the African Affairs Board within the federal Parliamentary framework. Indeed, Unsworth's implicit distrust of Southern Rhodesian good faith became embarrassingly explicit during the sessions on 8 and 9 January.¹²²

On Thursday 8 January, Unsworth and Moffat argued that the Territorial Governments should remain autonomous and in no way subordinate to the Federal Authorities. They argued, therefore, that any Federal Bill seeking to alter the balance of responsibilities between the territorial and federal legislatures and the concurrent list, would require the support of two-thirds of each of the three territorial legislatures, in addition to the assent of the Federal Assembly. Moreover, Unsworth and Moffat proposed that African land rights should be guaranteed to remain a territorial responsibility by placing them outside the jurisdiction even of constitutional federal bills. They maintained that African land rights should only be capable of amendment through an Order in Council from the United Kingdom Government. When he was pressed during the subsequent debate, the full extent of Unsworth's distrust of Southern Rhodesia was revealed.

Unsworth was concerned that even the British Government's veto would not prove adequate protection for the continuing autonomy of the northern territories, because, he argued, neither the Southern Rhodesian Government nor certain other influential figures in central Africa, were really committed to Federation. Indeed, Unsworth went so far as to predict that relatively early in the life of the Federal Parliament, a bill would be introduced seeking to amend the constitution, by transferring all territorial functions and powers to the federal Government. It would not only be debated, he claimed, it would succeed because it would not be possible for the United Kingdom Government to prevent the early transformation of the

Federation into a unitary state unless the requirement of two-thirds majorities in the territorial Legislatures, as well as the Federal Assembly majority, had been established.

Predictably, Welensky expressed outrage at Unsworth's implicit and explicit claims that he and Huggins would seek "to twist the federation into an amalgamation". The following day, Beckett went further and accused Unsworth and Moffat of attempting to scupper the federation insisting on constraints in the federal Constitution that would be unacceptable to the Southern Rhodesian electorate. This may very well have been a consideration in Unsworth's strategy for the Conference. Whether it was or not there is definite evidence to indicate that his analysis of Southern Rhodesian intentions was not the unjustified allegation that Huggins and Welensky claimed it to be. Huggins and his close associates appear to have been convinced that once federation was established, the United Kingdom Government would not interfere in its internal working and even if they attempted to do so, their efforts would prove ineffectual. He considered that the Conservative Government was constrained to offer only a federation rather than a unitary system of government, but believed that once the federal system was in operation London would not stand in the way of Southern Rhodesia gaining complete dominance and moulding the federation into a virtual amalgamation.¹²³ Lord Altrincham certainly encouraged Huggins in this interpretation of the situation:

My own feeling, as you know, is that the people of Rhodesia will be one thousand times wise to get federation through, whatever strings may be attached to it in the first instance. Once Federation is through, the future will be in their hands. No one on earth can stop it, whatever the conditions attached. And the future must be in their hands if the British way in Africa is to prevail.¹²⁴

Whether or not the British Ministers at the Carlton House Terrace Conference viewed the issue in the same light is largely immaterial, because Unsworth and Moffat's arguments of 8 January showed the strength of conviction, within Governmental circles in the northern territories, that domination was the Southern Rhodesian aim and it showed too their determination to thwart these ambitions. The compromise solution to this stalemate between the delegations was first suggested by Lyttelton on 9 January; he proposed a constitutional review after ten years. This was formally introduced by Swinton after the weekend recess, on 12 January, and finally agreed by the Conference on 14 January. By freezing the responsibilities and scope of the Federal and Territorial Governments, and the functions on the concurrent list for ten years, the British Ministers hoped to reassure the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian Government delegations that Southern Rhodesia would not be able to gain control of the Federation before that time. Huggins and Welensky concurred with this solution because of the implicit understanding that at that review, to be held seven to ten years after the inauguration of the Federation, full independence for the Federation was virtually guaranteed. After independence it could develop as it saw fit. Such a position could only be adopted because of the

confident expectation that African fears concerning Federation would have been proved groundless by then, and as a result African opposition would have faded away.

The Parliamentary Labour Party's failure to maintain united opposition to the Imposition of Federation

The extent of the disquiet within the Parliamentary Labour Party over Griffiths' position on the issue of Federation never fully emerged into the open. Partly this was because Griffiths had, by late 1952, gained the support of Attlee, and partly it was due to the astute prevention, by Morgan Phillips,¹²⁵ of a debate on the specific issue of federation at the Labour Party Conferences of 1952 and 1953. Attlee had waited in vain for the Southern Rhodesian Government to produce evidence that it intended to implement "partnership" in the Crown Colony. As a result he withdrew his conditional support for Federation and threw his weight behind those in the Parliamentary Party who opposed imposition.¹²⁶ This did not occur until 1953 and goes some way in explaining Attlee's failure to speak during the first five major debates on Federation. The equivocal nature of his support, as leader of the Party, for Griffiths' rejection of imposition was determined by his personal belief in the need for a British bloc in central Africa. While both Griffiths and Gordon Walker shared his belief, the former was convinced that African consent was an essential pre-requisite to the introduction of Federation, whereas the latter concluded that the establishment of Federation overrode any consideration of African opposition. Attlee's discomfort in defending Griffiths' policy led to his adopting a very low profile on the question of imposition. It is worth noting that the

Labour Party leader's most important contribution to the debate on Federation on 6 May 1953, was the commitment he gave, on his own Party's behalf, to work for the success of the central African Federation experiment once it was legally established.¹²⁷ The fragile nature of the Party leader's support for Party policy on Federation made it imperative that the question was not extensively or thoroughly debated.

At the 1953 Labour Party Conference, the agenda never reached Colonial Policy,¹²⁸ while at Morecambe in October 1952, Phillips attached the Federation issue to that of South Africa and general African matters, submerging the issue and making it virtually impossible to debate in detail Griffiths' opposition to the implementation of the Government scheme. The Composite Resolution to Conference, moved by Dr B Cardew, opposed the transfer of the High Commission Territories to South Africa unless their African inhabitants consented, rejected the imposition of the Federation in central Africa over and against the clear opposition of its African population, held up the Gold Coast Constitution as the model by which the British African Colonies should rapidly progress to full Independence, condemned South Africa's apartheid policies and urged the United Kingdom Government to raise the issue at the United Nations.¹²⁹ In the event the resolution, with its explicit endorsement of the Griffiths' line, was remitted by Conference to the National Executive Committee without a vote being necessary, but not before Dugdale had announced from the platform that in his opinion the central African Federation was completely and absolutely unnecessary.¹³⁰

With the Party superficially united behind Griffiths' opposition to the imposition of the federal scheme, Attlee led a delegation from the National Executive Committee to the Colonial Office on 12 December 1952.¹³¹ The delegation, which included Griffiths, Phillips and White, presented its case to Lyttelton, Swinton, Salisbury and Foster.¹³² The purpose of the visit was to stress to the Government Ministers the Labour Party's strong reservations about the federal scheme and its opposition to its imposition before the final constitutional conference of January 1953. It was unusual for the leader of the Opposition to make representations in such a fashion, but the impact of this move on the Government was reduced by the fact that Attlee's leadership of the delegation was seen as being merely formal. It was Griffiths who took the major role and who delivered the message of the opposition of the Labour party, the Trades Union Council, and the International Federation of Trade Unions to the imposition of Federation over the united opposition of the African people. The Conservatives also, as we have seen, took comfort and encouragement from the knowledge that significant support for the concept of federation and for their particular proposals, existed inside the Parliamentary Labour Party, even though no open division had, as yet, resulted from the Labour party's official endorsement of Griffiths' position.

By February 1953 the extent of the differences between Griffiths and his supporters and Gordon Walker and his group could no longer be hidden. The total rejection of Griffiths' position on federation was advocated at meetings of the Labour Party's Commonwealth and

Colonial Group and then at successive meetings of the Parliamentary Labour Party on 24 February and 4 March.¹³³ At a meeting on 24 February, Griffiths' opposition to the imposition of the federal scheme over the united African opposition, was countered by Gordon Walker, who sternly warned that, unless federation was implemented in central Africa, all three territories would fall under the power of Dr Malan's South Africa. Although a show of hands indicated that only about one-fifth of those present were in favour of Gordon Walker's position, Attlee chose to adjourn the discussion for a future meeting, before making any decision. When Griffiths again achieved overwhelming support in the Parliamentary Labour Party on 4 March, complete opposition to the imposition of any federal scheme on central Africa was confirmed as official Labour Party policy. In endorsing Griffiths' policy, the Parliamentary Labour Party rejected calls from the "Keep Right" group, and others, seeking to avoid public splits over the federation issue,¹³⁴ for a free vote on the Government proposals. As we shall see, however, this was not the end of attempts to secure abstinence for pro-Federation Labour MPs without appearing to break standing orders. The Labour Party leaders had to find such a device because they were aware that by allowing the small group of mainly right-wing MPs to flout standing orders would make it much more difficult to enforce these orders against a prospective Bevanite revolt. The outcome of the Parliamentary Labour Party meeting of 4 March was generally considered to be a decisive victory for Griffiths over Gordon Walker. Until then Gordon Walker had always opened or closed

for the Opposition on any debate on federation in the House: he did not do so again after the Parliamentary Labour Party meeting of 4 March. From that time the Labour Opposition mounted a vigorous Parliamentary campaign against the Enabling Bill in the Chamber and throughout the Committee stage.¹³⁵ Griffiths and the Parliamentary Labour Party even sought, in vain, to have a Select Committee established to examine two petitions presented by the Chiefs and people of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia,¹³⁶ in which they expressed their fears and their opposition towards Federation. Finally, the Parliamentary Labour Party even opposed the Federation Order in Council on 27 July.¹³⁷ Despite this vigorous campaign of opposition at every stage of the Parliamentary process, Attlee was, at all times, quite insistent that once the Bill became law, the Labour Party would accept the fact and seek to make the Federation a success.¹³⁸

In determining the grounds for the Labour Party's opposition to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Enabling Bill, Griffiths had been particularly careful to avoid any rejection of the principle of federation for British central Africa. The arguments proffered for opposing that Bill were that imposition over united African opposition was unjustifiable and that the safeguards of African interests had been diluted to the point of total inadequacy. It was hoped that by concentrating on these issues the dissident views of Gordon Walker and his "Keep Right" group could be accommodated, and they were also consistent with Griffiths' personal views and previous statements on Federation. This proved to be wishful thinking by Griffiths, but adopting any other position would have led to further weakening of Attlee's support for his policy.

Attlee had, initially, favoured only a two-line whip for the Federation debate on 24 March. The main argument presented in favour of this at the Parliamentary Committee meeting was that it would enable Gordon Walker's group inconspicuously to abstain. This proposal was only withdrawn in favour of a three-line whip on Bevan's insistence that the central African Federation was a major issue.¹³⁹ Attlee, nonetheless, showed the extent of the ambiguity of his support for Griffiths' position and his own personal sympathy for Gordon Walker's arguments, by ignoring the Party's Standing Orders and announcing at the meeting of the Parliamentary Labour Party on 19 March, that those with conscientious objections to the issue of Federation could abstain.¹⁴⁰ After this announcement it is hardly surprising that the main ratification debate on 24 March failed to produce the expected strong and convincing attack on the Government's proposals.

On the day of the debate, the Labour Party attempted to give the appearance of bitter opposition to the imposition of federation but, although Gordon Walker, seated in splendid isolation, kept a low profile,¹⁴¹ Stanley Evans gave a powerful speech in favour of federation which severely dented the Labour Party's position.¹⁴² - The announcement of Queen Mary's death also somewhat deflated the importance of the debate. - At the end of the debate, despite a last minute appeal by Griffiths and Sir Frank Soskice,¹⁴³ Gordon Walker and fifteen like-minded Labour MPs defied the three-line whip and abstained on the vote. This gave the Government a majority of 44 and this pattern was then repeated throughout the subsequent divisions and debates.¹⁴⁴

It has been argued that the dissidents did not seriously affect the cohesion or impact of the Labour Party's parliamentary opposition to the implementation of Federation,¹⁴⁵ and it is true that the number involved was small, but the emergence of a division in the Parliamentary Labour Party's ranks was, nonetheless, important. It was important, as we have seen, because of the encouragement and sense of moral justification it gave to the Conservative Government. That the abstainers included four ex-Ministers of the Crown¹⁴⁶ tended to increase the impact of their views, in Government eyes at least. Ultimately, however, whether the Labour rebels abstained or succumbed to Griffiths' and Soskice's last ditch persuasion, was not of overriding importance. It was the knowledge that substantial support for Federation and disquiet about Griffiths' position existed within the Parliamentary Labour Party that strengthened the Government's resolve to proceed. In their view the sixteen Labour rebels were indicative of a substantial minority of dissent within the Labour Party.

S E C T I O N 3

THE UNITED CENTRAL AFRICA ASSOCIATION
AND EXTRA-PARLIAMENTARY OPPOSITION TO
FEDERATION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

CHAPTER 9

Extra-parliamentary Opposition
to Federation in the United Kingdom

Before examining the British extra-parliamentary opposition to federation it is useful to briefly recap the Government's position on the federation issue.

Griffiths felt that the only circumstances which would impede the Conservative Administration in imposing their federation scheme were a united parliamentary opposition to federation and the Nyasaland Protectorate African leaders producing alternative proposals for closer association in central Africa.¹ However, that such circumstances would arise was a hope based more on wishful thinking than reality. The clear differences over federation between Griffiths and Gordon Walker while in office, indicated the negligible prospects of the Labour Party in opposition uniting behind a single policy for British central Africa. From the outset the new Conservative Government was aware of support for its position on federation from within the ranks of the Parliamentary Labour Party. Even if Griffiths had succeeded in preventing the breach from becoming open, the knowledge of its existence would have encouraged Churchill's Administration. Furthermore, Griffiths must have been well aware that while the governments of Britain, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia would have been prepared to consider, even welcome, alternative proposals, the Southern Rhodesian Administration would not and could not accept anything less than a strong federal authority. Nonetheless, Griffiths made every effort to

maintain disciplined Parliamentary support for his stand in opposition to the imposition of federation against the wishes of central Africa's African inhabitants, while also seeking to persuade the latter to propose alternative plans.

As we have seen, Griffiths could not, even if he had so wished, oppose the principle of federation for British central Africa. In succumbing to Cohen's pressure for an Officials Conference, Griffiths became identified with the policy of Federation. More importantly, there was no possibility of the Parliamentary Labour Party remaining united on a platform that rejected federation for Nyasaland and the Rhodesias. Thus the policy of opposing the imposition of federation evolved as the only means of both remaining consistent with previous statements and actions, and avoiding the party dividing over the issue. Griffiths achieved some success in sustaining the party line during the 1952 Parliamentary debates, with Gordon Walker ostensibly backing his policy, although he showed his awareness of the tenuous nature of the party's unity by putting it to the test of a vote on only one occasion. Griffiths' position was helped by the amount of support his stand on federation received from within the Fabian Colonial Bureau,² particularly in relation to his attempts to persuade the African leaders of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia to produce alternatives to the government's federation plans.

Formed in October 1940 by Rita Hinden and Creech-Jones, the Fabian Colonial Bureau had by 1945 become the best known and most influential non-government agency dealing with British colonial matters. Its

close ties with the Labour Party inevitably resulted in frequent and close liaison with the Attlee Administration, particularly while Creech-Jones was at the Colonial Office. Even before Labour came to power, however, the Bureau had established good working relations, including close personal contacts,³ with the Colonial Office and its Officials. The quality of these formal and informal links can be estimated from the fact that on at least one occasion the Colonial Office formed an internal committee to study Fabian Colonial Bureau proposals. The committee's findings were subsequently discussed in detail with Bureau representatives.⁴ The Fabian Colonial Bureau was active across the whole spectrum of Colonial issues, but, we are concerned only with its role in the debate over Central African Federation.

The Fabian Colonial Bureau had opposed the idea of federation when Labour was in power and had rejected the specific scheme that emerged from the Officials Conference of March 1951, despite the efforts made by Gordon Walker to convince it that if federation did not emerge soon, Southern Rhodesia would link up with South Africa.⁵

The Bureau would have preferred to have seen the Central African Council retained and developed into something similar to the East African High Commission. However, as Southern Rhodesia had rejected the extension of the Council, the Fabian Colonial Bureau proposed that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland be associated with east Africa in an expanded High Commission framework.⁶ At a meeting with a Fabian Colonial Bureau delegation on 2 July 1951, Griffiths rejected such a scheme out of hand, on the grounds that East Africa's

political future might be endangered by the entry of such a strong Afrikaner presence within the Northern Rhodesian and Nyasaland European populations.⁷

The Fabian Colonial Bureau did not dismiss the validity of the South African threat, indeed it was the Bureau that had taken the initiative in raising with Griffiths, at a meeting on 13th April 1951,⁸ the danger posed by high Afrikaner immigration into Northern Rhodesia. It was highly critical, however, of the failure of the Officials' Report of March 1951, to produce specific evidence of the threat of South African pressure on British central Africa and of the likelihood of Southern Rhodesia entering the Union.

The Fabian Colonial Bureau found no detailed evidence of substantial changes since 1938 - as the Officials claimed - to justify the rejection of the Bledisloe Commission. The Bureau argued rather that "If there is a strong economic case in favour of federation, it is not presented convincingly in the Report". The nub of the Fabian Colonial Bureau's opposition to the Officials' federal scheme, however, was that it remained convinced that only a strong central government would satisfy Southern Rhodesia which had ambitions to change the federation into something very different.⁹

The Fabian Colonial Bureau was, therefore, convinced that federation was not in the best interests of the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia especially as it was uniformly opposed by the indigenous populations of these territories. In rejecting the Officials' federal scheme the Bureau made it clear that it was not opposed to the principle of closer association in British central

Africa, but believed that no proposals would be acceptable to both the northern territories' African and Southern Rhodesia's settler populations.¹⁰ Furthermore, the Fabian Colonial Bureau dismissed the Officials' claim that scant differences existed between the 'native' policies of Southern Rhodesia and those of its two northern neighbours.¹¹

For these reasons the Bureau sought assurances from Griffiths, on 9 July 1951, that he was not going to British central Africa to force the African inhabitants to accept the federal scheme, and that African opinion would be the decisive factor in determining the final decision on federation.¹² Having gained these assurances, the Bureau made every effort to encourage African organisations in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia not to boycott the Secretary of State's visit and to try to ensure that the visit was a success.¹³ Although the Fabian Colonial Bureau opposed federation but not closer association, for central Africa, and had rejected the specific plan proposed by the Officials' Conference, in March 1951, the Bureau became closely aligned with Griffiths' policy of opposing imposition rather than federation itself. This was, in some ways, not a surprising occurrence, given that the three outgoing Colonial Office Ministers - Griffiths, Dugdale and Thomas Cook - joined Creech-Jones on the Fabian Colonial Bureau's advisory committee at the end of 1951.¹⁴ The decision to concentrate more on opposing the imposition of federation against united African opposition, rather than to oppose the whole idea of federation and the specific federal proposals, was, however, an issue that was hotly disputed within the Fabian

Colonial Bureau and one that was never unquestioningly or wholeheartedly pursued. Senior members of the advisory committee, such as Hinden, Nicholson, Greenidge and Faringdon, argued strongly that the Bureau was severely weakening its case by abandoning a position in which it directly challenged the government to produce convincing arguments proving that federation would not result in the halting of African political advancement.

There was, moreover, as much support for a policy of total rejection of federation in central Africa amongst the Labour MPs on the advisory committee, as there was for toeing Griffiths' line.

Dugdale, who had not hidden his animosity toward federation while in office, gained the support of White, Sorenson, Driberg and, to a lesser extent, Creech-Jones, in pressing for the Bureau to adopt a position totally rejecting federation. Griffiths and Cook did not remain long on the Advisory Committee and it was left to John Hynd, James Johnson, Frederick Skinnard and John Rankin to try to uphold the official Labour Party policy within the Fabian Colonial Bureau. This deep division, over the tactics the Bureau should employ in seeking to prevent the establishment of federation, was never properly resolved. As a result, the impact of the Fabian Colonial Bureau was frequently diminished in the campaign to prevent the implementation of federation. Its arguments were diffused and the momentum of its opposition campaign diluted by its inability to discard one of the alternative strategies and concentrate on the other. As late as 12 March 1953, when a deputation from the Fabian Colonial Bureau pressed Hopkinson not to implement the federal scheme,

the internal debate within the Bureau remained unresolved. Virtually half of the Advisory Committee and its delegation disagreed with the line adopted at the meeting. They felt that the counter arguments employed by Hopkinson justified their view that it was basically unsound simply to oppose the imposition of federation but not federation itself.¹⁵

The advantages of Griffiths' position opposing imposition, but not federation - Parliamentary considerations apart - was that it enjoyed a much broader popular appeal than either opposing the federal concept or simply the proposed constitution. Its great weakness was that it was based on only a few arguments, none of which were particularly convincing, and the government had a strong counter argument that it was acting on behalf of the African populations and in their best interests as their legal trustees.

The Fabian Colonial Bureau was in full and united agreement on the second element in Griffiths' position over imposition, namely, that the African people should propose alternatives to federation. When Labour ~~was~~ in power, the Bureau, while supporting the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia in their rejection of federation, was concerned that the opposition in central Africa to a federal constitution was too negative. The Bureau felt that the African opponents of federation needed to counter the specific arguments in favour of federation and offer alternative arrangements for closer association in central Africa.¹⁶ The alternative proposals the Fabian Colonial Bureau would have favoured was for a High Commission on east African lines. When no initiative was forthcoming from the

Africans of the northern Protectorates, the Bureau itself pressed both Griffiths and Lyttelton for such an arrangement to be considered.¹⁷

While the Fabian Colonial Bureau canvassed for a High Commission in central Africa during Griffiths' time as Colonial Secretary because they favoured closer association for the region, short of federation, the reasons offered for this solution during Lyttelton's tenure as Secretary of State were rather different. African leaders, such as Chinyama, President of Nyasaland African National Congress, and his associate Orton Chirwa, were informed that unless they produced constructive alternatives the Conservative Administration, faced with a straight choice between imposing the proposed federal constitution or abandoning closer association altogether, would definitely opt for the former. Furthermore, Griffiths and his supporters' ability to maintain a Labour Party fairly united in opposition to the introduction of federation for central Africa against the wishes of its indigenous population, would be endangered.¹⁸ Not surprisingly, therefore, Griffiths too was keen that the African leaders should offer alternative proposals to federation, "to give the Party something to fight on". Alongside direct requests to the African nationalist leaders, the best endeavours of Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt and Jim Rodgers were sought in an effort to persuade Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia's African leaders to co-operate on this issue.¹⁹ Griffiths and the Fabian Colonial Bureau were so eager for the African leaders in the north to produce an alternative form of closer association in central Africa because they believed that the chance of success of their policy depended on it to a large extent.

The Bureau and the Labour Party leadership were convinced that their agreed strategy could succeed but only if the Conservative Administration could be portrayed as not only over-ruling the opposition of the African inhabitants of central Africa, but also rejecting their reasonable proposals for an acceptable alternative. It would then be the United Kingdom and Southern Rhodesian Governments, not the Africans, who would be seen as being unreasonable and intransigent in their insistence on a federal format for closer association in central Africa.

The chiefs and Congress leaders in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia could safely present alternative plans in the knowledge that they would certainly be rejected by the Southern Rhodesian Government. There was no danger of them being accepted, but if they were made they would place the British Administration on the defensive, strengthening the Labour Party's resolve and at least weaken the unity of the Conservative Party, even if splits did not occur.

Such plans would also have forced the Northern Rhodesian Administration to officially recognise and confer with the African opposition. The leaders of the African communities in the northern Protectorates, however, were totally opposed to any links with Southern Rhodesia and were simply not prepared to propose the formation of such connections, even as a good tactical ploy. Nor were they prepared to be connected even by association, to such schemes, and so they consistently boycotted the closer association conferences convened by the Conservative Administration. In this, as with the question of alternative proposals, the African leaders of Nyasaland and Northern

Rhodesia were at odds with their allies in the United Kingdom. The Fabian Colonial Bureau, Griffiths and Creech-Jones, all tried to persuade the Africans to attend the April and October 1952 London Conferences. It is hardly surprising that their efforts at persuasion proved unsuccessful;²⁰ the reason why Creech-Jones, Griffiths and the Bureau itself wanted the African delegation to attend was to ensure the opportunity to present alternative schemes to the federal plan. Marjorie Nicholson, on behalf of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, argued that no blame could be directed at Lyttelton concerning the African boycotts of the federation conferences.²¹ However, annoyance at the Africans' refusal to take the advice being offered them from Britain, led to elements within the Advisory Committee concluding that there was little point in any further delegation from central Africa coming to London, as they would inevitably boycott the January 1953 Conference as well.²²

The Fabian Colonial Bureau had tried to persuade Griffiths and the Colonial Office to oppose all moves towards federation during the term of the Attlee Administration. The Labour Government committed itself to no specific proposals for a federal arrangement in central Africa, but the Bureau failed to prevent Griffiths, Gordon Walker and Attlee all becoming personally committed to the principle of federation for the region, albeit with different positions and reservations. Once Lyttelton had committed the new Conservative Government to the early implementation of the Officials' federal scheme, the Fabian Colonial Bureau increasingly tended to place less emphasis on the rejection of federation as such, and more on stressing the unacceptableness of the United Kingdom, as the Imperial power,

imposing a federal framework of government onto British central Africa against the clear wishes of an overwhelming majority of its African inhabitants. The Bureau progressively adopted this strategy partly because of its close ties with the Labour Party, but also to encourage a united and broad-based opposition campaign.

Nonetheless, many leading figures within the Advisory Committee were extremely concerned by the manner in which the campaign developed.

The change in emphasis of the Bureau's opposition to federation occurred against the better judgments of many within the organisation. Likewise, there was widespread frustration at the Bureau's inability to persuade Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia's African representatives to produce proposals for an alternative scheme to federation. There was, in addition, disapproval of some of Banda's more virulent attacks on federation, and central Africa's European settlers, and pressure for the Bureau to be publicly disassociated from them.²³

This general increase was exacerbated by the rapid emergency of a number of new organisations intended, like the Fabian Colonial Bureau, to influence British Colonial policy, and the re-organisation of some bodies of longer standing, which brought them more directly into areas which the Bureau had long considered to be their own exclusive domain.

From its inception, the Fabian Colonial Bureau had worked diligently to establish contacts with a wide range of organisations generally concerned with the welfare of colonial peoples. Links were formed with such diverse bodies as the West African Students' Union, the League of Coloured Peoples, the Royal Empire Society and the Anti-

Slavery Society. The Fabian Colonial Bureau's close ties with the Anti-Slavery Society were hardly surprising, since Creech-Jones had been a member of its Executive Committee since 1938, and relations were further cemented with the appointment of its Secretary, Charles W W Greenidge, onto the Bureau's Advisory Committee in 1941. In all these cases, however, there were clear demarcations between the different organisations' different roles, interests and perspectives. They could all be collated under a general interest in some aspect, or part, of the British Colonial Empire, but their specific interests tended only to overlap in fairly peripheral areas. Each agency's fundamental concern was different from those of the others. The Bureau's attitude towards co-operation with other bodies began to be re-examined when, starting in 1950 - but particularly from early 1952 - this cosy situation began to break down.

One of the relationships which was revised was that between the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the Union of Democratic Control. The Union of Democratic Control was, at its formation in 1914 by E D Morel, a body concerned primarily with the defence of human rights around the world. It was intended to be a non-party organisation and over the years had led campaigns on such wide-ranging issues as support for the Spanish Republic and opposition to the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. At its Annual General Meeting in December 1950, however, it was agreed to dramatically reduce the range of issues with which the Union would involve itself and its whole purpose was re-examined.²⁴ The Union's Annual General Meeting accepted a

recommendation from the Executive Committee that it narrow its areas of concern to Africa and, in particular, British Colonies in Africa. Some work would continue in the general field of seeking to lessen the danger of war, but the Union's efforts would be concentrated on Africa. An African sub-committee was established to ensure that the new priority was pursued.

The Union of Democratic Control's claims to non-party status had been undermined by 1950, by the preponderance of left-wing Labour MPs within the Executive Committee. Nonetheless, long-standing financial donations from individuals in the United States were still forthcoming and enabled the Union of Democratic Control to carry out research and plan for other schemes in Africa. Just prior to the Annual General Meeting in October, the Union had organised a successful conference at Elfinward on "The Crisis in Africa" at which the economic, political and international problems facing Africa, and its potential to overcome them, were examined.²⁵

Both at the conference and at the Annual General Meeting, the Union of Democratic Control endorsed its complete support for the rapid achievement of full self-government for all colonial territories in Africa. As such the Union of Democratic Control was in direct conflict with the majority view of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, which favoured a gradual development to independence for colonial Africa. More importantly, the Union of Democratic Control was becoming involved, to the exclusion of almost everything else, in a topic that comprised a major part of the Bureau's activities.

The Union of Democratic Control continued in this vein, with the publication of a pamphlet by Michael Scott, "A Shadow over Africa"

and, in June 1952, organised a large conference on South Africa.²⁶

Thus, between 1950 and 1952 the union of Democratic Control was transformed into an organisation which could begin to rival the Fabian Colonial Bureau's dominant position as the main extra-parliamentary voice on colonial affairs, for Africa at least. With India having gained independence, the long-running issue of South Africa, its internal policies and its role in Namibia, was beginning to emerge as the colonial issue. This, coupled with the Kenyan Mau Mau and British Guiana crises, and the continuing controversy over federation for British central Africa, ensured that Africa was very much to the fore in colonial issues. The arrival of the Union of Democratic Control into this area was, as far as the Bureau was concerned, a most unwelcome development.

1952 also saw the final emergence of a new organisation concerned with colonial affairs, one which was to surpass the Union of Democratic Control in its impact, but which the Fabian Colonial Bureau found it much easier to accommodate. The beginnings of this organisation, the Africa Bureau, can be traced to the informal meetings and discussions of a group of people in 1950. The regular members of this group were the Reverend Michael Scott, David Astor, Colin Legum, Arthur Lewis, Martin Wright, Margory Perham, Creech-Jones, John McCallum Scott, and Elizabeth Pakenham.²⁷ Their interest and ideas developed into a book Attitude to Africa,²⁸ a loosely co-ordinated action over the Seretse Khama affair. The success of the book, the experience gained during the Khama campaign, and the financial commitment of David Astor, all served to encourage this informal grouping to move

towards establishing a formal agency. However, the impetus which finally produced the official launch of the Africa Bureau in March 1952, was the central African Federation controversy.

The African Bureau, as its name implies, was concerned only with the continent of Africa. Its early activities, moreover, were concentrated on central African Federation and South Africa, particularly the Union's involvement in Namibia and demands for the transfer of the High Commission Territories. That these issues were the Africa Bureau's priorities was determined partly by events, but also because of the personal commitment to these topics of its Director, the Reverend Michael Scott. The emergence of the Africa Bureau illustrates the growing importance of Africa's position in British Colonial affairs in the eyes of United Kingdom liberals. It also meant that a second British organisation was now engaged wholly or primarily in attempting to influence government colonial policy for Africa, publicising events in Africa in the United Kingdom, arranging platforms on which leading African figures could address, interest and educate the British public, and furthering the political and economic development of that continent, mainly through educational activities.

Two further bodies became heavily involved in African colonial questions at around the same time. The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines' Protection Society had been in existence for about one hundred years. Its original aims had been the abolition of slavery, in all its forms, and justice for aboriginal native races, but these had been extended to include the abolition of labour systems analogous to slavery and the advocacy

of common citizenship on a common standard of civilisation. As a result, the Anti-Slavery Society had become increasingly involved in the issue of how and when colonies should achieve self-government and independence. Moreover, by defining apartheid as falling within the definition of a labour system analogous to slavery, the Anti-Slavery Society concentrated much of its time and energy on South Africa and the surrounding territories to which the Union laid claim. This heavy involvement in Southern Africa increased during C W W Greenidge's²⁹ time as Secretary of the Society and included co-operation with the Fabian Colonial Bureau and Africa Bureau in their campaigns to prevent the imposition of federation during 1952 and early 1953.

Racial Unity, by contrast, was formed only at the start of 1952, with the specific purpose of working to secure that the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights was implemented and upheld around the world. Although over 2,000 people attended its founding meeting, pressing financial difficulties ensured that its first two months of existence were occupied with proposals to amalgamate with other groups.³⁰ At meetings on 14 and 23 January, and on 24 February, the possibility of joining with the Racial Relations Group and the African Relations Council were closely examined.³¹ Once the organisation got going, however, it rapidly became heavily involved in the campaigns to prevent the implementation of the government's federal proposals in British central Africa.

Given Racial Unity's stated aim, this would, at first glance, appear to have been a rather unlikely issue for it to have adopted. Upon

reflection, however, it can be seen that Racial Unity was almost certainly going to be heavily involved with the controversies of White-ruled Africa. Racial Unity was, after all, founded by Mary Attlee on her return to the United Kingdom after thirty-five years working with and amongst the coloured community of South Africa's Eastern Cape.³² Moreover, its chairman was Canon John Collins, so it was inevitable that its interest in the Declaration of Human Rights was primarily in relation to Southern Africa. Any organisation with such a wide remit is likely to establish priorities and with Racial Unity the priority was Colonial and Southern Africa. This tendency to concentrate on Southern Africa was reinforced when Thomas Fox-Pitt succeeded Peggy Cripps as Secretary at the end of 1952.³³ As far as political lobbying was concerned, Racial Unity sought to establish good relations with the Labour Party through Griffiths' and Wilson's presence on its General Council, but it also hoped for beneficial contact with the Conservatives via Lord Hailsham.

In June 1948, the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism was formed in Paris with Fenner Brockway as its international chairman.³⁴ The organisation was concentrated mainly in Europe and its United Kingdom section, of which Brockway was Vice-Chairman, never really gained much support or influence in itself. The primary function of the British section of the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism soon evolved into disseminating information about and from the numerous colonial nationalist movements affiliated to it. The Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism's interests and activities were thus largely determined by the nature of its affiliates which

were predominantly African nationalist movements, such as Nkrumah's Convention Peoples Party, Azikiwe's National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, Kenyatta's Kenya African union and the African Congresses of Uganda, Sierra Leone and Sudan. Britain's colonial policy in Africa therefore was its main concern and this inevitably included the central African Federation, although the crisis in British Guiana and particularly the Mau Mau upheaval in Kenya took precedence.

As we shall see, the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism did at one stage attempt to co-ordinate the campaign activities of all the British groups opposed to federation, but without much success. It was hardly surprising that the Fabian Colonial Bureau, in particular, rebuffed this initiative, given that the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism explicitly excluded Fabian Colonial Bureau personnel from attending conferences. Nonetheless, the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism was not without influence, particularly within the Labour Party, twenty-three of whose MPs were also members of the organisation. The Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism's influence on British colonial policy may have been, at best, peripheral, but its role within the opposition to federation within the United Kingdom cannot be so easily dismissed. For the Fabian Colonial Bureau the emergence of the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism, and its attempt to lead British opposition to federation, was one further example of the disturbing trend of proliferation of organisations involved in colonial affairs.

According to Marjorie Nicholson, the reason for the Fabian Colonial Bureau's unhappiness at these developments was the belief that they would lead to numerous organisations dealing with the same issues from a similar perspective. This would result in a proliferation of publications, meetings and campaigns aimed at the same general audience for which they would be competing for financial and other support. This in turn would lead to more diffuse pressure and less effective campaigns.³⁵ Another factor which caused the Bureau's disquiet was that they now had two specific rivals for the support of Labour MPs interested in colonial matters in the Union of Democratic Control and the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism.

A further cause for concern was the Fabian Colonial Bureau's rather precarious financial situation. Initially reliant on its two founders, Rita Hinden and Creech-Jones, for financial backing, the Bureau had rapidly evolved to a system of members' subscriptions providing the bulk of its finances. Due to the expansion of its activities, particularly in relation to research projects, the Fabian Colonial Bureau was in some financial difficulty by 1950.³⁶ Although the situation had improved somewhat by 1952, the outlook remained uncertain and so the prospect of direct competition for the limited pool of human and financial resources available was not welcomed. Nonetheless, it became increasingly apparent to all concerned that some sort of working arrangement between the various organisations would have to be found.

Reaching agreement over such an arrangement was no easy task, however. A significant minority within the Fabian Colonial Bureau was reluctant

to be associated in any way with the more overtly socialist organisations opposing federation, such as the Union of Democratic Control and the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism.³⁷ This attitude had surfaced two years earlier, when the Bureau had rejected an offer of close co-operation and financial support for the Fabian Colonial Bureau³⁸ from the General Secretary of the Union of Democratic Control, Basil Davidson. Another difficulty that soon emerged in the attempt to get a measure of co-ordination between the various bodies, was the difference in attitude between the Bureau and the other organisations over the best means of applying pressure to alter government policy.

The Fabian Colonial Bureau came under pressure to change its tactics and adopt a more forceful political line in its opposition to federation. Kenneth MacKenzie,³⁹ the Edinburgh World Church Group and the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism urged the Bureau to stage public protest meetings, organise campaigns of letters to the Press and step up its parliamentary action.⁴⁰ The Fabian Colonial Bureau, however, resisted this pressure because it did not feel able or equipped to alter its strategy of a gradual approach of trying to change British Government policy for central Africa primarily through private persuasion.⁴¹ Thus, any attempt at co-ordinating the efforts of the various British bodies campaigning against the imposition of federation would have to overcome wide differences concerning politics and tactics, quite apart from the antipathy within the Fabian Colonial Bureau towards the new arrivals.

At the end of May 1952, the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism attempted to unite all the *numerous* efforts into one co-ordinated campaign.⁴² This attempt, however, was regarded by the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the Africa Bureau as an attempt by the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism to attain dominance over bodies active in opposing federation, and was shunned accordingly.⁴³ Apart from possible prejudice, the main reason underlying the Fabian Colonial Bureau's and Africa Bureau's attitude was the conviction that it would be disastrous for any anti-federation campaign to be seen to be controlled by bodies with close ties with the British Communist Party.⁴⁴

From the outset the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism's attempt to establish a co-ordinating committee was surrounded in controversy. Fenner Brockway, the driving force behind the effort to unite all the disparate campaigns, claimed, at a meeting of interested parties on 26 May, that the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism had initially proposed that the Africa Bureau act as the unifying body and had only taken on the task itself when the Africa Bureau declined and suggested they take the initiative.⁴⁵ This account of events was flatly rejected by the Africa Bureau,⁴⁶ whose Secretary, Mary Benson, wrote to all the other organisations informing them that Fenner Brockway's claim was completely untrue.⁴⁷ Despite this set-back, the response from those organisations represented at the meeting on 26 May, and a subsequent one on 10 June, was encouraging. As International Chairman of the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism and a member of the Union of Democratic

Control's Africa sub-committee, Fenner Brockway worked assiduously to promote the establishment of a co-ordinating committee. At a Union of Democratic Control Africa sub-committee meeting on 8 July he proposed that the Union of Democratic Control be represented on the Central Africa Committee being organised by the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism. A resolution to that effect was duly passed to the Executive Committee in the full knowledge that the Fabian Colonial Bureau and Africa Bureau were determined to have no contact with the embryonic Central Africa Committee.⁴⁸ It was, in the end, the Union of Democratic Control and the Congress of Peoples Against Imperialism that formed the basis of the Central Africa Committee. Although many of the organisations represented at the two initial meetings of the Central Africa Committee were affiliated to it, they were, for the most part, not primarily concerned with Central African Federation. The two exceptions were the National Peace Council and Racial Unity, both of which co-operated closely with the Central Africa Committee on a number of ventures, including the publication of a pamphlet entitled "Our Trust in Central Africa".

As we have seen during the first half of 1952, Racial Unity was experiencing both financial and publicity problems in its attempt to become an established organisation. Racial Unity's support for the Central Africa Committee and the anti-federation campaign may well have been cemented by the knowledge that the nation-wide activities envisaged for this campaign could only aid its quest for financial security and political credibility. Whatever the reasons, Racial

Unity's Chairman, Canon L John Collins, was an active and influential figure within the Central Africa Committee and its activities which centred on organising meetings on the federation issue and raising questions in the House of Commons through its Labour MP members. The Central Africa Committee's campaign opposing federation culminated in a deputation to both Secretaries of State on 27 March 1953, which presented a memorandum arguing for a reconsideration of the federal proposals.⁴⁹

The Fabian Colonial Bureau, while shunning the Central Africa Committee, agreed to co-operate with the campaign against federation sponsored by the Africa Bureau. It was felt that the Africa Bureau enjoyed a wide spectrum of support concentrated within the churches, which did not coincide with the Fabian Colonial Bureau's traditional areas of patronage. It was recognised that both bodies and the anti-federation cause could only benefit from such a collaboration. The Fabian Colonial Bureau did not attempt to prevent its individual members from working in the Central Africa Committee's campaign, but argued that it would be detrimental for the Bureau, or the Africans' anti-federation cause, to be associated with what they considered to be extremists in the United Kingdom.⁵⁰

Nonetheless, some contact was inevitable while the Bureau's Vice-Chairman, Reginald W Sorenson, MP, and Tom Driberg, MP, remained active on both the Union of Democratic Control's Executive Committee and the Bureau's Advisory Committee.

The Fabian Colonial Bureau worked closely with the newly formed Africa Bureau, the churches and Michael Scott in particular, in

particular, in making the necessary arrangements to maximise the impact and publicity of the visit by the Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian African delegations during April and May 1952.⁵¹ The success of those efforts were followed by joint planning and close communication, to avoid any overlap in the publication of pamphlets, duplication of letters to the press or clashes of dates for public meetings.⁵² It was agreed, for example, that it would be the Fabian Colonial Bureau which would organise a meeting on central African federation at the Labour Party Conference later in the year. While the two agencies continued to co-operate, and Creech Jones' and Professor W Arthur Lewis' memberships of both the Fabian Colonial Bureau's Advisory Committee and the Africa Bureau's Executive Committee ensured the maintenance of close contact, each organisation still tended to pursue its own campaign against federation. The Africa Bureau sought as wide a base as possible for its campaign against the imposition of federation. Although it had members from the three major political parties its attempts to broaden the scope of its support within the Conservative Party did not meet with much success. Its main concentrations of support were within the Churches and Universities. It was towards this market that the Africa Bureau's monthly journal Africa Digest was primarily aimed, as were its other publications⁵³ and this tended to colour the methods by which it campaigned.

One of the Africa Bureau's first important ventures was a large conference on the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 3 May 1952. Building partly on the success of this occasion, the Africa

Bureau tended to concentrate its efforts on similar formal events. From early 1953, however, this imbalance was counteracted to some extent, by the activities of the growing numbers of largely autonomous local Councils for African Affairs. These bodies - of which the Manchester Council for African Affairs (MCAA) and the Scottish Council for African Questions (SCAQ) became the most active and influential - were the result of interest awakened by the United Kingdom tour of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian chiefs in early 1953.⁵⁴ The impact of this tour, which was organised by Scott and the Africa Bureau, with the help of other interested parties, was reinforced with the publication in January of the chief's petition to HM The Queen.⁵⁵

The Manchester Council for African Affairs was formed by Max Gluckman and the Dean of Manchester, Bishop Wilson, who became its first Chairman, in January 1953. It had the specific goal of preventing the United Kingdom Government's federal constitution for central Africa being imposed upon the African people of the region. The Council successfully organised a large conference on the issue of imposition on 19 March 1953. At the conference resolutions calling on the British Government to refrain from implementing any constitutional changes in central Africa, in the absence of African approval and support, were overwhelmingly approved. The Council tried to reinforce the strength of its requests to the Government by a personal meeting with the Colonial Secretary, but Lyttelton refused to meet them. Frustrated on this front, Gluckman instigated a campaign within the Council, to apply pressure to MPs with small

majorities to persuade them to oppose the Administration in its intention to impose federation.⁵⁶ The adopted tactic was to organise groups of people resident in marginal constituencies, primarily through the Churches and associated bodies, to lobby their MPs, directly and by correspondence, to oppose the implementation of the federal constitution. The hope was that if these MPs threatened to oppose federation, some reduction in support for the Government's scheme would occur within Parliament. Whatever the merits of Gluckman's idea, it produced no real returns. What the Council did achieve was the maintenance of the question of the imposition of federation as a topical political issue within the Manchester area. The Africa Bureau's primary aim in its campaign against the imposition of federation, as with all its other enterprises, was to create the platforms and means by which Africans could present their own case to the British public and, to a lesser extent, the British Government. This was the philosophy behind the establishment of the Africa Digest and the motivation for establishing the African Protectorates Trust⁵⁷ and the African Development Trust.⁵⁸ The African Protectorates Trust was established to provide opportunities and facilities for higher education and technical training for Africans from the Protectorates of Southern Africa and was to be complemented by the more general economic activities of the African Development Trust. As such the goals, methods and support base of the Africa Bureau contrasted starkly with those of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, particularly in relation to its campaign activities.

The Fabian Colonial Bureau's preferred method of opposition was to raise matters either in Parliament, through the good auspices of a small group of Labour MPs, or directly with Colonial Office officials and Ministers in private meetings. These traditional methods by which the Fabian Colonial Bureau sought to exert influence became increasingly ineffectual during 1952. The very close ties the Bureau had enjoyed with the war-time Coalition Government, and especially with the post-war Attlee Administration, were greatly weakened during Lyttelton's time at the Colonial Office. Lyttelton only received one deputation from the Fabian Colonial Bureau concerning federation throughout 1952, which compares unfavourably with the four Griffiths entertained in 1951. Of equal importance was the dramatic reduction in the number of informal meetings between Colonial Office Officials and Fabian Colonial Bureau representatives. These had been a consistent feature since the Bureau's establishment in 1940.

The decrease in contact between the Bureau and Colonial Office Officials can, at least in part, be attributed to the strain placed on their relations by the severe criticisms made by the Fabian Colonial Bureau of the Officials' Report of March 1951, which favoured the early establishment of federation. Another contributing factor, however, was undoubtedly Cohen's departure to Uganda in early 1952, since he had played a leading part in the continual development of the Colonial Office-Fabian Colonial Bureau interaction.

The decline in the special relationship between the Fabian Colonial Bureau and the Colonial Office cannot be explained entirely by the

attitude and policies of the Conservative Administration. The Bureau itself came to question the worth of sending deputations to Lyttelton as it became apparent that the decision to introduce federation had already been made and that the Colonial Secretary was inflexible on the whole issue.⁵⁹ This assessment prompted leading figures within the Fabian Colonial Bureau to conclude that until the African leaders of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were prepared to offer alternatives to federation, there was little the Fabian Colonial Bureau could effectively discuss with the Colonial Office concerning the federal scheme.

This realisation, as we have seen, encouraged the Fabian Colonial Bureau to press the nationalist leaders of central Africa to make some sort of counter offer to the federal proposals. It also strengthened the faction with the Fabian Colonial Bureau's leadership that wanted to concentrate resources on opposing the imposition of the federal scheme, rather than the federal scheme itself. As a result, efforts were made through correspondence and at the meeting of 18 February, to gain assurances from Lyttelton that federation would not be imposed without African consent.⁶⁰ The Bureau failed to obtain any such assurances and became resigned to the inevitability of some form of closer association being forced upon central Africa.

Nonetheless, opinion within the Fabian Colonial Bureau was divided over whether or not the Conservative Administration would impose the federal constitution. Marjorie Nicholson, for example, was confident that the Government, faced with united African opposition

in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and vociferous campaigns against imposition at home, would not proceed.⁶¹ John Lodge did not share such optimism and was convinced that the United Kingdom Government wanted to give as much support and independence to the European settlers of central Africa as they could manage. Lodge felt that the Conservative Administration would be influenced far more by the opinions of its own MPs than by the views of the Churches and other interested bodies. With this in mind, Lodge was strongly lobbying two Conservative MPs, Hamilton Kerr and Douglas Marshall, who were known to be uneasy about possible government intentions for central Africa and, as members of the Anti-Slavery Society, open to arguments in favour of an alternative to federation.⁶²

There were also some indications that a significant group of Conservative back-bench MPs were unhappy with the Government's policy of forcing the implementation of federation against strong Parliamentary and public opposition, and without any support from the Africans of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, and that the Government itself was concerned.⁶³ On the assumption that these indications were accurate, the Fabian Colonial Bureau advocated that any decision on federation be postponed for two to three years and a High Commission on east African lines be introduced in the meantime. Their hope was that if these proposals were adopted, then, before federation was introduced, the success or otherwise of the interim High Commission would have to be examined, the provisions for safeguarding African interests in the federal proposals could be substantially strengthened and African consent would be forthcoming.⁶⁴

The defensive, even defeatist, nature of the Fabian Colonial Bureau's opposition to the imposition of federation during 1952 was accentuated further in early 1953. After its unsuccessful meeting with Hopkinson on 12 March, the Fabian Colonial Bureau concentrated its efforts on seeking concessions from Lyttelton over amendments to the Northern Rhodesian constitution. A stream of correspondence combined with private meetings on 2 and 20 July produced no significant successes for the Bureau.⁶⁵

The publication in October 1953, of the Fabian Colonial Bureau's pamphlet Central African Federation : What Now?, prepared by Creech Jones, marked the end of the Bureau's fight against the introduction of federation into British central Africa. The Bureau sought to make the best of federation by pressing for the economic development of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and the continual improvement of the African population within federation. It was also determined to urge the United Kingdom Government to continue to fulfil its responsibility for the northern territories even though the federal constitution was in operation, and take full advantage of any Federal Constitution Review Conference to advance the Africans' political position.⁶⁶

The Scottish Dimension

A more positive aspect of the Fabian Colonial Bureau's campaign against imposition, was its close collaboration with the efforts of the Edinburgh World Church Group. As early as 11 February 1952, Marjorie Nicholson proposed to the Reverend W D Cattnach, Secretary of the Edinburgh World Church Group, that his group and the Fabian

Colonial Bureau co-operate closely in their campaign against the imposition of federation.⁶⁷ Dr Kenneth Little⁶⁸ in Edinburgh and John Hatch⁶⁹ in Glasgow, members of the Bureau's Advisory Committee, were to be its contacts with Cattanach's group, and to cement this relationship the former became the Edinburgh World Church Group's Chairman.⁷⁰ By this means some efforts were made to co-ordinate the various anti-federation campaigns within Scotland.

On 29 February 1952, the Edinburgh World Church Group organised a public meeting to protest against any attempt to introduce federation into British central Africa against the wishes of its African populations.⁷¹ The evening proved a great success with over 1,100 people crowding into the Assembly Hall to hear Banda, Julius Nyerere, Hatch, Cattanach and MacKenzie propound the case against federation.⁷²

MacKenzie in particular made a strong impression. He stressed that, although federation should not be implemented whilst the Africans remained opposed, this did not mean that the South African threat should be dismissed or ignored: rather, the very real danger, posed by the Union and Afrikaner immigration, should be faced squarely to counter its use in support of the imposition of federation. MacKenzie insisted that immigration from South Africa into British central Africa could be controlled as effectively on a territorial as on a federal basis and that any claims to the contrary should be challenged.

The following day a conference on the proposed federation of central Africa was held in Glasgow under the auspices of the Iona Community.⁷³ The preponderance of those who attended were church people, but in

addition, around 70 Trade Union and Co-operative delegates were present. The conference unanimously agreed on a resolution opposing the imposition of any federal scheme without African consent, and expressing grave doubt about certain aspects of the Government's handling of the closer association negotiations. The resolution was forwarded to the Prime Minister and his Cabinet, the leaders of the Labour and Liberal Parties and to all Scottish MPs. More importantly, the organisations represented at the conference agreed to contribute funds to help organise a national campaign against federation throughout Scotland. In an effort to capitalise on the success of the meeting, the Edinburgh World Church Group published, towards the end of March, a leaflet by MacKenzie entitled Spotlight on Central Africa in which the arguments for opposing federation and its imposition were outlined.⁷⁴ Apart from organising public meetings the other main method which the Edinburgh World Church Group used to pursue their campaign against federation was the Scottish press, particularly the Scotsman.

The Edinburgh World Church Group co-ordinated a letter-writing campaign to the Scottish press to coincide with the visit of the delegation of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian Chiefs to the United Kingdom. They were encouraged in this by the series of large and successful meetings they and the Iona Community had held in Scotland during January and February of 1953. This letter-writing scheme was organised by Kenneth Little and Kenneth MacKenzie, with the help of Sinclair Shaw. They had conducted a previous one, during the summer of 1952, but it had differed somewhat, in that it was primarily a

debate on the letter page of the Scotsman between Little and Shaw, on the one side, and John Wallace, Secretary of the United Central Africa Association London Committee on the other.

Little explained the reasons for expending so much time and energy on this one newspaper in a letter to Nicholson of 9 July 1952.

I think it is important to put up a good show in the Scotsman because we have so far got "Scotland" behind us, and the Scotsman's willingness to provide so much space means that we can pack in the sort of stuff for which it is usually very difficult to obtain a public hearing.⁷⁵

There is good evidence in support of Little's claim that "Scotland" was opposed to the imposition of federation on British central Africa. The strength of opposition to federation expressed at the well-attended public meetings and the weight of opinion which appeared in the letters pages of the Scottish press, support his thesis. As we have seen, there was also some interest and financial support from the Trade Union movement, supplementing the many centres of opposition within the churches and universities. This has led one historian to claim that Scotland's students, professors, workers and clergy became allied over the common cause of opposing federation in central Africa.⁷⁶ Such a claim is, however, a gross exaggeration.

What interest there was in the federation issue, amongst Trade Unions in Scotland, was confined to their leadership and those with Church or Iona Community connections and, in the case of the leadership, was transitory. A further important conference dealing with federation was held in Glasgow on 6 December 1952, and on this occasion there was negligible Trade Union involvement.⁷⁷ While a well-organised and

voluble anti-federation lobby spread to cover most of Scotland, the vast majority of the general public remained indifferent to or ignorant about British central Africa. Amongst Trade Union members indeed a certain amount of antagonism existed based on the belief that the time and effort spent on campaigning for the rights of foreigners, and black ones at that, distracted attention from important domestic problems.⁷⁸ A similar situation existed within the Labour Party, in that while certain MPs were heavily involved in the campaigns opposing federation, the issue did not carry much weight in the party either at Westminster or in the country at large.

Nonetheless, the situation within Scotland was appreciably different from the rest of the United Kingdom. Throughout the whole of Britain the resistance to the Government's plans for federation in central Africa was concentrated within the Churches and Universities. Given the much more dominant position of those two institutions within Scottish society, compared with the rest of the United Kingdom, the impact of the opposition to federation was necessarily greater north of the border. This tendency was reinforced by the role of the Iona Community and the establishment of a nationwide organisation specifically opposing federation, the Scottish Council for African Questions, which had no English or Welsh equivalent.

The Iona Community had been established in 1938 in an attempt to create closer contacts between ministers and unemployed men and in the hope that a mutual lifestyle, based on Christian and social disciplines, could be produced. After the war the scope of the Iona

Community was extended into a general attempt by clergymen to reach the working class. When the Iona Community was brought within the jurisdiction of the Church of Scotland, in 1951, its purpose, apart from giving a spiritual and ecumenical lead, was to emphasise the value of the social gospel and its relevance for contemporary problems and political issues.⁷⁹

The Leader of the Iona Community during 1952 and 1953 was the Reverend Dr George F MacLeod, and its Secretary was the Reverend T R Morton. Both these men were personally opposed to federation in central Africa; given the influence of their positions, and the remit of the Iona Community, it is hardly surprising that their organisation became heavily involved in the campaign against federations's imposition. The significance of the Iona Community's role within the Scottish opposition to federation was that it broadened the range of people involved beyond the rather narrow confines of Church and university. Equally important, it provided those seeking the rejection of federation for central Africa with a Scotland-wide network of contacts generally sympathetic to their cause.

Further impetus for the efforts of the Iona Community and the Edinburgh World Church Group was provided by the position adopted by the 1952 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland. The General Assembly unanimously agreed that no federal scheme should be adopted in British central Africa "without the consent and co-operation of the Africans."⁸⁰ This pronouncement, like the General Assembly itself, was invested with an exaggerated significance within Scotland,

a bias attributable to the vacuum created by the lack of any national forum for political and social debate. Nonetheless, it was still an important event and, as we shall see, was viewed with considerable concern by Welensky and the United Central Africa Association London Committee. Apart from gaining publicity for the case against federation, the General Assembly's motion also ensured that opposition in Scotland would centre on the case against imposing federation against the wishes of the African people, rather than on any flaws contained in the scheme itself, or in the concept of federation for central Africa.

It was the Iona Community, however, which provided the opponents of federation with an already established organisation to further their cause. However as 1952 progressed it was increasingly felt that this body did not offer a suitable vehicle by which to intensify the campaign. A national body specifically concerned with the federation issue and the United Kingdom's policy towards its African Colonies was required. The Iona Community, it was accepted, could not and should not attempt, or be tempted, to evolve in this direction. At a conference on the future of Britain's African colonies, held in Glasgow on 6 December, at which the main political parties were represented, the Reverend Dr Neville Davidson, minister of Glasgow Cathedral and Vice-Convener of the Church of Scotland's Church and Nation Committee, announced that a Scottish equivalent to the Africa Bureau was soon to be inaugurated: a Scottish Council for African Questions.⁸¹

The launch of the Scottish Council for African Questions (SCAQ) on 5 March 1953, finally provided Scotland with an appropriate national organisation to pursue the anti-Federation cause.

Based on well-established local committees in Glasgow, Edinburgh and Aberdeen, and liaising closely with the Africa Bureau, SCAQ organised a series of public meetings in 1953 protesting against the imposition of federation.⁸² However, SCAQs emergence came one year too late.

Having been in the incompatible position of opposing the Government on a potentially important and contentious issue for one whole year, it was with relief that the Church of Scotland General Assembly of 1953 abandoned that position. The General Assembly decided that since the introduction of federation was inevitable, it should not be opposed any longer, but instead be given a fair chance to succeed. Accordingly, while regretting that African consent had not been obtained, the General Assembly called on the African populations of the three central African Territories to co-operate over the introduction of federation. In so doing the General Assembly rejected the arguments of George Macleod and his supporters. They argued that the Church should not stop protesting and objecting over this or any other issue simply because it became - or seemed certain to become - law. In rejecting Macleod's argument the General Assembly sought to move away from a position opposed to government policy and adopt a mediating role between the United Kingdom and central Africa's African inhabitants.⁸³

It can be argued that established churches inevitably prefer to reach compromises with the secular authority rather than challenge them. Whatever the merits of such an argument, by the Spring of 1953 the Church and Nation Committee of the Church of Scotland had been striving for a whole year to gain some sort of concession on central Africa from the government, which would enable the Church in good faith to drop its opposition to federation. Between the General Assemblies of 1952 and 1953 the Church and Nation Committee, under its Convener, the Reverend Professor J H S Burleigh, had pressed Colonial Office officials, Rennie and finally Hopkinson, to amend the proposed federal constitution to guarantee African rights and hopes for political advancement.⁸⁴ However, as we shall see in the next Chapter, members of the Church and Nation Committee had also co-operated with the United Central Africa Association's London Committee in promoting the federation cause.

Although no concessions on the terms of federation were forthcoming from the Government, Burleigh and another influential figure on the Church and Nation Committee, the Reverend Dr Urie Baird, were amongst the strongest advocates for the withdrawal of the Church of Scotland's opposition to federation at the 1953 General Assembly.⁸⁵

The Church and Nation Committee in its supplementary report on Federation to the General Assembly, while expressing concern that African consent had not been gained, nonetheless invited the Assembly to urge all concerned to give federation a fair trial now that its establishment seemed inevitable. The Committee was convinced that the Church must not say anything which would forment strife or

encourage unlawful action in central Africa.⁸⁶ Burleigh proposed and Baird seconded the motion that -

The General Assembly note that Central African Federation seems now inevitable, and, while deploring that the consent of the Africans had not been obtained, would yet earnestly call upon all concerned to give the Federal Scheme a fair trial in the hope that it may prove beneficial to the three Territories.⁸⁷

In persuading the General Assembly to support this motion and reject the many amendments tabled, Burleigh and Baird claimed that insecurity and instability were the real dangers to Central Africa.⁸⁸ Thus, the South African threat was again stressed albeit implicitly, in pressing the case for central African federation.

The success of the Burleigh/Baird motion removed the Church of Scotland from a public stand which had been of some embarrassment to the government and its supporters and, by so doing, completely undermined SCAQs attempts to establish a popular and uniquely Scottish opposition to federation; an attempt already weakened by SCAQs inability to attract any leading Conservative Party figure onto its Executive Committee.

CHAPTER 10

The London Committee of the
United Central Africa Association

While opposition to federation was gaining support north of the border, events were happening elsewhere which would in the end undermine this Scottish opposition.

During July and August 1951, Welensky was in London attempting to persuade the Conservative Opposition to commit itself to the creation of a federation in British central Africa, and to put pressure on the Labour Government to implement this policy. Thanks to the good offices of Lord Altrincham, Welensky and Geoff Beckett were able to have extensive discussions with leading Conservative politicians.¹

Welensky held talks with Churchill, Salisbury, Swinton, Lennox-Boyd, Winterton, Harlech, De la Warr and Woolton, all of whom he found most helpful.² As a result of his various meetings, Welensky was confident that the Conservative Party would make great efforts in support of federation, in the House of Commons at least.³

The more interesting development to emerge from this series of discussions, however, was the tentative proposal for the formation of an informal committee in the United Kingdom, to promote the idea of federation. Winterton, in conversation with Harlech, in late July or early August, and then in a letter to Welensky dated 4 August 1951, formally suggested that such a committee be established and proposed that its membership include Harlech, Altrincham, De la Warr, Lennox-Boyd and Winterton himself.⁴ Although it was not until

the later part of May 1952 that the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association was actually established, it is clear that Welensky's interest was roused by Winterton's suggestion in 1951.⁵ From that point on it was only a matter of time before such a body was formed.

Furthermore it can be surmised that the specific plans and preparations for the launch of the London Committee were set in motion by Welensky during April and May 1952 as a direct response to the emergence and activity of such bodies such as the Africa Bureau and Racial Unity and their concentration, in conjunction with the Fabian Colonial Bureau, on opposing the introduction of federation. Welensky and his associates felt that such agencies as the Royal Empire Society and the Royal African Society had failed to produce a counter-balancing response to what they regarded as the biased anti-federation views of the well-established Fabian Colonial Bureau and Anti-Slavery Society, and their recently-formed allies.⁶ It was intended that the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association fill this perceived gap and not allow the claims of the Africa Bureau and its many allies, to go unchallenged.⁷

It was hoped that the London Committee would be regarded as a non-party organisation and not as a specifically pro-federation lobby group. For the most part it was not perceived as such, but, as we shall see, this did prevent it from opposing strongly the arguments of the groups opposed to federation, with some measure of success. Throughout the time it was in operation the London Committee maintained close ties not only with the leading Conservative Party politicians, but also with that Party's administrative organisation.

Moreover by appointing an ex-Colonial Office civil servant, John H Wallace, as its secretary, Welensky hoped to ensure that personal contacts were established with the officials at the Colonial Office. Wallace was personally committed to the cause of the white settlers in British central Africa, as the advice he proffered to his successor at the Colonial Office demonstrates: "Remember your Kith and Kin".⁸ This sort of attitude was definitely on the wane within the Colonial Office by 1952, a process that had been accelerated since the war by the rise of men like Lloyd, Poynton and especially Cohen, within the Office. It is doubtful, therefore, if Wallace retained important or influential contacts in a Colonial Office controlled by Lloyd and Poynton with an African division run by Gorrell-Barnes.⁹

On the other hand, what is beyond doubt is the strength of support and help within the Conservative Party and its Central Office for the United Central Africa Association and its London Committee. Whether the aid given was official or unofficial, it could not have occurred without at least the implicit consent or the covert direction of senior party figures. The help given to the United Central Africa Association was channelled through the London Committee and this was the means by which detailed notes prepared by Terence Kennedy of the Conservative Party Central Office on the organisational framework required for the Southern Rhodesian federal referendum, were forwarded to Salisbury.¹⁰ This will be considered in the next Chapter.

Before we examine further the composition and activities of the

London Committee, it must be emphasised that this body was established and controlled by Welensky. As it was a sub-section of the United Central Africa Association it might be assumed that Huggins, as President of the organisation would have had overall responsibility for the London Committee's operations but this was not the case. It was Welensky who made the important appointments, provided the financial backing and it was he to whom the office-bearers of the London Committee were ultimately responsible. Huggins was, in fact, opposed to the formation of the London Committee and, once it was operating, tended to be critical of its efforts, dismissing it as being incapable of influencing British public opinion.¹¹

The London Committee of the United Central Africa Association was formally established around mid-May 1952, with capital of £4,500, under the chairmanship of Prince Yurka Galitzine.¹² Its full-time secretariat rapidly expanded to a staff of seven headed by Wallace and including three administrative assistants, P McDonagh, Ross Wilson and B Hutton-Williams.¹³ To further boost the impact which the London Committee hoped to make with its pro-federation message, Gee and Company were hired as public relations consultants. All this was expensive, but Welensky was happy with the progress made by the London Committee during the initial six weeks of its existence.¹³

From the outset, the two general points which the London Committee sought to emphasise from public platforms, at private meetings and in the press were, first, the very great economic benefits federation would bring to British central Africa and, second, the fact that widespread support for federation did exist within the African population, but was being intimidated into silence by the threats and

violence of a small minority of extremist agitators. As we have seen, this was increasingly the approach adopted by the Conservative Administration from around October 1952. The argument of endemic intimidation which prevented African support for federation from being expressed, was the London Committee's main counter to the opposing groups' campaign against the imposition of the federal scheme.

The European settler leadership in central Africa laid great stress on the African intimidation thesis. In the lead up to the January 1953 conference in London, Huggins stressed to the United Central Africa Association's London Committee that there existed "a considerable amount of worth-while African support for the federation proposals", but that intimidation and fear of reprisals severely limited the number of public expressions of support.¹⁴ It was this argument that was utilised most forcefully and effectively against the churches and their associated bodies during 1952, and, even more strongly, in 1953.

The general attitude of the British churches had been established in 1951, with the adoption of a resolution by the British Council of Churches, opposing the imposition of federation without the consent of the Rhodesias' and Nyasaland's African inhabitants. Although the British Council of Churches modified its position somewhat in 1952, it was the 1951 resolution which, broadly speaking, was adopted by the British churches and missionary bodies.¹⁵ Moreover, as the views of missionaries working in, or recently returned from, central Africa carried a great deal of weight in the press and with the

general public, particular efforts were made by the London committee to influence the missionary organisations. On 25 September 1952, for example, Wallace and Welensky met with the Reverend L G Greaves, Assistant Secretary to the Conference of British missionary Societies, and impressed upon him the full extent of intimidation in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. Welensky and Wallace were also at some pains to reassure Greaves that the imposition of federation would not encourage South Africa to initiate moves to incorporate the High Commission Territories.¹⁶

In seeking to counter the anti-federation views prevalent within the British churches and missionary organisations, the London committee was aided by the general pro-federation stance of the various denominational newspapers. Unlike the non-denominational British Weekly, which forcefully opposed federation and its imposition in central Africa, the Church Times, Methodist Recorder and The Tablet servicing the United Kingdom's three largest denominations, all either overtly or implicitly supported the establishment of central African Federation.¹⁷

During June and July the London Committee attempted to counter the flow of anti-federation letters appearing in the British press. Welensky was especially pleased that, due to the efforts of the London Committee and Sir Marston Logan¹⁸ in particular, the Scotsman's letter page during July no longer consisted of unanimous criticism of federation.¹⁹ Galitzine, Wallace and the rest of their associates also began to lobby Members of Parliament in an attempt to gain more support for federation. Their main priority in this area was

to foment support for federation within the sections of the Labour Party generally recognised as being broadly sympathetic to it. In establishing these contacts, Wallace's influence with Lord Ogmores must have been useful. When Ogmores had been Parliamentary Secretary at the Colonial Office, he had been accompanied by Wallace on a six-week tour of east Africa in April and May 1948. Wallace took some credit for influencing Ogmores towards the strongly pro-federation position he had adopted by 1951.²⁰ By mid-August 1952, good relations had been established between the London Committee and Gordon Walker and his "Keep Right" group, to whose numbers it was hoped to recruit some of the one hundred or so MPs believed to be in some measure sympathetic to the federal cause.²¹

A further strand in the London Committee's strategy was to obtain public platforms upon which one of their number could proclaim the advantages of federation. This programme took some time to establish, with only a handful of venues found in June, July and August 1952. In some measure this was to be expected, as it took time for the London Committee to make its presence felt and to build up a nation-wide list of speakers who could present a good case for federation and were prepared to do so. It is unclear whether the London Committee sought people specifically with experience of central or east Africa, but a high proportion of its speakers did conform to this pattern.

September saw a healthy increase in the number of engagements requiring a speaker from the London Committee and a very creditable thirty-five speeches at functions or meetings across the whole of

the United Kingdom was achieved during October. This monthly total of speaking engagements was, by and large, maintained through to the end of March 1953. Although local branches of the Overseas League, United Nations Association and the Young Conservatives featured as regular venues, the overall majority of these engagements were addresses to Rotary Clubs. Wallace accepted that Rotary Clubs were not the ideal venues for their speakers but they did at least have the advantage of usually being reported in the local Press. He was particularly disappointed by the response of the Royal Empire Society: only the Bristol and Oxford branches responded positively to his overtures.²²

With the exception of some United Nations Association meetings,²³ most of these speaking engagements did not involve the competition and debate provided by the presence of an opposing speaker. The London Committee made every effort to engage in such public debates and was highly critical of the many United Nations Association branches which did not provide them with a platform and only invited anti-federationists to address their meetings. Indeed so incensed did members of the London Committee become about what they perceived to be the anti-federation bias of the United Nations Association that they complained about it to Ministers and to the United Nations Association president, Lord Cecil.²⁴ Racial Unity, by contrast, did organise a large public meeting in London on 17 October, to which Wallace was invited to present the case in favour of federation in opposition to Dr Banda.²⁵

However the London Committee was rarely invited to provide speakers

for the large conferences and public meetings organised by the numerous bodies involved in the anti-federation campaign. Whenever possible on these occasions, however, Wallace and anyone else who was available from the London Committee, would attend to offer opposing arguments or, failing that, to ask awkward questions from the floor. To this end Wallace and Stephen Joelson attended the two-day conference on federation organised by the United Nations Association and the Council for Education in World Citizenship on 10 and 11 October 1952. At this conference they enjoyed the assistance of Stanley Evans, MP of Gordon Walker's "Keep Right" group who made a powerful speech in favour of federation from the floor.²⁶ Similarly Wallace was among the audience at a public meeting on federation, held under the auspices of the Africa Bureau on 9 October.²⁷

Support from the press was mixed but the London Committee could rely totally on East Africa and Rhodesia whose editor, F Stephen Joelson, was an influential figure in their counsels. The close and regular correspondence between Joelson and Welensky served two purposes. First, it enabled Welensky to influence the coverage of the federation debate and the reporting of the central African political situation in the British Press. Joelson's monthly journal, although enjoying only a very modest circulation, was a very respected and influential newspaper in the specialised area it covered. Whilst Joelson was definitely not Welensky's puppet, he, nevertheless, received a great deal of information from Welensky and sought to accommodate his wishes whenever possible. Moreover, as a member of

the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association and a firm supporter of Welensky, Joelson was consciously involved in a public relations campaign in which he ensured that the East Africa and Rhodesia played a leading part. Second, the Joelson-Welensky correspondence provided the latter with a second, more independent, view of the work and achievements of the London Committee to that provided by the reports Welensky received from Wallace and Galitzine.

With regard to the national press, the London Committee felt that only the Daily Telegraph, Financial Times, Daily Mail, Daily Express and Sunday Times had adopted, from the beginning, a consistently favourable position on federation for British central Africa.

The Times, Daily Mirror and Daily Herald had all been, at various times, too critical or unhelpfully questioning, while the Manchester Guardian and the Observer had, in the London Committee's view, been, from the start, forthright in their opposition to the federal scheme and its imposition. Viewed from a more detached perspective, however, it is difficult to see the role of The Times as anything other than a strong, if not uncritical, supporter of the case for a central African Federation. As for the provincial newspapers, the members of the London Committee were content with the support for the federal cause that emanated from the Yorkshire Post, Newcastle Journal and Aberdeen Press and Journal. The Scotsman, by contrast, was viewed as a focal point of the fierce Scottish resistance to federation.²⁸

In their campaign to promote, within the United Kingdom, the cause of central African federation, the London Committee gained the

committed support of John Connell, a leader writer on London's Evening News.²⁹ Although Connell proved to be a great asset, the London Committee generally recognised that the efforts of such anti-federation correspondents as Hugh Latimer, Basil Davidson, and Colin Legum, more than compensated the cause of their opponents.³⁰ Nonetheless, as 1953 progressed and the implementation of federation increasingly appeared to be a foregone conclusion, many of the newspapers which had been ambivalent in their position on federation and had reserved judgment, came out firmly in its support. Although the Economist and News Chronicle, amongst others, were primarily endorsing the inevitable, Wallace's intensive lobbying of the editorial staff of the national and large provincial newspapers may also have contributed³¹ to the swing in support of federation.

The London Committee expended a great deal of time and energy in seeking to win over as much of the British press as possible. It was greatly concerned, however, by what is considered to be the strong anti-federation bias of the BBC. The London Committee, while eager for as much broadcasting exposure of both central Africa and the case for federation as possible, took exception to a number of aspects in the BBC's coverage. Its main complaint was what it saw as a preponderance of anti-federation participants in discussions and talk-shows broadcast on the issue. A major series of seven talks on the BBC under the title of Partnership in Africa was considered by the London Committee to be anti-federation propaganda, since all but the first address were by people opposed to federation.³² To add insult to injury, the BBC used as impartial experts on the

federation debate, individuals whom the London Committee considered to be arch opponents of federation, such as Kenneth Kirkwood, Arthur Lewis and Colin Legum.

By the latter part of 1952, the London Committee was seeking to make senior BBC management aware of their complaints of bias. In early December, Altrincham wrote to the Governor of the BBC, Sir Alexander Cadogan,³³ complaining about the persistent anti-federation slant to the BBCs reporting on, and programmes about, the federation issue.³⁴

What is unclear about Altrincham's initiative is whether he intervened as an individual, in his capacity as a senior Conservative Party figure, or as Vice-President of the United Central Africa Association. Whichever it was he had enough status to be granted a meeting a few days later with the Corporation's Director-General, Sir Ian Jacob.³⁵ During their discussion Altrincham attacked the tone and content of the BBCs programmes and reporting on Africa in general, as well as on the specific issue of federation.³⁶

Although the United Central Africa Association's London Committee do not appear to have protested further to the BBC, fellow supporters of federation did so only two months later. Early in 1953, the matter of biased reporting and broadcasting against federation was raised with Jacob once again, this time by the Chairman of the Joint East and Central Africa Board, Archer E Baldwin.³⁷ As we shall see, this was one very minor action in support of federation made by business concerns with interests in central Africa.

It was not only in lobbying the BBC that one of the United Central Africa Association's British-based Vice-Presidents proved to be of

service to the London Committee. In February 1953 the Africa Bureau announced plans for a campaign of prayers and protest against the passage of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Enabling Bill, on the grounds that it would be imposing a federal constitution against the wishes of the African majority. By March, the Africa Bureau's protest plan was attracting a great deal of attention and appeared to be going to be a very well-supported venture. In an attempt to undermine the Africa Bureau's prayers and protest campaign, the United Central Africa Association's London Committee requested that Leopold Amery approach the Archbishop of Canterbury, Dr Geoffrey Fisher, to ask if he could take action against the campaign.³⁸

As a result of Amery's approach, Dr Fisher took the opportunity of addressing the Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge in London on 10 March, to attack the ethical basis of the Africa Bureau's campaign.³⁹ The Archbishop of Canterbury argued that the church should not, indeed could not, take sides over the federation issue. He stressed that it was perfectly possible to be either for or against federation, either for or against its imposition, and still be a good and true Christian. Therefore, it was unacceptable, Fisher argued, for it to be even suggested that Christians be called upon to pray against federation, as this would inevitably imply that to support federation was unchristian and even evil.⁴⁰ While the Archbishop of Canterbury's intervention had a strongly negative impact on the Africa Bureau's campaign in England, the London Committee were concerned about his negligible influence north of the border.⁴¹

Such was the London Committee's disquiet about the extent of opposition to federation in Scotland, that from the end of the conference on federation in January the majority of its resources had been concentrated on the public opinion battle north of the border. According to Wallace it was not only members of the London Committee who were worried about the situation in Scotland. In a letter to Welensky of 12 February 1953, he claimed that Government Departments and Ministers were "perturbed at the flood of anti-federation letters which has appeared in the Scottish press".⁴²

Wallace's views may have been out of fashion in the Colonial Office and thus his opinion of little consequence to it, but nonetheless, he probably still had reliable sources of information within the Department. It is therefore fairly safe to assume that Government Ministers and Departments were indeed concerned by the extent of the opposition encountered by their proposals for central Africa, within Scotland. They were also being kept fully informed about any action the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association was taking to counter this opposition.⁴³

From the latter part of 1952, through to mid-1953, the United Central Africa Association's London Committee believed that the anti-federation campaign in Scotland was intensifying.⁴⁴ This conviction was confirmed during the early part of 1953 by their realisation that the Scottish Council for African Questions was proving to be amongst the most active opponents of the imposition of federation.⁴⁵ As we have seen, SCAQs anti-federation campaign was severely undermined by the 1953 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland's decision

not to continue to oppose the imposition of federation. As we shall see, the United Central Africa Association's London Committee lobbied vigorously to achieve that very result.

The United Central Africa Association's London Committee's lobbying strategy was aimed partly at Scottish public opinion, but mainly at influential people within its society and within the Church in particular. The Commissioners comprising the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland are intentionally changed almost completely from year to year but the membership of its important committees is much more stable.⁴⁶ Partly as a consequence, the annual reports of these committees carry considerable weight in the General Assembly's debates on matters pertinent to any particular committee. On the federation issue the two relevant committees were the Church and Nation Committee, and the Foreign Missions Committee. Accordingly, the United Central Africa Association's London Committee attempted to convince key figures on these two Church committees that continued opposition to the introduction of federation served no useful purpose, but rather aggravated an already difficult situation.

During October 1952, Sir Marston Logan lobbied Dr J W C Dougall, Secretary to the Foreign Missions Committee, while Wallace concentrated his efforts on the Reverend Dr M Urie Baird, Secretary to the Church and Nation's sub-committee on Commonwealth Subjects.⁴⁷

As a result of these efforts, Wallace was confident that the Church of Scotland, at the 1953 General Assembly, could be persuaded to drop its insistence that African consent was an essential prerequisite for federation, and instead accept the imposition of

federation as inevitable, thus curtailing its efforts to seeking the best possible terms under the federal scheme for central Africa's African inhabitants.⁴⁸ Logan and Wallace's October success was followed up by Rennie at the turn of the year in a pro-federation campaign visit to Scotland. Wallace believed his visit did a lot of good, by influencing popular perceptions of the proposed federation and by converting at least two members of the Church and Nation Committee to the federation cause.⁴⁹

In February 1953 the United Central Africa Association's London Committee sought to capitalise on its earlier successes by making a further effort to try to influence opinion in Scotland's Church and media on the federation issue. The London Committee's assistant Secretary, B Hutton-Williams, met with Mr Fraser, the Scotsman's news editor, Mr Dinwiddie, the head of BBC Scotland, and the Convener of the Church and Nation Committee, the Reverend Professor J H S Burleigh.⁵⁰ In his talk with Fraser, Hutton-Williams stressed the concern felt within the United Central Africa Association's London Committee and, more importantly, within Whitehall, at the amount of "ill-informed emotional comment" appearing in the Scotsman's correspondence columns.⁵¹ Having only recently left the Colonial Office and retaining close links with it, Hutton-Williams could convincingly represent its views. It is interesting to note that shortly after this meeting, in early March, the Scotsman closed its letters page to the federation topic.⁵²

Hutton-Williams did not record what Fraser's reaction was to his arguments but on Dinwiddie there is no such reticence.

Dinwiddie himself is 100% pro-Federation and exceedingly well-informed, but owing to his official position as head of the BBC in Scotland, he cannot declare himself openly . . . [Nonetheless] He is already assisting unofficially . . . I feel sure that if he is approached further co-operation may be obtained.⁵³

Further encouragement for the pro-federation cause in Scotland came from Burleigh. He felt Rennie's visit had made a good impression and reported that a small nucleus of the Church and Nation Committee were in favour of federation, but cautioned that he had to "tread most delicately" in attempting to steer his committee and wider opinion within the Church towards accepting the imposition of federation. As it was, because recent public statements by the Church and Nation Committee had neglected to clearly oppose federation:⁵⁴

. . . there was an element in the General Assembly which looked upon the Church and Nation Committee with some disfavour. He pointed out that the Foreign Missions Committee, which was an older committee of the Assembly, had all along been anti-Federation and that the Scottish Missionary concept, of which the Foreign Mission Committee felt themselves to be the guardian, had conditioned over many years the views of some of the senior members of the Assembly. . . . He thought the Scottish Nationalists were coming out against Federation, and that the Church and Nation Committee had to move very carefully. He said however, that he would make it his business to sound out the more reliable elements within the Church and Nation Committee with a view to trying to crystallise pro-federation feeling.⁵⁵

As we have already seen Burleigh and Baird played important parts in the 1953 General Assembly's decision to desist from opposing the introduction of federation. What is now clear is that Burleigh had

been attempting to steer the Church of Scotland towards such a decision for some time before the Assembly convened in May and that he had the United Central Africa Association's London Committee's co-operation and support in achieving this aim.

As well as seeking to encourage supporters of federation in influential positions, such as Burleigh and Dinwiddie, to counter the Scottish anti-federation campaign, the London Committee attempted to persuade opponents of federation that continued opposition to the scheme would only bring about turmoil in central Africa. This was the thrust of the argument utilised by Burleigh and Baird at the 1953 General Assembly and endorsed by it. A few weeks earlier two influential figures associated with the anti-federation cause, Hemingford and Attlee, made public statements in Parliament. They independently announced their acceptance that the establishment of federation was certain and argued that as a consequence opposition to its introduction should cease and everyone should work to ensure its success, especially for the good of the African populations of the three Territories.⁵⁶

On 18 May, the day before the General Assembly convened, a letter appeared in the Scotsman under Lord Tweedsmuir's name reminding the Church's commissioners of Attlee and Hemingford's appeal and arguing that it should be heeded by the General Assembly. More importantly on the same day the Scotsman not only reported the Church and Nation Committee's supplementary report on federation at great length, it also strongly endorsed the views of that committee.⁵⁷ When the Church and Nation Committee presented its report to the General

Assembly the following week, the Scotsman again gave wide coverage and editorial support to the Church and Nation Committee's supplementary report.⁵⁸ The Report's reception at the General Assembly was undoubtedly influenced by this and earlier support for the Church and Nation Committee's position on federation.

As we have seen already, Burleigh and Baird had collaborated with the United Central Africa Association's London Committee in seeking to overturn the Church of Scotland's opposition to federation and Hutton-Williams of the London Committee had also attempted to influence the Scotsman on this issue. Moreover, the arguments presented to Parliament by Attlee and Hemingford did no more than reiterate an earlier appeal by Lord Milverton, the Chairman of the United Central Africa Association's London Committee.⁵⁹ His argument was much the same as that adopted by Attlee, Hemingford, the Church and Nation Committee, and the editor of the Scotsman. After Milverton employed it, this line of argument was reproduced in numerous letters to the press and anti-federation organisations. These letters, which had been written by the London Committee, but not acknowledged as such, were sent under the names of various supporters of the Committee.⁶⁰ Lord Tweedsmuir's letter to the Scotsman was just one more of these missives.⁶¹

The London Committee expended a great deal of time and effort attempting to bolster public support for the introduction of federation and persuading various individuals and organisations to discontinue opposing federation. As it became more probable that federation would be imposed in central Africa over and against the

opposition of its African inhabitants, so the London Committee's approach to its task changed and its degree of success grew. As has been shown, during 1952 and 1953 the London Committee had stressed that only the widespread use of intimidation and threats of reprisals by African nationalists, especially Congress, prevented the public expression of widespread African support for federation. The London Committee also sought to mobilise and co-ordinate the many supporters of federation within the United Kingdom. However, it was only from April 1953 onwards, with saturation point reached on appeals to erstwhile opponents to accept the inevitable and help to ensure federation's success, that opposition to the introduction of federation notably diminished in the United Kingdom.

Nonetheless, it is debatable how much credit should be assigned to the London Committee for ensuring that opposition to the imposition of federation did not become as widely held as to dissuade the Government from introducing federation. What is clear is that without the London Committee's efforts, the anti-federation bodies would have enjoyed a free rein in government circles. While it is unclear if this would have made much difference overall, it would probably have been critical in the Scottish context. Without the London Committee's efforts there would have been every possibility of the 1953 General Assembly following George Macleod's lead and endorsing the 1952 Assembly's resolution opposing any federal scheme which failed to gain the support of a majority of Nyasaland and the Rhodesias African inhabitants. Such an outcome would have transferred SCAQs prospects of creating and maintaining within

Scotland a popular opposition to federation.

In conclusion, it is interesting to note that Welensky wound up the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association in August 1953. He did so not because its staff and members were keen to discontinue their activities, but because all available Northern Rhodesian finances were required to launch and support the Federal Party as contributions from Southern Rhodesia remained minimal.⁶²

CHAPTER 11

Tension and Distrust between the Rhodesias within the United Central Africa Association

While the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association was promoting central African federation within the United Kingdom and attempting to defuse the impact of the anti-federation campaign, its parent body in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was preparing for the Southern Rhodesian referendum on the proposed federal scheme. As we have seen, the European population of Southern Rhodesia and its political leaders wanted an amalgamated central Africa, or a Greater Rhodesia. Those amongst them who were prepared to settle for federation remained convinced that it was the second best option but hoped that it might still eventually lead to amalgamation. This unwillingness to abandon the dream of an amalgamated central Africa served to heighten the unease and distrust between Southern Rhodesian settlers and their white northern neighbours. Southern Rhodesians found it difficult to comprehend why the European populations in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were resistant to an amalgamated central Africa and Southern Rhodesia's inevitably dominant role within it. This attitude struck many white Northern Rhodesians and Nyasalanders as being high-handed if not downright arrogant, and ensured constant tension between Southern Rhodesia and her northern neighbours. This tension was specially evident during the campaign in favour of the federation proposals, in the Southern Rhodesian referendum in 1953.

Huggins and Welensky set up the United Central Africa Association as their vehicle to campaign in favour of federation at the Southern Rhodesian referendum, and present federation in the best possible light in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia. There were a number of reasons why it was deemed prudent to establish a new body to organise the campaign in favour of federation, but perhaps the strongest was the United Party Government's determination to prevent the federation issue and referendum from dividing Southern Rhodesia along party lines. Another advantage to the pro-federation side in using a non-party-political body, based in all three territories, to campaign on the issue, was that it enabled Welensky to work assiduously for federation and provide financial backing, without becoming openly associated with the Southern Rhodesian governing party. It also made it that much harder for accusations, that Welensky was interfering in Southern Rhodesia's internal affairs, to be proven. A further factor encouraging the formation of the non-party-political United Central Africa Association was the marked unpopularity of the Southern Rhodesian Government. The United Central Africa Association side-stepped this and also provided a rallying point for the large numbers of basically pro-federation supporters of the Rhodesia and Labour parties.¹ With the creation of this single issue body, it was much more difficult for the anti-federation lobby to widen the referendum into a test of the government's record in office, rather than discuss the merits of the specific federation proposals on offer. Finally, the United Central Africa Association provided the foundation for the Federal Party, formed immediately after Federation. Huggins and Welensky, on

numerous occasions during the referendum campaign, rejected claims made by their opponents that this was the purpose behind the formation of the United Central Africa Association but two such astute politicians would not have overlooked the advantages of establishing and operating a central Africa-wide political organisation well before the federal state actually came into being.

The Federation campaign in Southern Rhodesia was also complicated by the sheer number and breadth of issues and views being channelled into a simple 'yes' or 'no' decision on a specific set of proposals. Within Southern Rhodesia, the opponents of federation consisted of hardline advocates of amalgamation and those who favoured a greater Rhodesia which might include all or part of Northern Rhodesia, or even extend beyond that territory. There were those who favoured linking with Northern Rhodesia but were reluctant to be associated with Nyasaland as well, those who felt Southern Rhodesia should pursue dominion status on its own, while still others favoured Southern Rhodesia's entry into the Union. Finally, an influential group favoured federation but opposed the terms on offer, arguing that by rejecting these Southern Rhodesia would force the British Government into putting forward a scheme more favourable to Southern Rhodesia and her interests.

The pro-federation side also represented an alliance of views between the minimalists and the maximalists. On the one hand were those who saw the central African federation as being the end goal: on the other hand were those who considered it to be no more than a stepping stone on the route towards a much greater white-ruled

federation in central and east Africa. This picture was further complicated by the presence within the United Central Africa Association of a body of opinion which felt that the proposals on offer could be improved. While most of those who held this view were prepared to accept Federation on less than ideal terms, others were clearly tempted by the arguments of those advocating a rejection of the terms available in order to force better ones.

Naturally, with these various positions being represented in each camp, tensions and disputes were rife within the opposing factions. As we shall see, many questions can be raised about the commitment, and degree of support for federation, within the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association.

On 5 March 1952, David Stirling led a delegation from the Capricorn Africa Society (CAS) to see Huggins to discuss the possibility of its amalgamation with the United Central Africa Association. At this meeting it was agreed that the CAS would merge with the United Central Africa Association² under the latter's name. The new organisation was formally launched on 3 April 1952,³ with Huggins as its President and Welensky amongst its Vice-Presidents.⁴ The United Central Africa Association had been in existence since 1948,⁵ so planning, organising and fund-raising had been under way for some time before the union with the CAS.⁶ However, it was only from April 1952, and the United Central Africa Association's re-launch in conjunction with the CAS that Huggins and Welensky moved from behind-the-scenes support of the United Central Africa Association and formally assumed the leadership of the Association.

The United Central Africa Associations of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were all autonomous and responsible for their own organisation and finance, but answerable to a co-ordinating body, the National Executive Committee, on which each Association was represented. The United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia was initially organised into four regions - Manicaland, Mashonaland, Midlands, and Matabeleland - and Salisbury. The Chairmen and Deputy Chairmen of these five areas made up the Southern Rhodesian Executive Committee, chaired initially by Stanley Cooke, which provided co-ordination at national level and fed into the National Executive Committee covering central Africa as a whole. To begin with the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia was primarily concerned with a registration drive for the forthcoming referendum, stressing the importance of federation for Southern Rhodesia and gaining maximum pro-federation publicity. Later on the United Central Africa Association attempted to influence United Kingdom public opinion on federation by organising a letter-writing campaign in support of federation, to British newspapers, stressing how widespread the problem of African intimidation by members of Congress was, and forwarding to Ross Wilson of the United Central Africa Association's London Committee all printed examples that could be found of pro-federation statements by Africans.⁷ Similar methods were employed by the United Central Africa Association in Africa to generate public support for federation within the Rhodesias and Nyasaland's white populations, and they wrote as many letters and articles as possible to central African newspapers, under

various names, re-stating the arguments in favour of federation. Although Stirling had secured Huggins' agreement to the United Central Africa Association campaigning in support of the federation proposals amongst the African as well as the European populations, this aspect of the Association's work was never considered important within Southern Rhodesia. Whatever he said in his meeting with Stirling, Huggins was of this opinion and informed Welensky in early July 1952 that finance for the United Central Africa Association should be concentrated on the Southern Rhodesian referendum campaign, rather than on trying to persuade Africans to look favourably on federation.⁸

The Capricorn Africa Society/United Central Africa Association union provided even more divisions within the Association. From the outset there were tensions between those who sought greater federation, with Bechuanaland and/or east Africa, and those who favoured closer association only with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. The former group tended to be concentrated within the ranks of the Capricorn Africa Society who had become part of the United Central Africa Association. The friction between the Capricornists and non-Capricornists within the United Central Africa Association was exacerbated by the preponderance of younger, more recent immigrants amongst the former, and older, long-established settlers within the latter grouping.

The Capricornists numbered Raymond Byrne amongst its ranks, and he became the United Central Africa Association's Organising Secretary in March 1952. He was firmly in favour of the creation of a

greater Federation, uniting central and east Africa,⁹ but was prepared to abide by the strategy vigorously advocated to him by Welensky, that moves towards closer union with east Africa must, of necessity, await the establishment of the central Africa federation.¹⁰ By June, however, Byrne had been forced out of office amid accusations of incompetence, a casualty of the friction and in-fighting between the two competing factions within the United Central Africa Association. The prime mover behind his departure was the United Central Africa Association's Treasurer, Cecil D Dryden, but Byrne's position was also undermined by the high degree of personal and professional animosity that existed between him and the General Secretary of the United Central Africa Association, A F Hopkinson. Dryden was highly critical of Byrne's performance and successfully engineered his replacement by Rex Reynolds, a reporter on the Rand Daily Mail. Dryden's two main protagonists in this in-fight were Dr D Fowler and R M Cleveland, Deputy Chairman of the United Central Africa Association who represented the Capricornist wing of the United Central Africa Association and who resigned, disillusioned, in June 1952.

Initially at least, Welensky appears to have attempted to remain aloof from the internal bickering of the Southern Rhodesian branch of the United Central Africa Association, but he was greatly concerned by the resulting administrative chaos and organisational ineffectiveness. This concern was shared by many other Northern Rhodesian United Central African Association members, who were particularly disturbed by the departures of Byrne and Cleveland. As Welensky was responsible for financing the whole of the United

Central Africa Association, the longer the disruption of the Southern Rhodesian branch continued, the more his adopted position of non-interference became untenable, and the more pressure he came under from elements within Northern Rhodesia to impose some sort of order in the south. Nonetheless, Welensky was able to withstand this pressure during the middle of 1952, because the Southern Rhodesian branch of the United Central Africa Association was seen to be taking action to end the disputes and commence, in earnest, fund raising and campaigning.

In early July the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia was completely re-organised with the formation of a management committee under Dryden's chairmanship. Dryden had met with Cleveland and Fowler to hammer out a working relationship and as a result the latter two agreed to serve on the new committee. These events were important in reducing criticism from the north. Also important was the presence of Sir Ellis Robins and Ralph Palmer on the management committee, which seemed to indicate that the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia was finally going to embark on a concerted fund raising drive in concert with the business community. Such expectations, however, were not fulfilled. By the end of September 1952, widespread dissatisfaction existed over the performance of the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia and of Hopkinson in particular. While Hopkinson took the brunt of the criticism, and was replaced by H D Sutherns as General Secretary when his contract expired on the last day of September,¹¹ Stirling and Huggins were also roundly criticised, albeit implicitly

for the most part, especially for failing to provide adequate leadership.¹² Northern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association members were also unhappy with the slow progress of integration of the United Central Africa Association and the Capricorn Africa Society, and the lack of any serious attempts to gain African support for Federation.¹³ Efforts were made to persuade Welensky to try to convince Huggins of the need both for changes and for greater involvement on his part.¹⁴ Whether as a result of these approaches or not, Welensky did indeed meet with Huggins and urged him most strongly to take an active lead in the campaign for federation.¹⁵ Welensky claimed that the changes to the Southern Rhodesian branch of the United Central Africa Association instigated by Huggins in October 1952, arose as a result of their meeting earlier in the month.¹⁶ Apart from Sutherns replacing Hopkinson as General Secretary, these changes consisted of the establishment of a co-ordinating committee under the chairmanship of T P Cochran. He explained at a meeting of the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association's Finance Committee on 24 October, that Huggins was concerned at the slow rate of progress made by the United Central Africa Association and wanted representatives from the newly formed co-ordinating committee to attend every meeting of all the various sub-committees of the association "and take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that decisions arrived at were put into effect."¹⁷ Huggins outlined these tactics when he wrote to Welensky in October 1952, explaining the new organisational structure of the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia.¹⁸

When Cochran outlined Huggins' plans to the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association's Standing Committee on 7 November 1952, however, they were criticised as being too unwieldy. Instead an alternative solution, proposed by Sutherns, was agreed, that the Chairmen of all Southern Rhodesia's sub-committees should meet with the Co-ordinating Committee once a week to sort out problems, initiate and follow up action. These weekly meetings, held on Friday mornings, were attended by: Stanley Cooke (National Executive Committee Chairman), T P Cochran (Standing and Co-ordinating Committees Chairman), Sir Ellis Robins (Policy Committee Chairman), C D Dryden (Publicity and Finance Committees Chairman), S W Sandford (Organisation Committee Chairman), Mrs M E Rosin (Women's Central Committee Chairman) Sir Harold Cartmel-Robinson (Inter-territory Liaison Committee Chairman), plus the remaining two members of the Co-ordinating Committee: J M Caldicott and Ralph Palmer.

In addition to this attempt to give some shape and impetus to the Southern Rhodesia branch of the United Central Africa Association, its organisation on the ground was also re-organised. The number of branches was reduced to three - Salisbury, Bulawayo and Umtali - and P J S Mackay was employed to tour Southern Rhodesia establishing local committees or sub-branches covering the whole territory and using, wherever possible, town Mayors and Chairmen of town Management Boards as their Conveners.¹⁹ Mackay made rapid progress in this exercise and was able to report to the Organisation Committee on 19 November 1952, that nineteen local committees of the United Central Africa Association had been, or were in the process of being established.²⁰

Huggins' initiatives brought rapid improvements in local organisation but on the central issue of discontent with the performance of the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia, namely fund raising, or rather the lack of it, the picture remained far from satisfactory. The complaints, moreover, were not only confined to Northern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Internal Affairs, Julian Greenfield, was also critical. Even after Huggins' re-organisation of the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia, Greenfield wanted further changes and the association re-launched as the "United Rhodesia Association". He considered that Huggins was neither very competent nor really interested in the internal workings of organisation.²¹ Moreover, the widespread feeling within the upper reaches of the United Central Africa Association itself was that the organisation in Southern Rhodesia was still far from satisfactory.²² Welensky, too, remained unhappy with the organisation of the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia and unimpressed that Huggins, while agreeing with his proposals for specific changes, had not acted on them.²³ However, he was not prepared to adopt the strategy suggested to him by N H Wilson, namely of stopping all financial support from Northern Rhodesia for Southern Rhodesia's United Central Africa Association until it started producing results on both the fund raising and campaigning fronts. Wilson described the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association's fund raising efforts to date as "a complete fiasco", accused it of "ridiculous extravagance" and argued that this would continue to be the case so long as Welensky and the

Northern Rhodesian branch of the Association continued to pay its bills.²⁴

From its formation the United Central Africa Association had been financed by the mining companies based in Northern Rhodesia, principally BSAC, Anglo-American Group and Rhodesia Selection Trust Group. However, this finance did not usually go directly to the United Central Africa Association but instead went via Welensky.²⁵ Welensky therefore controlled the supply of funds from the mining companies of Northern Rhodesia, which meant in effect that he controlled the whole of the United Central Africa Association's finances, as donations from other sources proved very disappointing. It was this lack of financial support from sources other than Northern Rhodesia's mining companies and the perception in the north that the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia was making no concerted effort to raise donations from elsewhere, that caused a great deal of resentment and ill-will. Welensky himself was not completely free from these feelings and they coloured Northern Rhodesian attitudes to a number of problems which arose within the United Central Africa Association.

The mining interests in central Africa had, in the initial post-war period, been strong supporters of amalgamation but had slowly come to realise, with Welensky, that amalgamation was not attainable, whereas federation was. Sir Dougal Malcolm, Chairman of the British South Africa Company, at a meeting with Welensky on 26 July 1951, urged him to make a concerted effort to gain an amalgamated central Africa. Welensky, however, stuck resolutely to his position that

it was better to push for the achievable target of federation than hold out for the ideal, but unobtainable, solution of amalgamation.²⁶ By the latter part of 1952, these same mining interests had not only come to favour the establishment of a central African Federation and responsible government for Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, but were actively lobbying leading figures in the Conservative Party to bring it about.²⁷ The Anglo-American Corporation, moreover, was, by this stage, keen for federation to be brought about with African support.²⁸

The reasons for the mining companies' financial and political support for Welensky and federation are easy to understand. With decolonisation occurring or being actively considered for an increasing number of Britain's overseas possessions, including Ghana and Nigeria in Africa itself, the mining companies were eager to secure long-term political stability, under trustworthy political leadership, for the whole of central Africa. The mining companies knew and respected Welensky from the bargaining surrounding the 1949 agreement on the future ownership of Northern Rhodesia's mineral royalties.²⁹ The creation of a Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in which Welensky held a position of political power second only to Huggins appeared to meet their requirements, particularly if a certain measure of African support was also forthcoming. The donation of many thousands of pounds to the United Central Africa Association through Welensky during 1952 and 1953, would have been seen as a small price for the Northern Rhodesian mining concerns to pay to ensure the future security of investments which ran into

millions of pounds. Some measure of the extent of these investments can be gained from the level of funding involved in just one of the mines in Northern Rhodesia. In December 1952, it was reported that the Rhokana Corporation was investing eleven million pounds over five years in its new Bancroft mine, near the Belgian Congo border.³⁰ Profits too were considerable and the Anglo-American Corporation made over twelve million pounds from its Rhokana mine alone in the financial year 1951-52.³¹ However, as it became increasingly apparent that the United Central Africa Association was almost completely dependent upon the Northern Rhodesian mining interests for its funding, these interests were not above using the goodwill of Welensky, thus obtained, to aid their efforts to gain tax concessions.³²

It is difficult to determine exactly how many thousands of pounds companies, with mining interests in Northern Rhodesia, donated to the United Central Africa Association via Welensky. Some estimate of the amounts involved can be gained from the fact that the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association cost Welensky's backers a total of at least £12,000 before its secretariat was finally dissolved at the end of August 1953,³³ while the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association Committees and sub-committees spent a minimum of £18,000, and possibly significantly more, during just six months between November 1952 and April 1953.³⁴ However the point to be borne in mind is that Northern Rhodesia's mining companies were the only significant source of funding for the whole of the United Central Africa Association.

In a letter to Godfrey Pelletier on 16 October 1952, Welensky complained about the poor fund-raising efforts of the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association committees and states that it is money raised in Northern Rhodesia which is financing the United Central Africa Association throughout Central Africa, and also the London Committee.³⁵ Indeed, in that same month, Welensky was forced to ask John Wallace to introduce economies in the running of the London Committee as a direct result of the serious drain on resources incurred in financing the Southern Rhodesian referendum campaign which suffered from the lack of fund raising within Southern Rhodesia.³⁶ The Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association raised next to nothing; it was Northern Rhodesian money that financed the Southern Rhodesian referendum campaign in favour of federation. At the same time however the anti-federation group was able to obtain funding within Southern Rhodesia. This state of affairs was clearly recognised within Northern Rhodesia and fuelled feelings of dissatisfaction with Southern Rhodesia's approach to federation and her attitudes towards her northern neighbours. The unresolved problem, that Southern Rhodesian white inhabitants wanted something different from federation than did their fellow whites in Nyasaland and, especially Northern Rhodesia, was as clearly exposed in this context as it was around the negotiating table. Indeed, so concerned did Welensky become at the damage being done to intra-Rhodesian relations by Southern Rhodesia's lack of financial support for federation, that he arranged for a donation of over £1,000 to be made directly from Prain's Rhodesia Section Trust Group

to the Southern Rhodesian branch of the United Central Africa Association. Even with this artificial boost to their fund-raising efforts the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association had only just managed to raise a total of £3,000 by the end of October 1952,³⁷ a figure roundly criticised as desultory in certain quarters of Northern Rhodesian's settler population, who were unaware that the real figure was considerably lower.

As Neil H Wilson pointed out to Welensky in a letter of 29 September 1952, the level of Southern Rhodesia's commitment to federation could be gauged by comparing the £20,000 raised by Southern Rhodesia's white population of only 23,000 for the referendum on responsible government or incorporation by South Africa, with the paltry £3,000 raised so far by a population nearly five times as large.³⁸ Privately Welensky shared Wilson's view of the Southern Rhodesian attitude, describing Southern Rhodesia's financial contribution to the federation referendum campaign as being "miserable" in a personal letter to Wallace on 2 May 1953.³⁹ In an earlier letter, Welensky had informed Wallace that not only had Northern Rhodesia's fund raising, primarily from the mining companies, financed, almost unaided, all three campaigns - London, Southern and Northern Rhodesia - but at Welensky's instigation several large donations from Northern Rhodesian interests had been made directly to the Southern Rhodesian branch of the United Central Africa Association in an attempt to make it appear that "the Southern Rhodesian side had made some real contribution financially to the campaign".⁴⁰

Southern Rhodesia's poor fund-raising efforts were closely allied to indifferent administration. In Northern Rhodesia, by comparison, Jim Phillips had established local United Central Africa Association committees in every town on the Copperbelt, with the exception of Chingola, by early September 1952, and F S Owen provided effective support to Welensky's fund-raising efforts.⁴¹ By the end of September, Abrahams was proposing to Welensky that Phillips should be moved to Southern Rhodesia to lead and revamp the administration of their United Central Africa Association,⁴² and before the end of the year Welensky had been convinced of the need to instal Phillips in Salisbury to attempt to make the Southern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association more effective. Phillips took up his new post at the start of 1953, but continued to be paid by the Northern Rhodesian branch of the Association, yet another example of the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia being subsidised by its northern equivalent.⁴³

As we have seen there was considerable unease within Northern Rhodesia at the prospect of entering a federation with their larger southern neighbour. This unease was in no way diminished by the shared experience of campaigning for a supposedly mutually agreed goal under the framework of the United Central Africa Association. Concern amongst Northern Rhodesian settlers was further heightened when they were faced with the prospect of federating with a territory carrying a national debt of £111 million. Welensky defended Southern Rhodesia's financial situation by arguing that it represented crucial long-term investment in the development of her railways, electrical,

steel and construction industries.⁴⁴ Be that as it may, Northern Rhodesia was lending money to its neighbour for her to finance her national debt, was single-handedly financing the Central African Airways Corporation for at least part of 1953, and lent Southern Rhodesia a further £5 million for the Rhodes centenary celebrations. The Times concurred with the opinion that the Southern Rhodesian economy was in poor shape.⁴⁵ Southern Rhodesia's inability and/or unwillingness to finance its own pro-federation referendum campaign raised the possibility in some minds that Northern Rhodesia would similarly be required to pay Southern Rhodesia's national debt after federation.

Apart from the tension and increased friction arising from Southern Rhodesia's almost complete lack of success in fund raising for the United Central Africa Association, there were at least three other areas in which irritation and dispute arose between the settler populations of the two Rhodesias in the immediate pre-federation period.

One oft-repeated complaint amongst Northern Rhodesian whites, of their southern neighbours, concerned the level of ignorance in Southern Rhodesia of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and the pervasive attitude of condescension amongst Southern Rhodesian settlers towards the northern territories and their settler populations.⁴⁶ Resentment amongst Northern Rhodesian whites provoked by this attitude of white Southern Rhodesians, created the generally soured atmosphere within which all the other issues and disputes took place.

A second major dispute between the Rhodesias occurred over which site, Kafue or Kariba, offered greater advantages for supplying hydro-electric power to the two territories. This disagreement, dating back to at least 1947, carried on well into the life of the Federation itself, but erupted into full blown conflict between the Rhodesias on two occasions in the run up to the establishment of the central African federation. In July 1951, the Hydro-Electric Power Commission, set up by the CAC to resolve the dispute, reported in support of the Kariba option and caused a storm of protest from within Northern Rhodesia as a result. Then, in May 1953, Welensky, with the unanimous support of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council, visited Johannesburg to confer with Sir Ernest Oppenheimer over possible funding for a hydro-electric scheme at the Kafue river site and provoked protests from Southern Rhodesia.⁴⁷

This disagreement, while being a constant low-level irritant to intra-Rhodesian relations, was not directly linked to the federation issue. It is thus of only passing interest in an examination of the disputes between the white Rhodesias, thrown up in their pursuit of closer association in central Africa. A disagreement that was far more central to the Rhodesias' search for agreement on the terms of federation concerned the United Central Africa Association's campaign strategy in the run up to the January 1953 London Conference on central African federation and the Southern Rhodesian referendum on 9 April, on acceptance or rejection of the terms agreed at the conference. At the root of this dispute was the Southern Rhodesian insistence, at the January Conference, on further concessions towards their

ideal of amalgamation. This conflicted with general acceptance by Northern Rhodesia of the terms already on offer, based on its conviction that the British Government was not prepared to go much further in meeting Southern Rhodesian demands. However, Cartmel-Robinson informed Welensky in October 1952, that the widespread impression within Southern Rhodesia and within its branch of the United Central Africa Association was:

"that the United Kingdom regards federation of such importance that it would go to any lengths in concessions, if Southern Rhodesia were firm enough in its demands."⁴⁸

Accordingly the electorate of Southern Rhodesia expected concessions from the United Kingdom Government to the Southern Rhodesian position at the January conference.

This impression had been fostered, albeit unknowingly, by Hopkinson during his tour of central Africa in July and August 1952. Hopkinson's intention during the tour had been to leave those he met in no doubt - but without ever actually explicitly saying so - that the Government intended to push federation through despite continued opposition from the Labour Party and others in the United Kingdom, and Congress in central Africa. In particular he was determined to convince the African inhabitants of the three territories that no campaign of strikes and non-co-operation would affect the government's decision to carry through federation.⁴⁹ Welensky fully agreed with Hopkinson's aims and concurred with him that doubts should not be raised about the British Government's will to proceed. However, he also sought to convince the British Minister that he was faced with, and was trying to counter, the widespread impression in Southern Rhodesia

that the United Kingdom Government were so committed to Federation that Southern Rhodesia could successfully demand "much greater concessions at the January conference than they originally could have hoped for".⁵⁰

This view had widespread support within the Southern Rhodesian branch of the United Central Africa Association and was advocated most forcibly by the Association's deputy chairman, T P M Cochran, in a speech that became known as the Cathedral Hall or Midlands speech, in early September 1952.⁵¹ Cochran argued that although Federation was essential, Southern Rhodesia should press for better terms, including a majority in the Federal Assembly, at the January conference in London. As we have seen a Southern Rhodesian majority in the Federal Assembly was completely unacceptable to Northern Rhodesia and Cochran's public support for a further attempt to achieve it was viewed with anger and alarm in Northern Rhodesian United Central Africa Association circles.⁵²

N H Wilson supported by C Boyd-White, J Hugill, Dr Fowler and A Stokes, all of the United Central Africa Association, wrote to Huggins immediately after Cochran's Cathedral Hall speech complaining about its content and demanding that Huggins bring Cochran into line with the United Central Africa Association policy.⁵³ This demand presented a number of problems for Huggins, not least of which was that there was no clear United Central Africa Association position on changes to the proposed Federation. The United Central Africa Association was created to press for federation, and to achieve the best possible deal for the settlers of central Africa,

but these goals sidestepped the difficulty that what was considered desirable in Southern Rhodesia was frequently at odds with Northern Rhodesian objectives. Indeed, Welensky had identified one of the problems of the United Central Africa Association's campaign for a central African federation, as being the diversity of views expressed by Association members on what the federation should entail and what amendments should be sought to the federation proposals at the January conference.⁵⁴ Cartmel-Robinson was also unhappy at the large disparities in what various United Central Africa Association members were propounding as being the Association's preferred terms for federation.⁵⁵

Huggins was also very aware that if the United Central Africa Association was to continue to be regarded as a non-party organisation, it was essential that Cochran, as Chairman of the Rhodesia Party,⁵⁶ should continue to hold an influential position within the Association. Cochran had won the backing of a majority of his party's delegates for federation at the Rhodesia Party's congress at Gwelo on 18 July,⁵⁷ but Huggins realised that such support could all too easily be dissipated if Cochran took offence at any public reprimand over his Cathedral Hall speech, dropped his support for federation and resigned from the United Central Africa Association. Nevertheless, the strength of feeling, amongst Northern Rhodesian elements within the United Central Africa Association, aroused by Cochran's speech, made it imperative that some action be undertaken, otherwise there was a distinct possibility that the United Central Africa Association would split in two. At a Special Committee meeting

in late September 1952, Huggins admonished Cochran for his Cathedral Hall speech. Cochran undertook not to repeat his call for the United Central Africa Association to press for a Southern Rhodesian majority in the Federal Assembly and to publish a correction of his Cathedral Hall speech to that effect.⁵⁸

Huggins had gone as far as he felt he could to bring Cochran more into line with the views of the United Central Africa Association's Northern Rhodesian wing but some influential Northern Rhodesian Association members remained far from satisfied. Abrahams felt that the United Central Africa Association in Southern Rhodesia was being used as a vehicle to further certain political careers, while other Association members were actually seeking to sabotage the campaign for federation through their membership of the United Central Africa Association.⁵⁹ Neil Wilson was more specific in his complaints, informing Welensky that: "I cannot see Federation making any progress at all until Cochran is removed."⁶⁰

As we have seen, Huggins was not prepared to dispense with Cochran's services, but the need for tighter control over what was set out as the United Central Africa Association's position on federation and possible concessions at the January conference, had been brought home to the Association's leadership. Cartmel-Robinson argued that, while the United Central Africa Association was pledged to attempt to gain better terms for Southern Rhodesia at the January conference, clear limits should be spelt out concerning the range of concessions being sought by the Association.⁶¹ By the middle of October 1952, the National Executive Council of the United Central Africa Association

was convinced that the range of views emanating from the United Central Africa Association on suggested changes to the federation proposals was "doing considerable damage to both the Association and the cause of Federation."⁶²

Accordingly, the United Central Africa Association's National Executive Council issued a memorandum to all Association members making public speeches, which laid out the United Central Africa Association position on possible amendments to the federation proposals.⁶³ The memorandum emphasised that, while the United Central Africa Association was pressing for certain amendments, no major alterations to the existing federation proposals could be expected. Amalgamation had been ruled out by the opposition of the Northern Rhodesian, Nyasaland and United Kingdom Governments. Any variation from the official position contained in the memorandum was to be clearly identified as a personal view and accompanied with the assurance that it was perfectly feasible for members of the audience to support federation while disagreeing with the personal view being espoused. The memorandum also stressed that the advantages of federation over amalgamation must be clearly explained.

In the following month, November, further action was taken to ensure that the United Central Africa Association expressed a more uniform view on potential amendments to the federation proposals. The Organising Committee drew up a list of approved speakers from the Association's membership.⁶⁴ By then Hopkinson had also advised Welensky on how to counter the common misapprehension that the United Kingdom Government was so committed to the creation of a Central Africa

federation that it would make substantial concessions to Southern Rhodesia to secure federation at the January conference. Hopkinson advised Welensky to argue that the present United Kingdom Government "is 100% behind this scheme" and no other, stressing that Southern Rhodesian hopes of a more centrally controlled Federation emerging from the January conference were therefore illusory.⁶⁵

An extension of the idea that concessions could be won at the January conference had also begun to gather ground amongst Southern Rhodesians during 1952. This was that by rejecting the federation terms currently on offer at the April referendum the Southern Rhodesian electorate would force the British Government to return with terms more acceptable to them. This line of reasoning was generally confined to the two organisations, one formed and one about to be formed, to counter the United Central Africa Association and oppose federation, namely, Sir Ernest Guest's Rhodesia League⁶⁶ and R O Stockil's Rhodesia Association.⁶⁷ Among the arguments Welensky employed to oppose this was one pointing out that if the Labour Party won power in the United Kingdom it would most certainly not make further offers of any description⁶⁸ if Southern Rhodesia had rejected the previous terms.

In the end Welensky and Huggins not only obtained the result they wished for in the April referendum, but also managed to maintain the federation issue as a non-party matter. However, to ensure the latter outcome it was deemed prudent for Huggins to resign from the Presidency of the United Central Africa Association⁶⁹ and announce the abandonment of any attempts at forming a federation party.

He did so just a few days before the Rhodesia Party's emergency congress on Federation in early February 1953.⁷⁰ The Rhodesia Party duly refrained from voting to oppose the offer of federation at its emergency congress⁷¹ and the Rhodesia Association was hurriedly formed. However, as we have noted, the structure of the United Central African Association remained as a basis for the United Federal Party which took Huggins and Welensky to power in the new Federation.

CHAPTER 12

C O N C L U S I O N

On 4 September 1953, Lord Llewellyn was sworn in as the first Governor-General of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and on 18 December Sir Godfrey Huggins formed its first government, as a result of the Federal Party's victory in the general elections of 15 December 1953. This was the culmination of eighty years of fluctuating pressure from various quarters for the creation of some sort of united central Africa.

The whole question of closer association in central Africa revolved around the British Government's indecision on how to neutralise most effectively the danger of Afrikaner nationalism. Over the years British Government policy for the containment of Afrikanerdom vacillated between supporting the creation of an external balance in the form of a central African bloc and the pursuit of a solution internal to South Africa which ensured the political emasculation of extreme Afrikaner nationalism. If the latter goal were achieved, the United Kingdom was prepared to concede British central Africa to South Africa, indeed would have been keen to do so, as such an expansion of the Union's white population would serve as extra insurance for its continued loyalty to Britain and Empire. Thus British imperial interests dictated that its policy towards the central African Territories would be directed by the need to create either an external or an internal solution to the

problem of Afrikaner nationalism.

There were, however, other considerations, aside from those of the United Kingdom. Part of the explanation of why neither the external nor internal solutions were implemented before 1953 was that the countries involved had incompatible goals. South Africa's ambitions of northward expansion were compatible with Britain's internal solution, while Southern Rhodesia's ambitions for the formation of a 'greater Rhodesia' to rival the Union to its south were, in effect, Britain's external solution. Furthermore, Northern Rhodesia tended to be wary of moves towards closer association in central Africa because of its fear of being dominated by Southern Rhodesia in any such grouping, while the Nyasaland administration was strongly opposed to joining any union in central Africa and favoured linking with east Africa if some form of closer association was necessary.

In the immediate post-war period, as Britain gave increasingly serious consideration to the possibility of African majority rule for a growing number of her colonies, so the appeal of entering a settler-controlled central African Federation grew among the settlers of those Colonies not as an end in itself but as a means of avoiding the alternative of African rule. Accordingly, in the early 1950s, leading settlers in Kenya, Bechuanaland and, to a lesser extent, Tanganyika made unsuccessful attempts to engineer the inclusion of their respective colonies in the proposed Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Similarly, the settler populations of the three territories which formed the central African Federation

did so because their respective primary goals were denied to them and Federation represented an apparently viable compromise solution. Northern Rhodesia, denied representative government, settled for Federation, while Nyasaland, denied closer links with east Africa, found the prospect of entering Federation less distasteful than delaying its formation and producing widespread civil disorder and the undermining of the Government's authority. However, while Southern Rhodesian whites, unable to achieve amalgamation, appeared to settle for Federation, they in fact saw it as no more than a step towards their ultimate goal, which remained amalgamation.

One factor leading to the Federation's failure was that the Governments and settlers of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, from the beginning, recognised that there was a fundamental lack of support for Federation in Southern Rhodesia where the white population continued to hope to attain amalgamation. Accordingly, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were distrustful of any initiatives emanating from Salisbury as being moves to bring that end nearer.

Within the United Kingdom the post-war political consensus in favour of creating a Central African Federation broke down over the issue of whether or not the opposition of the African populations in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to closer association with Southern Rhodesia should be allowed to effectively veto the scheme. Although a large minority of Labour MPs either shared the Conservative Party view that it should not, or were indifferent to the issue, Jim Griffiths ensured that Federation became a contentious party political issue by winning the support of the majority of the

Parliamentary Labour Party for a position opposed to the introduction of a Federal Scheme while African opposition remained overwhelming.

This was also the position adopted by various special interest organisations, within the United Kingdom, which either adopted the issue of Federation or were formed specifically to campaign and lobby against its imposition over African opposition. To counter these organisations, Roy Welensky formed the London Committee of the United Central Africa Association which liaised closely with the Conservative Party and the Colonial Office, especially in its lobbying of senior Church of Scotland figures in 1952 and 1953. Thus, in the United Kingdom, as in central Africa, Federation was formed against a background of dispute and discord. Differences in motivation and intention are also discernible between the three men primarily responsible for the establishment of the Federation - Andrew Cohen at the Colonial Office, Herbert Baxter at the Commonwealth Relations Office, and Roy Welensky in central Africa. Cohen and Baxter were motivated to pursue closer association in central Africa by the fear of South African expansion, but differed over the degree of central control which should be exercised in the resulting Federation. In contrast, Welensky was seeking to create a white settler dominated state based in, but not restricted to, central Africa and made use of South Africa's territorial ambitions, and the horror with which they were viewed in Whitehall and Westminster, to help him towards this goal.

In conclusion, what must be stressed is that the Federation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland was a compromise, but a compromise which left its three constituent territories both dissatisfied with the end product and suspicious of the ambitions of their fellow members. Denied their true goals, the governments of the three central African Territories joined together in Federation because the probable consequences of not doing so were unacceptable to them. The one feeling common to all three territories was that of resentment; Nyasaland's resentment was at being forced by London and circumstance to join the Federation; Southern Rhodesia's resentment was at having to settle, even if only temporarily, for less than amalgamation; and Northern Rhodesia's resentment was with Southern Rhodesia's attitude towards the northern territories and its patent understanding of Federation as a step towards amalgamation. No-one in central Africa, white or African, wanted Federation but as we have seen, no other compromise seemed acceptable to the majority of the interest groups involved.

Footnotes : Chapter 1

1. Also referred to as the Transvaal
2. see R Robinson and J Gallacher, Africa and the Victorians (London 1962)
3. for the following vide A C Ross, The Origins and Development of the Church of Scotland Mission, Blantyre, Nyasaland, 1875-1926 unpublished PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh
4. Robinson and Gallacher, op cit, p.224
5. Cawslon to Herbert, 1 July 1889, FO 403/111, noted in Ross, op cit, p.183
6. W E Gladstone had by then resigned over Irish Home rule, in March 1894, and the Prime Minister of the Liberal administration was Lord Rosebery
7. The Jameson Raid, 29 December 1895-2 January 1896: Jameson used British South Africa Company police based on the Bechuanaland Railway concession of the Company to invade the Transvaal in a vain attempt to overthrow the government of President Kruger
8. Kaiser Wilhelm II's congratulatory telegram to Kruger of 3 January 1896 on the defeat of the Jameson Raid, resulted in the Anglo-German crisis
9. The Transvaal ordered munitions from Europe, fortified Pretoria and Johannesburg and, in March, concluded an offensive and defensive alliance with the Orange Free State
10. The Boer War ended with the Peace of Vereeniging, 31 May 1902, in which Boers accepted British sovereignty and were promised representative government in return
11. Sir Alfred Milner was Governor of the Cape Colony 1897-1901, High Commissioner for South Africa 1897-1905, and Governor of the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony 1901-1905
12. see Ronald Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, 1908-1948, (Edinburgh, 1972) p.74
13. see B Williams (ed.), The Selborne Memorandum (London 1925) The memorandum was published in South Africa in 1909 as a contribution to the propaganda campaign for Rhodesian inclusion in the proposed Union. As such it was, in effect,

a manifesto of Milner's 'Kindergarten' and gained particular support from C P Lucas, head of the Dominions Department 1907-1911. Prime Minister Asquith, however, was unimpressed by Selborne's arguments and the Colonial Secretary, Crewe, favoured delay

14. see Martin Chanock, Unconsummated Union, Britain, Rhodesia and South Africa, 1900-1945 (Manchester 1977) p.50
15. Chaplin to Gwynne, 21 March 1909, Chaplin Papers, quoted in Chanock, op cit, p.53
16. Chanock, op cit, p.47
17. Crewe to Selborne, 25 February 1909, CO 878-932
18. Harcourt to Gladstone, 20 August 1913, and Gladstone to Harcourt, 29 April and 22 September 1913; from Gladstone Papers quoted by Chanock, op cit, pp.62-63
19. see W R Louis, Great Britain and Germany's Lost Colonies 1914-1919 (Oxford 1967) p.33
20. Gladstone to Harcourt, 3 August 1911, referred to by Chanock, op cit, p.113
21. Hyam op cit, p.25
22. Smuts to Merriman, 30 August 1915; Smuts Papers, Vol.III, p.318, Louis, op cit, and Buxton Papers 1915, Buxton to Harcourt, 15 May 1915, quoted in Chanock, op cit, p.114
23. Chanock, op cit, p.53
24. Buxton proposals of 1916, see CO 417/589, Chanock, pp.114-115 and 119-120, and Hyam, pp.30-31
25. Buxton to Long, 14 August 1917, Confidential, CO 417-589
26. Chaplin Papers, Long to Chaplin, 14 April and 4 September 1917, quoted by Chanock, op cit, p.114
27. see Botha to Smuts, 26 February 1918, Smuts Papers, Vol.III p.609
28. see Hyam, pp.32-33 for an account of Smuts' efforts for annexation at the peace negotiations.
29. Christiaan de Wet had been one of the Boers' military leaders in the 1899-1902 conflict, as had Hertzog, Smuts and Botha. That they were fighting each other just over a decade later indicates the extent of the divisions that had emerged within the Afrikaner community

30. For example see the debate on closer union in the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council of May 1909
31. see Chanock, op cit, pp.56 and 64-65
32. see Hyam, op cit, p.47
33. Hyam, op cit, pp.83-92
34. CO 417/466 minute by Hopwood of 23 July 1909
35. Chanock, pp.89, 110 and 116. See also B K Long, Drummond Chaplin, p.216
36. CO 417/542 minute of 10 August 1908
37. CO 417/540, Anderson to Harcourt, 14 May 1914
38. Chanock, op cit, p.112, refers to Gladstone to Harcourt, 3 August 1911, Gladstone Papers and also BSA Co. to CO 19 December 1911, and minute of 20 December 1911, CO 417/508
39. CO 417/538, Report of 22 December 1913
40. Long, op cit, p.216 refers to a telegram from Chaplin to Long of 1917
41. Long, op cit, p.206
42. Chanock, p.145 refers to Malcolm to Chaplin, 16 April 1919 (Chaplin Papers) and Milner to Buxton, 8 April 1919 (Milner Papers)
43. Milner Papers, Buxton to Milner, 12 and 19 May 1919, referred to by Chanock, op cit, p.145
44. for details see Hyam p.66
45. see Alexander Hetherwick, 'Nyasaland Today and Tomorrow' Journal of the Royal African Society, 1917 and Sir Harry Johnston, 'A Central African Federation' in the same volume
46. Milner to Smuts, 1 January 1920, Milner Papers, quoted in Chanock, op cit, p.147
47. British High Commissioner in South Africa from 20 November 1920 to 5 September 1923
48. Churchill succeeded Milner as Secretary of State for the Colonies in February 1921

49. Connaught to Churchill, 18 February 1921 CO 417/657
50. Lambert to Secretary of State 6 August 1919 CO 417/620
Lambert was head of the Dominions Department of the Colonial Office from 1911 till 1925
51. BSA Co. to CO, 3 March 1921, CO 417/460
also Smuts to Churchill, 11 May 1921, CO 537/1183
and minute by Lambert 17 and 19 May 1921, CO 537/1183
see also Report on Union of South Africa House of Assembly debate of 17 February 1949, The Bulawayo Chronicle, Friday 18 February 1949. In this Smuts made it clear that if Southern Rhodesia had gone into the Union in 1921, the British South Africa Company would have included Northern Rhodesia as well "without any additional consideration"
52. It was not always clear whether it was just Southern Rhodesia or both Rhodesias that were at stake. Certainly Smuts wanted both and the Company were, by then, happy to be compensated for both and although the CO still maintained their position on the Zambesi being the border between black and white Africa, many were confident that this could be circumvented
53. Lambert argued strongly in favour of responsible government for Southern Rhodesia and in May 1921 urged Churchill to ignore the advice of the British High Commissioner in South Africa and take no action that would "press Union on Southern Rhodesia". see minute by Lambert, 15 May 1921, CO 537/1183
54. see Chanock, op cit, pp.149-151
55. Minute by Amery of 4 February 1921, Churchill to Sir Henry Lambert of 27 and 29 September 1921, CO 417/675
56. see Chanock, op cit, pp.150-152
57. Note of 27 September 1921, CO 417/674
58. see Secret Extract from conclusion of Cabinet meeting 78(21) Conclusion 3, CO 417/674
59. see Hyam, p.65
60. see Chanock, op cit, pp. 151 and 153 and reference to Coghlan's description of Lambert and Masterton-Smith as "two staunch friends" in Coghlan to Buxton of 20 December 1921 in Buxton papers
61. Minute by Lambert, 12 May 1921, CO 537/1183 "I do not myself believe that it is at all [in] Rhodesia's interest to join the Union at present, because it will mean as the price of

union assistance an influx of poor Dutch which may alter the whole character of the country"

62. Hyam, op cit, p.68
63. For this and other observations on the referendum campaign and result, see Drummond Chaplin to Smuts of 30 October 1922 in Jean van der Poel (ed) Selections from the Smuts Papers, Vol.V, September 1919-November 1934 (Cambridge 1973), No.83, pp144-147
64. The vote was 8774 for representative government and 5989 for incorporation, on a 78% poll
65. Jones to Churchill, 3 June 1921, CO 417/660 and Churchill's speech to Imperial Conference, CO 417/622
66. Cmd 1129 (Commission set up in July 1919, reported to Parliament in 1921)
67. Smuts to Bonar Law (newly elected Conservative Prime Minister) 20 November 1922, Smuts to G A Ormsby-Gore (new Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies) 21 November 1922, and Smuts to Churchill (now out of office) 22 November 1922. In Smuts Papers, Vol V, numbers 85, 86 and 88, pp.149-1954
68. Smuts to Ormsby-Gore, 19 January 1923, ibid No.93, pp. 160-161
69. Chaplin Papers, Malcolm to Chaplin, 28 April 1921, referred to in Chanock, p.151
70. Smuts to L S Amery (new Secretary of State for Colonies) 25 November 1924, Smuts Papers, op cit, Vol.V No.155 pp.237-239
71. see Hyam, Chapters 5 and 6

Footnotes : Chapter 2

1. Northern Rhodesia's economic position at that time was very largely dependent on the performance of the lead-zinc mine at Broken Hill
2. Indians in Kenya, Cmd 1922, of 1923
3. Cmd 1922, p.9
4. see L S Amery, The Forward View (London 1935) and My Political Life, (London 1953)
5. Chanock, op cit, p.191
6. 8 June 1927, meeting on federation in east and central Africa, between, amongst others, Amery, Ormsby-Gore, Sir S Wilson, Grigg, Cameron and Stanley. Cab.27/349
7. see Smuts to Amery of 25 November 1924, 17 July 1925, 11 March 1927, 1 May 1928, amongst others, see Selections from Smuts Papers, Vol.V, pp.237-381. Smuts strongly urges Amery to pursue a policy of British/European rule and settlement from the Cape to Kenya that would eventually form a great Dominion, surpassing Australia and Canada in resources and importance
8. East African Commission Report, Cmd 2387, (1925). Members were W Ormsby-Gore (Conservative), Major Church (Labour) and Lord Linfield (Liberal) and they visited Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1924
9. Cmd 2387, p.7
10. Sir Donald Cameron, My Tanganyika Service and some Nigeria, (London 1939), pp.224-233. Lord Altrincham, Kenya's Opportunity (London 1955), p.71
11. see G Jones, Britain and Nyasaland, (London 1964) p.167 and R I Pearce, The Turning Point in Africa, (London 1982) p.4 for evidence that both Governors and the Colonial Office had effective vetoes on any initiative
12. in particular p.5 of 'Future Policy in regard to Eastern Africa' (1927) Cmd 2904 and M Perham, Lugard - The Years of Authority, (London 1960) pp.680-681
13. Cameron, op cit, p.226
14. D S Rothschild, Toward Unity in Africa (Washington 1960) pp.18-26

15. Whilst in South Africa, Amery had emphasised in his public speeches the Union's responsibilities as a Dominion within the Empire, he had portrayed the Empire as a collectively interdependent Empire rather than one controlled by Britain. He also dwelt on South Africa's "opportunities for the extension of her political and economic influence in connection with the whole development of Africa to the north of the existing boundaries of the Union. This theme of a greater South Africa of the future also enabled me to work in, on several occasions, and more particularly in my farewell speech at Cape Town, an earnest appeal for racial unity". This racial unity had nothing to do with the African population but was a reference to British and Afrikaner South Africans.
DO 117/75 and Secret Memorandum for Cabinet of 5 October 1929, CP 296 (27)
16. ibid
17. Secret memorandum for Cabinet of 5 October 1927, CP 296(27)
18. see Hyam, op cit, Chapter 5
19. see Hyam, op cit, pp. 111-115
20. Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa (January) 1929, Cmd 3234. Between January and April 1928 the Commissioners visited Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and South Africa.
21. Cmd 3234, p.95
22. Cmd 3234, p.103
23. ibid, p.142
24. ibid, p.268
25. ibid, p.268. Hilton Young envisaged a similar plan for East Africa with an unofficial majority in Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika "Crown Colony" status
26. ibid, p.285. The major report was supported by the other three Commissioners: Sir Reginald Mant, Sir George Schuster, and J H Oldham
27. ibid, p.264
28. ibid, p.265
29. Moffat succeeded Coghlan as Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia in 1927
30. Northern rhodesian Hansard for 23 April 1928, col.127

31. Northern Rhodesian Hansard for 21 November 1929, col. 166
32. Minute by Amery of 3 February 1929, DO 117/120
33. Clifford to Sir Charles Davis, Private and Confidential, of 15 and 16 October 1929 DO 117/172
34. Memorandum on Native policy in East Africa (Cmd 3573) issued by Lord Passfield in June 1930; Northern Rhodesia was included in its understanding of East Africa
35. Cmd 3731
36. See C Leys and C Pratt, A New Deal in Central Africa (London 1960), p.8
37. see E Clegg, Race and Politics (Oxford 1960) pp.68-69
Copper prices fell from £72 to £27 a ton in 1930
38. see Jones, op cit, p.130 and Leys, op cit, p.5
39. Sir Herbert Stanley, on becoming High Commissioner in South Africa supported Clifford's analysis of British requirements and called for a pro-British confederation consisting of Bechuanaland, Nyasaland, the Rhodesias and the other two High Commission territories if possible. DO 121/101
Stanley to Secretary of State Thomas, 11 October 1932
40. A J Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa (London 1964) p.260
41. A Prelude to the Politics of Independence in Northern Zambia, 1983-1939 (Manchester 1971) pp.256-258 and Wills op cit, p.269
42. Nyasaland Legislative Council Debates, 6 June 1933, speech by R Tait Bowie
43. see Colin Leys, The Making of the Federation (conference paper of 17 April 1959) FCB 107/3, item 9
44. Although an effective unofficial colour bar operated in Northern Rhodesia
45. All the Northern Rhodesian members of Legislative Council attended, as did representatives from every Southern Rhodesian political party.
46. Malcolm MacDonald, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, 1931-35, Secretary of State for the Dominions 1935-39, and for the Colonies 1935 and 1938-40

47. see Cmd 3731 and also Cmd 5949, pp.113-115
48. Chanock, pp.222-223 and K Nyarmayro Mufuka, Missions and Politics in Malawi (Washington 1978) pp. 125-126
49. see Chanock, p. xi and p.224, and also William L Shirer, The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich (London 1960) p.373. Offer made to Hitler by British Foreign Secretary
50. Negotiations between Hertzog and Smuts had begun on 16 February 1933 and only began after Smuts' discussions with Tielman Roos had first foundered on 10 February. It had been Roos' resignation from the judiciary and re-entry into the political arena that had finally forced Hertzog to leave the gold standard
51. In the South African General election of 17 May 1933, the Nationalist coalition won 137 of the 150 seats
52. On 5 June 1934 the two parties united and Dr D F Malan led 19 Nationalist MPs into the new Afrikaner Nationalist Party
53. The remnants of British imperialists in South Africa were represented by Colonel Stallard's Dominion Party with its 7 MPs
54. see Hyam, op cit, pp.116-117
55. see Smuts Papers, op cit, Vol.V, P Duncan to Smuts 13 June 1932; J H Hofneys to Smuts June 1932 and Smuts to M G Gillet 13 July 1932, pp.512-534
56. Smuts to Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs, 28 July 1933, DG 116/562
57. At these meetings Hertzog had been further annoyed by Britain's refusal to concede to any of his demands for transfer. See Cab. 23/88, pp.369-372, and Cab.(37)32 Cabinet meeting of Wednesday 28 July 1937, com.8, and Cab.23/93 pp.14-18
58. see Cabinet meetings of 26 May 1937 (cab.23/88) and 21 July 1937 (cab.23/89)
59. Cmd 5949, (1939) The Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Lord Bledisloe was chairman, and the other members of the commissioners three MPs representing the Conservative, Labour and Liberal Parties, I Orr-Ewing, W H Mainwaring and E Evans; a former colonial civil servant, T Fitzgerald, and a representative of business and commerce, P A Cooper

60. Cabinet meeting of 13 October 1977, Cab.23/89 CM (37)37
61. For further details on the Royal Commission Report see Richard Gray, The Two Nations (London and New York 1960) part 1, Chapter 5
62. Speech reported in The Livingstone Mail, 20 May 1939
63. ibid, Welensky was speaking at the same meeting
64. see Northern Rhodesian Hansard, 6 June 1939, in particular speech by Captain A A Smith (Nkana electoral area) col.496
65. Cmd 5949, paragraphs 444 and 526-7
66. A J Wills, An Introduction to the History of Central Africa (London 1964) p.269
67. Bledisloe to Eden, 1 December 1939 and 26 January 1940 in DO 35/825
68. Stanley to Machtig, 10 July 1940, DO 35/825
69. DO 35/825 minutes of meeting on 14 March 1940 between Eden and MacDonald with the representatives of the Anti-Slavery Society, including A C J, Noel Buxton and Charles Roberts
70. see Hyam, op cit, pp.163-167
71. ibid, pp.170-171
72. ibid, p.170
73. Smuts Papers, op cit, Vol.6 Smuts to E F C Lane, 26 May 1936, pp.40-41
74. Ibid, see Smuts to Amery of 22 and 29 June 18 May 1936, and Amery to Smuts of 14 July, 22 November and 2 December 1937 pp.42-108
75. DO 35/825
76. Formerly William Ormsby-Gore, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies 1922-24 and 1924-29, Secretary of State for the Colonies 1936-38 and High Commissioner in South Africa 1941-44
77. DO 116/8 and 35/141
78. CO 795/122 part 1 "Notes on future policy in Central Africa" by G F Seel

79. Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Colonial Office
80. CO 795/122 part 1 minute by Gater of 1 May 1943
81. Malcolm MacDonald, Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1938-40 and Dominions 1935-39; R Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for Dominions 1939-40; Viscount Cranbourne, Secretary of State for Dominions 1940-42 and 1943-45, and Secretary of State for Colonies 1942-43; Lord Moyne, Secretary of State for Colonies 1940-42
82. Moore was Governor of Kenya
83. see Pearce op cit, pp.72-73 and Louis op cit, pp.332-336
84. Hertzog's government fell and Smuts became Prime Minister and Defence Secretary of a new ministry on 5 September 1939, after Smuts motion declaring war on Germany, opposed by Hertzog on a neutral stance, was passed in the South African Parliament on a narrow majority and Hertzog resigned
85. DO 35/826 Joint memorandum by Cranbourne and Moyne of 23 October 1941
86. CO 847/23 Colonial Secretary Lord Moyne's memorandum "Expansionist ambition of the Union of South Africa" of March 1941
87. Smuts to M C Gillett, 31 January 1942, pp.346-347 Smuts Papers Vol.5
88. South Africa's general election results for 7 July 1943 vote - United Party 89; Nationalist Party 43; Labour Party 9; Dominion Party 7; Independents 2. With the co-operation of the smaller parties and the three African representatives Smuts' working majority went up to 67 from the 13 he secured to bring South Africa into the war
89. Smuts Papers, Vol.5, pp.456-467
90. Cab. 66/49 18 April 1944
91. Cab. 65/42 Thursday 27 April 1944, WM(44)58, WP(44)211
92. see, for example, the Leaders in the Glasgow Herald, 26 October 1945 and 18 March 1946
93. DO 35/1122 Swinton to Cranbourne, 18 March 1944
94. Baring was Governor of Southern Rhodesia 1942-44 and High Commissioner in South Africa from 1944-51

95. Baring to Secretary of State, 6 April 1945 DO 35/1172
96. Baring to Machtig, 28 August 1945 DO 35/1274
97. Charnock, op cit, pp. 208 and 219-221
98. Cab. 65/17, WM(41)9 See War Cabinet meeting of Thursday 23 January 1941
99. Cab. 65/53, WM(45)14 War Cabinet of Thursday 12 July 1945
100. Cab. 128/1, CM(45)27 Cabinet of Monday 3 September 1945
101. Glasgow Herald, Monday 29 April 1946
102. Pearce, op cit, pp.24-25
103. Hansard (Commons) Vol.374, cols. 67-68 of 9 September 1941
104. Cranbourne, Viscount, later Marquess of Salisbury, Secretary of State for the Colonies 1942-43 and for the Dominions 1940-42 and 1943-45
105. Moyne, Secretary of State for the Colonies 1940-42
106. see CO 323/1858 part 2 memo of September 1941 by Moyne "The Future of the Colonial Empire" and CO 554/128
107. CO 323/1858 memorandum by Attlee, Eden, Cranbourne and Stanley on Colonial policy of 5 December 1942
108. Cab. 65/28 WM(42)154, War Cabinet of Wednesday 18 November 1942
109. Minutes by H Macmillan of 1 September 1942 and by Cranbourne of 4 September 1942 in CO 323/1848
110. Cab. 65/33, WM(43)12m WP(43)33, War Cabinet of Wednesday 20 January 1943 and Cabinet 65/34 WM(43)53, War Cabinet of Tuesday 13 April 1943
111. Secretary of State for the Colonies 1943-45
112. see Pearce, op cit, pp34-37 and Louis, op cit, p.253
113. Note from Stanley to Eden of 6 January 1944 CO 323/1858 part 2
114. see Pearce, op cit, pp. 34-35
115. Taylor, Don, The Rhodesian (London 1955) pp. 58-59

116. Hansard (Northern Rhodesian), 30 March 1942, col.17
117. Hansard (Northern Rhodesian) 25 November 1943, col.152, Pelletier and McKee abstained
118. Clegg, op cit, p.113
119. see Hansard (Northern Rhodesian) for 28 and 29 August 1945
120. CO 795/128 Memorandum by Cohen and Creasy, March 1944
121. Cab.66/48, Cabinet meeting of 6th April 1944
122. Cab.65/42, WP(44)191, War Cabinet Meeting of 27 April 1944; Permanent secretariat for Central African Council established in Salisbury in October 1945. Chairman of Council was Governor of Southern Rhodesia. Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia and the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, ex officio members. In addition, each territory had three ordinary members nominated for terms of not more than two years, both unofficials and government. Leaders of opposition in Southern Rhodesia, Stumbles, refused his place on the CAC
123. Cab.65/43 WM(44)90, WP(44)363, War Cabinet of Wednesday 12 July 1944
124. G H Hall was Secretary of State for the Colonies, July 1945-October 1946
125. Gore-Brown to Welensky, 18 June 1946, RW 24/73 and Northern Rhodesian Hansard, 3 December 1946 col.52f
126. Cab.65/44, WM(44)172 War Cabinet of Wednesday 20 December 1944 and Cab.65/49 WM(45)33, War Cabinet of Monday 19 March 1945 and Cab.65/50 WM(45)42 War Cabinet of Thursday 12 April 1945
127. CO 537/2118 reference to Sir Edmund Richard's telegrams to Secretary of State 3 November 1944 (No.445) and of 1 June 1944 (No.21(1))
128. Cab.65/33 WM(43)4 War Cabinet of Thursday 7 January 1943
129. Cab.65/42 WM(44)58, WP(44)211, War Cabinet of Thursday 27 April 1944
130. CO 537/2118 minutes by Watson of 27 July 1946 and 17 May
131. CO 537/2118 Sir G Crater to H F Cartmel-Robinson (acting Governor of Northern Rhodesia) of 2 November 1946
132. Hall accepted that the Government of Southern Rhodesia was still in favour of amalgamation but decided that amalgamation was not practicable. CO 537/5884

Footnotes : Chapter 3

1. Memorandum for Speakers, issued by National Executive Council of UCCA : RW 5/2. (For first part of chapter see Morgan, Kenneth O., Labour in Power 1945-51 (Oxford 1984) and Pimlott, Ben, Hugh Dalton (Jonathan Cape, London 1985))
2. Kendall Ward to David Stirling 25 February 1951: RW1/11
3. Stirling to Ward, undated, and Welensky to Michael Blundell, August 1951: ibid
4. Stirling to Ward, undated, but probably the end of March 1951: ibid
5. Ward to Stirling, 7 April 1951, Wilfrid Havelock to Welensky, 3 September 1951, Welensky to Havelock, 15 September 1951 and numerous correspondence between Welensky and Male of the Tanganyika European Council throughout 1951; ibid
6. Memorandum by G Herbert Baxter on CAS proposals, 24 January 1952 CO 1015/70
7. ibid and Baxter to Cohen, 26 November 1951 CO 1015/70
8. Welensky to Huggins, 14 December 1951, RW 39/112
9. Rennie to C E Lambert, 9 January 1952 and Baxter to Liesching, 26 January 1952 CO 1015/70
10. Rennie to Welensky, 28 January 1952 RW 39/114
11. Memorandum on CAS and proposed March Salisbury Settlers Convention by Baxter CO 1015/70 and MacLennan to Baxter, 8 January 1952 DO 35/3602
12. Baring to CRO, Telegram No.97, 26 June 1952 CO 1015/70
Gibbs was a member of Southern Rhodesia's Assembly and Chairman of the United Party; Cooke was President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industries of Southern Rhodesia and Chairman of the UCCA; Keller was a member of Southern Rhodesia's Assembly, an influential trade unionist and an ex-leader of the Rhodesia Party; and Grenfell was managing director of the British South African Company in Northern Rhodesia and a member of CAS.
13. Baxter to Sir Percivale Liesching, Permanent Under-Secretary of State Commonwealth Relations, 26 January 1952, ibid

14. Welensky to Havelock, 6 June 1952, RW 39/113
15. CRO to Baring, Telegram No. 180, 24 June 1952 CO 1015/70
16. Havelock to Welensky, 11 July 1953, RW1/11
17. ibid and Havelock to Welensky, 13 July 1953
18. Havelock to Welensky, 13 July 1953, ibid
19. Welensky to Havelock, 28 July 1953, ibid
20. ibid and Welensky to Glover, 7 August 1953,
ibid and Welensky to Prince Yurka Galitzine, 27 August 1953 RW 5/3
21. F Gordon Harper to Welensky, 12 January 1952 RW 1/11
22. Gordon Harper to S Wingfield Digby (a member of the Southern Rhodesian Assembly), 4 September 1950 DO 35/3825
23. Welensky to Gordon Harper, 12 January 1952 RW 1/11
24. Lord Ogmores to Digby, 17 August 1950; Digby to Huggins, 18 September 1950; Huggins to Digby, 18 October 1950; J H Le Rougetel to CRO, 26 February 1952, and Ian MacLennan to Baxter, 16 March 1952 DO 35/3825. Beckett to Welensky, 7 August 1952 RW 1/11 and Welensky to Tom Reid, MP, 6 June 1952 RW 39/115
25. Freddie Crawford to Welensky, 4 June 1952 and Welensky to Crawford, 3 July 1952 RW 39/115
26. The Times, 8 April 1953 and undated minute by Le Rougetel CO 1015/85
27. Ian M R MacLennan, United Kingdom High Commissioner to Southern Rhodesia to J P Gibson (CRO), 28 September 1951 DO 35/3598 and Note of meeting between Griffiths and European Elected Members of Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council on 12 September 1951 RW 39/117
28. L S Glover to Welensky, 21 July 1952 RW 1/11
29. Welensky to Huggins, 11 August 1952, ibid
30. Huggins to Welensky, 13 August 1952, ibid
31. Glover to Welensky, 3 October 1952, ibid
32. Welensky to Salisbury, 11 October 1952, ibid

33. Glover to Welensky, 10 November 1952, ibid
34. Glover to Welensky, 29 March 1953, ibid
35. Glover to Welensky, 23 July 1953, ibid
36. Welensky to Glover, 7 August 1953, ibid
37. Welensky to Huggins, 26 August 1953, ibid
38. Huggins to Welensky, 14 September 1953, ibid
39. Huggins' Private Secretary to Stewart Parker (Welensky's Private Secretary), 8 December 1953, ibid
40. Bathoen II to Glover, 5 January 1954, enclosed with Glover to Welensky, 8 January 1954, ibid
41. Welensky to Huggins, 22 January 1954, ibid
42. Welensky to Glover, 23 January 1954, ibid
43. Glover to Welensky, 1 February 1954, ibid

Footnotes : Chapter 4

1. Minute by Andrew B Cohen to Sir George Gater, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office, 12 June 1946 CO 537/1518
2. Richards to Gater, 30 May 1946, ibid
3. Memorandum by W A W Clark on 'Joint Services', 20 May 1946, ibid
4. Clark to Cohen, 20 May 1946, ibid
5. Sir Campbell Tait to Sir Eric Machtig, Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Dominions Office, Telegram No.102, 23 May 1946, ibid
6. Cohen to Gater, 12 June 1946, ibid
7. ibid and Cohen to Gater, 16 May 1946 CO 537/1519
8. Richards to Gater, 30 May 1946 CO 537/1518
9. Cohen to Gater, 17 June 1946, ibid
10. Machtig to Clark, 16 July 1946, ibid
11. Gater to Richards, 8 July 1946, ibid
12. Clark's 'Joint Services' Memorandum, op cit
13. Clark to Machtig, 4 January 1946; Refos to Sir Ernest Guest, Southern Rhodesian Minister for Internal Affairs, assurance that Lord Addison, Secretary of State for the Dominions, July 1945 to 6 October 1947 (Dominions Office was re-named Commonwealth Relations Office on 7 July 1947) had stated that he favoured amalgamation for central Africa during their discussions in late 1945 in London RW 14/1
14. Undated memorandum by Cohen, based on his discussions with Lambert and D Williams from his division and Gandee of CRO CO 537/4687
15. Colby to Cohen, 2 March 1949, ibid
16. Cohen to Gater, 12 June 1946 CO 537/1518
17. Memorandum by Cecil Barker (Commissioner for northern Province of Nyasaland) to Creech Jones, 10 December 1948, ACJ 22/3 Creech Jones would have had the opportunity of taking up the points made in this memorandum with Barker when he stayed with the northern Province Commissioner at Mzimba, Nyasaland on 19 April 1949, ACJ 12/9

18. Barker Memorandum op cit and Colby to Cohen, 2 March 1949
CO 537/4687
19. Cohen Memorandum, op cit
20. Cohen to Gater, 12 June 1946, CO 537/4687 and Rennie to
Cohen, 17 July 1948, CO 537/3608
21. Southern Rhodesian Parliamentary Debates, Volume 24,
Column 2448, 22 November 1944. For Guest's view see East
Africa and Rhodesia, 11 January 1945 and also Don Taylor,
The Rhodesian. The Life of Sir Roy Welensky (London 1955)
p.72
22. Taylor, op cit p.72
23. United Party 13 seats, Liberal Party 12, Rhodesia Labour
Party 3 and Southern Rhodesia Labour Party 2
24. J R T Wood, The Welensky Papers. A History of the Federation
of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Durban 1983) p.99
25. Major General Sir John N Kennedy (Governor of Southern
Rhodesia) to Machtig, 2 March 1948, CO 537/3608
26. Note of a meeting between the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, G H Hall, Welensky and Gore-Browne on 26 July
1946 by N D Watson of 27 July 1946, CO 537/2118
27. Northern Rhodesian Debates, 11 December 1946, Column 275f
28. see Chapter 2, pp 70-71
29. H F Cartmel-Robinson (Acting Governor of Northern Rhodesia
while Waddington was in London) to Gater, 16 October 1946,
CO 537/2118
30. Gater to Cartmel-Robinson, 2 November 1946, ibid
31. see Chapter 2 pp.71 -72
32. Watson's note of a meeting between Cohen, Waddington, Tait
and himself to discuss Welensky's motion, dated 27 July
1946, CO 537/2118
33. Waddington to Secretary of State for the Colonies, Telegram
No.660, 6 December 1946, ibid
34. Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 11 December 1946
35. Minute by Watson, 23 October 1946, CO 537/2118
36. East Africa and Rhodesia, 5 December 1946

37. Wood, op cit, pp. 104-105
38. Northern News, 27 April 1947
39. CAC Memorandum Number 26/47, CO 537/2118. Southern Rhodesia Assembly Debates, Vol.27, part I, 12 and 16 May 1947 and Rhodesia Herald, 16 May 1947
40. Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesian officials were opposed, Barrow and Tait-Bowie from Nyasaland were neutral, and Gore-Browne ambivalent. The balance changed when Beckett replaced Gore-Browne on the Council later that month (May 1947)
41. Bulawayo Chronicle, 28 March 1947 and Rhodesia Herald, 17 March 1947
42. Watson to Cohen, 23 April 1947, CO 537/2118
43. As we have seen such aims also received support from the settler communities in Kenya and Bechuanaland: see Chapter 3, pp 80-86
44. For example see: Rhodesia Herald, 25 November 1946, 21 February and 11 July 1947, 12 February 1948; and Bulawayo Chronicle, 26 October 1945, 13 December 1946, 17 and 20 June 1947
45. Wood, op cit, p.108
46. Kennedy to Machtig, 2 March 1948, CO 537/3608
47. Colby to Creech Jones, Telegram No.4, 11 March 1948, ibid
48. R C S Stanley (Northern Rhodesian Chief Secretary) to Creech Jones, 20 April 1948, ibid
49. Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 7 January 1948, Col.683f
50. see for instance Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council Debates, 6 March and 24 June 1948
51. Colby to Creech Jones, Telegram No.4, 11 March 1948, CO 537/3608
52. Rennie to Creech Jones, 28 April 1948, ibid. Northern News, 17 April 1948, report on meeting at Broken Hill addressed by Welensky, Geoff B Beckett and B Goodwin on the twin issues of amalgamation and representative government
53. Wood, op cit, pp.114-115
54. Kennedy to Machtig, 2 March 1948, CO 537/3608

55. John Chadwick (CRO) to C E Lambert (CO) 17 February 1949 CO 537/4687. Rhodesia Herald, 13 March and 1 April 1948
56. Young was Southern Rhodesian Assembly member for Bulawayo East, see Chadwick to Lambert, 17 February 1949, CO 537/4687
57. Davenport (later Sir George) was Southern Rhodesian Minister of Mines, Commerce and Industry. He had shared pro-amalgamation platforms with Harris and, during February 1948, spoke in favour of amalgamation at a number of meetings. Kennedy to Machtig, 2 March 1946, CO 537/3609
58. Rhodesia Herald, 7 June 1948
59. Note by Watson dated 27 July 1946, of a meeting between Hall, Welensky and Gore-Browne on 26 July 1946 CO 537/2118
60. see Chapter 2, pp 74-75
61. H Nigel Parry (later Sir Hugh) was Clark's, later Benson's deputy at the CAC
62. Northern News, 10 June 1948
63. Rennie to Creech Jones, 18 June 1948 CO 537/3608
64. Cohen to Rennie, 29 June 1948, *ibid*
65. Sir Thomas I K Lloyd, Gater's successor as Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Colonial Office
66. Lloyd to Machtig, 17 July 1948 CO 537/3608
67. Kennedy to Noel-Baker (Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations) 22 December 1948, CO 537/4687
68. For the information on Parry's memorandum and the official response I have had to rely on Wood, *op cit*, pp. 118-122 (which is based on an interview of Parry by Wood) as I could not locate any papers touching on this episode at the Public Records Office
69. Cohen to Lloyd, 16 July 1948 CO 537/3608
70. The Central Legislature of the EAHC held its first session on 6 April 1948
71. Cohen to Lloyd, 21 July 1948 CO 537/3608
72. Note of meeting held in Machtig's room at CRO, 22 July 1948, chaired by Gordon Walker. Others present were - Lloyd, Cohen, Lambert and T W Fraser (Colonial Office); Clark (Chief Secretary of CAC); Machtig and Sir C Dixon (CRO), *ibid*

73. *ibid.* Lloyd to Cohen, 19 July 1948 CO 537/3608
74. Rennie to Cohen, 17 July 1948 and Colby to Cohen, 4 June 1948, *ibid*
75. Note of meeting in Colonial Office, 30 July 1948, on amending the Northern Rhodesia Constitution, chaired by Creech Jones, Others present were - Cohen, Lambert, J T A Howard-Drake, Rennie, R S Hudson (Northern Rhodesia's Secretary for Native Affairs), Welensky, Gore-Browne, Beckett and two African representatives, E S Chileshe and M Mubita, *ibid*
76. Wood, *op cit*, p.123
77. Note of meeting in Colonial Office, 30 July 1948, *op cit*, CO 537/3608
78. Lloyd to Rennie, Telegram No.426, 21 August 1948, and reply, Telegram No.520, 25 August 1948, *ibid*
79. *ibid.* Taylor, *op cit*, p.100
80. Welensky and his supporters won a resounding victory in the elections of 27 August 1948
81. For a brief account see Wood, *op cit*, pp.120-121
82. Chanock, *op cit*, p.247
83. A conference at Lancaster House on the problems arising for Britain and the Colonial Office from the United Kingdom's ten African Colonies or Protectorates; 29 September to 9 October 1948
84. Cohen to Lloyd, 12 October 1948 CO 537/3608
85. Wood, *op cit*, p.124
86. Memorandum by Lambert entitled 'Federation in Central Africa' 11 October 1948. Cohen to Lloyd, 12 October 1948 CO 537/3608
87. On Gater's retirement in 1947, Creech Jones appointed Lloyd as his successor over the head of the Deputy Under-Secretary of State, Sir Arthur Dawe. In April 1947 Creech Jones promoted Cohen from Assistant Secretary to Assistant Under-Secretary of State and also advanced Poynton
88. Creech Jones' private secretary to Cohen, 18 October 1948 and notes between Creech Jones and his private secretary of 19 and 21 October 1948 CO 537/3608

89. Note by Creech Jones, 28 October 1948, *ibid*
90. *ibid*
91. Memorandum by Creech Jones, 8 October 1948 CO 537/3608
92. Attlee to Creech Jones, 12 July 1950, ACJ 7/1. Pearce, *op cit* pp. 91-92 and 94, Kenneth Harris Attlee (London 1982) p.446 see also Chapter 3 pp 78-79
93. Cohen to Lloyd, 16 and 21 July and 12 October 1948, CO 537/3608
94. Wood, *op cit*, pp. 128-129
95. *ibid*, p.125
96. General correspondence, RW 5/3
97. Cohen to Colby and Rennie, 3 November 1948, CO 537/3608
98. *ibid*
99. Rennie to Cohen, 22 November 1948. Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council Debates, 12 November 1948
100. Cohen to Lloyd, 7 March 1949, CO 537/4687
101. *ibid*
102. Note of meeting at CRO, 24 March 1949, attended by Noel-Baker, Creech Jones, Cohen, Lambert, Tait and Sir Cecil Syers, CO 537/4687
103. Creech Jones to Noel Baker and Attlee, 17 April 1949, *ibid*
104. Creech Jones' private secretary to Colonial Office, copied to Tait at CRO, Telegram No.240, 11 April 1949, *ibid*
105. Rhodesia Herald, 20 December 1948
106. Kennedy to Noel Baker, 22 December 1948, CO 537/3608
107. Vile to Lambert (undated) reporting discussions between Creech Jones and Parry on 19 and 20 February 1949 and between Creech Jones and Welensky and Stanley on 22 and 23 February 1949, while Creech Jones was in South Africa attending an Air Transport Conference CO 537/4687
108. Kennedy to Sir Percivale Liesching (Permanent Under Secretary of State, CRO) 11 January 1950, CO 537/5884

109. Cohen to Colby and Rennie, 3 November 1948 CO 537/3608
110. Central Africa Victoria Falls Conference - Federation Proposals, CO 537/4687
111. Rennie to Cohen, 21 February 1949 ibid
112. Verbatim Report of Victoria Falls Conference, 16 and 17 February 1949, ibid
113. Kennedy to Noel-Baker, 1 April 1949, ibid
114. Vile to Lambert, op cit
115. Note of meeting in Creech Jones' room at Colonial Office, 6 June 1946, between the Colonial Secretary, Waddington, Cohen, Watson, Welensky and Gore-Browne CO 537/4687
Creech Jones urged the Northern Rhodesian unofficials to take on more responsibilities, sit on an expanded Executive Council and work more closely with Waddington and his officials in administering the Territory
116. Creech Jones to David Astor, the Observer's proprietor, 3 January 1951, ibid. The Colonial Secretary complained about an article by Patrick O'Donovan which appeared in the Observer on 24 December 1950. While Creech Jones admitted that Government authority in Northern Rhodesia depended upon the local settlers exercising a degree of restraint, he argued that such circumstances had been fairly common-place in British Colonial history. He claimed that O'Donovan's highlighting the growth of Afrikaner influence in Northern Rhodesia, threats of unilateral action by the Territory's settlers and the results produced by these threats, only served to hinder the British Government and strengthen Welensky's position
117. House of Lords, Hansard, Vol.165, col.1117, 30 November 1949
118. Stanley to Vile, 26 February 1949 CO 537/4687
119. A E T Benson (Clark's successor as CAC Chief Secretary) to Cohen, 18 July 1949, ibid
120. Federation - Why a move forward is thought to be desirable, ibid
121. Rennie to Creech Jones, 21 December 1949, ibid
122. ibid
123. Discussions were held in London, 18 November - 7 December 1949. However the file on which the papers relating to

these meetings have been put (CO 537/4688) is unavailable at the Public Record Office because it has been retained by the Ministry responsible for it. However, the participants were probably the same as those who attended the penultimate meeting on 6 December 1949, namely, Beadle, Robinson, N R Bertram, A D Chataway (Southern Rhodesian Government), K M Goodenough (High Commissioner in Southern Rhodesia), Creech Jones, Noel-Baker, Gordon Walker, Liesching, Baxter, J P Gibson and J S Gandee

124. Rennie to Cohen, 1 February 1950 CO 537/5884
125. Summary of Conclusions arising from Beadle discussions and M Williams to Lambert, 30 December 1949, CO 537/4687
see also Wood, op cit, pp. 156-158
126. Cohen to Colby and Rennie and Benson, 20 December 1949
CO 537/4689
127. Rennie to Creech Jones, 21 December 1949, ibid
128. Williams to Lambert, op cit
129. Benson to Lambert, 7 December 1949, enclosed a copy of Huggins Gatooma speech of 3 December 1949 CO 537/4689
130. Benson to Lloyd, 10 December 1949, and Rennie to Lambert, 23 December 1949, ibid
131. see p 104
132. Benson to F L Brown (Nyasaland Chief Secretary), 14 January 1950, Benson to G E Thornton (Northern Rhodesian Chief Secretary), 18 January 1950, and Benson to Lambert, 19 January 1950, CO 437/5884. Annexure B of Benson's letter to Thornton, which was copied to Lambert and Brown, gave a detailed summary of the discussions and events leading up to the CAC meeting on 25 January 1950
133. During December 1949, the constitutional reforms recommended in Justice J H Coussey's report, were unanimously endorsed by the Gold Coast Legislative Council and accepted by the British Government as a working basis for discussion. These two decisions made the early introduction of virtual home rule for the Gold Coast a strong likelihood
134. Benson to Thornton, op cit
135. ibid
136. Gordon Walker to Huggins, 13 January 1950 CO 537/5884
and Williams to Lambert, 30 December 1949 CO 537/4689

137. Lambert to Lloyd, 12 January 1950 CO 537/5884
138. Huggins to Gordon Walker, Telegram No.9, 17 January 1950, ibid
139. Rennie to Creech Jones, Telegram No.40, 30 January 1950, ibid
140. Benson to Lambert, 12 and 19 January 1950, and Benson to Thornton, op cit
141. Benson to Thornton, op cit
142. Colby to Cohen, 13 January 1950, CO 537/5884
143. Colby to Cohen, 10 February 1950, ibid
144. Rennie to Cohen, 1 February 1950, ibid
145. Benson to Thornton, op cit
146. Colby to Cohen, 13 January 1950, ibid
147. Rennie to Cohen, op cit
148. Benson to Thornton, op cit, and Benson to Lambert, 19 January 1950, CO 537/5884
149. Rhodesia Herald, 21 December 1949
150. Verbatim record of 11th meeting of CAC, 25 January 1950, DO 35/3590. Present at the meeting were - Kennedy (Chairman), Southern Rhodesia: Huggins, G A Davenport (Minister of Mines and Transport), E C F Whitehead (Minister of Finance, Posts and Telegraphs), R O Stockil (Leader of Liberal Party), Northern Rhodesia: Rennie, Thornton, Welensky, Beckett, Nyasaland: Colby, Brown, MP, Barrow, S S S J Haddow, CAC Secretariat: Benson (Chief Secretary), Parry (Deputy Chief Secretary), J P P Michell (Assistant Chief Secretary)
151. Rennie to Creech Jones, 8 March 1949 CO 537/4687
152. Rennie to Creech Jones, 10 December 1949, ibid and Northern Rhodesian Legislature Council Debates, 7 December 1949
153. Rennie to Creech Jones, 21 December 1949 CO 537/4687
154. Brown to Lloyd, 10 December 1949, ibid
155. Kennedy to Liesching, 11 January 1950 CO 537/5884
156. Rennie to Cohen, 1 February 1950, ibid and Verbatim record of 11th Meeting of CAC, op cit, p.11

157. Colby to Cohen, 13 January and 10 February 1950,
CO 537/5884
158. Chaired by Benson, the other committee members were -
Beadle, Stockil, Barrow, Brown, Welensky and Stanley

Footnotes : Chapter 5

1. Morgan, op cit, pp. 410-412 and 444
2. The Home Secretary, J Chuter Ede allowed the Boundary Commission to give undue weight to rival constituencies, greatly handicapping Labour's re-election chances
3. The decision was at least in part determined by Bevan's refusal to move from the Department of Health to the Colonial Office, Morgan, op cit, p.410
4. New Statesman, 11 October 1947, amongst wider criticisms of Attlee's Cabinet re-shuffle of that month, was the complaint that Griffiths had not been promoted into the Cabinet
5. Goldsworthy, D J, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-61 (Oxford 1971) p.53 and Leys and Pratt, op cit, p.19
6. Lambert to Lloyd, 30 March 1950, CO 537/5884
7. Cohen to Lloyd, 16 March 1950, *ibid*: Cohen's note of a meeting on 15 March 1950, between Lloyd, Cohen, Baxter, Gibson and Gandee
8. Williams to Lambert, 30 March 1950, *ibid*
9. Lambert to Lloyd, 30 March 1950, *ibid*
10. Liesching to Secretary of State CRO (undated) recording details and impressions of his visit to Salisbury, 23-24 March 1949 CO 537/4687
11. Minutes of meeting in Secretary of State's room in the Commonwealth Relations Office, 31 March 1950, CO 537/5884. Those present were - Griffiths, Gordon Walker, Lord Holden, Baxter, Gibson, Gandee, Lambert, Wallace and Williams
12. Note of meeting at the House of Commons, 3 April 1950, CO 537/5884. Present were - Griffiths, Gordon Walker, Baxter, Gandee, Cohen, Lambert, Goodenough (Huggins' private secretary)
13. Huggins' proposals at the meeting on 3 April 1950 and Welensky's proposals made later in the month (see footnotes 15 and 18 below) clearly demonstrate that the common impression that Nyasaland was forced into a reluctant Rhodesia by the British Government, is wrong (see Chapter 7, footnote 20)
14. Note of meeting, 3rd April 1950, op cit

15. Stanley to Lambert, 11 April 1950, enclosing a copy of Welensky's Federation proposals, CO 537/5884
16. Lambert to Gibson, 19 April 1950, *ibid*
17. Lambert to Cohen, 28 and 29 April 1950, and Gibson to Lambert, 28 April 1950, *ibid*
18. Note of meeting between Gordon Walker, Welensky and Gore-Browne, 3 May 1950, *ibid*
19. Note of meeting in the Colonial Secretary's room in House of Commons, 4 May 1950, CO 537/5884. In addition to Griffiths those present were - Cohen, Lambert, Williams, Rennie, Welensky and Gore-Browne
20. Labour Party International Department, Paper Number 210, July 1939, Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions, Green, J F N 'The Bledisloe Report', p.3, FCB 106/1 ff 4-7. The Bledisloe Commission did note the opposition of the Northern Rhodesian civil service to amalgamation (para. 391), but Green claimed that this was due to their support for union with South Africa
21. Lyttelton to Rennie, Telegram No. 64, 9 February 1952 and Rennie's reply, Telegram No. 88, 22 February 1952. A J Williams and Stubbs (Northern Rhodesia's Acting Secretary for Native Affairs) to Lyttelton, 1 May 1952 and minute by J E Marnham, 25 September 1952, CO 1015/59
22. Note of meeting, 4 May 1950, *op cit*
23. CO 537/5884
24. Memorandum by Cohen 'Relations of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland', *ibid*. Wood, *op cit*, p.168 and Taylor *op cit*, p.128 credit Huggins with first raising the possibility of an officials conference in August 1950, while Gann, L.. A history of Northern Rhodesia (London 1964), p.410, believes it to have been Baster's idea and Goldsworthy, *op cit*, p.216 and Rotberg, Robert I, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa (Harvard 1966), p.231, credit Cohen. Although Baxter supported the idea and was closely involved in its planning and execution, the original idea appears to have been Cohen's, and first surfaced during discussions with Beadle in November 1949
25. Cohen to Benson, Colby and Rennie, 6 April 1950, CO 537/5884
26. Benson to Cohen, 27 April 1950, *ibid*
27. Lambert to Cohen, 3 May 1950, *ibid*
28. Cohen to Lloyd, 4 May 1950, *ibid*

29. Briefing paper, 'Relations of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland' prepared by Lambert and cleared with officials at CRO as well as the Colonial Office, *ibid*
30. Parry to Thornton and Brown, 3 July 1950, *ibid*
31. Parry to Thornton and Brown, 27 June 1950, *ibid*
32. Note of meetings on 24 July and 25 July 1950 by Lambert, dated 27 July 1950, CO 537/5885. Present at the two meetings were - Benson, Lambert, Gibson, Gandee and Benson, Griffiths, Cohen, Lambert, respectively
33. Stanley to Cohen, 26 July 1950 and Huggins to Attlee, Telegram No.183, 12 August 1950, CO 537/5885
34. Note of meeting in Colonial Secretary's room, 20 September 1950, *ibid* (Those present were - Griffiths, Rennie, Benson, Cohen, Lambert, Williams and Timms), and Cohen to G Wheeler (MOD) 30 April 1951, CO 537/7201. See also Manchester Guardian, 12 September 1950
35. Gordon Walker to Attlee, 5 October 1950, CO 537/5885
36. Minute by Williams, with supporting comments from Lambert, 7 September 1950, *ibid*
37. Colby to Griffiths, Telegram No.371, undated (but either 18 or 19 September 1950) *ibid*
38. Colby to Cohen, 19 September 1950, *ibid*
39. Cohen to Lloyd, 19 September 1950, *ibid*
40. Stanley (Acting Governor of Northern Rhodesia) to Cohen, Telegram No.474, 20 September 1950 and Lloyd to Griffiths, 19 September 1950, *ibid*
41. Colby to Cohen, 24 February 1951, CO 537/7201
42. Cmd 8233 (1951) Central African Territories, Report of Conference on Closer Association
43. Benson to Cohen, 25 January 1951, CO 537/7201. Benson reported discussions between A T Williams and E I G Unsworth, Northern Rhodesian Attorney-General with the Southern Rhodesian delegation to the Officials Conference in Salisbury in 11 January 1951
44. Conference on Closer Association in Central Africa. Minutes of meetings, memoranda and conference papers, DO 35/3596

45. Minutes of 12th meeting of Conference on Closer Association, held in CRO, 13 March 1951, *ibid*
46. Wood, *op cit*, pp. 180-181
47. Minutes of 15th meeting of Conference on Closer Association, 19 March 1951, DO 35/3596
48. Cmd 8235 (1951) Central African Territories, Comparative Survey of Native Policy
49. *ibid*, p.3, para 5
50. For instance, Lambert to Stanley, 18 May 1950, CO 537/5884
51. Cmd 8235, *op cit*, Appendix pp.15-16, para 7
52. see p.158
53. For instance, Kennedy to Liesching, 11 January 1950, CO 537/5884
54. Baxter to Gordon Walker, 4 April 1951, CO 537/7203
55. Colby to Cohen, 24 February 1951, CO 537/7201
56. Cohen to A M Mackintosh (Griffiths' private secretary) 18 April 1951, CO 537/7203
57. Cohen to Griffiths and Duqdale, 18 April 1951, *ibid*
58. *ibid*
59. *ibid*
60. Note by Gordon Walker of his meeting with Griffiths on 25 April 1951, DO 35/3594
61. *ibid* and briefing for this meeting, DO 121/136
62. Most obviously demonstrated by Gordon Walker's vehement endorsement of the South African threat at Cabinet on 7 and 31 May 1951, CAB 128/19
63. Note by Gordon Walker, 25 April 1951, *op cit*
64. Cabinet conclusions, 7 May 1951 CAB 128/19
65. Gordon Walker's private secretary (Eleanor J Emery) to Attlee's private secretary (David W S Hunt), 24 May 1951, and Huggins to Gordon Walker, 17 May 1951 CO 537/7203

66. Lambert to Lloyd, 25 May 1951, CO 537/7203
67. Lloyd to Griffiths, 9 April and 28 May 1951, *ibid*
68. Griffiths to Lloyd, 2 June 1951, *ibid*, and Conclusions of Cabinet, 31 May 1951, CAB 128/19
69. Lambert to Lloyd, 1 June 1951 and reply, 2 June 1951, CO 537/7203. See also CP(51) 122 and CP(51) 144
70. Cabinet Conclusions, 31 May 1951, *op cit*
71. Cohen to Wheeler, 30 April 1951, DO 35/3594
72. Gordon Walker to Huggins, Telegram No.132, 4 June 1951 CO 537/7203
73. Gordon Walker to Baxter, 30 April 1951, DO 35/3594. Gordon Walker provided a summary of his meeting with Griffiths and Morrison (Lord President, July 1945 to March 1951, Foreign Secretary March to October 1951) of that same day
74. Lambert to Lloyd, 5 June 1951, CO 537/7203. Lambert recounted discussions between Gordon Walker and Griffiths on 4 June 1951
75. Griffiths to Cohen (hand written) 10 (or possibly 18) June 1951, *ibid*
76. Morgan, *op cit*, pp. 170-173, 409, 442 and 464. Griffiths, James Pages from Memory (Dent, 1969) p.130
77. Morgan, *op cit*, pp.447-448
78. Claimed by Welensky, Hopkinson and Wood, amongst others
79. Gore-Browne's and Moffat's independent attempts to drum up African support for federation and constitutional changes
80. Parry to Lambert, 12 June 1951, CO 537/7202
81. Parry to Lambert, 10 August 1951, CO 1015/56
82. Huggins to Liesching, 4 August 1951, and MacLennan to Baxter, 28 August 1951, CO 1015/56
83. MacLennan to Gibson, 6 July 1951, *ibid*, and minute by Liesching, 23 July 1951, on closer association and his impressions from his visit to Southern Rhodesia between 26 June and 12 July 1951, DO 35/3597
84. MacLennan to Baxter, 18 July and 31 August 1951, *ibid*

85. Parry to Lambert, 12 June 1951, CO 537/7202 and minute by Liesching, 23 July 1951, op cit
86. Welensky to Hugh K McKee (Rhodesia House), 11 May 1951, RW 5/95
87. Griffiths to Gordon Walker, Telegram No.408, 3 September 1951, DO 35/3597
88. Griffiths arrived in Nyasaland in late August and toured the Protectorate for eight days seeking information and views, in particular those of the African population. The Colonial Secretary then repeated this exercise in Northern Rhodesia during the twelve days leading up to the Conference. Gordon Walker arrived in Salisbury on 10 September 1951
89. Note by Griffiths, September 1951, DO 35/3598
90. Gordon Walker to Sir Stephen Holmes (CRO) Telegram No.183, 13 September 1951, ibid
91. Minute by Liesching, 23 July 1951, op cit
92. Gordon Walker to Holmes, Telegram No.166, 14 September 1951, DO 35/3598
93. Griffiths to Gordon Walker, Telegram No.408, 3 September 1951, and MacLennan to CRO, Telegram No.164, 31 August 1951, DO 35/3597
94. Gordon Walker to Griffiths, Telegram No.141, 5 September 1951, ibid
95. Rhodesia Herald, 4 September 1951
96. Huggins to Gordon Walker, Telegram No.169, 4 September 1951 and Gordon Walker to Griffiths, Telegram No.147, 5 September 1951, DO 35/3597
97. Gordon Walker to Rennie, Telegram No.182, 13 September 1951, DO 35/3598
98. Note of meeting between Griffiths and Northern Rhodesian Elected Members, Lusaka, 12 September 1951, RW 39/120, and Welensky to Gore-Browne, Welensky to Chris Goosen, both 15 September 1951, RW 39/119
99. Record of meeting between representatives from the Union, Rhodesia and Rhodesia Labour Parties, Salisbury, 3 September 1951, RW 39/112. Note of meeting also in DO 35/3598. Those present were - Julian Greenfield (Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice), A R W Stumbles (Deputy Leader of Rhodesia Party) and H H Davies (Leader of Rhodesia Labour Party and an ex-Minister)

100. The other two African representatives from the norther Territories were P Sokota and E K Gondive
101. Welensky to Rennie, 31 July 1951, RW 39/116
102. Minutes of Conference on Closer Association of the Central African Territories, Victora Falls, 18-21 September 1951. RW 17/11/1 and CP (51) 265, 'Closer Association in Central Africa. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations' 12 October 1951, CAB 129/47
103. Welensky to Lennox-Boyd, 18 October 1951, RW 5/95
104. CP(51)265, op cit
105. Mackintosh to R B Marshall, 9 October 1951, DO 35/3600
106. CP(51)265 was drafted by Cohen in consultation with Baxter, at Griffiths' and Gordon Walker's request "with the object of leaving their views on record for whichever Government was returned after the General Election"; Cohen to Lloyd, 31 October 1951, CO 1015/59
107. Baxter to Lyttelton, Holmes to Liesching, 30 October 1951, DO 35/3600. Statement by Lyttelton on closer association in House of Commons, 21 November 1951, Hansard, cols. 394-399. Cohen to Lloyd, 31 October 1951 and Lloyd to Lyttelton and reply 1 November 1951, CO 1015/59
108. CP(51)265, op cit
109. *ibid.* see as well, Rhodesia Herald, 10 September 1951 and Griffiths, Pages from Memory, op cit, p.113
110. see p.158
111. CP(51)265, op cit
112. *ibid*

Footnotes : Chapter 6

1. Baxter to Lyttelton, Holmes and Liesching, 30 October 1951, DO 35/3600
2. Cohen to Lloyd, 31 October 1951,, CO 1015/59
3. Briefing for Lyttelton for Cabinet on 15 November 1951, CO 1015/59
4. Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Secretary of State for the Colonies and Lord Privy Seal, respectively
5. Cabinet Conclusions, 15 November 1951, and CP(51)11, CAB 128/23
6. Huggins to Ismay, Telegram No.209, 9 November 1951 DO 35/3600
7. Gibson to Baxter, 13 November 1951, and MacLennan to Baxter, Telegram No.230, 9 November 1951, *ibid*, and Cohen to Lloyd, and Lloyd to Lyttelton, 31 November 1951, CO 1015/59
8. Gibson to Baxter, 13 November 1951, *op cit*
9. Parry to Welensky, 16 October and 10 November 1951, RW 39/116. Welensky to S H Veats, 2 November 1951 RW 39/119. See also RW 39/118
10. Parry to Welensky, 26 November 1951 and reply, 30 November 1951, RW 39/116
11. Huggins to Ismay, Telegram No.230, 13 December 1951, DO 35/3601
12. MacLennan to CRO, Telegram No.237, 20 November 1951, DO 35/3600
13. Parry to Cohen, 2 November 1951, *ibid*
14. MacLennan to Baxter, 23 November 1951, DO 35/3601. Southern Rhodesian Assembly Debates, Vol. 32, No.54, 14 November 1951, cols. 3323-3376 and 19 November 1951, cols. 3503-3545
15. Cohen to Lloyd, 31 October 1951, CO 1015/59
16. MacLennan to Baxter, 28 December 1951 and Parry to Lambert, 29 December 1951, DO 35/3601. Welensky to Jackson, 29 December 1951, RW 39/116
17. MacLennan to CRO, Telegram No.237, *op cit*
18. Note of meeting in Government House, Lusaka, 2 December 1951, between Huggins and the Elected Members of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly, with Welensky in the chair, RW 39/117

19. Welensky to Huggins, 4 December 1951, RW 39/116. Rennie to Lloyd, Telegram No.36, 20 December 1951, DO 35/3601
20. Rennie to Lloyd, Telegram No.36, op cit
21. Welensky to Huggins, 14 December 1951, RW 39/112
22. Welensky to Douglas Dodds-Parker, MP (Chairman of the Conservative Party's Imperial Affairs Committee and Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Party) 14 December 1951, RW 39/116
23. Stanley to Welensky, 22 and 30 August and 15 December 1951 RW 39/114
24. Stanley to Welensky, 15 December 1951, ibid
25. Welensky to Gerald Sayers, MP, (an influential figure in the Conservative Party Research Department), 21 December 1951, RW 39/116
26. Rennie to Lloyd, Telegram No.65, 2 January 1952, DO 35/3601
27. Welensky to Stanley, 3 January 1952, RW 39/112
28. Beckett to Welensky, 29 December 1951, ibid
29. Welensky to Dodds-Parker, 29 December 1951, RW 39/116
30. Welensky to Stanley, 3 January 1952, op cit
31. Gore-Browne to Welensky, 20 November 1951, RW 39/119
32. Welensky to Gore-Browne, 4 December 1951, ibid
33. Huggins to Welensky, 5 January 1952, RW 39/112
34. Welensky to Huggins, 29 December 1951, ibid
35. Welensky to Huggins, 12 January 1952, ibid
36. ibid and minutes of Conference on Closer Association, 18 - 23 September 1951, op cit, which include verbatim records of Welensky and Huggins speeches
37. Welensky to William F Castle, 1 April 1952, RW 39/119
38. Welensky to Morris, Sergeant, Davies, L'Ange, Millar, Robertson and Van Eeden (Elected Members of the Legislative Council who were not in London), 30 April 1952, RW 39/115
39. Beckett to Welensky, 2 October 1952, ibid

Footnotes : Chapter 7

1. Minute by Baxter, 3 January 1952, DO 35/3601
2. Colby to Cohen, May 1951, DO 35/3597
3. Colby to Cohen (copied to Rennie) Telegram No.545, 30 November 1951, DO 35/3601
4. *ibid*
5. Statement by the Colonial Secretary on Government policy as to closer association in central Africa, 21 November 1951 Hansard, Vol.494, cols.392-397, Cmd 8411(1951)
6. Cohen to Colby (copied to Rennie), Telegram No.448, 3 December 1951, DO 35/3601
7. Cohen to Lloyd, 31 October 1951, CO 1015/59
8. Colby to Lloyd, Telegram No.9, 7 January 1952, DO 35/3601
9. Lloyd to Colby, Telegram No.7, 4 January 1952, and reply, Telegram No.8, 7 January 1952, *ibid*
10. Liesching to Ismay, 7 January 1952, *ibid*
11. Lloyd to Rennie and to Colby, Telegrams Nos 2 and 11, 8 January 1952, *ibid*
12. Liesching to Ismay, 7 January 1952, *op cit*
13. Beckett to Welensky, 29 December 1951, RW 39/112
14. Note of meeting in Lloyd's room at Colonial Office, 7 January 1952, DO 35/3601. Lloyd was in the Chair and others present were - Liesching, Baxter, Gibson, Gandee, Cohen (soon to leave for Uganda as Governor), W L Gorell-Barnes (later Sir William), Lambert, Williams and J W Stacpoole
15. *ibid*
16. Baxter to MacLennan, 4 January 1952, DO 35/3601
17. Note of meetings in CRO, 18 January 1952, DO 35/3608. Present at first meeting were - Baxter, Gibson, Gandee, Lambert, Williams, McPetrie and Southern Rhodesian officials, T G Gisborne, J B Ross and W F Nicholas: present at second meeting were - Liesching, Colby, Rennie, Baxter, Lambert, Gandee and Huggins and Gisborne (Secretary to the Southern Rhodesian Cabinet)

18. Summary of conclusions reached in discussions with Huggins at the CRO, 22 January - 1 February 1952, CO 1015/87 and Minutes of nine meetings with Huggins, 22 January - 4 February 1952, DO 35/3608 and RW 39/117. Participants: Ismay, Lyttelton, Lennox-Boyd, J F Foster, Liesching, Baxter, Lambert, Rennie, Colby, Huggins, Whitehead, Gisborne, (Colby and Rennie returned to central Africa on 3 February, the final session on 4 February was to agree the wording of the communique which was released after the talks)
19. Welensky to Altrincham, 29 December 1951, RW 39/116
20. Welensky to Huggins, 12 January 1952, RW 39/112. Welensky makes it clear that he believes "that it is essential to keep Nyasaland in the proposed Central African Federation"
21. The decision had actually been taken in advance of the officials discussions, at a preparatory meeting for the Huggins talks. It should be noted that Colby was not present at this meeting: those who were were - Lyttelton, Ismay, Foster, Liesching, Rennie, Baxter, Gibson, Lambert, Williams and Stacpoole. Note of meeting, 17 January 1952 DO 35/3602
22. Sayers to Welensky, 23 January 1952, RW 39/116
23. The Working Party consisted of officials from the Colonial Office and CRO, who met a total of sixteen times between 12 February and 15 April 1952. Its members were - Baxter (Chairman), Gibson, R L D Jasper, D C Cole, N Aspin, Lambert, Gorell-Barnes, and the legal adviser, J C McPetrie, DO 35/3607
24. Rennie to Welensky, 28 January 1952, RW 39/114 and Minutes of January/February meetings with Huggins, op cit
25. Parry to Gorell-Barnes, 1 March, 1952, DO 35/3605. Present were - Southern Rhodesia: Huggins, Whitehead, Greenfield, A H Strachan (Secretary to the Treasury), Gisborne and A D Evans (Assistant Secretary, Internal Affairs), Northern Rhodesia: Rennie, Williams, Unsworth, R P Bush (Secretary for Native Affairs), Welensky, Beckett, Moffat and Lt Col. E M Wilson (Member for Health and Local Government), Nyasaland: Colby, C W F Footman (Brown's successor as Chief Secretary), Barrow and Haddow. Parry and MacLennan, among others, were in attendance
26. MacLennan to Baxter, 4 March 1952, CO 1015/87
27. Parry to Gorell-Barnes, 1 March, op cit
28. Welensky to Altrincham, 29 February 1952 and Welensky to Parry, 29 February 1952, RW 39/114

29. Parry to Gorell-Barnes, 1 March, op cit. Parry also made Welensky aware of his fears. Parry to Welensky, 24 March 1952, RW 39/112
30. Moffat to Welensky, 11 August 1951, RW 39/114 and MacLennan to Baxter, 4 March 1952, CO 1015/87
31. D Williams to Gorell -Barnes, 10 March 1952, CO 1015/87
32. Welensky to Dodds-Parker, 21 February 1952, RW 39/116, Parry to Gorell-Barnes, 1 March, op cit and Parry to Barnes, 20 March 1952, CO 1015/87
33. Colby to Lyttelton, 1 March 1952, CO 1015/87, providing the Nyasaland Government's official comments on further demands for concessions by Southern Rhodesia
34. Huggins to Ismay, 30 January 1952, and a minute by Lambert, 31 January 1952, recording Lyttelton's recollections of his private meeting with Ismay, Huggins and Whitehead on 30 January 1952, DO 35/3602
35. Baxter to MacLennan, 2 February 1952, ibid
36. Parry to Gorell-Barnes, 20 March, op cit
37. Commander Thomas Fox-Pitt (Provincial Commissioner in Northern Rhodesia) to Marjorie Nicholson (Secretary of Fabian Colonial Bureau), 25 February 1952, FCB 101/6 ff153-155
38. Fox-Pitt to Nicholson, 27 June 1952, ibid ff190 and Summary of Events leading up to Kitwe meeting of African Leaders on 28 October 1951, RW 39/112
39. Fox-Pitt to Nicholson, 25 February, op cit
40. Parry to Gorell-Barnes, 20 March, op cit
41. Welensky to Dodds-Parker, 21 February 1952, RW 39/116
42. Welensky to Huggins, 31 March and (early) April 1952, RW 39/112
43. Huggins to Welensky, 31 March 1952, ibid
44. ibid. Huggins complains about the indifferent attitude to federation by Nyasaland's "tea barons" and that of Nyasaland's European population, as expressed by Barrow at the September 1951 Victoria Falls Conference. See minutes of said conference, RW 17/11/1
45. Welensky to Huggins, (early) April 1952, op cit

46. The conference opened on 23 April and its eleventh and final session was on 5 May 1952. For a list of those attending see Appendix I
47. Verbatim minutes of 3 and 4 sessions of Closer Association Conference, 25 April 1952, CO 1015/101
48. Verbatim minutes of fifth session, 28 April 1952, ibid
49. Verbatim minutes of sixth session, 30 April 1952, ibid
50. Verbatim minutes of eighth session, 2 May 1952, ibid
51. Verbatim minutes of seventh session, 1 May 1952, ibid
52. Cmd 8573 (1952) (Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Draft federal scheme prepared by a conference held in London in April and May 1952)
53. Cmd 8671 (1952) Report of Judicial Commission, Cmd 8672 (1952) Report of the Fiscal Commission and Cmd 8693 (1952) Report of the Civil Service Preparatory Commission
54. see, for instance, the comments of Nye, Fletcher, and Beckett during the seventh session of the Closer Association Conference, 1 May, op cit
55. Cmd 8235, op cit

Footnotes : Chapter 8

1. Churchill's replacement of Lennox-Boyd with Hopkinson immediately before the April/May 1952 Conference on federation in central Africa, and of Salisbury with Swinton just prior to the January 1953 Conference is an indication of his lack of involvement and interest in the issue. This is certainly how Welensky interpreted these actions; see numerous correspondence in RW 5/2 and RW 5/3
2. Lyttelton, House of Commons Debates, 14 November 1951, RW 39/116
3. The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, Viscount Chandos (Bodley Head, 1962) p.355
4. Goldsworthy, op cit, Chapter VI, pp. 201-209
5. for Creech Jones' estimation of the Labour Government's position see the Glasgow Herald, 1 October 1948. For the Conservative Government's position see "Relations with the USA in the context of the UN" Memorandum by Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 24 September 1952 C(52) 306, cols.129/55
6. Goldsworthy, op cit, p.207
7. There is evidence that Lyttelton viewed the Colonial Office as being an insufficiently important post for his merits and was angry that this was what Churchill offered him. see The Backbench Diaries of Richard Crossman, ed Janet Morgan (Hamish Hamilton & Jonathan Cape, London 1981) p.30
8. Memorandum by Secretaries of State for Commonwealth Relations and Colonies, 9 November 1951 C(51) 11, Cab. 129/48
9. CP(51) 265, Cab. 129/47 and see p.192
10. Mason, Philip, Year of Decision: Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1960 (Oxford University Press 1960), pp. 27-28
11. Minutes of third meeting of 1951 FCB Advisory Committee, House of Commons, 25 April 1951. FCB deputation had met Griffiths and officials on 13 April. Immigration from South Africa to Northern Rhodesia discussed. CWW5 11/11 fs
12. Griffiths to Marjorie Nicholson, 7 June 1951, FCB 26/2 ff 81-82
13. FCB delegations led by Faringdon and consisting of Marjorie Nicholson, Rita Hinden and Hilda Selwyn Clarke, amongst others, had private discussions with Griffiths on 2 and 9 July and with Gordon Walker at the start of June. CWWG 11/11 ff 10-13

14. Report of meeting between FCB deputation and Griffiths 9 July, in minutes of seventh meeting of 1951 of FCB Advisory Committee, House of Commons, 10 July 1951, CWWG 11/11 f 13
15. Statement by FCB on Central African Federation, 5 July 1951, CWWG 11/11 f 12
16. Goldsworthy, op cit, p.214 based on interview with Lord Chandos (Lyttelton)
17. 24 June 1951, CP(51) 177 Cab. 129/46
18. ibid and 26 June 1950, CP(50) 13, Cab. 129/38
19. Rhodesia Herald 20 June 1951 for report of Malan's address to South African Senate of 19 June; United Kingdom High Commissioner in Southern Rhodesia to United Kingdom High Commissioner in South Africa, Telegram No.103 of 20 June 1951. Reply of same date, DO 35/3595, Die Burger and Star of 16 January 1952, reported in Dutch African Opdom no.2 (9 - 23 January) 1952. DO 35/3602
20. Hansard (House of Commons), Tuesday 4 March 1952, Vol.497, No.47 cols. 208-334
21. Minute by W A W Clark on Griffiths' Address, 10 January 1952, DO 35/3602
22. Hansard, Vol.497, No.47, cols.296-300, 313-324
23. ibid, cols. 284-288
24. ibid, cols. 305-311
25. Franklin, Harry, Unlikely Wedlock (Allen & Unwin 1953), p.78
26. Sayers in the Conservative Journal, Commonwealth and Colonial Affairs, March 1952 pp. 8-9, a view shared by Roy Welensky, see Welensky to Gerald Sayers, MP, 4 December 1951, RW 39/116
27. CP(51) 265, Cab. 129/47 and see pp. 192 and 232
28. Manchester Guardian, 5 March 1953
29. Daily Telegraph and Morning Post, ed 25 March 1953
30. Goldsworthy, op cit, Chapter VI, part 2
31. Amery to Welensky, 17 November 1952, RW 39/115

32. Report of Parliamentary Delegation from the United Kingdom Branch of Commonwealth Parliamentary Association on Central Africa, Mauritius and Malta, August 1951. Members: Julian Amery, A E Baldwin, William Coldrick, and Stanely W Evans. Two-thirds of the twenty-page report dealt with Central Africa and was in favour of federation, RW 39/117
33. Hansard, Vol. 497, 4 March 1952, cols. 208-339
34. ibid, and Dodds-Parker to Welensky, 6 March 1952, RW 39/116
35. Hansard, Vol. 499, 29 April 1952, cols. 1233-1298
36. Welensky to fellow members of Lesislative Council, 30 April 1952, RW 39/115
37. Hansard, Vol. 504, 24 July 1952, cols. 773-882
38. A T Williams (Acting Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia) to Welensky, 15 March 1952, RW 39/112 and Hansard, Vol. 497 4 March 1952
39. Stanley W Evans to Welensky, 10 April 1952, RW 39/119
40. Hansard, 24 July 1952 and Guardian, 25 July 1952
41. At the 1952 Conference, Morrison and Dalton lost their seats to Crossman and Wilson and at the 1953 Conference Gaitskell failed to win election, but Griffiths retained fourth slot 1951-1953
42. J Amery to Welensky, 17 November 1952, RW 39/115 and Dodds-Parker to Welensky, 6 March 1952, and Amery to Welensky, 17 March 1952
43. Amery to Welensky, 17 November 1952, ibid
44. see correspondence with Evans and Reid in RW 39/119 and RW 39/115
45. Welensky to all fellow elected members of Legislative Council, 12 May 1952, RW 39/115
46. Leader of the Liberal Party
47. Conservative Member of Parliament and newspaper columnist
48. Welensky to Huggins, 14 May 1952, RW 39/115
49. Welensky to Martin Visagie (Fort Jameson), 4 June 1952, RW 39/11
50. Welensky to Altrincham, 25 August 1952, RW 39/115

51. Reid to Welensky (undated but received by Welensky on 5 August 1952) RW 39/115
52. Franklin, op cit, p.75, Gann, L H, A History of Northern Rhodesia (Chatto and Windus 1964) p.418 and Rotberg, op cit, p.245
53. Welensky to Altrincham, 25 August 1952, RW 39/115
54. Welensky to Reid, 6 August 1952, ibid
55. Thomas Fox-Pitt to Marjorie Nicholson, 27 August 1952 FCB 101/6 ff 196-198
56. Welensky to Reid, 6 August 1952 RW 39/115
57. Welensky to Lord Salisbury, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 26 September 1952, copy to Henry Hopkinson, Minister of State at Colonial Office, with instructions to destroy letters after reading and definitely not to leave copies on Departmental files, RW 39/115
58. Sir J H Le Rougetel, United Kingdom High Commissioner to South Africa, to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 28 December 1951, Telegram No.459, CO 1015/85
59. Sir J H Le Rougetel to Sir Evelyn Baring, United Kingdom High Commissioner to Southern Rhodesia, 5 March 1952, Telegram No. 65, CO 1015/85 and DO 35/3605
60. Le Rougetel to Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations 28 December 1951, op cit
61. 'Relations with the Union of South Africa in the context of the United Nations' memorandum by Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, 24 September 1952, C(52)306, Cab. 129/55
62. ibid
63. Baxter to Liesching on Central African Federation and High Commission Territories, copies to Holmes, Sir Leslie Gibson, Clark, Gibson Gandee and Lambert, 16 January 1952, CO 1015/85
64. Sir William Gorell-Barnes had succeeded Sir Andrew B Cohen as Assistant Under-Secretary, responsible for the African Division after Cohen had secured the position of Governor of Uganda from Griffiths, towards the end of his term in office
65. Hyam, op cit, p.189, and Walker, E A, A History of Southern Africa (Longmans 1962), p.910

66. Gorell-Barnes to Campbell, 13 February 1952, CO 1015/85
67. Minute by W A W Clark, 14 January 1952, DO 35/3602
- 67a. Minute by Garner, August 1951, DO 121/137
68. Minute by Clark, 14 January 1952, op cit
69. Baxter's comments on Clark's minute, 14 January 1952, DO 35/3602
70. Le Rougetel to Sir Evelyn Baring, Telegram No. 65, 5 March 1952, CO 1015/85 and DO 35/3605
71. On 20 March the South African Supreme Court had invalidated the legislations on race relations of the Afrikaner government, on 22 April Dr D F Malan introduced a Bill to make the South African Parliament a high court, to prevent the Supreme Court from invalidating the legislation on race relations as it had done in the previous month.
72. see in particular Unsworth's and Moffat's arguments during the Carlton House Terrace Conference, January 1953
73. F Stephen Joelson to R W Pers, 25 March 1952, RW 39/116
74. For details on the CAS and Colonel David Stirling, see Wood, op cit
75. Minute of meeting, chaired by Baxter, with Stirling, Ismay, Lennox-Boyd and officials from Commonwealth Relations Office, 8 February 1952, CO 1015/70
76. see Chapter 6, footnote 22
77. Dodds-Parker to Welensky, 5 February 1952, and Welensky's reply 21 February 1952 RW 39/116
78. Stanley W Evans to Welensky, 10 April 1952, RW 39/119
79. Welensky to Huggins, 31 March 1952, RW 39,112
80. Welensky to Dr Alex Scott, 28 March 1952, RW 39/112
81. Welensky to Moris, Sergeant, Davies, L'Ange, Millar, Robertson and Van Eeden, 28 April 1952, RW 39/115
82. Welensky to Huggins, 19 July 1952, RW 39/113
83. Fox-Pitt to Marjorie Nicholson, 27 July, 5 August, 13 August, 19 September 1951, FCB 101/6 ff 88-89, 91-101, 102-107, 137-141
84. ibid, 27 June 1952, f.190

85. ibid, 16 August 1951 ff 108-114 supported by the Reverend Dr. Fergus MacPherson in interview with author, 2 and 3 June 1982
86. ibid, 21 August 1951, ff 115-118
87. ibid, 19 September 1951, ff 137-141
88. ibid, 21 August and 5 September 1951, ff 115-118, 132-139
89. ibid, 23 March 1952, ff 160-161 and Fox-Pitt to Creech-Jones, 30 March 1952, ACJ 22/10 ff 44-46
90. C(52)193, 13 June 1952, Cab. 129/52
91. Hansard, Vol.502, 18 June 1952 and Cmd 8573 (1952) Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Draft federal scheme prepared by a conference held in London in April and May 1952
92. The Observer, 22 June 1952
93. Henry L d'A Hopkinson, later Lord Colyton, succeeded Alan Lennox-Boyd as Minister of State at the Colonial Office in May 1952. Lennox-Boyd became Minister of Transport and Civil Aviation, returning to the Colonial Office in August 1954 as Lyttelton's successor
94. Wood, op cit, pp. 274-275
95. BBC transcript of pre-recorded message, 20 June 1952 RW 39/113
96. The Times, 19 June 1952
97. The Times (Leader) 22 January and 29 April 1952
98. The Manchester Guardian, 25 July 1952
99. Hopkinson in Central Africa from end of July to end of August 1952, and visited Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia in turn
100. Welensky, R. 4000 Days (London 1964) pp.57-58
101. Hopkinson to Welensky, 1 October 1952, RW 39/113
102. Hopkinson to Welensky, 22 October 1952, RW 39/113
103. Address to Liverpool Luncheon Club by Foster, RW 5/2 and the Scotsman (report and editorial) 4 November 1952
104. Wood, op cit, p.296

105. James Rodger came to Blantyre in 1924 and was the senior Scots missionary in Nyasaland. His work as an agriculturalist gave him unrivalled intimacy with the village people
106. Neil Bernard began his service as a missionary in West Africa in 1933. In 1949 he was appointed to Blantyre to co-ordinate all Church of Scotland missionary work in central Africa
107. FCB.104/4 ff 43-44
108. Margorie Nicholson, Secretary of Fabian Colonial Bureau
109. J A Rodger to Marjorie Nicholson, 18 November 1952, FCB 104/4 ff 46-47
110. Fox-Pitt to Marjorie Nicholson, 13 August 1951, FCB 101/6 ff 102-107
111. For Creech Jones' opinion of Labour Government's position see Glasgow Herald, 1 October 1948, for Conservative Government's position see Relations with Union of South Africa, Cab.129/55
112. On the basis of an interview with Lord Colyton, Wood had argued that the decision, by the Conservative Government to implement federation despite widespread opposition, was taken on the strength of Colyton's report of his tour of British Central Africa, Wood, op cit, p.297. In fact the decision was taken on the receipt of a memorandum by Salisbury, Swinton and Lyttelton at Cabinet on 22 December, see footnote 115 below
113. Hopkinson to Welensky, from United Nations Association, New York. 22 October 1952, RW 39/113
114. Cabinet conclusions, 22 December 1952, CC (52) 107 Cab.128/25
115. Rennie's views were at Appendix III of Memorandum by Lord President of Council, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations and Secretary of State for the Colonies, 'Proposed Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland', 16 December 1952, C(52) 445, Cab. 129/57
116. *ibid*, Appendix IV and Colby to Lyttelton, December 1952 CO 537/5886
117. *ibid*
118. CC(52) 107, Cab. 128/25

119. ibid
120. Conference on the Federation of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Vol.III - Verbatim Record of Proceedings, January 1953, RW 5/3. see also Wood, op cit, pp.316-349
121. Welensky to T H Grey, 1 January 1953, RW 17/38
122. Verbatim record of January 1953 Conference, op cit
123. FCB Conference Memorandum containing extracts from a letter from J L Stewart, a former agricultural Officer in the Gold Coast, recently retired, to Southern Rhodesia. Stewart was friendly with a long-established, successful tobacco farmer (not named), an intimate of Huggins. Stewart claims the farmer's views are the same as Huggins! 23 December 1952, FCB 99/3 f 129
124. Copy of letter from Lord Altrincham to Huggins, enclosed in Huggins to Welensky, 13 February 1952 RW 39/112
125. Morgan Phillips, Labour Party General Secretary
126. Goldsworthy, op cit, p.219
127. The Manchester Guardian, 7 May 1953
128. Goldsworthy, op cit, p.206
129. Wood, op cit, p.300 and the Daily Telegraph and Morning Post 2 October 1952
130. The Times, 27 September 1952
131. C(52) 445, 16 December 1952, Cab. 129/57. The other members of the Labour delegation were W A Burke and Mrs Irene White, The Times and Manchester Guardian, 13 December 1952
132. Swinton replaced Salisbury as Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations three days later, on 15 December 1952
133. Wood, op cit, p.359 and John Wallace to Welensky, 2 March 1953, RW 5/3, Daily Express, 25 February 1953, Manchester Guardian, 5 March 1953, The Times, 25 February and 5 March 1953
134. Scott, Michael, A Time to Speak (Faber and Faber, London 1958) p.280
135. Hansard, Vol. 513, cols. 658-801, 24 March 1953, Vol.515, cols. 37-168, 4 May and cols. 407-514 6 May 1953, Vol.516, cols. 37-180, 1191-1340 and 1911-2052, 9, 18 and 24, June 1953.

Labour moved a total of 69 amendments to the Bill during the Committee Stage, see Goldsworthy, op cit, p.225

136. Hansard, Vol.515. op cit, 4 May 1953
137. Hansard, Vol.518, cols. 899-965, 27 July 1953
138. Hansard, Vol.515, col. 425, 6 May 1953
139. Janet Morgan, (ed.), op cit, p.212
140. ibid. p.211
141. Manchester Guardian, 25 March 1953
142. Janet Morgan, (ed.), op cit, p.212
143. Jackson, Robert J. Rebels and Whips (Macmillan, London 1968) p.132
144. see footnotes 135 and 137 above. There was a majority of 26 on the Second Reading on 6 May, 23 on the Third Reading on 9 June and 46 on the Order in Council on 27 July 1953.
145. Goldsworthy, op cit, p.230
146. Gordon Walker, former Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, Sir Hartley Shawcross, later Lord Shawcross, former Attorney-General, Richard R S Stokes, former Minister of Materials, Morris Webb, former Minister of Food, all abstained on the Second Reading of the Enabling Bill, 6 May 1953, Hansard, Vol. 515, op cit

Footnotes : Chapter 9

1. Goldsworthy. op cit. pp.224-225
2. Also denoted by FCB or the Bureau. For accounts of the FCB activities see Goldsworthy. op cit. pp.123-164 and 255-264. Cole, Margaret, The Story of Fabian Socialism (Heinemann, London, 1961) pp 281-288, and the Introduction to the FCB Collection at Rhodes House Library
3. see FCBs Annual Report, October 1943 - October 1944: CWWG 11/4 ff 48-50
4. ibid
5. Minutes of 4th Meeting in 1951 of FCB Advisory Committee, 6 June 1951 report on recent meeting between FCB delegation led by Lord Altrincham and Gordon Walker, CWWG 11/11 f 10
6. Statement on CAF by FCB, 5 July 1951: CWWG 11/11 f 12
7. Minutes of 6th Meeting of FCB Advisory Committee, 3 July 1951 CWWG 11/11 f 11
8. Minutes of 3rd Meeting in 1951 of FCB Advisory Committee, 25 April 1951. CWWG 11/11 f 5
9. a Statement on the Report of the Conference on Closer Association of the Central African Territories, FCB (51)7, CWWG 11/11 ff 16-17
10. Statement on CAF by FCB, 5 July 1951, CWWG 11/11 f 12
11. ibid, 8th meeting, 25 July 1951, ff 20-21
12. Minutes of 7th meeting in 1951 of FCB Advisory Committee, 10 July 1951, CWWG 11/11 f 13
13. ibid, 8th meeting, 25 July 1951, f 22
14. Goldsworthy op cit, p.255
15. ibid, p.263
16. Nicholson to Fox-Pitt, 18 July 1951, FCB 101/6 f 83
17. Nicholson to Rodger, 3 November 1952, FCB 104/4 f 45
18. Nicholson to Orton E Chirwa, 22 August 1952, FCB 104/4 f 41 and Nicholson to Fox-Pitt, 2 May 1952. FCB 101/6 f 176

19. Nicholson to Fox-Pitt, 11 August 1952, FCB 101/6, f 193 and Nicholson to Rodger, 3 November 1952, op cit
20. FCR, 7th Meeting 1952, 27 October 1952, CWWG 11/12 f 34
21. Nicholson to Fox-Pitt, 2 May 1952, FCB 101/6 f 176
22. Nicholson to Rodger, 3 November 1952, op cit
23. Hilda Selwyn-Clarke to Little, 18 February 1952, FCB 7/1 f 98
24. Report on UDCs AGM 1950, RW 39/119
25. Report on 'Crisis in Africa' Conference, CWWG 9/7 f 9
26. CWWG 9/7 f 10
27. see Goldsworthy, op cit, pp. 264-271
28. Contributors - Scott, Legum, Lewis and Wight (Penguin, London 1951)
29. Charles Wilton Wood Greenidge, served with Colonial Service on St Kitts and Barbados 1919-36, Solicitor-General, Nigeria, 1936-41, on retirement Secretary of Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society (Anti-Slavery Society) 1941-56, Director 1957, Member FCB Advisory Committee 1941-58, Member of Labour Party Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions 1941-50, Secretary 1946-50, Member of Legislative Council Barbados 1958-62
30. CWWG 8/6 f 39
31. R R G represented at meetings by Purnell, Norman and Turner and A R G representative by the Reverend L G Greaves, CWWG 8/6 f 20
32. CWWG 8/6, f 39
33. Krishnamurthy, B S, The British Opponents of the Central African Federation 1952-1963. Paper given at University of London School of Oriental and African Studies and Institute of Commonwealth Studies African History Seminar on 19 February 1963
34. Brockway, Fenner, Outside the Right (London 1963), pp41-43, Goldsworthy, op cit, pp. 149-153
35. Nicholson to Mary Benson (Secretary of Africa Bureau) 20 May and 4 June 1952 FCB 7/1 f 22 and 24

36. Minutes of 7th Meeting of Advisory Committee, 26 July 1950
CWWG 11/10 f 10
37. Selwyn-Clarke to Little, 18 February 1952, FCB 7/1 f 98
38. Minutes of 7th meeting of Advisory Committee, op cit
39. Mackenzie was a leading member of the Edinburgh World Church Group, SCAQ and the Iona Community and played a major role within Scotland, especially in the Church and Labour Party, in seeking widespread popular opposition to the Government's policies for Central Africa.
40. Kenneth Mackenzie to Nicholson, 27 January 1952, FCB 7/1 f 107. Nicholson to Fenner Brockway, 23 May 1952, FCB 7/1 f 163
41. Nicholson to Cattnach, 11 February and 15 February 1952, FCB 7/1 ff 122-123
42. Fenner Brockway to Nicholson, 15 May 1952, FCB 7/1 f 162
43. Nicholson to Fox-Pitt, 9 June 1952, FCB 101/6 f 184 and Goldsworthy, op cit, p.272 and Scott, op cit, pp 271-272
44. Nicholson to Fox-Pitt, 9 June 1952, FCB 101/6 f 184
45. Minutes of meeting to discuss formation of a Co-ordinating Committee to oppose the present schemes for a Central African Federation, 24 May 1952, FCB 7/1 f 164
46. Elizabeth Pakenham to Fenner Brockway, 8 June 1952, FCB 7/1 f 166
47. Handwritten note, probably by Nicholson, FCB 7/1 f 164
48. Minutes of UDC Africa Sub-Committee meeting, 8 July 1952, CWWG 9/7, f 12
49. Goldsworthy, op cit, p.274
50. Minutes of 5th meeting of FCB Advisory Committee, 11 June 1952, CWWG 11/12 f 26
51. Nicholson to Fox-Pitt, 9 June 1952, FCB 101/6 f 184
52. Minutes of 6th meeting of FCB Advisory Committee, 1 July 1952, CWWG 11/12 f 28
53. Amongst them were 'Africa - Which Way Now?' by Patrick O'Donovan, Africa Correspondent of Astor's Observer and 'African Challenge' by Creech-Jones

54. Scott, op cit, pp.276-277 and Krishnamurthy, op cit, p.3
55. 'A petition to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth II against Federation, made by the Chiefs and Citizens of Nyasaland'. Signatories - Chief Somba, W P Gomani, Acting Inkosi Gomani, Iukosi M'Belwa II, N A Mayanga, M P S Kuntia, B W Mathews Phiri, I C K Murumba, Hastings K Banda, ACJ 22/4 item 4 and Scott, op cit, pp. 278-279
56. Krishnamurthy, op cit
57. Africa Protectorates Trust Board of Trustees - Marjory Perham, Reverend Canon R W Stoppard, Lord Noel-Buxton, Reverend Michael Scott
58. African Development Trust Board of Trustees - Sir Walter Moberly, Reverend Professor C E Raven, Lord Noel-Buxton, and Reverend Michael Scott. For a report of its work, see O'Donovan 'Africa - Which way now?', op cit
59. Nicholson to Fox-Pitt, 8 February 1952, FCB 101/6 f 147
60. Nicholson to Lyttelton, 13 February 1952, FCB 26/2 f 124
The FCB deputation to the Colonial Secretary on 18 February 1952 was headed by Faringdon and consisted of Sir Richard Acland, MP, F W Dalley, Greenidge, Rita Hinden, Reginald Sorensen, MP, Irene White, MP and Marjorie Nicholson
61. Nicholson to Little, 19 March 1952, FCB 7/1 ff 95-96
62. John H Lodge to Nicholson, 21 May 1952, FCB 7/1 ff 116-117
63. This was the opinion of Max Gluckman and Peter Monkhouse of the Manchester Council for African Affairs, the latter of whom had had a private meeting with Lyttelton in February 1953, Krishnamurthy, op cit
64. Nicholson to Fox-Pitt, 14 July 1952, FCB 101/6 f 192, and Minutes of 6th meeting of FCB Advisory Committee, 1 July 1952, CWWG 11/12 f 28
65. Minutes of 1st meeting of FCB Advisory Committee, and 6th meeting, 28 January and 22 July 1953 respectively CWWG 11/13 ff 1 and 33, Nicholson to Lyttelton, 9 March, 19 March, 16 June and 6 July 1953, FCB 26/2, ff 150, 155, 159 and 160 respectively
66. 'Central African Federation - What now?', paper by Creech Jones, FCB(53)4 CWWG 11/13, ff 36-37
67. Nicholson to Cattanach, 11 February 1952 FCB 7/1 f 122

68. Lecturer in Edinburgh University, Department of Social Anthropology
69. Lecturer and Researcher in African Studies, Glasgow University; Assistant Director of African Bureau, September 1953, the Labour Party's Commonwealth Officer 1954-61
70. Nicholson to Cattanach, 15 February 1952, FCB 7/1, f 123
71. Letter from organisation on federation and announcing meeting, The Scotsman, 28 February 1952
72. Cattanach to Selwyn-Clarke (undated, but probably late March 1952), FCB 7/1, ff 117-119, and The Scotsman, 1 March 1952
73. The Glasgow Herald, 3 March 1952, chaired by Moderator of the Presbytery of Glasgow, the Reverend John S Laurie
74. Cattanach to Selwyn-Clarke, op cit and Mufuka, op cit, p.160. Meeting chaired by Kenneth Little, Reader in Social Anthropology, Edinburgh University
75. Little to Nicholson, 9 Huly 1952, FCB 7/1 f 87
76. Mufuka, op cit, p.159
77. The Glasgow Herald, 8 December 1952
78. Interview by author with Penry Jones, member of the Labour Party, Iona Community and EWCG in early 1950s
79. The 1951 General Assembly of the Church of Scotland accepted the recommendations of the Special Committee anent the Iona Community, (Convener, Very Reverend Professor J G Riddell), and the ad hoc Committee on the Iona Community (Convener, Very Reverend John White) to accept the community into the Church of Scotland organisation. An Iona Community Board, consisting of 25 members, with the status of a Church of Scotland General Assembly Standing Committee was established as its governing body and it was confirmed that women could be associate but not full members. The Church of Scotland Year Book 1951-52
80. Principal Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland with Minutes of Proceedings, Morrison & Gibb, Edinburgh, May 1951
81. The Glasgow Herald, 8 December 1952
82. The Scotsman, 6 March 1953

83. The Scotsman, 26 May 1953 and The Principal Acts of the General Assembly of the Church of Scotland - convened at Edinburgh May 19 to 27 1953 - and the Minutes of the Proceedings, Morrison & Gibb, Edinburgh 1953, pp 391-392, and ibid, May 20 to 28 1952, p.221
84. The Scotsman 26 May 1953
85. ibid
86. Principal Acts of General Assembly of Church of Scotland - convened at Edinburgh 19 to 27 May 1953 - with Minutes of Minutes of the Proceedings. Session 10 Report and Supplementary Report of Committee on Church and Nation, 25 May 1953
87. ibid, p.391
88. ibid and The Scotsman, 26 May 1953

Footnotes : Chapter 10

1. Welensky to Altrincham, 10 July 1951, RW 39/116
2. *ibid.* Welensky to Huggins, 25 July 1951, RW 39/114 and Welensky to Stanley, 1 August 1951, RW 39/112 and Winterton to Welensky, 4 August 1951, RW 39/116
3. Welensky to Huggins, 25 July, *op cit*
4. Winterton to Welensky, 4 August, *op cit*
5. Welensky to Winterton, 22 August 1951, RW 39/114
6. Undated Memorandum compiled by Lane-Poole as directed by the UCAA, London Committee on 21 August 1953. RW 5/3
7. *ibid*
8. Quoted by Wallace in, Wallace to Welensky, 9 August 1951 RW 39/119
9. Sir Thomas Lloyd was Permanent Under Secretary of State, Sir Hilton Poynton was Deputy Under Secretary of State and William Gorell-Barnes was Assistant Under-Secretary of State
10. Welensky to Wallace, 25 October 1952, RW 5/2
11. Wallace to Welensky, 13 October 1952, *ibid*
12. Ross Wilson was replaced by R J Baker at the start of October 1952
13. Welensky to Jack Thomson (General Manager of Roan Antelope Copper Mines Ltd, Luanshya, Northern Rhodesia) 16 July 1952 RW 39/119
14. Minutes of UCAA London Committee meeting (which was attended by Huggins) 12 December 1952, RW 5/2
15. Lane Poole memorandum, *op cit*
16. Wood, *op cit*, pp.301-302
17. Church of England, Methodist and Roman Catholic, respectively
18. Logan had been Chief Secretary of Northern Rhodesia, 1937-42. Now retired and living in Scotland, a member of the London Committee

19. Welensky to Thomson, 16 July, op cit, and Welensky to Robert Stewart, 26 February 1952, RW 39/119
20. Wallace to Welensky, 9 August 1951, ibid
21. Minutes of London Committee Meeting, 15 August 1952, RW 39/84
22. Lane-Poole memorandum, op cit
23. Wallace debated with Boris Gussman at a meeting organised by the Wolverhampton Branch of the UNA on 8 December 1952, see minutes of London Committee meeting, 12 December 1952, RW 5/2. The Putney and Rockampton branch of the UNA arranged for Freda White to speak in opposition to Wallace at a meeting on 2 October 1952, see Wallace to Welensky, 13 October 1952, RW 5/2
24. Minute of London Committee meeting, 5 November 1952, RW 5/2 and Lane-Poole memorandum, op cit
25. Wallace to Welensky, 13 October, op cit
26. Addressed by Creech Jones, Gussman, Peter Abrahams, David Wilson (Editor of West Africa), Freda White (Executive Committee, UNA), Rita Hinden (Honorary Secretary, FCB), Colin Legum (reporter on the Observer) and chaired by Andrew Boyd (the Economist), reported in Wallace to Welensky 13 October, op cit
27. Four to five hundred people in the Assembly Hall of Church House, Westminster were addressed by Michael Scott, Creech Jones, Abrahams and Lord Hemingford, under the Chairmanship of Lady Pakenham, ibid
28. Lane-Poole memorandum, op cit, and an appendix to a 'Press and Intelligence Summary' issued by the London Committee and compiled by its assistant secretary, B Hutton-Williams, CO 1015/151
29. Wallace to Welensky, 14 April 1953, RW 5/3
30. Lane-Poole memorandum, op cit
31. Wallace to Welensky, 17 March 1953, RW 5/3
32. Lord Hailey delivered the first address, Lane-Poole memorandum, op cit
33. Sir Alexander Cadogan was Permanent Under Secretary of State at the Foreign Office, 1938-1946, UK representative at the UN, 1946-50, and was appointed Governor of the BBC in 1952

34. Minutes of London Committee meeting, 5 December 1952, RW 5/2
35. Lt Gen Sir Ian Jacob was Controller of European Services at the BBC in 1946, Director of Overseas Services, 1947-52 and Director-General, 1952-60
36. Minutes of London Committee meeting, 12 December 1952 RW 5/2
37. Archer E Baldwin to Welensky, 20 February 1953, RW 39/119
38. Wallace to Welensky, 17 March 1953, RW 5/3
39. Wallace to Welensky, 12 March 1953, ibid
40. see the Times, 11 March 1953, for a full report on Fisher's speech
41. Lane-Poole memorandum, op cit
42. Wallace to Welensky, 12 February 1953, RW 5/3
43. see CO 1015/151 and CO 1015/152
44. Wallace to Welensky, 27 April 1953, RW 5/3
45. Prince Yurka Galitzine to Welensky, 21 April 1953 and Wallace to Welensky, 26 April 1953, ibid
46. Appointments to the Church and Nation Committee, for example, is for four years and members can be re-appointed
47. Minutes of London Committee meetings, 24 and 31 October 1952, RW 5/2
48. ibid. Minutes are also on CO 1015/151 indicating that Colonial Office officials were aware of the London Committee's successful attempts to curb the Church of Scotland's opposition to Federation
49. Wallace to Welensky, 12 February 1953, RW 5/3
50. 'Report of Activities in Edinburgh on 17 February 1953' by Hutton-Williams, dated 19 February 1953, CO 1015/152
51. ibid
52. Wallace to Welensky, 17 March 1943, RW 5/3
53. Hutton-Williams report, op cit
54. ibid. For example, the Church and Nation Committee's press release of 30 December 1952

55. Hutton-Williams report, op cit
56. Hansard, House of Commons, 6 May 1953, Vol.515, col. 425
House of Lords, 1 April 1953, Vol.181, cols 533-537
57. The Scotsman, 18 May 1953
58. The Scotsman, 26 May 1953
59. Lord Milverton's appeal, Press Association Release,
10 April 1953
60. Wallace to Welensky, 14 April 1953, RW 5/3
61. Lane-Poole to Welensky, 3 June 1953, ibid. E H Lane-Poole
was Wallace's successor as Secretary to the London Committee
June to August 1953
62. Galitzine to Welensky, 21 April 1953, Wallace to Welensky,
26 April 1953, and replies of 30 April 1953 and 2 May
1953, RW 5/3

Footnotes : Chapter 11

1. The Times, 25 February 1953
2. In addition to Stirling, the delegation consisted of A C Soffe, R M Cleveland, Maj Gen Revell Smith and N H Wilson, RW 5/2
3. Welensky to Dr Alec Scott, 28 March 1952, RW 39/112
4. Other UCAA Vice-Presidents were Beckett, Haddow and Barrow, Eastwood and Keller
5. Rhodesia Herald, 13 March and 1 April 1948
6. Welensky to Parry, 28 March 1952 and Huggins to Welensky 24 March 1952, RW 39/112
7. Minutes of UCAA Co-ordinating Committee meeting, 24 October 1952, RW 5/2
8. Huggins to Welensky, 2 July 1952, ibid
9. Byrne to Welensky, 27 March 1952, ibid
10. Welensky to Byrne, 31 March 1952, ibid
11. Harold Cartmel-Robinson (former Northern Rhodesian Chief Secretary) to Welensky, 2 October 1952 and Neil H Wilson to Welensky, 30 September 1952, ibid
12. B G Abrahams (Member of Northern Rhodesian UCAA Executive Committee, to Welensky, 26 September 1952, ibid
13. ibid
14. Wilson to Welensky, 29 September 1952, RW 5/2
15. Welensky to Wallace, 16 October 1952, ibid
16. Welensky to Cartmel-Robinson, 31 October 1952, ibid
17. Minutes of UCAAs Finance Committee meeting, 24 October 1952, ibid
18. Huggins to Welensky, 20 October 1952, RW 39/115
19. Cartmel-Robinson to Welensky, 20 October 1952 and Minutes of UCAA Organisation Committee meeting, 19 November 1952, RW 5/2 and Huggins to Welensky, 20 October 1952, RW 39/113
20. ibid

21. Greenfield to Welensky, 8 November 1952, RW 39/115
22. Minutes of UCAA Co-ordinating Committee meeting with Chairman of the sub-committee (the Special Committee) 14 November 1952, RW 5/2
23. Welensky to Greenfield, 22 November 1952, RW 39/115
24. Wilson to Welensky, 29 September 1952, RW 5/2
25. see in particular correspondence throughout 1952 between R L Prain (Chairman, Rhodesian Selection Trust Group) and Welensky in RW 38/39
26. Welensky to Col Charles Ponsonby, 27 July 1951, RW 39/119
27. Prain to Welensky, 18 December 1952, and 1 January 1953 RW 38/39
28. Wallace to Welensky, 15 July 1952, RW 5/2
29. After months of negotiations between Welensky and Sir Dougal Malcolm (Chairman of the BSAC) it was announced in August 1949 that the BSACs mineral rights for Northern Rhodesia would be ceded to the Territory's Government in 1986. Until that date the BSAC agreed to pay 20% of its net earnings from royalties to the Northern Rhodesian Government in exchange for exemption from any sort of special taxes. Some £30 million was raised by this measure between 1949 and 1964
30. Daily Herald, 11 December 1952
31. African World, January 1953
32. Welensky to Prain, 16, 29 and 30 January and 8 April 1953, RW 38/39
33. Wallace to Welensky, 12 and 17 March 1953, and Lane-Poole to Welensky 3 June 1953, Wallace to Welensky, Welensky to Prain, Welensky to Wallace, all 1 April 1953, RW 5/3. Welensky to Michael Blundell, 7 May 1953, RW 1/11. Memorandum, Activities of UCAA over CAF, February - August 1953, CO 1015/152
34. Minutes of UCAA Finance Committee, 5 November 1952 (RW 5/2), estimated future budget requirements at £18,000. Welensky told Wallace in a letter of 15 April 1953 (RW 5/3) that the Southern Rhodesian referendum campaign had cost far more than he had expected it to, partly because of having to buy a large amount of newspaper advertising space towards the end of the referendum campaign to counter a massive last-minute advertising blitz by the anti-Federation camp

35. Welensky to Godfrey Pelletier, 16 October 1952, RW 5/2
36. Welensky to Wallace, 16 October 1952, ibid
37. ibid. Cartmel-Robinson to Welensky, 25 October and reply 31 October 1952, RW 5/2
38. Wilson to Welensky, 29 September, ibid
39. Welensky to Wallace, 2 May 1953, RW 5/3
40. Welensky to Wallace, 15 April 1953, ibid
41. J D Phillips to Welensky, 8 September 1952 and Parker to F S Owen, 24 November 1952, RW 5/2
42. Abrahams to Welensky, 30 September 1952, ibid
43. Minutes of Special Committee meeting (Co-ordinating Committee and Chairman of Southern Rhodesia UCAA sub-Committees) 12 September 1952 RW 5/3
44. Northern Rhodesia Legislative Council Debates, 3 July 1952
45. The Times, 26 February 1953
46. Cartmel-Robinson to Welensky, 2 October 1952, RW 5/2
47. see Wood, op cit, pp. 372-373
48. Cartmel-Robinson to Welensky, 2 October 1952, RW 5/2
49. Hopkinson to Welensky, 1 October 1952, RW 39/113
50. Welensky to Hopkinson, 9 October 1952, ibid
51. Rhodesia Herald, 13 September 1952
52. Cartmel-Robinson to Welensky, op cit
53. Wilson to Huggins, September 1952, RW 5/2
54. Welensky to Wallace, 16 October 1952, ibid
55. Cartmel-Robinson to Welensky, op cit
56. R O Stockil was leader of the Rhodesian Party
57. Wood, op cit, pp. 291-292
58. Wilson to Welensky, 29 September 1952, RW 5/2 and Cartmel-Robinson to Welensky, op cit

59. Abrahams to Welensky, 26 September 1952, RW 5/2
60. Wilson to Welensky, 30 September 1952, ibid
61. Cartmel-Robinson to Welensky, op cit
62. Welensky to Wallace, 16 October 1952, RW 5/2
63. 'Memorandum for Speakers' issued by the UCAAs National Executive Council in October 1952, ibid
64. Minutes of UCAA Organisation Committee meeting 17 November 1952, ibid
65. Hopkinson to Welensky, 22 October 1952, RW 39/113
66. Guest had initially supported Gore-Browne's idea of a partitioned Northern Rhodesia with the settler part of the Territory being amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia (see Rhodesia Herald, 2 August 1952). Guest formed the Rhodesia League to oppose the Federation Scheme on 30 October 1952, but on 16 February 1953 he resigned and joined the pro-Federation campaign and the UCAA
67. The Rhodesia Association was formed on 15 February 1953. Its President was Sir Digby Burnett and Stockil was a member of its Executive Committee and was the dominant force in the Association, along with the political maverick, Denby Young
68. Wallace to Welensky, 5 April 1953, RW 5/3
69. Sir Robert Hudson, a former Chief Justice of Southern Rhodesia assumed the Presidency of the UCAA
70. Rhodesia Herald, 8 February 1953 and the Times, 12 February 1953
71. The Times, 16 February 1953

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The Reverend Dr Fergus Macpherson
The Reverend Penry Jones

APPENDIX I

CONFERENCES ON THE CLOSER ASSOCIATION OF THE CENTRAL AFRICAN TERRITORIES

I. LIST OF DELEGATES AND ADVISERS: 18-23 SEPTEMBER, 1951. CO 1015/59

Colonial Office:

The Rt. Hon. Mr. J. Griffiths, M.P., Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Mr. A.B. Cohen, C.M.G., O.B.E., Assistant Under-Secretary, Colonial Office.

Commonwealth Relations Office:

The Rt. Hon. Mr. P.C. Gordon Walker, M.P., Secretary of State for
Commonwealth Relations.
Mr. G.H. Baxter, C.M.G., C.I.E., Assistant Under-Secretary, Commonwealth
Relations Office.
Mr. J.S. Gandee, M.B.E., Principal, Commonwealth Relations Office.

High Commissioner:

Mr. I.M.R. MacLennan, C.M.G., United Kingdom High Commissioner to Southern
Rhodesia.

Southern Rhodesia:

The Rt. Hon. Sir Godfrey Huggins, P.C., C.H., K.C.M.G., F.R.C.S., M.P.,
Prime Minister.
The Hon. E.C.F. Whitehead, O.B.E., M.P., Minister of Finance.
The Hon. P.B. Fletcher, M.P., Minister of Native Affairs.
The Hon. J.M. Greenfield, K.C., M.P., Minister of Justice and Internal
Affairs.
Mr. R.O. Stockil, M.P., Rhodesia Party delegate. Leader of the Opposition.
The Hon. L.J.W. Keller, C.B.E., M.P., Labour Party Delegate.
Mr. A.R.W. Stumbles, Rhodesia Party Delegate.
Mr. W.H. Eastwood, O.B.E., M.P., Labour Party Delegate.
Sir Archibald James, Rhodesia Party Adviser.
The Hon. H.H. Davies, Labour Party Adviser.
Mr. A.H. Strachan, C.B.E., Secretary to the Treasury.
Mr. L. Powys-Jones, Secretary for Native Affairs.
Mr. T.G. Gisborne, Secretary to the Cabinet.
Mr. A.D. Evans, M.B.E., Assistant Secretary, Internal Affairs.
Mr. J.R.H. Shaul, O.B.E., Director, Central African Statistical Office.
Mr. V.L. Robinson, K.C., Attorney General.

Northern Rhodesia:

His Excellency Sir Gilbert Rennie, K.C.M.G., M.C., Governor.
Mr. R.C.S. Stanley, C.M.G., O.B.E., Chief Secretary.
Mr. R. Welensky, C.M.G., M.L.C., Leader of the Unofficials.
Mr. G.E. Thornton, C.M.G., M.B.E., Financial Secretary.
Mr. E.I.G. Unsworth, Attorney General.
Mr. W.F. Stubbs, O.B.E., Acting Secretary for Native Affairs.
Mr. J.S. Moffat, O.B.E., Senior Nominated Member for African Interests.
Mr. G.B. Beckett, C.M.G., M.L.C., Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Lt. Col. E.M. Wilson, M.B.E., M.L.C., Member for Health and Local Government.
Mr. P. Sokota, M.L.C., African Member of Legislative Council.
Mr. D.L. Yamba, M.L.C., African Member of Legislative Council.

Nyasaland:

His Excellency Sir Geoffrey Colby, K.C.M.G., Governor.
Mr. C.W.F. Footman, Chief Secretary.
Mr. V. Fox-Strangways, Secretary for African Affairs.
The Hon. M.P. Barrow, C.B.E., M.L.C., Member of Executive Council.
The Hon. G.G.S.J. Hadlow, O.B.E., M.L.C., Member of Executive Council.
Mr. J. Marshall, O.B.E., M.C., Nominated delegate.
Mr. K.O. Shelford, Nominated delegate.
Chief Mwase, Representative, African Protectorate Council.
Mr. E.K. Gondwe, Representative, African Protectorate Council.
Mr. C. Kumbikano, Representative, African Protectorate Council.

Conference Secretariat.

Mr. H.N. Parry, Chief Secretary, Central African Council.
Mr. N.A. Gibbon, M.B.E., Deputy Chief Secretary, Central African Council.
Mr. G.B.S.O. Clarke, Under Secretary to Southern Rhodesia Cabinet.
Mr. W.F. Nicholas, Southern Rhodesia Cabinet Secretariat.
Mr. K.J. Knaggs, Clerk of Councils, Northern Rhodesia.
Commander J.P.P. Michell, Assistant Secretary, Central African Council.

II. LIST OF DELEGATES AND ADVISERS: 23 APRIL-5 MAY, 1952.

CAB 129/52

United Kingdom

The Most Hon. the Marquess of Salisbury, K.G.	Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
The Rt. Hon. Oliver Lyttelton, D.S.O., M.C., M.P.	Secretary of State for the Colonies.
The Rt. Hon. A. T. Lennox-Boyd, M.P.	Minister of State for Colonial Affairs.
Mr. J. G. Foster, Q.C., M.P.	Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.
Sir Percival Liesching, G.C.M.G., K.C.B.	Permanent Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations Office.
Mr. G. H. Baxter, C.M.G., C.I.E. ...	Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Commonwealth Relations Office.
Mr. W. L. Gorell Barnes, C.M.G. ...	Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.
Mr. J. B. Williams, C.M.G.	Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.
Mr. E. Melville, C.M.G.	Assistant Under-Secretary of State, Colonial Office.
Mr. J. P. Gibson, C.B.E.	Assistant Secretary, Commonwealth Relations Office.
Mr. H. T. Bourdillon	Assistant Secretary, Colonial Office.
Mr. J. E. Marnham, M.C.	Assistant Secretary, Colonial Office.
Mr. R. S. Hudson, C.M.G.	Head of African Studies Branch, Colonial Office.
Mr. R. L. D. Jasper	Principal, Commonwealth Relations Office.

Southern Rhodesia

The Rt. Hon. Sir Godfrey Huggins, C.H., K.C.M.G., M.P.	Prime Minister.
The Hon. E. C. F. Whitehead, C.M.G., O.B.E., M.P.	Minister of Finance.
The Hon. J. M. Greenfield, Q.C., M.P. ...	Minister of Internal Affairs and Justice.
The Hon. P. B. Fletcher, M.P.	Minister of Native Affairs.
Mr. R. O. Stockil, M.P.	Leader of the Opposition.
Mr. W. H. Eastwood, M.P.	Rhodesia Labour Party Representative.
Mr. K. M. Goodenough, C.M.G., M.C.	High Commissioner in London.
Mr. A. H. Strachan, C.B.E.	Secretary to the Treasury.
Mr. T. G. Gisborne	Secretary to the Cabinet.
Mr. J. B. Ross	Deputy High Commissioner in London.
Mr. A. D. Evans, M.B.E.	Assistant Secretary for Internal Affairs.
Mr. J. N. N. Nkomo	African Delegate.
Mr. J. Z. Savanhu	African Delegate.

Northern Rhodesia

Sir Gilbert Rennie, K.C.M.G., M.C. ...	Governor.
Mr. E. I. G. Unsworth, Q.C.	Attorney General.
Mr. K. P. Bush, O.B.E.	Secretary for Native Affairs.
Mr. R. A. Nicholson	Economic Secretary.
Mr. R. Welensky, C.M.G., M.L.C. ...	Chairman of the Unofficial Members' Association.
Mr. G. B. Beckett, C.M.G., M.L.C. ...	Member for Agriculture and Natural Resources.
Lt.-Col. E. M. Wilson, M.B.E., M.L.C.	Member for Health and Local Government.
Mr. J. S. Moffat, O.B.E., M.L.C. ...	Nominated Unofficial Member of the Legislative Council representing African Interests.

Nyasaland

Sir Geoffrey Colby, K.C.M.G. ...	Governor.
Mr. V. Fox-Strangways ...	Secretary for African Affairs.
Mr. M. P. Barrow, C.B.E. ...	Senior Unofficial Member of Legislative Council.
Mr. G. G. S. J. Hadlow, O.B.E. ...	Unofficial Member of Legislative Council.
Mr. J. Marshall, O.B.E., M.C. ...	Unofficial Member of the Economic Development Committee.
Mr. K. Ommaney Shelford ...	President of the Convention of Associations.

Central African Council

Mr. H. N. Parry ...	Chief Secretary.
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Legal Advisers

Sir Kenneth Roberts-Wray, K.C.M.G.
Mr. J. C. McPetric.
Mr. T. H. Perrott.

Conference Adviser

Professor K. C. Wheare ...	Gladstone Professor of Government and Public Administration, University of Oxford.
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Secretaries

Mr. A. Savage ...	Cabinet Office.
Mr. D. Williams ...	Colonial Office.
Mr. N. Aspin ...	Commonwealth Relations Office.

APPENDIX II

The draft federal scheme prepared by the conference, held in London between 23 April and 5 May, 1952 (Cmd 8575), divided government responsibilities between the Federal and Territorial governments as follows.

Main federal functions	Main territorial functions
External Affairs	Provincial and Native Administration
Defence	Income tax (territorial)
Immigration	Agriculture
Economic planning and development	Forestry
External and certain aspects of inter-territorial trade	Veterinary services
Income tax (federal)	Game
Customs	Fisheries
Census and statistics	Co-operation
Railways	Marketing
Civil Aviation	Health
Trunk roads	African Education (primary and secondary)
Electricity Supply and Distrib- ution	Labour
Posts and Telecommunications	Mines
Broadcasting, Films and Tourism	Local Government
European education (primary and secondary)	Police
Higher education	Prisons
Medium and long term research	Public works (territorial)
Surveys	Roads (not trunk)
Major water development	Irrigation (not major)
National Parks	

The final division of powers saw the following Territorial functions transferred either to the Federal government or into a 'concurrent list', for which both Federal and Territorial governments had responsibility, but with federal law prevailing in any cases of inconsistency.

Income tax
European agriculture in Southern Rhodesia; the northern territories were free to hand it over to the concurrent list, and Northern Rhodesia soon did
Veterinary services in Southern Rhodesia (the same provision was made as for European agriculture in the two northern territories)
Co-operatives (except where a majority of the members were African)
Marketing
Health
Town planning
European police forces
Prisons
Roads